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INTRODUCTION
It is the purpose of this study to compare critically
the presuppositions and conclusions of two representative
contemporary realistic criticisms of idealism. Although in
general the opposition to the idealistic interpretation of
experience has follov/ed a few significant directions and em-
phases, among them some resting on misapprehensions and
others on insufficient or abstracting analysis, it has remained
for contemporary developments to give expression to it in forms
previously unexcelled in fairness and in rigor of analysis.
The development of the new realism in England and America rests
upon and can only be understood against the negative background
of its reaction to the whole contemporary clan of idealists,
and their favorite assumptions and beliefs. The examination
of this criticism, then, will serve a double purpose - a better
understanding of the direction in which the neo-realists are
moving, because it shows v/hat they have moved from, and a dis-
covery of the vulnerable breaches in the traditional defense
of idealism which need to be repaired or rebuilt if she is to
withstand the assaults of conflicting world vievifs.
After all, the recognition that the path of conflict and
antinomy, though humble, is the only way to philosophic truth,
is as old as Socrates. Y/hether its constructions are towering
or lowly, whether they soar in one harmonious integrated whole
the
or are scattered about with detached regularity of an army en-
campment it is only as speculation builds in the face of con-
‘ v:
vii
stant critioism of method and result, that they achieve perma-
nence. Mny* of the empirical data of system building must be
furni she'd by the tools of warfare used by its enemies; like the
builders of the wall, the fortunate philosopher is he who is
forced to keep his weapons of reprisal at his side. In spite
of the skill v/ith v;hich he anticipated and met many criticisms
not actually used against his thought until much later, it is
unfortunate for idealism that, so few of Berkeley’s contempo-
raries being far enough emancipated from common sense to make
fair attempts to refute his system, he v/as forced to criticize
it himself. The traditional criticisms of idealism have fol-
lowed the misinformed and shallow criticisms of his opponents;
it is noteworthy that the critics to be studied in this essay
have revived some of Berkeley’s own arguments - of course with
a justification in logical and psyct;iilogical theory.
The two men to be studied have been chosen because of
their intellectual position in the groups from which this most
influential of modern criticisms of idealism has arisen. Both
are penetrating analysts v/hose critical efforts have brought
confusion not merely to the ranks of the idealists, but to
pragmatists and naturalists as well. G. E. Moore particularly,
has fully justified the prediction made by Bo*?sinq_uet after the
appearance of the Principia Ethica .
"I believe Mr. Moore to have a real vocation
as a critic in the sense of a free lance who will
make the orthodox reflect and reconsider." ^
His critical analysis has been directed against the favorite
theories of just and unjust, with an impartiality worthy the
ln/r-iMind
,
13 (1904)
,
p. 261.
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forces of nature themselves, Vifhether Bosanquet’s further char-
acterization is also justified - that Moore ”has hampered him-
self with ideas no less dogmatic than those of the most hide-
bound orthodoxy"- it is hoped the sequel will show. At any
rate Moore’s "Refutation of Idealism" ^ has served as a model
for all later critics of id€2lism; in a true sense it is not
necessary to go behind it, but every other critic of idealism
since has found it useful, every defender has had to face it
and try to answer its destructive charges.
Nor is the significance of Perry’s criticism, somewhat
later, and emerging clearly and maturely into print with the
platform of the American new realists in 1910, to be underes-
timated. That two lines of thought which have few direct an-
tecedents in common should emerge in the same type of criticism
of traditional viewpoints, in common estimates of the prope-
deutic sciences, and in similar metaphysical views, is itself
a striking phenomenon. There are also significant differences.
Moore’s criticism is more cautious and presupposes less. Perry’s
arose after his own views had been completed in outline. Moore’s
views will probably never attain even this degree of complete-
ness. But a comparative study of the similarities and differ-
ences shown in their criticism will serve, not merely to illus-
trate the disconcerting lack of agreement which still exists in
realistic circles, but will furnish a clue to the elements of
v/eakness in their attack.
The study will be divided, roughly, iri^to three sections.
The first will give the historical material necessary to under-
pin!, 12 (1903), p. 433-453.

ix
stand the criticisms and positive systems under discussion in
detail. Neither philosopher indicated the sources of his
thought clearly, Moore much less so than Perry. Moore’s thought,
however, is to be understood against the rationalistic, Platonic
spirit of Cambridge, England; Perry’s against the predominuntly
scientific interest of Cambridge, America. Most of the writing
of both has appeared in periodicals. ' There is therefore some
hope of tracing genetically the interests of their mature pro-
ductive period. Such a study the first section, v/ill attempt
to supply.
The second section will be devoted to a comparative and
critical investigation of their criticisms of idealism. This
will limit itself largely, due to the nature of the criticism,
to epistemological considerations, only two chapters being de-
voted to metaphysical and practical problems of Weltanschauung.
_
The last section will examine, more briefly, the realistic
alternatives in epistemology and ontology, examining their lim-
itations and indicating the idealistic synthesis.
Discussions of the realistic criticism of idealism are
numerous. But without exception these discussions are so
general as to avoid all detail, or they are restricted to
isolated periods or papers - in the case of Moore to his early
essays, usually to the "Refutation of Idealism" alone, in
Perry’s to Present Philosophical Tendencies and the papers of
1909-1912, including "A Realistic Theory of Independence." In
three respects, therefore, this study may claim originality,
1. It compares the criticism of an outstanding English
Jr
Xrealist with that of an outstanding American realist. General
comparisons of the schools have been numerous
.
(A. K. Rogers,
R. Kremer
,
R, W. Sellars, B. Russell, and others), hut they have
lacked both detail and scope.
2, Its discussion is based not on particular statements
or periods in the thought of its subjects, but on a survey of
their entire intellectual development, marked in the case of
Moore, less so in Perry, Comprehensive studies of the two
men’s thought, of the type attempted in chapters II and III
are lacking, Hasan’s study of Moore and autobiographical
statements by both in the series on Contemporary -Englis h
Philosophy and Contemporary American Philosophy being the
only exceptions,
3. The criticism of the refutation of idealism is more
detailed than any heretofore
,
and from a different viewpoint -
that of personal, theistic idealism, epistemological dualism,
and the coherence criterion of truth - Berkeley strongly sup-
plemented in the direction, not so much of Kant, as of Leibniz
and Hegel. Among thinkers whose discussions of the criticism
of idealism have been considered are the following, references
to whose works may be found in the bibliography. Among ideal-
ists C. A. Strong, J. S. Mackenzie, James Ward, H. H. Joachim,
A. E. Taylor, B. Bosanquet
,
J. -E. Creighton, and 71. R. Sorley
have replied to Moore; Creighton, G. M. Bakewell, M. W. Galkins,
E. S. Brightman, A. C. Knudson, Wm. MacDougall
,
E. H. Hollands,
W. E. Hocking, 7i
,
M. Urban and others to the American movement.
The papers by F. C. S. Schiller, and John/ Dewey- are ’
,
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significant representatives ^ "tof pragmatic criticisms.
But realism is a movement critical of itself and much can be
learned from the criticism of neo-realism by other realistic
schools, particularly the new scholastics and critical realism.
R. Kremer’s and W. H. Sheldon* s studies are from the former
viewpoint, while S. Alexander, J. B. Pratt, A. 0. Love joy,
a. Santayana, G. D. Hicks, E. B. McGilvary, S. B. Hasan, John
Laird, and T. P. Nunn have written from various critical posi-
tions.
But the position of this paper is not in any great sense
dependent upon them. In a confusion of estimates before it,
its aim has been to attain an evaluation of the problem, which,
though it undoubtedLy loses in thoroughness and dialectic astute-
ness, has sought first the thrill of pursuing independent in-
vestigation with the aim of discovering, for a single, seeking
individual, the highway between uncritical common sense and
analytic skepticism which is Still open to idealism.
Unless otherwise indicated references to Kind and the
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society are to the new
series* The following abbreviations will be used for the
sake of convenience in documenting the study.
Perry, Approach to Philosophy * Ap. to Phil*
Present Philosophical Tendencies. P, P. T.
ffle Present Conflict of Ideals . P. C. 1.
yhe General Theory of Value
. G* T, V.
Moore, Philosophical Studies
. Phil, St,
Principia Ethica, Princ* Eth*

PART I
THE HISTORICAL RELATIONS AlID 13EVELOPMENT
OF THE THOUGHT OF MOORE AND PERRY

CHAPTER I
THE HISTORICAL BASIS
TDrei Kategorien von Philosophen: die einen
h(3ren das Herz der Binge klopfen
,
die andern nur
das der Menschen, die dritten nur das der Begriffe;
und eine vierte (der Professoren der Philosophie li
,
die nur das Herz der Literatur hiiren."
—Diary of Georg Sinmiel, Logos
, 8 (1918) p.l22.
Idealism has most often been identified with the second
class while realism has appropriated to itself the first and
third - and as champion of common sense repudiated the fo’urth.
But such a division of the metaphysical field between idealism
and realism is superficial, as a reference to Leibniz on the one
hand, and Hegel on the other, shows, A comprehensive survey of
the history of idealism and of its realistic criticism would
show that the roots of both alike divide in philosophy's basic
antinomy - that between empiricism and rationalism. For ideal-
ism the two roots are, respectively, the Heraclitean-Protagorean
subjectivism and the Eleatic, Platonic objectivism. The ideal-
ism of the English empiricists is the modern successor of the
first movement, the idealism of German mystic and romanticist
of the second. Against this tv^ofold movement traditional real-
ism, along v/ith common sense, has been on the defensive since
Aristotle. Trying to do justice to both sense and thought,
both particular and universal, it has never solved its most
pressing problem - the synthesis of the tv/o. That has remained
the task of the third movement, that which finds the synthesis
between the heart of things and the heart of man in an objec-
tive but dynamic or voluntaristic conception of the world. The

5dynamism of Aristotle, the Leibnizian monadology, Lotze’s
"spiritual realism," and contemporary personal idealism rep-
resent this movement, and the three together - idealism,
subjective or conceptual, realism, and spiritualism - provide
the setting for this study.
An historical treatment of the various relations of these
movements is beyond the scope of this paper. In the middle
ages the nominalistic realism of Aquinas is supplemented by
the empiricism of the English Franciscans and the rationalism
of the (lerman mystics, both tending to voluntarism in certain
aspects. In the early Enligh^ment, the nominalistic realism
of Descartes becomes idealistic rationalism, monistic in epis-
temology, in Malebranche
,
empirical idealism in Berkeley, and
voluntarism in such occasionalists as G-eulincx, Gordemoy and
in Leibniz.
The first criticisms of idealism in the modern sense
belong in this period. According to Laird^Antoine Arnauld
is the forerunner of the modern realistic criticism, but
Arnauld is not merely a realist; he is a voluntaristic
idealist, and his criticism is of Mav^lebranche^ s rationalism
rather than his idealism. Criticisms of idealism must be
considered in three groups - the criticism of empirical sub-
jectivism (half of Berkeley and Kant positivistically inter-
preted)
,
the criticism of idealistic rationalism (Kant
idealistically interpreted) and the criticism of personalism.
For the understanding of the modern movement it will be suf-
ficient, then, to begin with Berkeley and his opponents.
^A Study in Realism
,
p. 2-3.

41. Berkeleyan Idealism , The philosophy of Berkeley oc-
cupies the paradoxical position of being at the same time an
indirect source, through Mach, of the more empirical part of
new realism, and the outstanding target of its criticism. In
spite of Woodbridge’s essay on "Berkeley as Realist," the pre-
vailing note of realistic criticism of Berkeley has been the
charge of skepticism and subjectivism,^ We shall first indi-
cate the elements in Berkeley’s thought, more explicit in
Hume, which point to contemporary realism, then attempt to
fix the limits of his subjectivism, and finally point out
the limitations in his thought which realistic criticism may
exploit
.
The realistic elements in Berkeley are not easily dis-
cernible. A currently popular use of the term realism is
irrelevant, because in general, though not always, the new
realists themselves do not recognize it. Perry in his
historical studies sometimes interprets spiritualism realis-
tically; N. K. Smith opposes realism, not to idealism but
2
to subjectivism. It is the sense in which Lotze described
realism
his metaphysics as spiritual
,
the sense in which idealism
,
holding that the reality of the world consists in its being
an object for thought, implies that there must be one or
more thinking agents. In this sense Berkeley, positing a
plurality of minds as real, was a spiritualist. We shall,
however, define the metaphysical idealism to include all
1
Columbia University, Studies in the History of Ideas ,
vol. 1. See also "Some of Berkeley’s Early Critics," Berkeley’s
Complete Works
,
ed. by A. C. Fraser, iii
,
p. 399-408.
^H. B. Perry, Approach to Philosophy
.
p. 292-293. And
N. K. Smith, Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge ,
p. 1-2.

5theories that define reality in exclusively mental terms.
There is, however, another element in Berkeley’s thought
which, though not realistic, has proved adaptable to the needs
of modern realism. It is his analysis _ of sensible things
and criticism of the concept of material substance. The
doctrine of 'representative realism had not survived the in-
roads of mathematical physics. The distinction between
primary and secondary qualities, made by G-alileo and Locke
cut in two directions; while making a copy theory of know-
ledge untenable, it protected the rights of an independently
existing material substance, vague though the concept may
have become in Locke. Berkeley, in breaking down the distinc-
tion between primary and secondary qualities, may also be
interpreted in two ways. He himself argues in a way which
has never been refuted, though it has often failed, as Hume
pointed out, to carry conviction, that these quali-ties are
essentially mental, and as a result, shows the concept of
material substance to be both empty and unnecessary. The
esse of sensible things^consists of their percipi
,
and
percipient substance exhausts reality. The other alternative
which Berkeley explicitly rejected would have been, after
reducing the object of perception to sensible qualities,
as Berkeley did, to deny its dependence on the percipient
mind. Miss Calkins has pointed out that
"Berkeley gave the coup de grace to all forms
of materialism .when he proved, or led the way to
the proof, that matter (so-called physical reality)
ia a compo'und of qualities, and that every quality
turns out to be an elemental form of consciousness,
a way of being conscious." 2
^This is the limitation which is often forgotten by
Berkeley’s critics. See,,7/orks; p. 260-261.
^Persistent Problems of Philosophy, 4th ed. p. 400.
Quoted by Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies
, p. 132 .

Perry quotes this passage in evident agreement with the first
part of it, but holds the latter part to be an example of the
fallacy of exclusive particularity ~ things are compounds
of qualities, but not, therefore, of "elemental forms of
consciousness .
"
It is to be noted in passing, that both Miss Calkins and
Perry here overlook what is implicit in Berkeley’s system from
the "Theory of Vision" on, and becomes explicit in Kant - pri-
mary qualities are not unanalyzable elements .directly appre-
hended by the mind; experience of them is due to the mind’s
relating activity.^ On the other hand, passages in Berkeley
do justify the realistic extension of his system. In spite
of what has been said, the ideas are passive, inert entities,
ultimately irreducible (space, for example, being reducible
to minima sensibilia in the form of visual and tactual sen-
sations)
,
and immediately experienced by active spirits.
It is true that the constant emphasis of the first dialogue
between Hylas and Philonous is that the objects thus im-
mediately perceived are "sensible things" or "ideas" only.
"I a&kyou," says Philonous
,
"whether the things immediately
perceived are other than your own sensations or ideas?"
And when Hylas suggests the possibility of a dualism of
"two kinds of objects - the one perceived immediately, which
are likewise called ideas; the other real things or external
objects, perceived by the mediation of ideas, which are their
images and representatives," Philonous anticipates Kant in
stressing the activity of mind in knowledge and the phenome-
^
'.Vorks
,
i, p. 415-416.
i
7nality of its object.^ But in the sections in which Berkeley
tries to conciliate common sense and to avoid subjectivism,
he suggests the possibility of the independent existence of
the immediate objects of experience, and suggests that Hylas^s
ultimate skepticism is due to the dualistic theory of knowledge
with which he begins.
"Suppose you are going to write, would you not
call for pen, ink, and paper, like another man; and
do you not know what it is you call for? ...Is it
not evident you are led into all these extravagances
by the belief of material substance? ...It is this
occasions your distinguishing between the reality
and sensible appearances of things." ^
This passage clearly implies that reality of things and
their sensible appearances are identical, and commits Berkeley .
to subjectivism unless he assumes the principle of their in-
dependence.
Berkeley himself is aware of the danger of sub jectivivsm
and avoids it by abandoning his empiricism for a ratiomalism
resting on the principle of causality; the tulip is objec-
tive to my mind (the common sense position) but not indepen-
dent, or "exterior to all minds"; its objectivity consists
of either (a) "an external archetype ... external
,
I mean to
your own mind" or (b) divine causality or activity in
creating my ideas - "the powerful cause of my ideas." ^
Two crucial instances arise to test his theory of ob-
jectivity, and it must be admitted that his answers are
only incompletely satisfactory. The first is the problem of
identity of objects. Strictly speaking, we do not experience
^Op . cit .p. 414-415.
^Op. Cit .
,
p. 443-444.
^Op. cit
.
,
p. 406, 468, 458.

asame objects; only the creative Mind and its laws remain the
same.^ The second problem is that of the knov/ledge of other
selves. Here Berkeley's explanation again passes from empiri-
cism to rationalism to avoid solipsism.
"The knowledge I have of other spirits is
not imr^ediate
,
as is the knowledge of my ideas; but
depending on the intervention of ideas, by me re-
ferred to agent.^r spirits distinct from myself, as
effects or concomitant signs." 2
Th.e_ nature of the interpretation of sense data by which we be-
come av/are of other human beings, and its difference from the
nature of the interpretation of sense data by which we become
aware of physical things, is not discussed by Berkeley further
/
than to say that all ideas play the role of revealing spirit
to spirit. The ambiguity of Berkeley’s doctrine of notions
,
his concept of objectivity, and his failure to account for
the interpretative role of consciousness in its relation to
the objectivity of its objects, are limitations of his thought
which make it capable of misinterpretation by his successors.
In addition his sharp distinction between active mind and the
3passive ideas which are its objects, though valid in a cer-
tain aspect, becomes, psychologically interpreted, the opening
wedge of the epistemology of contemporary realism. These,
however, are not the considerations which led the earliest
critics of Berkeley to oppose him, as the study of A. 11. Fraser,
already cited, shows. Almost universally they completely
ignore the objective side of Berkeley’s theory and the funda-
mental rationalism of his method, and, applying the principle
of esse is percipi universally, charge him with . sjcepticism and
^Op . Cit.
,
p. 463-468.
^Tbid
.
,
p . 339
.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 307.

9solipsism, the direction in which Hume developed him and the
point of view from which Kant himself understood his system.
2. The Skepticism of Hume in its Relation to Realism . It
was Hume, who, following out the empirical part of Berkeley’s
syst-em, carried it to its skeptical consequences and thus used
half of Berkeley, through his criticism of causality, to refute
the other half. Starting with a thoroughly empirical rule of
procedure and criterion of knowledge, "that all our simple
ideas in their first appearance are derived from simple im-
pressions which are correspondent to them and which they exact-
ly represent," ^ he criticizes the concepts of space, time
and material substance as did Berkeley, but also the concept
of causality and of soul substance, both "innate" and ultimate
for Berkeley, and resolves all that is human to sensations
.2
"erising in the soul originally from unknovm causes"' in un-
known relations.
It must be pointed out in passing that this neglects
3
entirely the positive side of Hume’s thought, which rests on
an habitual "faith" in the reality of the known v\rorld. It
is the critical side of Hume, limited to the method of analysis
to minima sensibilia
,
and resulting in psychological atomism
that is of significance here, as the sceptical background of
the thought of Kant and the Scotch realists. His skepticism
is the direct consequence of a method of analysis, restricted
by the empirical criterion that it must not exceed a minimum
sensibile
,
applied to the dualistic theory of knowledge in
Treatise of Human Nature
,
ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge
,
p. 4.
^Qp
.
6it .
, p
.
7
.
3see admirable account of A. Riehl
,
Per Philosophische
Kritizismus . 2. ,Aufl.
,
i, p, 102-108.
'v T
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vogue since the Middle -^ges.
Perry has pointed out that Hume felt the force of the
suggestion that what he has called perceptions may not, after
all, be mental and that "it led him to the tentative supposi-
tion that perceptions can exist apart from the mind" and "that
the traditional substances, mental and spiritual, are made up
from the same manifold of elements." ^ This seems to be an
overstatement of the case. Like Berkeley in the empirical part
of his thought, Hume frees himself from the dualistic theory
of knowledge, so far as sensations are concerned, but what was
for Berkeley divine activity, was for him the "unknown cause"
of our sensations. In either case sense data are the material
from v/hich private knowledge is constructed. It remained for
Mach under the joint influence of Hurne and Reid to develop
this empirical analysis of perception into a monistic theory
of knowledge.
Aside from his analysis of sensations Hume’s criticism
of the concept of spiritual substance, though it causes his
critical thought to end in contradictions, is his outstanding
contribution to the American realists, (not to the English,
who have generally tended to retain the distinction between
mental activity and its objects). That mind "is nothing but
a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together
by certain relations, and suppos’d, tiio’ falsely, to be endow’d
with a perfect simplicity and identity," becomes, vvith James’
recognition that the relations themselves may be immediately
perceived, the relational vievj of consciousness which has en-
abled Perry and others to bridge the gap between their logical
^Present Philosophical Tendencies
,
p. 127-138: cf.
Treatise
,
p. 2C7-211.
r
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atomism and a lDeha\J.’ristic psychology,
Hume’s atomistic analysis of the objects of perception
and of mind, then, are significant antecedents of the more
empirical branch of contemporary realism. His criticism of
Berkeley as a skeptic is neither new nor complete, but his
insistence on the dependence of mental objects upon their be-
ing experienced^iake him the outstanding subjective idealist
in modern thought.
3. Kant and Realism . Kant’s relation to the realists
under discussion parallels Berkeley’s as paradoxical in that
it is the starting point of G. E. Moore’s thought but is later
rejected by both Moore and Perry. The motive behind Kant’s
critical philosophy - the attempt to provide a basis for the
universality and necessity of knowledge concerning reality -
that is, knowledge that is both synthetic and a priori - pre-
sents a problem which the neo-realist must face.^ As the
subjectivism arising from the sensationalism of Hume needed
supplementation by Kant, so the empirical movement in neo-
realism is supplemented in Moore and others by a Platonic
doctrine of universals mediated through Kant, but reverted to
the realm of the impersonal. The realist, then, may learn
from Kant’s analysis of knowledge, but rejects the synthetic
elements - the emphasis upon the mind’s activity in knov/ing.
It is here that Kant’s a priorism supplements Berkeley’s
empiricism in the idealistic tradition. Mind in knowing is
neither ultimately a substance behind inert atoms, nor is it,
as Berkeley at least once anticipated, and Hume held, a mere
^Op. cit .
,
p. 211.
^See Moore, ’’The Nature of Judgement,” Mind
, 8, (1899),
p. 183-184.
Si- '
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"bundle of sensations;" it is synthetic activity whose element
is not sensation but judgment. Hence, it is inevitable that
Kant belongs with the idealists and any philosopher whose method
is purely analytic must disagree with him, while recognizing
his service in investigating the basis of universality and ne-
cessity (and therefore, objectivity, in the Kantian sense) in
knowledge
For the realist Kant, then, has three aspects, two of
which v/e must reject, a. Kant's dualism between appearance
and thing in itself is for the realist a step backward from
Hume, and leads to skepticism and subjectivism. From this
point of view it is generally agreed that in spite of his
criticism of Berkeley, Kant is no less a subjectivist than
he. Resting on the dualistic theory of knowledge, teaching
the ideality of intuition and categories, and the unknowability
of independent reality, Kant is included in the realistic po-
lemic as truly as are his predecessors. It will not, therefore,
be necessary for us to discuss the ambiguous Kantian "Refuta-
ption of Idealism."
b. Kant 's attempts to do justice to the facts of psychol-
ogy in a logical discussion, and to the demands of objectivity,
by introducing a dualism in the knov/er himself - a distinction
between the transcendental and empirical selves - does not,
for the realist, enable him to avoid this subjectivism until
it is extended, by his followers, into absolutism. Here Kant
becomes the founder of a new idealism which meets with new ob-
jections in addition to the old.
^
The New Realism
,
p. 8-10 gives the estimate of Kant by
American realism. See also P.P.T, p. 139-144.
2 cf. N. K. Smith, Op. cit.
.
p. 298-321.
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c. Kant’s emphasis on the priority Of logic to conscious-
ness, as developed by the later critical idealists, is a defi-
nite factor in the development of contemporary realism. The
analysis of mathematical and scientific knowledge into its
I
purely logical structure, and their rejection of the Ding-an-sich
in any sense but that of a logical limit notion, with only
regulative function corresponds, though only analogically,
with the panlogism of certain contemporary realists and their
rejection of the concept of substance. So Moore in an early
period became a logical atomist, only to return, later, to the
concept of substance. The problem reduces to that of the in-
terpretation of Kant’s transcendental deduction of the cate-
gories. Are they deducible from mental activity (the empirical
strand in Kant) or from the logical propositions (the rational-
istic transcendental element). In Kant himself these two ele-
ments blend, but with the definition of logic, not as the
structure of thought, but the structure of reality, they be-
come distinct, realism following the second interpretation end
idealism the first. In the realm of value t eory
,
too, where
the Marburg school gradually emancipates itself from the
naturalistic fictionalism in terms of which Lange interpreted
Kant, the Heidelberg school carries on a similar analysis of
value experience.
So far the analogy between Neo -Kantianism and neo-realism
may be carried, but no further. What for the Kantians v;as a
positivistic limitation of knowledge to a descriptive analysis
of phenomena, becomes for the realists the ultimate account of
reality independent of the knowing act. The analytic study of
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experience is for the Neo-Kantians but an aspect of the original
principle of synthetic unity of mind, though abstracted from it.
The distinction is deeper than the priority of logic to experi-
ence; it has to do, as Perry points out} with the evaluation of
logic itself, for the Kantians the science of "the pure forms
of thought", for the realists the investigation of the realm of
classes and relations independent of thought. It is not v/ith-
out reason that the Kantian who seeks to develop a realistic
2
metaphysics develops a logic based on a judgment of one term.
For Kant the categories are mental; judgment is the ultimate
knowledge process; for the logic of the contemporary realists,
concepts are more ultimate than judgnients
,
not the synoptic
results of the judging process. Here are the logical extremes
between which there can be no meeting in contemporary thought.
They imply that Kant and those who follow him, thoug;h they be
realists, must be rejected by the analytic realists whom v/e
discuss.
The source of Kant’s doctrine that forms of intuition and
categories are mental is English empiricism, especially Berkeley
supplemented by Hume. To it the realistic tradition since
Aristotle stands diametrically opposed. Kant’s attempt to avoid
subjectivism without recourse to the causal arguraent (a) by de-
% ducing the categories from logic, (b) by assuming a "transcen-
dental self" itself unexperienced would meet the realist’s
demand only if (a) the logic is of the right kind, and (b) the
transcendental self is itself dissolved into its logical objects,
^P.P.T.
,
p. 147.
2a. Riehl, Op . igit
. ,p. 416, H. Maier , Wahrheit und
Wirklichkei't
,
Tlibingen: Mohr, 1926, p. 117-147.
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as, for example, "possible experience." But this cannot be
done without destroying Kant, v/ho stands in the nominalistic,
activistic tradition of thought.
Before discussing the direct sensationalist ic and logical
antecedents of Moore and Perry it yet remains to mention two
older realistic schools, one Kantian, and the other arising
in reaction to sensationalistic subjectivism.
4. Herbart . The realism of Herbert was the pluralistic
reaction against the idealistic attempt to deduce reality
from a single principle. Against Hegel it maintained the
principle of identity as the logical starting point of all
speculation, and therefore the logical priority of being to
all change and all relationship. Reality is attained through
subjecting appearances to conceptual analysis (the task of
logic), and completing the concepts of ordinary experience
to remove their contradictions. Against the idealistic in-
terpretation of Kant, his critical limitation of experience^
remains valid. The distinction between thing in itself and
phenomenon is reinstated; we can know imraedie tely only ap-
pearance, yet we can infer something of the nature of the
thing in itself through the conviction that appearances have
objective validity. "So viel Schein, so viel Hindeutung auf
ein Sein". The result is an atomistic interpretationu^f the
thing in itself as a plurality of "reals," eternal, indistinct
as to quality, possessing only one property, self-preservation
as the maint #.nance of absolute position in "intelligible
space." All secondary properties of appearances, in particular
^See J. Royce
,
The World and the Individual
,
i, p. 109-110
V
•*.
16
the experienced extension, duration, matter, motion, the thing
property relation, and causality are due simply to the Integra
tion of reals - they are purely apparent.
In so far as Herbart stresses the dualism- of appearance
and reality, he has nothing in common with the new realism as
a whole, which stresses the independent metaphysical signifi-
cance of appearances themselves. The relation of reality to
knowledge is not that of simple identity for Herbart. His
Kantian premises bring his realism nearer that of Leibniz than
to that of recent ki^^al pluralists, though a comparison with
the distinction as Bradley makes it would be interesting, the
difference between the pluralistic realism of the one and the
monistic idealism of the other being a difference between the
analytic logic of substance-quality relations on the one hand,
and the synoptic logic of judgj^ment on the other. The one
transcends contradiction by analysis, the other finds it in
analysis, and transcends it in integration, while neo-realism
tends to accept the fact of contradiction at its face value.
Though Herbart ’s "reals” are relatively meaningless, they
are not logical in nature. In spite of his psychological anal
ysis of consciousness into elements, a continuation of the
work of Hume and Hartley, and an historical antecedent of the
relational theory of consciousness, he seems, like Leibniz,
to conceive the "real" after the analogy of consciousness.
•'
"Die Psychologie zeigt uns am Beispiel der Seele
eine ganz vorzUg^iche innere Bildung eines einfachen
Wesens. Nach diesem Typus muss man sich die eines
jeden anderen, auch unter den nichtvorstellenden
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Wesen denken.^^
In addition to the emptiness of Herbart’s concept of "real",
which, as Royce points out, is instructive to every critic of
realism, there is the equally instructive ambiguity’ in his
system between the plurality of reals and the unity of the
intelligible space they occupy; and between the self-suffi-
ciency of the real and the relation which results in appear-
ances, a.n ineffable relation amenable, however, to logical
analysis; between the atomistic conception of consciousness,
with which he supplanted the faculty psychology still held by
Kant, and his description of mind as simple unity.
There is, however, a tendency in Herbert, which is in-
structive for our later criticism of the implications of
neo-realism. It is his reduction of all dynamic relations to
relations of position in "intelligible space." V/haterer
other analogies there may be between his reals and the monads
of Leibniz, they are not to be interpreted in terms of force.
All continua are but appearances; reality is static and dis-
crete. Causality and change in general are illusion because
they involve contradictions . They arise in combination of
static individuals in some unexplained way. This is an in-
herent difficulty in all realistic systems which pin their
faith on analysis. It reveals the fallacy, apparent to any-
one of nominalistic training, involved in any attempt to dis-
cover reality through the logic of analysis.
^Quoted by A. Messer, Ceschichte der Fhilosophie im 19 .
Jahrhundert . Leipzig: Q,uelle u. Meyer, 19^3. p. 11.
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' 5, Reid and Scotch Realism . The other realistic devel-
opment to be discussed stands more directly in the line of
descent leading to the realism of today - the Scotch common
sense school vvhich avoided the skepticism of Hume, not as did
Kant, by a reduction of objectivity to universality and neces-
sity, but by a bold return to naive realism, and the doctrine
that in perception the mind apprehends the physical object
directly.
This position, so important for the understanding of con-
temporary realism, can be illustrated in the criticism of
Berkeley in Thomas Reid’s Essay on the Intellectual Powers of
Man, a criticism which anticipates several points of the more .
recent refutation.
After tracing Berkeley’s rejection of matter and his
reduction of the universe to two categories - ”to wit, minds
and ideas in the mind,” back to its origins in Descartes^
dualism and skepticism as to the nature of objects of sense,
he critizes his system in the following points:
-
a. vVhat Berkeley has assumed as self evident (’’that all
the objects of our knowledge are ideas in our ovm minds”)
really appears improbable if not absurd. '
b. Berkeley, eager to enlist "comiaon sense" to the sup-
port of his theory, does so "not without some straining.”
For he m.akes a subtle distinction that the vulgar opinion is
"that the very things which we perceive by our senses do real-
ly exist," but that "the notion that those things have an
absolute external existence, independent of^fbeing perceived
by any mind ... is a refinement of philosophers," as is "the
notion of material substance." He is an epistemological monist
II
i
I
'
I
I
I
i
\
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but does not assert the doctrine of independence.
c. Berkeley is unable to do justice to common sense in
explaining the principle of identity in objects.
d. Though Berkeley’s argument furnishes strong evidence
of an all-governing Mind, "it seems to take av/ay all -the evi-
dence we have of other intelligent beings like ourselves .
"
"I am left alone, as the only creature of G-od in the universe,
in that forlorn state of ea;oism into which it is said some of
the disciples of Descartes were brought by his philosophy."
e. Berkeley attempts to provide a basis for our knowledge
of other minds by asserting that though we cannot have an idea
of them, we may have a notion of them. To Ilylas’s objection
that he may as truly have a notion of matter
,
Philonous answers
that the notion of deity and other minds rests on inference
from a "reflex act" (self-knowledge). Nevertheless Reid owns
himself to agree with Hylas.
"Though Hylas declares himself satisfied with
this answer, I confess I am not; because, if I may
trust the faculties that God has given me, I do
perceive matter objectively; that is, something which
is extended and solid, which may be measured and
weighed, is the immediate object of my touch and
sight. And this object I take to be matter, and not
an idea. And though I have been taught by philoso-
phers that v;hat I immediately touch is an idea, and
not matter, yet I have never been able to discover
this by the most accurate attention to my own per-
ceptions . " ^
This passage illustrates the fact, explicit elsev/here
,
that Reid’s concept of matter rests on the scholastic notion
of substance in which qualities inhere, the notion to which
Moore, in his nominalistic period, tentatively reverts, while
Perry, more empirical, rejects the concept of substance com-
pletely.
^Thomas Reid, Op
.
c Lt
. .
Cambridge: Bartlett, 1850. p. 99-110
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Comv;,on sense, ^ Reid holds, does not admit that we know only
ideas, but insists that we have direct experience of this ma-
terial substance. But upon closer scrutiny of the ground of
our knowledge Reid vacillates between the principle of iimuediate
perception, as Hamilton interprets his system, and mediated
knowledge resting on an intuitive basis of ’^natural suggestion,"
only my conviction of the object’s presence is immediate.
"In original perception the signs are the
^
various sensations which are produced by the impres- '
Sion made upon our organs. The things signified are
the objects perceived in consequence of those sensa-
tions by the original constitut i on of our nature .
"
It is in this sense that Moore understands Reid and critizes
2him as after all a subjectivist.
"Our senses give us a direct and a distinct
notion of the primary qualities, and infojm us v/hat
they are in themselves; but of the secondary qualities,
our senses give us only a rela tive and obscure notion.
They inform us only, that they are qualities that
affect us in a certain manner, that is, produce in us
a certain sensation; but as to what they are in them-
selves, our senses leave us in the dark."^
So for secondary qualities perception is sensation plus the
intuitive belief that it has an external ground; "for percep-
tion of primary qualities sensation becomes less and less sig-
nificant" and "original constitution of our natures" more and
more important.
^Hor does Reid define common sense in a quantitative sense;
he puts it rather on an a priori basis - those underlying assump-
tions "so necessary in the conduct of life that a man cannot
live and act according to the rules of common prudence without
them." Quoted by A.K. Rogers, English and American Philosophy
Since 1800, p. 4.
~2ph i 1
.
p. 57-59.
^Thomas Reid, Op. cit.
, p. 145-144.
(
21
In connection with Reid’s discussion of the nature of
perception and its ultimate basis in universal intuition or
belief, several distinctions significant to later realism are
mode. One is that between mental act and independent object,
with which he rejects empirical idealism.
"To prevent mistakes, the reader must again
be reminded that if by ideas are meant only the acts
or operations of our minds in perceiving, remember-
ing, or imagining objects, I am far from calling in
question the existence of those acts. ... The ideas,
of whose existence
^
require the proof, are not the
operations of any mind, but supposed objects of these
operations. They are not perception, rememb/ranc e
,
or conception, but things that are said to be per-
ceived, or remembered, or imagined .. .These
,
by all
who acknov/ledge their existence, are called real
things
,
not ideas . " 1
This is directed against Kume
,
and is the distincticn intro-
duced later by Brentano
,
reappearing in Moore’s Refutation
of Idealism.
Another significant point in Reid’s realism is his re-
jection of the causal account of perception (even though, in
his discussion of the perception of secondary qualities, he
inconsistently reintroduces it)
,
and his insistence that the
relationship betv/een sense object and object of perception be
logical
.
"Wlien we say that one being acts upon another,
we mean that some power or force is exerted by the
agent, which produces, or has a tendency to prodine,
a change in the thing acted upon. If this be the
meaning of the phrase, as I conceive it is, there
appears no reason for asserting, that, in perception,
either the object acts on the mind, or the mind on
the object... To be perceived is what logicians call
an external denomination, which implies neither action
nor quality in the object perceived." ^
The causal new point rests upon an illegitimate analogy to
physical motion.
^Op . cit.
, p. 121.
^Ibid
. p. 126.
(
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In his discussion of concention
,
Reid again obscures pre-
vious distinctions and returns to the theory of epistemological
monism. Having rejected the theory of ideas in the mind, Reid
now holds that in conception there is still no question of an
idea, but of an act of the mind which is directed immediately
to an independent object.
*V/e know nothing that is properly in the mind
but thought; and when anything else is said to be
in the mind, the expression must be figurative and
signify some kind of thought."
Even in conceiving a centaur., we do not have an idea of it in
our mind; we conceive no image but an animal. To distinguish
two objects, the one mental, the other physical, is mear\^-ing-
less. ^ The implication i-s
,
as Hamilton recognized in his
"Supplementary Dissertations," that there is a realm of un-
reality existing objectively - something analogous to the realm
of subsistence of contemporary realists.
It will be clear, to summer i ze
,
that though "Reid would
seem to combine both the chief moments of true realism, the
3directness of perception and the independence of objects,"
he falls back on a representative theory of knowledge and bases
this upon "common sense" principles as a priori as Kant’s, but
with their universality stressed rather than their necessity.
Reid’s fundamentally dualistic account his outstanding
interpreter. Sir William Hamilton, recognized and attempted to
correct. Perceptual knowledge, to be certain, must have its
object actually present to the mind in space. I.Iemory of part
and contemplation of possibility of the future are mediated
^Op . Cit., p. 245, 253, 254.
,
section 2, Oip. e 1 1 . , p. 254, footnote.
^S. T. Hasan, Realism
, p. 59.
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through ideas. Secondary qualities are presentatively or
inDiediately known, primary qualities only in so far as they
are ”now and here
,
that is, in proximate relation to our organs."
But consciousness, which "is a knowledge solely of what is now
and here present to the mind,” and " is therefore only intuitive,
also "comprehends every cognitive act.” "Therefore all our
mediate cognitions are contained in our immediate." ^
Hamilton’s limitation of immediate knowledge to qualities
only of the organism or of objects proximate to it, cuts off
the knowledge of the external object from direct knowledge. The
mind has knowledge of its immediate perceptions; knowledge of
objects is only through causal inference. He thus remains a
representative dualist, even in his theory of perception, and
his dualism is strengthened in his theory of memory and concep-
tion. Scotch realism
,
in spite of its emphasis on immediacy,
remains representative realism like its antecedents
,
Descartes
and Locke, its only interest being its effort to check the em-
poverishment of the object while recognizing the distinction
between primary and secondary qualities. Historically, however,
it is of interest as anticipating many of the distinctions made
in the rivivel of realism in England in the present century.
6. The Philosophy of Pure Experience . Not until the second
half of the nineteenth century do the basic dogmas of modern
realism appear. Representationalism or dualism, which underlay
Hume’s scepticism, was .implicit in Kant, and only verbally over-
come by the Scotch school, was definitely abandoned by several
German thinkers following in the Humean tradition. In an open
^"Notes on Reid." 0^. Cit .
, p. 458, 128, 462,
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letter to Avenarius in 1893, Schuppe points out the possibility
of epistemological monism being interpreted, not solipsist ically
,
but realistically, and states the general positivistic position
of the "Immanence" school:
"It is purely arbitrary to refuse to appearance
the corporeality of things and to conceive it as a
mere idea which is mental and non-spatial and the
exact opposite of the sensible and the spatial."^
Schuppe^s assertion does not prevent him from remaining
subjectivistic in his interpretation of sense qualities. It
is with his attack of) the metaphysics of thing-in-i t?elf
,
and
the activity of the knov/ing mind, however, that Ernst Mach
2begins his Analysis of Sensations . Starting on a Humean basis,
reducing all mental elements to original sensations
,
including
pleasure and pain, he concludes that to avoid metaphysical
theories of knowledge and scepticism it is necessary to identify
the things in themselves with our experienced sensations. "Thing,
body, matter, are nothing apart from the combinations of the
elements, the ideas, sounds, and so forth, nothing apart from
their so-called attributes." ® The concept of substance and
the "protean pseudo-philosophical problem" arising from it are
cast aside. The scientific analysis of the physical world into
"artificial hypothetical atoms and molecules," as v/ell as
science’s whole distinction between the knowing self and its
object has arisen as a result of the economic interests of thought
^"Die Best^.tigung des naiven Realismus; offerer Brief
an Herrn Prof. Dr. Richard Avenarius." Viertel jahrsschrif
t
fur wissenschaftliche Philosophie , 17 (1893)
,
p. 364-388.
Quoted in Hasan, Qp . Pit .
,
p. 65.
^Eng. tr. by G. M. Williams, Chicago: Open Court, 1914.
cf. p. 36, footnote.
^Qp . Cit
.
,
p. 46, 21, 6-7.
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and must be given up "for the higher purposes of science."
Only the sensations are real, and they are directly experienced
by us.
7/hat is the nature of the ego which experiences the physi-
cal world as related sensations? The very question shows that
"we have succumbed to the old habit of subsuming every element
under some unanalyzed complex."
"If vie regard the ego as a real unity, we become
involved in the following dilemma: either we must set
over against the ego a world of unknowable entities
(which would be quite idle and purposeless)
,
or we
must regard the whole world
,
the egos of other people
included, as comprised in our own ego ( a propositicn
to which it is difficult to yield serious assent),"
Consciousness is therefore "a practical unity, put together
for purposes of provisional survey, or as a more strongly co-
hering group of elements (sensations)."
Hind, body, ego, spirit, matter, are abridgments and
limitations of man^s thought which have been "formed and domi-
nated, not by the full and pure desire for knowledge as an end
in itself, but by the struggle to adapt himself favorably to
2the conditions of life."
Machos theory is thus scarcely distinguishable from the
empirical parts of neo-realism. Things are related sensations
and as such are independent of perception, but are directly
apprehended. Complexes of sensation may be common to many per-
cipients and may pass from one individual to another. Error,
in particular, illusion, and relativity of perceptions, are due
to the varied relations of the human body to its envirornnent
,
and to man’s power of voluntarily and consciously determining
Op . c i
t
.
,
p. 310-311.
Ibid
, p. 25-26, 28. For Mach as biological pregmatist
so p. 32-33, 356.see al
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his own point of view,"^ Thus the two alternatives of the
dilemraa of dualistic theories of knowledge are avoided - at
least verbally - scepticism and solipsism.
But if consciousness is merely a relation between the
sensations of the physical world, upon '/iiat does it in its
turn depend? It depends upon the relation of parallelism be-
tween body and sensations
,
i.e. between my bodily series and
2
the physical v/orld which I experience. Instead of the psy-
chological analysis of knowledge in terms of the relation of
subject and object, it becomes the physical analysis of the
relation of body to environment. Mach here anticipates the
biological basis of the neo-realist ic theory of consciousness.
Every sensation has an accompanying nervous process, and is to
that '^:'’:3nt parallel to it. The resulting dilemma is this:
A sensation or complex of sensations apprehended by me directly
is independently real, yet is conditioned upon the functioning
of my nervous system. Two consciousnesses may be identical to
the extent tO ' t-ho ox^tent of containing nerve-complexes in com-
mon; yet the two experiences are distinct as conditioned by
two distinct nervous systems. This difficulty, as well as the
problem of error in sensation, Mach does not reconcile with
his system. Sensations are independent of consciousness, but
not of . the body. "He is a fore-runner of modern realism, but
not a modern realist," says Hssan. It remains to be seen
whether his successors, the Humean neo-realists, can offer a
better reconciliation of the doctrine of epistemological monism
with the conclusions of physiological psychology.
^Op . Cit
.
, p. 10, and footnote.
2lbid. p. 9-10, 60-62.
•'^Qp . d.t.p . 73.
,I
.
t.
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7. Rationalistic Realism in Germany , If the German
empiricists stressed the doctrine of direct apprehension of
independent neutral elements in sense experience in correction
of Hume’s subjectivism, but sacrificed independence for con-
siderations of biological relativity, thi^rinciple re-ceived
its strongest defense in the field, not of empiricism but of
rationalisra - the logical reaction to Hegel, and the continua-
tion on realistic premises, of the investigation of the logical
structure of knowledge. It is in this group that the new real-
istic interpretation has arisen of logic as the science which
investigates, first an objective, then an independent realm of
relations between universals, and that logic therefore is
analytic, not synoptic, as Kant and the idealistic extension
of his system had taught. The movement received an impetus
from two sources - mathematics, in particular the investigation
of the foundations of geometry and the calculus of infinities,
and psychology.
In 1874 Franz Brentano laid foundations for the movement
in psychology. Still strongly empirical, he held that psycholo-
gy is to be the key to all future science and social develop-
ments, but that this does not necessarily imply relativism if
one keeps in mind the basic distinction, present in all ex-
perience, between mental activity and its object.
"Jedes psychische Ph^iiomen enthSlt etwaseils
Objekt in eich, obwohl nicht jedes in gleicher
?/eise. In der Vorstellung ist etTi/as vorgestellt,
in dem Urteile ist etwas anerkannt Oder verworfen,
^in dem Hasse gehasst, in dem Begehren begehrt
,
usw.”
^Psychologic vom empirischen Standpunkte
, 1874, p, 115.
A/ I
2B
In place of the Gartesian-Lockean distinction betv/een physical
object, passive idea, and active spiritual subs tance
,
Brentano
thus makes explicit what was suggested by the Scotch school; the
intermediate realm of subjective idea (image) is discarded, the
mind has an "intentional" character, and is directed at an inde-
pendent object.
Inner perception is thus the fundamental method of psychology,
though observation of the objects of inner perception is impos-
sible except as they are retained in memory. But inner percep-
tion has a double aspect - every mental act is directed at an
independent object, but secondarily every act also involves a
consciousness (Vorstellung ) of itself. Brentano ’s view of
consciousness is therefore directly opposed to the empirical
tradition; though spiritual- substance cannot be demonstrated
empirically, mental activity is distinct from its object.
In his analysis of the object series, Brentano remains a
duelist; the sensations, on which outer perception is’ based, are
mere symbols of objects, do not constitute the object itself,
which is substantial.
Brentano’ s distinction between psychic activity and its
object furnishes the basis of the Gegenstandstheorie of Meinong,
whose purpose is the logical analysis of the realm of object.
Beginning with a critical study of Hume, whose extreme empiri-
cism and atomic associationalism he criticized by stressing the
activity of the subject in awareness of general truths and
relations, he later shifts to a criticism of subjectivism by
developing his analysis of the transcendent object of all thought
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acts.^ He was the first to distinguish between the object and
content of thought.
In the analysis of the objects of cognition he proceeds on
the basis of the Aristotelian ’ logic
,
from representation to
judgment, '•t'he objects of representation have Sein (existence)
,
the objects of conceptual thought, called Ob jectiv , have
Bestehen (subsistence). Even unreal and contradictory objects,
the round square, may be the object of thought and therefore
possess s some type of independent being. Meinong suggests
Ausser.sein
,
only to revert to a more subjective interpre teticn
2later and ascribe to them Annahmesein , opening the way again for
a subjective interpretation of error in the liber die Erfahrungs -
grundlagen unseres Wissens by assigning to them Pseudo -existenz .
The thought of a sphere beyond reality where contradictions
repose, from which Meinong retracts as he develops his theory
of Annahmen and investigates the relation betv/een >?'' the
object of perception and the real thing, was retained by the
American realists and most forcibly expressed by Holt; Moore,
as we shall see, undergoes a similar transformation toward
nominalism in his thought. Meinong* s thought itself, as H<aaan
points out, is a struggle between "maintaining on the one hand,
that perception is direct apprehension of things; and on the
other, that sensa are other than things - they are mental effects
of physical objects.” ^ Gegenstands-^heorie is after all only
i SoeeinsWissenschaf
t
,
including the realm of all possibility, the
relation of subsistence and existence (Daseinswisaenschaf t ) needs
still to be established.
^tlber Gegenstgnde hfeherer Qrdnung
.
Graz
,
1899; ^^ber Annahmen ,
Leipzig, 190S7
2ther Annaliman
, p. 242.
^Op . eit
.
,
p. 83.
i
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Meinong here falls back on the concept of substance whose
appearances are properties, ^ With the properties (appearance)
,
the substance or thing is directly and necessarily given. Con-
sciousness must perforce pass, even from one appearance or
property, to the substance in which it inheres. It does not,
however, do so by a causal inference, but by logical implica-
tion, for such a syllogistic inference would not account for
the quality of directness in |)erception nor would it lead to
a single definite object of perception, since causal inference
involves a chain of contingent factors.
The relativity of sense data, so carefully shovm by
Berkeley, now causes Meinong to widen the gulf between sensum
and thing, and to emphasize, as he did.^not earlier, the sub-
jectivity of the former, including both primary and secondary
qualities. Though we do not casually infer a thing from its
appearances in perception, sensa are really effects of things.
The relativity of sensa can be corrected in perception, but
perception, though direct, is liable to error, like the analo-
gous case of memory, which is immediate, not derivative, but
of only probable evidence. Both perception and memory can be
verified only by means of other perceptions and memories ,nand
Meinong now corrects his earlier definition of perception ( "Ein
auf eine Wahrnehmungsvorstellung gegrundetes, unmittelbar
evidantes
,
affirmatives Existenzurteil ilber ein gegenw’drtiges
Ding.")> to admit that the thing is not actually present, but
2
precedes its effect. Certainty of perception is sacrificed,
1
Die Erfahrungsgrundlagen unseres Wissens
,
^Op . Git.
, p. 36, 65-66.
Sections 5, 19.
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and Meinong places perception and memory on the same basis
as probable direct apprehensions of an external noumenal
reality. 7/ith this change it would seem that the directness of
perception is sacrificed, and that perception is really a causal
inference from sense data.
Meinong^ s theory of value is more objective than Perry’s
and less so than Moore’s theory of intrinsic values. Though
value always depends upon the interest of a subject for an
objective, (this is nearer merry’s psychological definition of
value), and there is no value that is not "personal," feeling
<
and desire are never unaccompanied by an intellectual basis of
perceptual and conceptual judgments. This led Ehrenfels to
develop the natural implications of Meinong’ s earlier, more ob-
jectivistic thought, by stressing the apsychological aspects of
value theory. Value inheres in the objects of feelings or de-
sires, and is in this sense impersonal and absolute. Value is
a property, not of a simple object, but of a complex objective'.
The Phenomenology of Husserl
,
also developed out of Bren-
tano’s pioneer thought, and contemporary with both Meinong and
Russell, is still subject to such diverse interpretations that
we shall not attempt to discuss it, especially since his thought
is not so directly paralleled in English realism. His attack
of psychologism in logic is in direct accord with the movement
discussed by this paper, and he is usually interpreted realis-
tically.^ But primarily Husserl’s phenomenology is a method
that, interpreted intuitively and phenomenally, is being appro-
^Cf. Hasan, Op . git .
, p. 295-298; Oesterreich in Ueberweg ,
Orundriss Per Geschichte Per Philosophie , 12. Auf 1 , Mv
,
p. v.
((
3E
priated bj idealists and realists alike. After all Hegel was a
phenomenologist before him.
8. Other Criticisms of Idealism . The naturalistic critique
of idealism has not been traced in this essay. Herbert Spencer,
at least, exerted so direct an influence upon later thought that
it may be worth while to indicate briefly the grounds on which
he revised the Kantian phenomenalism implied in his First Princi-
ples
,
and sought to establish a "transcendental realism" of
substance. Spencer’s thought, determined by Kant, Mill and
Darwin, was alternately positivistic in its epistemology and
naturalistic in the field of the philosophy of science, thus
involved in the same contradiction which marked all the posi-
f
tivistic philosophers of nature of the last century, for natural-
ism logically implies a naively realistic theory of kno’iirledge
.
So it is not surprising that Spencer, hesit«i*antly
,
advances
a criticism of idealism and a defense of "transcendent realism,"
and quite characteristic that he does it in his "Subjective
Psychology." Transcendent realism is "agnostic realism,” ur-
•••
-P-o realism v/ith the reservation that the absolute is
unknowable. Spencer’s arguraent fails to do justice to the
positive considerations for idealism, but rests entirely on his
"subjective" criterion of truth - the "universal postuifate"
that truth must be tested by the inability to conceive its
negative. Is all reality mental, or is there an independent
physical world? The negative of the first alternative is more
conceivable than that of the second; ergo , realism is more
probable than idealism. The ultimate criterion, it will be
c
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apparent, is here the same coim;.on sense with which Spen^jer's
uncritical adherence to critical epistemologies would seem to
be inconsistent.
The criticisms of absolute idealism have not been treated
here, as (1) the early criticisms of the German school were
generally positivistic and naturalistic, and (2) their more recent
English disciples furnish the direct background of Moore^s thought.
Representative of an early naturalistic criticism of idealism
is Feuerbachls reduction of Hegel’s absolute spirit to the crea-
tion of subjective spirit as a means of control of or adaptation
to objective spirit, a criticism which belongs in the realm of
religion. With such naturalistic criticism we are here not
directly concerned as realism agrees with idealism in its po-
lemic against the naturalists of the nineteenth century. Nor
have we discussed realistic movements resting on the dualistic
theory of knowledge and attempting to pass from idea to object
(1) by causal inference (Helmholtz and Riehl)
,
or (2) by logical
implication (Wolkelt). Our interest has limited itself to the
rising tide of realism which rests in a new epistemolocgy and a
new conception of logic.
9. Summary . Our conclusions so far may be summarized by
pointing out that the realistic criticism of idealism from
Berkeley on interpreted it as subjectivistic in the implication
of its epistemology, gradually recognized that these implica-
tions seemed to rest on a dualistic theory of knowledge, recog-
nized in the problems of identity and of our knowledge of other
minds a crucial test of subjectivism, and attempted with varying
r
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but always incomplete success, to substitute a theory of direct
apprehension of independent objects only to be drawn back into
the representationalism against which idealism was first direc-
ted (Scotch -School, Meinong)
,
or into a phenomenalism which makes
the object dependent on mind or organism (Mach, Avenarius) . In
general, mind was stressed as activity distinct from its object,
though Mach and Avenarius, in the spirit of Hume, identified it
v/ith a relation between non-mental objects, a relation rooted
in the behavior of the biological organism. The real thing is
variously conceived as a substance whose properties are imme-
diately known, as the end product of the analysis of appearances,
or as a relation between appearances. All, with the exception
of the empirio-criticists
,
tried to do justice, not merely to
perception, but to memory and conceptual judgment as well. But
the inner dialectic of realism, driven by the facts of relativism
and error back to representationalism or positivism will find
fuTther illustration in our study of Moore and Perry.
"m
i
6
C
CHAPTER II
THE STAGES OR MOORE’S THOUGHT
The Historical Basis. G. E* Moore is not a
systematic writer; he has never penetrated through to a
system, though he has outlined many tentatively* His thought
is mainly an analysis of isolated categories and a dialectic
directed against prevailing systems. It is this that makes
his earlier work so truly a starting point of contemporary
realism. To understand him it is not scb important to 3mow
those whom he recognizes as teachers, as to know those whom
he criticizes. Few philosophers are so consistently impersonal
analytic, and negative in their writings*. To one philosopher
only does he openly acknowledge a direct indebtedness^. An
attempt to outline the influences under which his thought has
developed must therefore be purely inferential, since he
himself offers only the vaguest of clues, and be based (a)
on the prevailing thought at Cambridge, (b) on the unity of
point of view underlying frequent and disconnected papers on
specialized problems, and (c) on anticipations of his thought
among philosophers whom he must certainly have known.
Moore’s connection with Cambridge has been more or
less continuous since his student days in the nineties, first
as student from 1894 to 1898, then as^ellow from 1898 to 1904,
university lecturer in moral science from 1911 to 1925, and
professor of moral science since 1925. In the years of his
earlier studies. Trinity College was the center of diverse
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philosophical activities. Bertrand Russell and A, N.
Whitehead, "both fellows, were beginning the investigations
which later resulted in their years of joint labor on the
Principia Mathematica
.
appearing in 1910 to 1913, and giving
so pov/erful an impetus to the rising mathematical logic*
More directly influential on Moore, whose most consistent
work has been in the criticism of ethical theory, was Henry
Sidgwick, whose Methods of Ethics , twenty years earlier, had
sought to reconcile the rationalism, whose traditional seat
was Cambridge, with utilitarianism, and who remained a
processor in Trinity College until his death in 1900. His
criticisms of classical moralists introduced Moore into the
field of his later efforts; in the Principia Ethica he
subjects utilitarians, idealists, and Sidgwick himself to a
searching criticism based on Sidgwick*s combination of
intuitionism and empiricismj and his theory of the indefinability
of the good, but with the addition of a new Platonic view-
point. Moore must have heard Sidgwick*s discussion of the
philosophy of Kant, in which he interprets the ^ihilosopher
realistically in opposition to Caird^ but his first inter-
pretation of Kant was idealistic, though deterministic and
already colored by Platonism,
In addition to this activity in the realms of logic
and ethics, there was a pronounced idealistic movement at
Cambridge in the late nineties and the beginning of the pre-
^The Philosophy of Kant and Other Lectures and Essays
.
1905; See also "Kant's Refutation of Idealism". Mind, O.S.,
5 (I880),p.lll-115.
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sent century - a school distinguished from the Oxford ideal-
ists hy its pronounced pluralism, James Ward had "been lectur-
ing in Trinity College since the eighties and continued through
much of Moore *s most creative period. His psychological and
idealistic development of Leibniz was criticized by Russell in
1
1900. The other idealist, James McTaggart, passing into
pluralism through the Hegelian dialectic, Ihd published his
Studje s in the Hegelian Dialectic in 1896
,
and was de^ve loping
his Studies in Hegelian Cosmology
,
published in 1901, In
both of these men Moore found much to criticize. With Ward's
psychological approach he was unsympathetic, and his sharply
analytic mind found McTaggart 's use of the Hegelian material
logic impossible’, and the idealism with which he himself
began is derived from the more analytic thought of the Oxford
School, which he himself related to Kant,
It was Oxford rather than Cambridge which occupied
the philosophical spot light of that period. The first in-
filtrations into Anglo-Saxon thought of the Kantian philosophy
through Hamilton, and of post-Kantian idealism through Carlyle
and Coleridge, had been succeeded by the more critical ideal-
istic reaction against positivism and utilitarianism which
centered in the Hegelian revival at Oxford, Its emphasis was
logical rather than epistemological, Hutchinson Stirling's
The Secret of Hegel had introduced this thinker to England in
1865; T, H, Oreen” subj ected traditional English empiricism to
a thorough criticism on the Basis of an Hegelian logic and had
Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz.
Cambridge; University Press, 1900,
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developed an absolutistic theory of a "universal consciousness'*
as an implication of ethics and a relational theory of knowi-.*^ '
ledge. Thd[Cairds, like Green, had used Hegelian thought as
the basis of an evolutionary philosophy of religion, while
F. H. Bradley and his student, B. Bosanquet, defended it
by logical considerations. Moore was evidently most familiar
with Bradley's thought.
The logical approach of these thinkers has a definite
relationship to the new realism. Like Hegel they equate truth
and reality, but they supplement Hegel’s logic with the relation
al approach of the empirical school. Bradley's thought illus-
trates at its best the combination of the developmental ration-
alism of Hegel and the analytic skill of the empirical tradition
It is his combination of the Hegelian method with his analytic
criticism of the categories that develops into his unusual
and paradoxical account of reality as a graded and seriated
Experience, ultimate consistency and completeness being found
beyond properties and relations, beyond space and time, cause
and freedom, beyond the self and reason itself.
As Wahl points out^ Bradley's entire system rests
upon his principle of internal relations. The elemer t of
logical structure is the judgment, which corresponds to the
relational structure of reality. But judgment is from one
aspect a whole-part relation, the qualification of a that
by a what ; from a less complete viewpoint it is merely a
^The Pluralist Philosophies of England and America
, p . 6
.
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relating of two concepts. In the former case, the relation
is more ultimate than the abstract predicate, and individual-
ity is attained only in the absolute. The analysis of the
world into terms in relation leads ever into deeper contradic-
tion. Any relation must rest on an ultimate and essential '
foundation in its subject. Neither relations of space and
time, nor those of identity and similarity, least of all those
of subject and object, can be explained save on the basis of
the whole of which they are abstractions.
Bradley thus^ uses the relational analysis of reality,
but transcends it by his theory of the judgment and of internal
relations-. Realism begins 'by adopting his method of relation-
al analysis, but rejecting the theory of internal relations
and the theory of individuality. Two further elements in
Bradley are adopted by the realists.
a, Bradley’s empiricism and use of analysis lead him
to reject the category of substance per se‘. Totality is the
only substance, and it is experience. bJn particular, this
empirical emphasis leads him to reject the self. In line
with Hume, and in direct agreement with Mach, he resolves the
self into a relation ( internal, of course, to that abstraction
from reality which "has it”; Mach would say, the biological
organism) between its objects. Perry, and Moore in his earlier
realistic period, agree in rejecting the concept of substance,
while Perry consistently denies the reality of consciousness.
1• f nr
~ J,:.;
4
. t /iT -O ..iT .1 O.*'.:, '- L . r-
-’j « - - J . ...
'd'}-- '> ?.• -;. i.»\* ni: u;
3..
:
: i’Xr! /'I -l r, ^•3 1.*
) ,.n0
,
..xlO !. •: i
. J. .3 ^
f *•
. * -J
wit..
*.*v
• n.-> .*•.
'to i*or;." . : .. ^>, '.
..
. I . . ; .
. 'V .. - ..
.... : ?-:j . o t ; t.'^v ''
'
‘
'
,
• ..
.3f» £ S.(7 -/J
V
^
i 3 ^ .“;a I >.!:i **..
^'u..
-J X ~ .3
**. v>i. .Vfc*3 ,^.4. ^ V.3* i
'i ! J: -]:>•.. )•::
3 vr.'^x .1 . T • i. .’.1. -iU :
no i.J'j'
.
’ ,
0 .- . .
}
i..' >7 • ) ;. / '
: r.
.
.
.
O^’l
' 1
. .
: ;U.:JC 1 ' '/vr j . :;ii
j J . ; '“i ••V. 10-'.
iJ"
'i
1
r*'
* W '-«» *
40
Another characteristic of Bradley’s thought which exposes
him to the attack of cautious rationalistic thinkers, hut which
is not essential to idealism of this school, is his resort to
feeling or intuition a^the ultimate method of philosophy* The
absolute is the perfect identity of that and what , of universal
and particular, and this unthinkable perfection may be known
by the imperfect within it only by fe'eling - a highly romantic
conception which furnishes material for a commonly urged
practical criticism. But, as we shall see, the realist needs
his ovm basis of identifying universal and particular, and
will draw on his own parti cuiar theory of intuition to account
for it.
The reaction against absolute idealism reached its
full strength in the period in v^hich Moore began his creative
work. Of the movements arising in opposition to it, two
closely related ones remain within the limits of idealism -
personal idealism and pragmatism. Both, iri^their English form,
were voluntaristic and both-, neglected the controversies
.over logic and the nature of relations. Lotze 'was influential
in the development of the former movement, which received its
clearest expression in the collection of essays on Personal
Idealism appearing in 1902. Out of this group arose the
humanistic pragmatism of Sohiller. Both groups oppose not
only absolute idealism but the contemporary realism.
Earlier, however, than this idealistic reaction was
a rising tide of realism, vigorous in championing the fact of
objective reference in experience, liioroughly metaphysical as
^ Xo la : OXt ^.r.^-i}£ -XC. :ji'l .: l
^n3':oYtv.if 'lof- i tprt‘5 •‘^$itJ: ’-o^- 'yJ
j-
-sfis i y^u^.a^ lir
a/iT.O'Xv 9c^'v<;^.a ^ Ln:js T,a(T ;^i;l
'
• 0.£s.Sm30^ ; - 3(;^I<^’j't tif -+ i. ' n •4^ v:a
> i;P3*5:H 'r£,'tr.a'ui:iop •/: *£Ot< 'jiiii’iait^iiS: ripas c^ r£pXii7r fjQj:‘:.ri»offc-j
•3.''
n
t« ; r..-:o'^ s/'* '• i ifids ' <ih
•brv'? ; iviB lo Ai^s'.P'f ild
^uiiO >»J3 ^ ot^'-t
a
‘rj X IT
i
1o ^'3 2. liw
t 1 p'.«p,Vi: yiuXp^c»c Jjnld^ ajsSoji^'X esCT
pv,#. i^t.'*! j »•; sii ijipola* fi'- tfiv/ ni £jo.i46Ci;:,rt;i^
or-'-^
,
"-t ol io.-iii i sr:*feijc 3j>w:ov'aa >«I+ XC
- 10 ?sji:v!i, C d&ao c5^f>aoXp
.
..
:1 ; Jt il v^s: TPi'iCi/.a , iiSor *' ft'; i-i 3iis rn i Up* ^ £ Ificccip^:
baifo-jiiy. n . Jbna oiteixe.ta^jrlov e-xa./
r.^J:1'iis:rX *a c a-w PS-^OiI ti‘J3Xsx ’to dxx/iibn d.a> p.i:apl lov
tij-i. n dakiw ,^.P2>is9Vo^ x^mTO't acw ^noirtixoXerpb pflT si
X.^no sxfK r»o B to noitp^- CIoo xit noiaap'i ;Xa, j’i<^;i/5S;X'y
f.SlOXtt. ^X?0X‘3 tP CfUO^ t“?0$x (iX :'-JfIXX.>3f;- Ipi?
^ !:' paw-<'VO avTOO'-C'* oitoE » -aO'.X cdOo '-'lo iiia.tX;'il/l‘^,‘I4. 'iiJ'lrt' .ik’Uf.i
'*
,:: vi^Xf>sX(rr^trf<5u J-ik' pP'£'Lo>;ir, *•:, f:-c;
’oi-^^vi .:ryJ: i •:='.L;Jr
'
'IP .}o--.i 0;X* fl.l '=T. JO w.;" feV ,x^-£pO'i to xx
vXd^txoXQ.v
^
- >r.r»ix'x p. “ Cti PXiOX'Sridx -ay ij : o
r.-v
..r
•".v
U
-'
'
-
..'^ 'U.
41
opposed to naturalism
,
rereading Heid and Hamilton in terms
of the controversies of its time* Thomas H.Case identified
himself with the Scotch school and attacked epistemological
idealism because of its foundation in the Cartesian dualism.
But like the viev/s of Reid and Hamilton his own position is
still representationalistic, merely proceeding from the world
of physical science rather than from the object of naive real-
ism, He concludes that the mind knows "external" physical
1
objects by causal inference from internal sense data.
Case*s evaluation of science and his theory of know-
ledge influenced L, T. Hobhouse, whose v^ork on epistemology,
The Theory of Knov/ledge , appeared in 1895. But he overcame
the representationism of Case in a comprehensive theory of
direct apprehension of primary and secondary qualities and
the categorial relations which combine them. Such apprehension
is an original act of mind. But not all objects thus directly
apprehended have independent existence; coherence is the cri-
2
terion of independence,
Moore’s own transition from idealism to realism is
most directly anticipated by the reviver of the Aristotelian
Society, before which manj^ of Moore’s papers were later to be
read. Shadworth Hodgson began as a Kantian, and subjected
3
idealism to criticism on a Kantian basis, as had Sidgwick.
Bqt he rejected what he conceived to be a basic thought of
Kant, the distinction of subject and object as the a priori
principle from v/hich to deduce reality. One must begin anew
^ Physical-. Realism . 1888
.
p, 23, 24, See Hasan, 0£. cit.
.
p, 291-292,
P* 532-535, 525-527.
The Metaphysics of Experience
. 1898,
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by th.e analysis of experience, and without causal and genetic
considerations. Thus considered, the independent object pre-
sented in experience is primary, and the idea of the exper-
iencing self secondary and derived. The dualistic account of
knowledge rests on "the distinction of inseparables" - knowledge
and existence, process and content. In memory of the past as
well as perception of the present, the objective world is
immediately given, while the subjective is dependent upon it.
The theory of direct apprehension is clear in these thinkers,
but they do not entirely and clearly set forth the theory of
independence as held by later realists, Moore himself early
criticizes Hodgson for failing to distinguish mental activity
and its object, the distinction from which later realism starts.
It must be said that Moore’s early thought is relative-
ly independent cf these movemeit s. His historical sources
must be found further back, in the relational logic of the
Hegelians, in Kant, and in Plato, In 1898 he himself acknow-
ledges Kant as his master,
"I have chosen to deal with him at such length,
mainly because I think that reference to the views of the
philosopher with whom you are most in agreement is often
the clearest way of explaining your own view to an esoteric
audience; but partly k- also , because I think he has been
often misunderstood",'^
His starting point is thus an independent interpretation of
Kant, probably mediated by Sidgwick who had found the distinc-
tion of thing-in-itself from phenomenon to be that of the that
from the what of independent reality, but who had still inter- •
^"In Y/hat Sense if Any Do Past and Future Time Exist?"
Mind
. 6 ( 1897 ) ,j).238,
2"Freedom» Mind
. 7 ( 1898)
,
p. 179
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preted Kant nominalistically. At the same time his idealism
2
seems influenced hy Lotze as well as by Bradley,
Moore attributes his ideal cf pU losopl;tital rigor to
Kant, but it reflects also the logical work of his colleagues
at Cambridge, Though he does not use the symbolic logic until
1919, when he shows a high regard for its value and a proficiency
3
in its use, and though there is, with one exception, an absence
of all references to the researches in the foundations of
mathematics, his early am lyses of necessity, causality and
purpose, and identity reflect the spirit of the movement, 11^
provides the means of emancipation from the Bradleyan logic,
and the basis of his criticism of the theory of internal relations,
Moore’s Platonism is most apparent in the period of his
careful analyses of the categories, particularly in the essay on
4
"Identity", and in the logical objectivism of his second period.
It is only semi -Platonism, for as he emancipates himself from
absolute idealism he also rejects the monistic or synoptic
element of Plato which corresponds to the theory of internal
relations, "Reality is conceptual but not a hierarchy in Plato’s
sense. Here again he is backed by the logical method of analysis
into class and relation with which Russell’s name has become
associated, though the work of Meinong in Germany pointed in the
same direction of a positivistic Platonism, Moore’s theory of
intrinsic value, expounded in the Principia Ethica
.
is also dis-
tinctivel3^ Platonic, Only later, by the inherent dialectic of
^Mind, 0, S,, 5 (1880 ) ,pl.l3-115,
Sibid .. 6 (I892),p.238,
^"Critical Kote on Russell’s Essay on the Foundatjo ns of
Geometry," Ibid ,, 8 (1899) ,p397-405.
4proc", Aris t. Soc ,, 1 (1900 ) ,pl03-127.
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his system, but influenced also by the more nominalistic
discussions of Hobhouse and Hodgson which led him to a
reconsideration of Berkeley, Hume, and Reid, does he return
to a more empirical account of reality. From Kant, then, who
led him to sacrifice system to cautious analysis and who kept
him from the extremes both of empiricism and rationalism, Moore
turned to the simple logical realism of Plato, only to turn
again, several years later, to a more empirical interpretation
of the knowing process and therefore, with his realistic pre-
possessions, to a substantialistic account of the world'. These
changes we shall trace in greater detail in the development
af his thought,
2,Moore as Post-Kantian Idealist , Though idealism
is implied in Moore's earliest writings, it is difficult to
indicate its limits, especially since his interpretation of
Kant and Bradley is independent and already reflects the logical
objectivism of his second period. His thought begins with the
logical analysis of the realm of the transcendental, the thing-
in-itself, the intelligible world implied in appearances. Thus
there appears in this period the doctrine that space, time,
causality, as well as the world of sense, are purely phenomenal;
their relation to the "really real" being one, not of cause and
effect, but of logical ground and consequence. His Kant is al-
ready tempered by his Plato, Recognizing his dependence on Kant
and Lotze, he concludes "that neither Past, Present, nor Future
exists, if by existence we are to mean the ascription of full
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Reality and not merely existence as Appearance”, although the
Present is more real than the Past, and the Past than the
Future^ His recognition of degrees of reality is not, as Hasan
2
holds, a realistic hesitation, hut shows the influence of Bradley,
as he clearly recognizes. In the essay on "Freedom” he desires
a mode of direct apprehension of the timeless and logical intelli-
gible world, ”an entirely different form of perception which
would share with space and time nothing but the mere immediate-
3
ness of the presents This intuitive element
,
as well as a
distinction which he urges against Hodgson, :>.is retained
in his realistic period.
”I cannot help making a distinction between the pro-
cess of thinking and the content (later the term content
will be rejected and object substituted) of thought. Be-
cause I cannot think without taking some time about it, I
cannot see it follows that what I think about need also be
in time”
•
His idealism is tempered with naturalism in this essay*. With
Bradley he rejects the reality of the self.
“What is disputed is whether psychical activity, at
least, may not be considered as fundamentally real. Our
contention is that it cannot be so, ’because it is inconceiv-
able except as taking place in time. That time itself cannot
be conceived to be fundamentally real is always admitted by
Kant himself, and indeed he has attempted a proof of it.
I can only state that the arguments by which Mr, Bradley has
endeavored to prove the unreality of Time appear to me
perfectly conclusive.”®
With this idealism, however, Moore combines a thorough
determinism, Kant holds to “unconditional determinism”, and
“rejects freedom in the only sense in which the two have been
J Mind, 6 (1897), ’p. 240,
^ Healism
, p, 232.
5 Mind . 6 (l89c7) , p, 240,
^ ry4., p. 238.
^ .¥ind„ 7',(l89a), p. 202 .
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generally discussed "by English thinkersi' Eor Kant uses the
notion of freedom in two senses, both of which are tc be
rejected. His discussion of '*transcendental Freedom as an
Idea of Reason", as “the relation between Reality and Appear-
ance" is irrelevant. "This *free causality* is not
causality in the ordinary sense; and there may well seem
a good case for the contention that it is not free either,
on the ground that freedom has an essential reference to
human volition'i^
But Kant speaks also of an "actual" freedom resting on "self
knowledge through apperception"?. This psychological conception
of freedom is miraculous in a natural series. The vulgar doctrine
of free will is due to the teclinical difficulties accompanying
psychological experiment, especially "because ex^periment in
psychology must be either indirect or encumbered by the fact
that the observed is the observer'*/. Consciousness offers nc
data for freedom, but merely for the possibility "that such
2
and such a choice will take place in my mind".
For Kant*s "rational freedom" Moore substitutes the
logical relation of ground and consequent'. All freedom is
purely phenomenal, as is the self which experiences it. The
only valid notion of selfhood is that of "a thing with a
distinguishable self, having a distinct efficiency in virtue
of that self. In this conception of the course of nature there
is contained the union of Determination and Freedom, in its
simplest form". Kant*s free causality must after all be a
logical determinlsml.
p P* ISl, 183'.
Ibid
., p. 186, 190.
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"A free cause must necessarily appear to us as a
logical reason, and, so far, as a *mere conception*, because
ix is not, as such, presented to us as an object of intui-
tion. It is always a universal, and though v/e can knov/
that it must also be an individual, we cannot experience
it as uniting the characters”'.^-
Kant*s error lay in overlooking the distinction betv/een a con-
ception as psychic existent and as content, as is shown also
in his double use of reason and rational
,
(a) for what is true
or objective, and (b.) as "that v/hich implies tha psychological
2
faculty of making judgments and inference si* Moore interprets
Kant*s phenomenalism as merely subjs ctive, and this subject-
ivity applies to psychic activity es well. The thing in
itself is the realm, not of rational freedom, but of logical
determinism.
Still a Kantian idealist, then, Moore is pointing
in the direction (a) of the empirical world of natural
causality which includes human thought, and (b) of a logical
realism as the ground of the v;orld of appearances but distinct
from it, (c) anticipating at one point the identity of the
‘3
logical and the particular. His logic already goes beyond
that of Kant. He interprets objectivity, no longer as
universality and necessity, but as independence of thought.
At the same time, the thing in itself, being of logical
structure, is experienced through reason.
3. Logical Realism!. Out of this paper a complete
realism scon develops, to issue full-blovm in the essay on
"The Nature of Judgment* in the following yearf a paper
^ Ibid
., p. 197-198.
? Ibid . . p. 200.
A Ibid ,, p. 194-195.MM, 8 (1899), p. 176-193.
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which indicates the position at which Russell’s "logical
atomism" and the American school, in so far as it is ration-
alistic, remain • In his "Critical Notice of Brunschvicg’s
Modalite du Jugement" of the preceding year, Moore has attacked
psychologism and emphasized logicall objectivism, but from the
Kantian viev/point of the judgment "as the fundamental and
unique act of intelligence"^ Now this Kantian logic is aban-
doned. The concept is the ultimate logical entity, and percepts
as well as propositions ha-« their ultimate being in it, per-
ception itself being a form of judgment.
"A judgment is universally a necessary combination
of concepts, equally necessary v/hether it be true or
false", "Its truth or its falsehood qjust be immediate
properties of its ov/n, not //{dependent upon any relation
it may have to something else", and "a concept is not in
any intelligible sense an ’adjective’ as if there were
something substantial more ultimate than it^ 2
His pluralistic Platonism is thus complete. The
world is ultimately a logical structure of universals in
relations. Existence is defined, in tv/o conflicting ways,
as a part of the v/hole. It is not substantial; it is"itself
a concept", but "to exist is merely to stand in a certain lo-
gical connection"; " an existent is seen to be nothing but
a concept or complex of concepts standing in unique relation
to the concept of existence. So existence is both an ultimate
irreducible concept and a complex relationship to that concept -
a somewhat involved logical problem. Perception is "the cog-
nition of an existential proposition". Moore has realized the
wish expressed in 1897 for some mode of timeless and direct
^ Hind, 6 (1897) ,pJ558.
X I'bid .,8 (1899), p. ‘192-193,
IToici
.
. P. 180, 183.
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apprehension of the world, hut the world thus apprehended is
purely logical.
Moore here hecomes for the first time critical of idealism
in general, naturally from the logical, not the epistemological
point of view. He agrees with Bradley's rejection of the
correspondence criterion of truth, hut rejects his subordination
of concept to reality; "existence is logically subordinate to
truth", Kant and Berl^eley err in describing a concept as an
abstraction from ideas, because they fail to distinguish between
idea as psychological sign and idea as universal meaning. The
latter is ultimate, and concepts in this sense can no longer
"be described as part of the content of any psychological idea
v/hatever”, as Moore iiimself had done in earlier essays,^ Kant
is after all a subjectivist. Having made c Objectivity not mere-
ly logical but metaphysical, Moore substitutes concepts for
sensations as the data of knowledge, and refuses to regard the
relations in which they stand "as in some obscure sense the
v;ork of the mind". The possibility of knowledge is not to
be explained by making "the cognitive relation an ultimate
2
datum or presuppositi®n, " Moore retains Kant's transcendental-
ism and its distinction between empirical and a priori
propositions, but rejects all idealistic reference of judgment
3
"either to our mind or to the world,"
Moore's "really real" has now emerged into a clearer
light. It is the Platonic realm of ideas in pluralistic form.
The doctrine of independence appears in full development as
9 IMl*. P* 176-178.
Ibid
.
.
p. 183i
^ Ibid,
.
p. 193,
i: K ^ 'J >
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applied to cognition.
Moore’s realism has now reached the stage at which
Russell’s is to remain. But Russell is still idealistic in
his epistemology, as Moore points out in criticizing his Essay
1
on the Foundations of Geometry , especially his proposition that
"the ground of necessity - - - arises from the mind.” Pro-
hahly with Russell in mind, Moore turns, in his next essay,
to an investigation of the concept of necessity, concluding
that all necessity, including that of causal and temporal re-
lations and a posteriori propositions, is an objective
2
quality of logical propositions. Mo subjectively experienced
necessity is ultimate; it is merely an indication of objective
necessity. Necessity is in all cases the logical reidtionship
of implication. Propositions are "necessary v/hen the;j^are
3
implied in a large number of other propositions."
Moore has thus completed the panlogistic system out-
lined in the "Nature of Judgment", but has done so only by
surrendering his realistic conception of truth as an unanalyzable
ultimate and turning to the idealistic criterion of coherence.
If necessity can be determined only by implication in "a large
number of other propositions", his pluralism is threatened;
reality tends to become a unity of relational structure, and he
seems involved in the very thought with which he had charged
Hegel and Bradley as a fallacy. To overcome this difficulty
4
he now seeks to refine the concepts of individuality and identity.
^ Mind* S (1899), p. 397-405.
2
"Necessity." Mind
. 9 (1900 ) ,p.289-304.
f cit . , p. 303.
^
"Identity." Prod
.
Arist
.
Soc
. , 1 (1901), p. 103-127'.
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The paper on "Identity**, and the articles on "Cause
and Effect” and "Teleology** in Baldwin’s Dictionary, written
at apparently the same time, are protests against idealistic
monism from the viewpoint of logical pluralism. .The distinc-
tion hy which Moore evades the monistic implication of his
own idea of necessity is that between conceptual identity
( which the idealists assume as the only basis of unity and on
which they build their principle cf identity-in-difference) and
numerical identity. The idealist error, illustrated in Leib-
niz’s deduction of the identity of indiscernibles from the law
1
of sufficient reason is not in basing identity on the concept,
but in holding that conceptual identity gives unity in a
numerical sense. The euntinomies which the idealist finds
in his logical analyses rest upon this confusion of the two
types of identity; so Hegel errs in holding that the law of
identity implies its opposite; "he only means that we must as-
sert something else of mind as well as the fact that it is mind,
2
not that we may assert it is not mind." This leads not merely
to the idealistic fallacy of the concrete universal, but to the
further one of ascribing to particulars which have conceptual
identity all the predicates which the conceptual whole of which
they are parts has - the microcosm-macrocosm idea in its logical
form.
"By such methods it is easy to prove that the vrorld
is an individual; that all differences are transcended in
it; that its capability of remaining one, in sl)ite of them,
is admirable."^
1
This criticism of Leibniz restricts itself to the
rationalistic, and overlooks the empirical and voluntaristic
elements in^his thought.
^ cit. ,p. 118 .
Ibid
.
.
p. 126 .
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So Moore still recognizes conceptual relationship as th€;
principle of identity, hut is awake to the problem of parti-
cularity and individuality, upon which his pluralism rests.
Metaphysics is still logical in nature, but propositions now
have particulars as subjects, concepts as predicates; concepts
may themselves be conceptually identical but numerically dis-
tinct. The difference between particular and universal is
merely "that they belong to different classes."
"Anything is particular which has to some other things
differing from it numerically only, the peculiar nameless
relation above mentioned. Anything is a universal which
has this relation to nothing else at all.", the relation
being that of similarity, "a peculiar relation to a third
thing - - - the Platonic idea, or, as v/e may now call it,
the universal."^
Moore has not yet reached an insight into the problem in its
most general form, the internality or externality of relations,
but is still trying to retain both horns of his dilemma - to
account for particularity in terms of a gradation of universal-
ity. But this logic is unstable. In so far as he is consistent,
he is a monist, in so far as he stresses the particular as an
element in judgment he is a pluralist but must surrender his
panlogism. In gradual steps he choses the latter alternative,
and thus moves from conceptual analysis, tliough the subject-
predicate relation, to the substance-attribute view of meta-
physics already noted in Reid which is the only possibility
open for a nominalistic realist. Subject is still merely
equivalent to self-identity or individuality, but will soon
be interpreted, in accord with common sense, as material'. Moore’s
efforts to preserve his pluralism are thus forcing him to more
^ M* cit . p. 116, 114.
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empirical considerations*
The next two papers illustrate this transition from
rationalism to a common sense empiricism, with the interming-
ling of the two motives and methods most apparent in the
second which shows that Moore himself was conscious of the
transition* They may he said to constitute the second phase
of his logistic period, and lead directly to the common sense
materialistic realism of the later periods* They have in
common his rejection of that type of empiricism which leads
to idealism and subjectivism, hut retain also his faith in
logical analysis*
In the first he criticizes McTaggart's concept of
consciousness as self-identity and whole-part relation, and
his argument for immortality,^ McTaggart*s conception of
^a whole which is in and for each of its parts'* is subjected
to the same criticism as was the Hegelian concrete universal
in the preceding paper; it confuses conceptual and numerical
identity* With McTaggart's pluralism of selves Moore seems
to he in agreement, hut with the addition of a physical real-
ity which is the object of their experience, hut the unity of
consciousness must he accounted for by its activity, not by
a • causal series in its objects*
"It is commonly supposed, as it was by Berkeley
(this is the first mention of Berkeley in his writings), to
be obvious to direct inspection that what I know is always
in my mind, whereas the only thing which really is thus ob-
vious, is that my consciousness of the thing is so* The
history of philosophy exhibits a uniform inability to dis-
tinguish between that of which I am„conscious and my . conscious-
ness of it - an^bility founS a monumenrin
"Mr* McTaggart's Studies in Hegelian Cosmology,
Proc* Arist * Soc* . 2 (1902), p. 177-214*
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’’idea* which regularly stands for both* The doctrine
that v/hen I am conscious of a thing there must always
he an image of it in my mind owes its plausibility to
the neglect of this simple distinction,"^
McTaggart’s conception that personal identity'' rests on
causation within the content of the mind is rejected because
of this distinction and its neglect of memory and of that
aspect of experience which we call cur self. The basis of
identity must be found in self-consciousness as unique and
distinct, and in memory, Moore criticizes also McTaggart*s
concept of timeless existence as opposed to appearance, not
as he had earlier criticized Lotze^s, to establish the un-
2
reality of time, but to establish its reality, McTaggart’s
argument for idealism "has the merit of being an excellent
reductio ad absurdum of all attempts to construct what Hr,
McTaggart would call ’Idealism’, i, e', any philosophy which
maintains that the universe is wholly spiritual and wholly
good." Idealism of this type fails ultimately "to ascribe any
value whatever to the existence of anything in time", since
"it must maintain that nothing does really exist in time."
"Its whole ethics must consist in ascribing a value which
3
they do not have, to things which do not exist,"
This paper thus reflects Moore’s common sense
empiricism and anticipates the distinctions of the "Refutation
of Idealism", and the Principia Ethica , Its emphasis, though
realistic, is personalistic in its theory of consciousness^
But Moore is not an empiricist in the traditional sense, and
^
Op. pit., p, 187,'
2 Ibid
., p. 178-17S,' Cf, Mind . 7 (1898), p. 202,
^ Itid
.. p. 187, 195,
< \
in his next essay, "Experience and Empiricism" he sets up
the limits of an empirical theory of knowledge. The paper
advances two theses,
1,
" In assuming experience as a premiss, philosophers
assume the truth of a vast number of propositions, which
as a matter of fact they subsequently conclude to be
false
•
2.
"Empiricists are distinguished, not by any theory
of the source of knowledge, but by the fact that they
constantly imply that all known truths are of the same
kind as experiences, although, in fact, they assume the
knowledge of truths which are not of this kind,""^
The empirical tendency misinterprets Kant, to whom the em-
pirical movement in contemporary thought is to be attributed,
but %<lio really merely based reason on experience, did not
limit it to experience, Moore’s notion of experience is
that of immediate intuition, "The objects of experience all
fall within the class of propositions about existing things.**
Memory and inference are distinct from the experience of
existing things, as is also imagination. Experience is
limited in accordance with the narrow theoretical interpreta-
tion of .Kant, But experience in this sense does not ex-
haust- our knowledge, nor is it the source of all of it. This
is the error of the empiricists. Objects of experience are
complex and lead to valid propositions. We infer objects
causally. The other error of the empiricists is their
neglect of necessary truth. Moore’s recognition of the
role of logic in knowledge
,
and the distinctions he has
already introduced against the idealists^ prevent him from
identifying himself with traditional empiricism, though he
J Proc . Arist. Soc. . 3 (1903), 80-96, p, 81.2 Ibid
.
.
p, 83, 87-88,
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is moving from rationalism because of his new interest in
the temporal and particular. The synthesis is to be found
in common sense intuitionalism, toward which he has already
been drawn by the need for various types of "ultimate and in-
definable relation^.
In 1903 appeared what may eventually^considered
Moore *s most significant systematic and constructive v/ork,
the culmination of the interest in ethics and value theory
stimulated in him by Sidgwick, The Principia Ethica re-
veals another motive behind the logical objectivism of this
period - the need for a basis of an objective and intrinsic
structure of values. Moore recognizes his problem ("What
things ought to exist for their own sakes?'* and *7/hat kind
1
of actions ought we to perform?") as Kantian, and holds
that propositions concerning value are intuitive, i. e.
incapable of proof, and universal, as opposed to judgments
concerning "particular things". But his sclution of the first
problem, the nature of value, is in closer accord with
Brentano, Meinong, and Ehrenfels, though reached independent-
2
ly of them. His discussion presupposes his previous logical
pluralism and faith in analysis, the intuitionalism of Kant
and Sidgwick, and the principle of personal self-identity
learned from Sidgwick and, partly, from McTaggart.
After setting up two normative considerations; (a)
a v/arning against the naturalistic fallacy of uncritically
identifying the good with some other object of thought, and
1
Op > cit . ~p. viii.
^Ibid., p. X, xi. Cf. Int. Jour. Ethics. 14 (1903).
p. 115-123.
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(fa) the fundamental position of the book, that value is
an intrinsic property attaching to "organic wholes", the
value of such a complex whole being different from the siom
of the values of its parts, Moore proceeds to a penetrating
criticism of evolutionary ethics (Syencer), hedonism (Mill
and Sidgwick), and utilitarianism. But it is his criticism
of metaphysical ethics that is of chief interest for the
present paper. Here a distinctly positivistic element
appears in his thinking, and with it the old distinction
in value theory between reality and value, while his basic
rationalism and objectivism remain intact. Value is an
intrinsic property of things, but not a real one!. Thus he
rejects not only Plato’s monism, but his identification of
reality and value. Idealistic theories commit the fallacy
of deducing the definition of the good from their metaphysics;
this is impossible because good denotes an "ultimate, unana-
lyzable predicate". The fallacious attempt rests upon tv/o
erroneous doctrines: (a) "the logical doctrine that all
propositions assert a relation between -existents" and (b)
"the epistemological doctrine that to.be gpod..is .to be felt
or willed in some parti cula,r Y/ay; a doctrine which derives
support from the analogous error, v/hich Kant regarded as the
cardinal point of his system and v/hich has received iimnehsely
wide acceptance - the erroneous view that to be ’true’ or
1
’real* is equivalent to being thought in a particular v/ay,"
Kantian idealism errs in thinking that volition and feeling
Op , cit1 140-141
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are analogous to cognition; they are "merely instances of
cognition", differing only in the type of their object,^
But though Moore’s definition of value as a property
of organic wholes smacks of the Hegelian logic - thus the
"Ideal" involves consideration of "the total effect on the
2
Universe" - Moore subjects the concept of organic wholes
to a searching analysis which he supposes to be a criticism
of Hegel, and which merely continues the criticism of the
paper against McTaggart. The necessary dependence of part
upon whole is categorically denied, and the term "organic"
is used "to denote the fact that a whole has an intrinsic
value different in amount from the sum of the values of
its parts", not to "imply any causal relation whatever be-
3
tween the parts of the v;hole in question*" jjis value theory
later sets the limits of his theory of external relations*
The Principia Ethica thus rests upon the logical
realism of the "Hature of Judgment", and in5)lies a realm of
being, logical in structure, but more than purely relational,
where value abides* The spirit is predominantly intuitional-
istic; this, in fact, constitutes its greatest difference from
the school of Brentano - value experience is cognitive*. Moore
is certainly not empirical in this essay; he holds an empirical
theory of ethics in the traditional sense to be impossible,
as his refutation of Mill shows* Ho monistic ideal is possible;
a Leibnizian theodicy is unv^arranted by the facts* When evil
1 P£* cit . , p* 141* This viev; is hard to reconcile
with his earlier theory of experience which was strongly in-
tellectualistic*
? I'bid .* p. 154.
•
^ Il>id
.
.
p. 31-3,5'.
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exists, the total state of things is not positivelj^ good,
‘1
though cognition of evil is necessary to the Ideah, One
concession of some importance is made to idealism; all
values ’’involve consciousness of an object, which is itself
usually highly complex, and almost all involve also an emot-
2
ional attitude toward this object,'*
In this period the fundamental distinctions of
Moore *s realism have appeared - the distinction between con-
scious activity and its object, the theory of direct
apprehension of the object which is independent (experience,
a subclass of true cognition, exclusive of memory and imagi-
nation, but inclusive of feeling and will). The object is
at first thought of as purely conceptual, then more and more
in temporal and nominalistic terms'. But the logical structure
of the object remains of fundamental significance, even in
value theory, With the tendenc^to empiricism comes a shift
in emphasis from logical intellectualism to common sense
intuitionalism, though the significance of analysis for
philosophic method is continually emphasized, Moore is being
driven to nominalism and materialism by the inner dialectic
of his thought. This particula-ristic tendency appears in
its fullness in the next period, which is merely a continua-
tion of the previous one,
1
Op, cit,
,
p, 220,
I~bid ,
.
p. 224,
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4. Common Sense Realism and its Logical Defense# The
need for a more empirical emphasis in his realism forces
Moore to a reconsideration of the negative and positive
foundations of his thought. Negatively, his criticism of
idealism must he revised hy a reconsideration of the thought
of Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, as well as the absolutists.
Positively, if the theory of immediate experience is to be
retained, his theory of cognition must abandon its intellect-
ualistic pattern and be built upon sense experience. This
work of revision is begun in the “Refutation of Idealism*^,
a document generally regarded as the first manifesto of the
2
new realism, and of central importance in the present study.
But its place in Moore’s own thought is rendered highly un-
certain by his own comment on it in the preface to his volume
of studies published in 1922, in which it is the first essay.
His omission of earlier writings implies a repudiation of his
earlier position, and therefore of his logistic metaphysics,
but even it is retained only with some carefully stated but
perplexing reservations. After saying that “some of the
views expressed in earlier (paper^ are views with which I
no longer agree,” he says of the “Refutation”, “This paper
now appears to me to be very confused, as well as to embody
3
a good many dovm-right mistakes." What the mistakes are he
has not indicated; the greatest are probably his certainty
^
Mind, 12 (1903), p. 433-453. Phil . St., p. 1-30.
^ Cf. Hasan, Realism
, p. 228; A. K. Rogers, English
and American Thought since 1800
., p.4H. 418. R. Kremer,
La Theorie de la Connaissance chez les Nio-realistes Anglais
,
p. 12; R. W. Sellars in D. S. Robinson, Anthology of Recent
Philosophy , p. 281> etc.
St., p. viii.
^ . '
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that all idealism is refuted with the refutation of ” esse
is percipi " . his abstract and analytic notion of sensum,
and his theory that conscious activity is unique; to the
central realistic tenets of the paper he consistently ad-
heres, his later work being directed merely to the completion
of the position advanced unsystematically but carefully in
the "Refutation”,
The immediate occasion seems to have been an
article by A* Taylor developing as the cardinal principle
of idealism the view ”that that which makes (any piece of
fact) real can be nothing but its presence as an insepar-
able aspect of sentient experience,”^ The first half of the
essay is a logical analysis of the implications of this
central proposition of idealism; the second half, more
empirical, an analysis of the assumptions and crudities of
the idealistic theory of knowledge'.
Though idealism’s mostfeeneral assertion is that
2
reality is spiritual, a necessary argument for that propo-
sition is that esse is percipi . Moore does not dispute that
idealism may be true; he hopes that reality is spiritual;
he proposes only to show that in every possible sense this
important link in the chain of idealistic reasoning is false.
To this is added the common sense motive in refuting idealism;
if it is true, "the universe is very different indeed from
what it seems."
The proposition esse is percipi has been accepted
1 Int . Jour , Eth ,. 13 (1902)^,
^ Moore thus assumes from the start that he is refuting
all idealism, not merely subjectivism.
^ Phil
. p. 1.
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only because of iogical, psychological, and epistemological
confusions. (a) It is a necessary synthetic judgment, for
percipi ( in the the broad sense of "being experienced" in
any way) is neither synonymous with esse
.
nor a part of it;
reality may be experience but it is x in addition. The
idealist claims that there is a necessary connection between
this X and the property of being perceived, and his first
error lies in assuming that the judgment is analytic and that
this necessary connection can be established by the law of
contradiction alone; he assumes, in other words, that a syn-
thetic judgment may at the same time be analytic. But neces-
1
sity, as Moore has earlier shov/n is logical and can be estab-
lished onl3^ by direct inference. Ead the idealists claimed
self evidence for their proposition they could not have been
refuted. Their theory of judgment, again, in v/hich two con-
tradictories (analytic and synthetic) can be combined, rests
i
upon the Hegelian notion of organic wholes being in their
parts; thus, in this case, the whole, being, is included in
‘2
its part, being perceived.
(b) But this logical confusion of the idealist rests
on the fallacy of inadequate psychological analysis - the
failure to distinguish mental act from object, already fre-
quently stressed by Moore, as v/e have seen. Experience of
green must be distinguishable from green if experience is
unique* The idealist’s rejoinder that this is an illegitimate
abstraction fails to note that some abstractions may be valid;
^
"Necessity". Mind
. 9 (1900), p. 289-304.
2. Phil. St., p.,7-12, 16.
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insistence on the organic unity of mental act and object
serves no object except that of obscuring the knov/ing pro-
cess. Wor are content and object of consciousness to be
confused, as the idealists do. Blue is not the content of
consciousness as it is of a flower. We have no reason "to
suppose that there are such things as mental images at all?
(Cf. Reid), "Even if there are mental images, no mental
image and no sensation is merely a thing of this kind."
It is also related through the activity of awareness.^
(c) Positively, if the nature of sensation be analyzed,
it will be seen that consciousness of blue is secondary and
derived from the existence of blue, and in no sense implied
in it. As opposed to idealism, then, Moore holds that in
being aware of a sensum or idea, "I am aware of something which
- -
- is not an inseparable aspect of my experience." "There
is therefore no question of hov/ we are to ’get outside the
circle of our ideas and sensations. ’ Merely to have a sensation
is already to ^ outside that circle." The only alternative
is solipsism, which the idealist cannot refute on his own
basis.
^
The nature of consciousness and of its object now need
further definition. Moore neglects the second problem (which
implies a nominalistic revision of his earlier logical plural-
ism, or at least a statement of the relation between sensum
|D and universal) but attempts a further characterization of
consciousness, (i) It is "transparent we lock through it
and see nothing but the blue; we may be convinced that there
^ 0£. cit .
.
p, 14-16, 24.
2 Ibid
., p. 27, 28.
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is something hut what it is no philosopher, I think, has
yet clearly recognized.” (ii) But "av/areness of the image
of blue” is really “to be aware of awareness of blue,”
Awareness is .diaphanous; "yet it can be distinguished if we
look attentively enough, and if we know that there is some-
thing to look for." (iii) "Awareness is and must be in all
cases of such a nature that its object, when we are av/are
of it, is precisely v/hat it would be, if we were not aware
Berkeley’s and Kant’s mentalism are therefore both
as
wrong; the only alternative to the view that "I am^directly
aware of the existence of material things in apace as of
my own sensations” is absolute scepticism, though we have
no certain knowledge that there are material things correspond-
ing to our sensations,^
The doctrines of direct apprehension and independence,
here extended from universals to sensations and material things,
Moore never relinquishes in his subsequent thought. But more
questions have been ral&ed than answered - (a) the relation
of universal and sensum to material thing, (b) the nature of
consciousness, (c) the relation of sense datum, usually regarded
by Moore as a particular, to universal. These problems will
dominate Moore’s epistemological thought for the next 25 years.
Meanwhile the relation of his nominalistic realism to
the traditional schools needs to be v/orked out in order to
make clear its logical foundations, particularly his relation
to Kant, Hume, Reid, and James, whose pragmatism was challenging
i tit , , p.20, 25, 29,
® Ibid
. , . p, 30,
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criticism. Granted that sensaticns and universals exist in-
dependently of conscious activity, does that fact furnish
a ground for the realism of common sense? The conclusion
of the "Refutation” had heen dogmatically hrief in its re-
jection of Berkeley, Kant
,
and Hume, They need further
criticism from the viewpoint of that paper - the fallacies
in (a) their logic of organic unity, (b) their subjective
epistemology.
First appears a discussion of Kant, whom he seems
to have re-read from the empirical and nominalistic view
point,^ Kant’s attempt to supplement empiricism by groundihg_^
the objectivity of synthetic a priori judgments in mental
activity is a failure, while his thought is essentially that
of Berkeley’s, but more subjective; he adds spatial and tem-
poral qualities and causality to the list of mental elements,
"Kant’s idealism is transcendental and differs
fiom Berkeley’s in that, whereas Berkeley only main-
tained the ’ideality’ or merely mental existence of
particular objects, Kant maintains the ideality of the
forms in which these objects are arianged," 2
Kant’s deduction of the validity of universal propositioTjs
from the mind is a failure because it premises an unproved
universal proposition such as it wishes to establish - that
mind is thus constituted as to give every object a certain
form. His reasons do not, for example, establish the validity
3
of the assertion "that any two groups of two make fourU
Kant’s dualism of things in themselves and things as
they appear is really complete skepticism.
^
"Kant’s Idealism," Proc. Arist. Soc,. 4 (1904). p.
127-140,
f Ibid ., p. 129.
^ P* 132-134,
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"The only alternative to the admission that we do
knov/ things as they are in themselves is the admission
that we have no knov/ledge at all* ¥e cannot escape this
dilemma hy contrasting with *things-in- themselves * the
* objects of experience*, for if we know any thing about
the objects of experience, then v/e know what properties ,
the objects of experience have, as they are in themselve s
Moore *s interpretation of Kant has thus shifted from the view
that the thing-in-itself is logical and ultimate reality, to
the interpretation of the phenomenal realm as directly per-
ceived but independent reality. Again the only alternative
is solipsism.
p
A review of Joachim *s The ITature of Truth is of
importance chiefly because in it Moore sees the problem of
the internal! ty of relations, anticipated in his earlier
writings, in its full significance for absolute idealism.
He does not subject the notion to full analysis until 13
years later, but his criticism of monistic idealism rests
upon this logical problem. Otherwise the review is merely
a negative defense of his newly won position. Joachim has
rieeuit to deny, but failed to refute, th^ollowing propositions.
"1. That some facts are facts, and some truths true,
which never have been, are not now, and never will be
experienced all , and which are not timelessly exper-
ienced either.
•2. That some of the facts and truths which we
experience are facts, and are true, not only at the time
at which they are experienced but also either at times
at which they are not experienced at all, or else timelessly.
"3. That precisely the same fact or truth may at one
time be experienced by me when I am seeing the sea and am
not seeing a house, and at another time when I am not see-
ing the sea and am seeing a house." (The assertion of the
numerical identity of the act of perception, even when its
object changes.)^
^ Ibid
.
.
p. 136.
2 Mind
. 16 (1907), p. 229-235.
^ Ibid., p. 231,
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In his criticism of the new conception of truth developed
1
in William James’s Prag;matism
.
Moore returns to a defense
of his earlier logical objectivism, but also to a modification
of it in the empirical direction, and from this position
rejects James’s doctrine of the mutability, utili.ty, and
human origin of truth. The source of his understanding of
James is solely the latter’s Pragmatism
, which had just
appeared, for he overlooks entirely the nominalistic an.-phasis
and thinks only of the humanistic and valuational elements
in James’s theory of truth. His analysis has many original
and suggestive aspects, but we need consider only changes
implied in Moore’s own ideas.
a. He returns from his earlier logical objectivism to
the Aristotelian conception of truth. Truth is the corres^—
2
pondence of judgments with reality. Judgment is therefore
no longer a complex|in reality, as in the ’'Nature of Judgment",
but is a mental act. Reality is particular*. This is in
line with Moore’s newly attained empiricism.
b. When James regards truth as mutable, he is really
pointing out either (i) the mutability of words, or (iij the
reality of change or temporal process. In this latter
respect James is right, as opposed to "all those who deny the
reality of time" ( a^oore himself, following Bradley, had
done earlier). But truth itself is immutable;
"if we mean by an idea, not mere words, but the kind
of an idea which words express, any idea which is true at
one time when it occurs, would be true at any time when
it were to occur.
1
“Professor James’ Pragmatism". Proc', Arist. Soc.. 8
(1908). p. 33-78.
? ITjici .. p. 127-128.
^ Ibid
., p. 131, 144, 137.
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c* As to James’s emphasis on the human origin of truth,
it is a fact that the existence of all "beliefs depends on
68
previous events in our history; moreover we make the tuuth
of our beliefs when we really make corresponding alterations
in the world. But beyond these restrictions, truth itself
is an immutable, eternal relation between our judgments
and reality,
Moore thus has revised his earlier objectivism
by a correspondence theory of truth and the conviction that
judgments are mental acts, not objectively real-. But the
universals in judgment are independently reeJ., as well as
sensa, v/hich Moore usually interprets as temporal, spatial,
and particular. The problem of the relation of the two,
and of the nature of im^iiate experience of universals, is
not yet solved. If the relation is determined wholly by the
mental judgment, Moore’s thought is in danger of the subject-
ivism which he seeks to avoid.
Another impulse toward subjectivism had been dis-
cussed two years earlier in the most significant positive
study of this period, "The Nature and Reality of Objects of
Perception,**^ which consists of a cautious and analytic
argument merely for the posajDility of the realistic position,
a description of the more nominalistic methodology of real-
ism, and the f irst discussion of the problem of the relativity
of sense data, raised by C, A. Strong and J. S, Mackenzie
in their criticisms of the **Refutation**
,
a problem which will
later lead to a modification of Moore’s realism,
££0c. Arist. Soc. . 6 (1906), p. 68-128; Phil. St.,
p, 31-96, ’ — *
2 14 (1905), p. 174-189; 15 (1906), p, 308-328,
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The thesis of the paper is that our knowledge of other
selves, which, Moore still holds with Russell, is an inference
and not direct, since consciousness is private, is impossible
unless certain objects perceived directly have independent
existence’. Unless realism is true, knowledge of the existence
of other persons is impossible. He does not attempt to refute
solipsism beyond pointing out that no philosopher, seriously
considers it'i He rests his ease on the common sense position
that other selves do exist, and attempts to discover a
reason for it.
First it is necessary, in order to define what con-
stitutes a reason, to outline a more empirical logic for real-
ism, developing the logic of inference into which his simple
relational logic had developed end which had threatened his
pluralism in an earlier period, but with a new place for
inductive procedure, or generalization.
"A good reason for a belief is a proposition which
is true, and which v/ould not be true unless the belief
were also true. ”2
A genetic explanation is not a reason, nor need the belief
be deducible from its reason by forme.! deductive logic; the
reason need only imply that the belief is "positively pro-
bable"
.
Such a reason is commonly given by certain pro-
positions which are ’’obvious'* and may be assumed true -
"propositions, namely, which assert that one man
would probably not have certain perceptions which he
does have, unless some other man had certain particular
perceptions ."3
In the case of good reasons for the truth of certain
^ ^^il« St;, p; 46-47.
5 Ibid., p, 35.
^ IM^., p. 40-41, 47.
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judgments concerning existence (in this case, the existence
of other persons), the inference must be a generalization #
Hence it is necessary to examine the necessary, though not
the sufficient, conditions for a valid generalization,^
Fpr induction observation is necessary, but "there is a
sense in which no man can observe the perceptions, feelings,
2
or thoughts of any other man." So Moore's problem is capable
or more restricted statement - "^JVhat reason do my own pbsrerva-
tions give me for supposing that any perception whatever,
which I have, would probably not occur unless some other
' 3person had a certain kind of perception?"
Some philosophers, among them Reid, say there is
no such reason, but fail to remember that absence of reason
does not prove the falsity of the belief. Their denial of a
reason follows from their subjectivism, and they usually re-
fute themselves, Reid's realism rests on his uncritical broad-
ening of the meaning of "observe" and "perceive" to include
belief; he is really a subjectivist following Berkeley in
denying that we perceive matter, and Hume in denying existence
4
to other minds. This view, though logically possible, leads
to paradoxes.
The facts of "observation" or "direct perception" which
may serve as grounds for a generalization concerning existence
are of two kinds - sense data, "colors, moving or at rest,
sounds, smells, and all the rest", and "my perceptions of them?
^ IMd., 61-67.
§ P* ^3,
t »P*
*
^
. p. 71,
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But they can serve only if they exist or are real'. Existence
must mean more than perception, as it does, even for Berkeley;
all attempts to reduce reality (i) to perception, (ii) to
systematic connection, (iii) to purpose, involve a vicious
circle for they depend on a more ultimate conception of reeil-
ity. Existence is a simple "property'*, indefinable, hut
"certainly neither identical with, or inclusive of, that com-
1
plex one which we mean hy the words * is perceived'."
Both types of objects must be real to serve as
reasons for the generalization that I should not have certain
perceptions unless another person had had other perceptions,
and therefore exists. We cannot postulate the existence of
other persons from our own perceptions or retain a faith in
it because "it works? (Reid);
"unless some of the observed data which I have called
sense contents ^ exist, my ovm observations cannot give
me the slightest reason for believing that any^body
else has ever had any particular perception, thought,
or feeling,"^
Thus Moore argues that our faith in the existence of (a) other
persons, (b) material objects, implies the existence, in some
sense other than our preception of them, of sense data and
mental activity - further evidence that the conclusions of
the "Refutation" were valid and that the idealistic ijramiise
implies solipsism.
But certain positive idealistic arguments against
the independent reality of sense data have been advanced by
Strong, following Berkeley, and here demand Moore's attention.
He does not deny that their reality may depend on perception
i Ibid ., p. 77,78.
* Ibid
.
.
p. 88-89.

7S
by another than rae;^ hence his theory conflicts vifith objective
idealism only in suggesting "that things, which are not
spiritual, do sometimes exist, as really and as truly, as
things which are*" But the relativity of sense data is the
most serious objection to his theory. To this charge he gives
two answers,
a. The relativity of sense data to the physiological
system is irrelevant. It confuses the process by which we
'2
perceive with the fact of direct perception, Moore is a
parallelist,
b. The relativity of sense data rests on "the assumption
that, if a certain kind of thing* exists at a certain time
in a certain place, certain other kinds of things cannot exist
at the same time at the same place, " But though we may exjjer-
ience a thing as hot or cold, it may be only one in reality.
Moreover we may deny the assumption, A drop of blood may at
the same time be red, or yellow, or some thirct color, all in
3
"the same spatial area,**
Yet the real existence of sense data
,
though it
is implied in knowledge of other selves, cannot be proved^
it is a faith that is plausible because its opposite cannot
be proved,
"The more I look at objects around me, the more I
am unable to resist the conviction that what I see does
exist, as truly and as really as my perception of it.**^
The paper is positively, as the "Refutation" was nega-
tively, fundamental for the new realism. Though the reality
i J~bid , . p, 91.
$ I'bid .. p. 68,
A I~bid .. p. 92, 93, 94-95,
^ Ibid
.
.
p, 96,
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of sense data is essential as a ground for belief in the
existence of other people (an argument v/hich would have no
validity for those realists, among them Perry, who believe
that experience of other minds is direct), it is itself
merely a common sense assumption. Space and time are real;
relativity of perception may be resolved by spatial analysis;
perception is itself a spatial relation between mind and its
object. But though the case for Moore *s materialistic real-
ism has been tightened, he has found it necessary to depend
more and more on common sense intuitions, and the problem of
relativity has become pressing. These problems lead him to
the verge of subjectivism in the next two papers,
Moore now finds it necessary to defend his position
against Hume*s skepticism. He has asserted the independent
reality, not merely of sense data, but of material objects,
other persons, and with them, causal relation. between the
objects of experience. All of these Hume denied on empirical
premises. Hence the need of discovering the false "reasons”
or implications of Hume’s skepticism,^ His attempt is not
successful, and he finally admits that proof and disproof are
impossible, and that the dispute is onti between ultimate
assumptions. Of the three levels of Hume’s skepticism, he
wishes to refute only the last - that we can know nothing
beyond the reach of present observation and memory, since we
cannot know that things are causally connected,
"The only proof that we do knov/ external facts
lies in the simple fact that v^e do know them" and that
it can be shown that the skeptic "has no reason for
1 "Hume’s Philosophy", Phil . St.
.
p. 147-167,
U -Ji. v5 4 ,
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denying thein.**^
Thus Hume*s argument against causal inference reduces it to
custom, hut ’•custom may produce heliefs" and yet"not neces-
sarily produce them”; hence the beliefs may yet he trueU
Hume’s disproof of the”vulgar theory” (naive realism) is
not discussed except for the remark that ”I think his argu-
ments are obviously inconclusive.” His arguments against
causal inference from observation to external objects are
"not at all sufficient to prove either that he cannot know
any one object to be causally connected with any other or
2
that he cannot knov/ any external fact.”
This is obviously no refutation of Hume, but merely
the assertion that he himself
I
bs not refuted the opposing
view, which is still possible.
"There is no reason wh3^ I should not confidently
assert that I do really knov/ some external facts, although
I cannot prove the assertion except by simply assuming
that I do. I am, in fact, as certain of this as of auiy-
thing; and as reasonably certain of it.”^
Ho passage could better show the precarious logical foundation
of the doctrine of independence.
In opposition to Hume’s skepticism, Moore merely
indicates his view of the relation of the object of perception
to "material things".
a. The thing observed is caused by the external objects
4
"which we never observe "i*
b. ”What is to prevent an external object from being
5
like some object which we have formerly observed?" This view
^ IMd., p. 160.
X » P« 161, 163.
Ibid., p, 163.
? P- 162.
^ l^id.
,
p. 162.
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is not entirely consistent with the first as the two "objects"
are certainly unlike in one respect if one is the cause of
the other, Moore, however, has adopted the causal theory
of realism, along with certain comuon sense prepossessions,
c,In opposition to Hume’s empiricism toward "matters of
fact" (for Moore, Hume is a rationalist in regard to "relations
of ideas") Moore's intuitionalistic inclinations, evidenced
in his earliest work, lead him to seek a mode of knowing
"matters of fact" "neither by direct observation nor by
memory, nor yet as a result of previous observations."^ Here,
obviously, his empiricism and rationalism need sharper defini-
tion than he anywhere gives them; physical things are a
causal or analogical inference from sense-contents, yet in
some sense they must be directly intuited. For the first
time Moore’s new interpretation of Kant and his logical
objectivism are at odds; sense data begin to appear subjective,
and the real object directly known by thought. This tendency
is alternately denied and recognized in the follov/ing papers,
2
In the "Subject Matter of Psychology" Moore approaches
subjectivism even more closely, perhaps in reaction to the
extreme objectivism developed by other writers on the basis
3
of his papers of 1903 and 1906, This paper is also Moore’s
most direct attempt to definejthe nature of consciousness, which
he had thus far defined only as "awareness of" ot "activity"
as distinct from its object. However, his failure to include
it in the Philosophical Studies probably indicated that he
1 Ibid ., p. 167,
2
I^3?oc . Arist , Soc , . 10 (1910), p, 36-62,
Particularly the papers in Proc , Arist . Soc,
.
1907-
1910 by T. P. Nunn and S. Alexander, v/ho with J. Laird, re-
present the most extreme forms of English realism.
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later repudiated its tendencyjboward subjectivism. Though
opening up many possibilities as to what is mental, the paper
involved a possible surrender to idealism v/hich Moore was quick
to reject.
The most immediately certain mental fact is the mental
act, which must be separated from its object, since "what I
remember, what I v/ill, etc, may be in each case different,
yet what I mean by ’remembering* or ’willing* may be in each
case exactly the same."^ This universalizing * of mental act
proceeds so far that he suggests, with the American r ealists,
that the privacy of consciousness may be denied, finding
positive evidence in Morton Prince’s Sally, There are three
kinds of undoubtedly mental facts; (a) conscious acts, (b)
certain "qualities" of these acts, (c) collections of acts
which have some sort of unity. In these contentions Moore
seems to be directly opposing Alexander, (a) by refusing to
differentiate acts in correspondence to their objects, (b)
by distinguishing conscious act from mind, (c) by suggesting
that mind may be conscious not only of its own acts but of
others ’
,
But"the mind itself" is a far more doubtful mental
entity than its acts, Hume’s view of the mind as the sum
of its parts is simple and convincing*. But Hume fails to
account for the unity of mind, the "relation which makes the
mental act mine".
"I think, therefore, that there is something to be
said for the view that ^ am an entity, distinct from
^Proc . Arist . Soc,
. 10 (1910), p. 38.
2 Ibid
. , p, 43.
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every one of my mental acts and from all of them put to-
gether,
There are no conclusive arguments against the view **that this
entity which hears and sees and feels and thinks is some part
of my "body," The view that "mind is mental is only one
among several possible alternatives."^ Moore thus approaches
both the behavioristic and the relational view of consciousness
characteristic of American realism, maintaining, however, the
distinct character of conscious acts as opposed to objects.
Most amazing, however, are Moore’s concessions as to
the possible conscious nature of sense presentations. Stout
3had called them mental, though his account of knowledge other-
wise resembled that of Moore', Though sense data must be dis-
tinguished from mental acts and from qualitie^f mental acts,
their nature depends ultimately upon the question whether they
are only when we are conscious of thei?i, "It is a very diffi-
cult problem and there is argument on both sides." At least,
A
the evidence is not sufficient to prove them mental,
5', The Sensum-Thing Relation and Phenomenalism, Moore’s
common sense realism has been marked, thus far, by a more
adventui^ome intuitionalism, and by a tendency toward a
causal interpretation of the relation between sensum and thing
that conflicts with his intuitionalism. As a result there
is seen, in the last tv/o papers, a developing subjectivism
that threatens to undermine the bases of his realism. But
his doubt concerning the objective validity of sense data is
^ Ibid,, p, 54,
2 Ibid , , p. 54,
2 "Things and Sensations", Proc . Brit, Acad ,. 1905,
4 Moore, 0£. cit ,
.
p, 61,
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withdrawn in his next study, "The Status of Sense Data,"
Much of the paper is a mere restatement of previous conclu-
sions; its positive contribution consists of (a) an exact
formulation of what is meant by sense data of sensible (the
term which Moore now prefers), (b) a reaffirmation of the
independent reality of sensibles as well as of material ob-
jects, and (c) a scrutiny of the various theories of the re-
lation between sensibles and objects, resulting in his retention
of the causal interpretation,
Sensibles include (a) images (in the narrowest sense),
(b) sensory experiemes in dreams, (e) hallucinations, (d) after-
images, (e) as well as sensations proper, actually experienced
or capable of experience'. These are all distinct from the act
of experiencing, on the one hand, and from the object on the
other, and all "have some common intrinsic property, which we
p
recognize, but which, is unanalysable
The relation of sensibles to the mind is readily
defined, though the status of mind itself is more obscure
even than in the preceding study.
"The direct relation of sensible to when I
actually see or hear it, but not v/hen I only thinh of or
remember it, is that of ’direct apprehensionj" But "it
is quite possible that there is no entity whatever which
deserves to be called *1* or ’me'^or *my mind."^
The unity of ,mental acts may (a) consist of the fact that one
entity (l) directly apprehends in< each of them, or (b) it
1 Proc. Arist . Soc ., 14 (1914), p, 355-380, T3ie volume
on Ethi cs, IT. Y,; Holt, 1912, is of llttT'e significance for this
study, since it repeats, in supposedly more popular form, the
conclusions of the Principia. Ethica , Outstanding changes are
his increasing emphasis on intuitive knowledge of "matter of
fact" already reflected in the paper on Hume, and the subjec-
tivity of^judgment, shown in his discussion of James,
^
Moore, Phil4=3vp. 170-171.
P. 173, 174.
La
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may be such that this entity is different in every act; the
relation may be merely to "one another" or to something which
ought not to be called "me",^ "I see no reason whatever for
thinking that sensibles ever are experienced by us in any
other sense than that of being directly perceived by us."^
Moore does not discuss the relation in case of memory and
thought; evidently sensibles are not present in those cases*
To the question whether sensibles ever exist at times
when they are not being experienced, there is no good reason
for an affirmative answer save that the idealist^s reason for
the negative is inadequate, and that Moore has "a strong pro-
pensity to believe" that sensibles "still exist unchanged -
-
- provided that the physical conditions outside my body re-
3
main unchanged." The argument that sensibles are relative
to our nervous system is fallacious, for it does not distin-
guish between the existence of the sensibles which we exper-
4ience and our experience of them * To account positively
for the relativity of sense qualities, Moore suggests that
(a) in cases such as color blindness, two sensibles may
occupy the same space, or (b) they may exist in different
places^ ot (c) some may exist in merely private space as
contrasted v/ith physical space ( based on Russell’s revival
of the old Newtonian distinction between absolute and relative
space )
•
The entire problem of the relation of sensibles to
physical objects is puzzling.
1
2
3
4
5
6
Ibid .
Ibid.
Ibid
.
Ibid .
Ibid
.
Ibid.
p. 174-175
p. 177.
p. 182.
p.l83.
p. 184.
, p. 187.
Some sensibles are in private
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space, while physical things are in physical space. They are
not identical, nor is the sensible identical with a part of
the object. Knowledge of objects consists of direct appre-
hension of sensibles and the perception of relations between
them. Four theorjies may be advanced as to the nature of the
object seen when sensibles are apprehended. Most of themfail
to explain the fact that the coin may appear to be elliptical,
but really is round,
a. Only the first dispenses with the causal relation
between object and sensible - it is v/hat Moore later calls
the Mill-Russell theory, that objects are|merel3^ the **pemanent
possibilities of sensations",^ On this theory an object may
be said to exist and have permanent properties only in an "out-
2
rageously Pickv/ickian sense". Like idealism, it makes reality
unlike the coim-ion sense notion of it,
b. The reraaininig theories are causal, though a causal
inference to the object is impossible, events in my. eyes and
nerves also being the cause of sensibles'. The first of these,
the idealist interpretation of object as spiritual^ is too
3
outrageously Pickwickian,
c. The identification of the object with the sensibles,
the position of American realism, would make it in^ossible to
ascribe permanent qualities which are not experienced to the
object, Moore *s causal interpretation of/the American school
is not valid,
d. The remaining view, which Moore tentatively adopts,
i Ibid , . p, 189,
i I~bid . . p, 191.
IMd., p. 193,
y.
> 5;
tU3
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is ’’roughly - - - identical vdth Locke’s view.”^ The real
ohjecl^hich causes the sensa has only primary qualities, the
sensa alone have secondary qualities* But the ohjective
nature of the- sensa is affirmed as against Locke, with the
suggestion again occurring that "none 4xist ’any where’ in
2physical space” anj'^ more than ’•in the mind”. Only some
resemble the phj^sical objects which are their source.
This vie?^ leads Moore to a final doubt. He has charged
idealism v/ith skepticism concerning the real object. Does
his ov/n view make the object capable of being known? ^^e
ansv/ers that by his view knowledge is possible if we discard
our prepossessions against immediate knowledge of objects
other than sensibles.
”I must know immediately, in the case of some
sensibles, both thay they^have a source, and what the
shape cf this source is.”
So Moore, to save his realism, once more abandons empiricism
for a pre-Humean intuitionalism. But now he needs a criterion
to distinguish valid from invalid sensibles.
But this causal solution of his problem is leading
Moore into a dualism an(3ji)henomenalism that are not in
harmony with his thought as a whole. Hence he abandons it
again for another solution, suggested by this demand for a
di rect intuition, not merely of the sensible but of the
physical thing itself. To take this demand seriously would
mean either to identify in some v/ay the sensible and the
physical thing, or to make the sensible entirely phenomenal.
^ Ibid
. .pJL95.
2 Ibid
., p. 195.
^ Ibid.
.
p. 196.

8£
In Moore’s remaining papers 'both of these solutions appear
alternately.
The next seems thoroughly phenoraenalistic. It is a
contribution to a symposium on ’’The Implications of Recog-
nition^ in v/hich Moore defends Russell’s theory of knowledge
by acquaintance of past events, against Miss Edgill’s charge
that it is inconsistent with the principle of causality in
consciousness. Contrary to his previous theory of memory,
Moore agrees with Russell, and says of Miss Edgill’s views,
"They show, if they show anj^thing, solely that
there are grounds for suspecting of falsehood his
theory that our sense-data are ’physical’ in a
certain sense. ”2
Recognition of past events is immediate, but sensa. and objects
are not to be identified as Russell does; sensa are other
than objects and merely ”represent" the latter more or less
’’accurately.'* They do not exist apart from perceptual
judgment and are changed qualitatively by the act of attention,^
Thus Moore once again closely approaches representationalism
and the subjectivity of sense data.
In the next paper, however, also a contribution to
a symposium^ he reverts to a clear assertion of the objective
reality of sense data and a tendency to identify them v/ith
the real object. All the materials of sense are not affections,
either of the knowing mind or of an;^^ mind, though Moore dis-
cusses only the epistemological issue, Not all presented sensa
are merely affections of ray mind; those sensa are real which
J Proc, Arist, Soc, , 16 (1916), p. 201-224.
IMd,
,
p . 223.
5 P* ~12, 222,
^
"Are the Materials of Sense Affections of the Mind?”
Proc
. Arist. Soc.
. 17 (1917), p. 418-429,
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are "localized and referred to an object", i, e. those v/hich
we naturally identify v/ith an object and which do not change
with the act of attention. Experience itself offers a dis-
tinction between those data which cease to exist with the
act of attention ( a flash of lightning) and those which do
not (a patch of color).
The problem on v/hich he has fluctuated in these
papers nov/ leads Moore to investigate again a more fundament-
al problem, the nature of reality, and to use his new formu-
lation of this problem in restating his theory of value in
the light of his more nominalistic outlook. Though logically
dependent on his theory of reality, he turns to the problem
1
of value first, a discussion which involves a reformulation
of the problem of necessity. As in his former work, value,
far from being subjective ("merely expressing a psychological
assertion to the effect that some particular individual or
class of individuals either actually has, or would, under
certain circumstances, have, a certain kind of attitude to-
wards the thing in question") is not only objective (as evol-
utionary and naturalistic ethics make it) but "intrinsic*
or at least a fixed relation to a property v/hich is intrinsic;
"whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses
it, depends solel3^ on the intrinsic nature of the thing in
question. It follows that one thing must always have the
same intrinsic value, and that things exactly alike possess
3
value in exactly the same degree. Intrinsic value in this
^
"The Conception of Intrinsic Value", Phil . St.
.
p, 253-
275; cf, p. vif,
2 Ibid
. ,
p . 260
,
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sense implies a type of necessity and possibility that is
neither purely causal and empirical, nor purely logical!.
Value would be value, as yellow would be yellow, "even if it
existed in a universe in which causal lav/s were quite differ-
ent from what the^^are in this one."^ It is an unconditional
necessity depending upon the internality of certain relations,
though ma.ny relations are external, among them the subjective
predicates and spatial, temporal relations. Beauty and goodness
are thus both dependent on the intrinsic natureoof things, but
have a status different from such "intrinsic properties" as
yellowness which describe the intrinsic natures of things as
a
values do not. The element of novelty in this paper is its
demand fo3^ type of unconditional necessity neither logical
nor empirical but involved in the nature of reality. It re-
flects the demand of realism, as it becomes more empirical,
for a new logic, a logic of reality such as absolute idealism
provides*. For Moore, because of his definition of logic, tliis
ontological necessity cannot be logical; because of his theory
of intrinsic value as independent of consciousness, it cannot
be determined by mental activity; he can only relegate it to
the limbo of"ultimate and further indefinable relations" which
is of such frequent usefulness in his thought. Here is a
possible point for idealistic supplementation.
The "Conception of Reality"^ belies the promise of its
title. Moore needs a definition of reality which will enable
him to distinguish between the reality of physical things, and
^ Ibid ,, p, 268,
2 Ibid ,, p, 270-272, 274,
3 Proc, Arist, Soc ,
.
18 (1918), p. 101-121,
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that of sensa, to say nothing of the intrinsic nature of
values^. But this paper is largely limited, to an eristic cri-
ticism of Bradley *s conception of the reality of time* No-
where does the sterility of Moore’s negative method appear
more clearly* Making no effort to understand Bradley’s positive
conception of a graduated reality in which time may possess
phenomenal reality and yet he unreal ”in the character which
it e^^hits", he stoops to matching sentence with sentence
and interpreting them in relation to his own problem* Bradley’s
dilemma, he finds, lies in his distinction between existence
and reality*
"He sees (what is perfectly true) that ’Time is
unreal’ must be consistent with ’We do think of Time,’
he thinks (falsely) 'that ’We do think of Time’ must imply
in some sense ’There _is such a thing ad^Time
,
’ and finally
infers (correctly) from this true and this false premiss,
that there must be some sense of the proposition •There
is such a thing as Time’ which is consistent with ’Time
is unreal* ’"1
Moore is by this time too much of an empiricist and nominalist
to tolerate the distinctions of the American realists between
existence and reality, or "being" and "being real*"
But it is Moore’s positive conclusion which is of interest
to us* "The most important and the commonest sense" of the term
real is "being a property of something" or "being something*"
Unreal is equivalent to ’imaginary" *^ Reality is thus not a
term tc be applied to any conception v/hatever; only to con-
cepts which belong to something and to the pe-rticular things
to which they belong. Things are real; universals (including
sensa by implication) only secondarily so'.
o » St*
,
p, 218.
P* 211-213*
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This paper provides the "basis for a closer definition
of the reality of sensa, upon which he has insisted so
consistently*^' The object of his next study is the relation
expressed in such judgments as ’’This is an inkstand”, which
express a relationship hetvfeen a sensuia and a material object,
and thus, if true, involve the existence of”material things
or physical objects'! Perception is direct ancjfeelf-evident,
needing no external criterion, but at the same time it may
2involve inference, Moore claims also, dn introspective
evidence, to be directly aware, with ”no difficulty whatever",
of the subject of the judgment, a sensum, as distinct from
3the physical object. In fact, the definition of a sensum
is that it is the ultimate subject of a perceptual judgment.
It alone is immediately given; the material object is knov/n
4
only by description.
Concerning the relationship between sensum and thing,
the old views are again reviewed. The sensum is obviously
5
not identical v/ith the object. It may be identical with a
part of the surface of the material object, though the re-
lativity of sense data militates against this view. It
cannot explain the identity/ of the object in the face of
changes in the data.
As a way out of the problem of relativity, Moore now
suggests that sense data may not really be relative and changing
but may only ’’seem" sa. Differences between sensa related to
6
the same object are only appearances, not real. This manifestly
introduces a dualism which makes his earlier theory of direct
^
"Some Judgments of Perception". Proc, Arist, Soc,. 19
(1919), p. 1-30,
? St, . p, 227, 3 Ibid, . p, 229-230,
^
P* 234^235. ^ Ibid, . p. 233-235.
^ Ibid
., p. 245-246*,
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iinpossilDle
.
apprehension of independent sensihles^, Moore explains the
"basis upon v/hich a presented sensura may seem to "be other than
it is as "an ultimate, not further analyza"ble
,
kind of psycho-
logical relation," He wisely admits, however, that in making
this distinction he may ""be talking sheer nonsense" "but is
"no longei^l^hle to see" that he is.
The causal theory of the relation "between sensum and
object is now abandoned as "utterly untenable" since the
presented object "has a whole series of causes."^ Another
suggestion may be that an "ultimate, not further definable
relation" of "being a manifestation of" exists between
sensum and object, "though I cannot find the slightest sign
o
that I am in fact aware of any such relation." The only
plausible alternative to these views, however, is the Mill-
Russell theory that the object is the permanent possibility
of sensations, which Moore still finds himself unable to
accept. He finally concludes that the part-whole relation
must be retained in the sense that the sensum is a directly
presented "property", and that perception is a judgment that
there is something which possesses this property, though the
identical property of a thing may seem different.
Once more, Moore’s thought seems to be encountering
new difficulties. He has succeeded in preserving the reality
of the sensum as "belonging to", "a part of", or "a property
of" a material thing, only to be led by the relativity'- of sense
data to surrender his theory of direct apprehension for a
^ I^id ,
.
p, 249,
2 Ibid
., p. 249-250.
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’•psychological relation” hy which sensa appear as different
from what they are, Sensa as experienced are thus ‘becomijng
phenomenal, while in relation to things they are resembling
universale more and more'.
The essay oh “External and Internal Relations“^hrings
to a close this period, in which Moore has reexamined his
theory of reality in relation to the problem of knowledge and
of values, and represents also his last systematic attack of
the logical foundations of absolute idealism, first developed
in the papers from 1900 to 1904, His position is that though
some relations are internal, others are as certainly external
to the terms related. But his logic has approached the
predicative logic of Bradley, A fact is, as Bradley points
out, not merely identical with its constituents, although this
does not determine the internality of the relation it involves;
in this sense "facts are unities which are not completely
analysable .” ^ Internality must mean more than this s^moptic
character of facts, and more than the view v/hich holds that
relations modify their terms. That this view is false is shown
by the most important application, historically, of the problem,
the knowing process. That the knov/ledge relation alters its
object "is certainly not true,” Alii, spatial relations are
purely external.
The doctrine of internalvrelations rests on a confusion
between relations and relational properties , the real claim
of the dogma being that a relational property modifies "the
term which has it.” Relations are obviously atomic and inde-
^ Proc . Arist , Soc, . 20 (1920), p. 40-63,
2 Phil , St,
, p. 276-309, p. 278.
^ Ibid
.
.
p, 280',
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pendent of things, (This illustrates the increasing duality
between the real and the logical in Moore’s thought,)
Internality depends on necessity. If this necessity were
strictly logical, all relations would be external, for a
necessary connection between a relational property and
the identity of the object cannot be established. To express
in the terminology of the "Refutation" what UooTejnoYi develops
with the symbols of mathematical logic, the judgment that
"not having P" implies "other than A" is not an analytic
judgment as the principle of internal relations would make it
(as "being red" implies "being colored"). Internal relations
must rest on an inner necessity; external relations are "matters
of fact",^
The other less extreme interpretation of the doctrine
of internal relations, that internal relations determine merely
qualitative differences, not nuraer-cal ones, leads to the
Leibnizian doctrine of the "Identity of Indiscernibles", which
is also false. As in his earlier criticism, Moore holds that
numerical and conceptual identity must be distinguished,
Moore’s emerging conception of reality expressed in this
essay in opposition;’ to Russell’s analysis of the same problem
holds that things have a nature or essence v/hich consists of
qualitie s as distinct from relational properties which are
2
not grounded in the term or its qualities^. This approaches
the position of critical realism’s distinction between substance
and essence and serves also to illustrate the rising phenomenal-
o P« 303,
^ IMd,, p, 308,
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ism of his thought, although elsewhere in the essay he reflects
the position developed in "Some Judgments of Perception” --
that sense qualities are identical with part of things,^
Moore *s solution of the problem of relations is thus consist-
ent with his early essay on "Identity”, hut reflects a return
to a predicative logic which finds the basis of identity ex-
plicitly in the distinction betv/een a thing’s qualities and
its relational properties*
The collection of essays made by Moore and published
o
in 1922"^indicates the elements which he himself retained in
his thought at that time, although he explicitly states that
they do not reflect a consistent position* He has omitted
those papers which showed the greatest tendency tov/ard sub-
jectivism, and seems to have flortified his nominalistic, concnon
sense realism, for the tL me being, in the theory that sensa
are parts of or properties of material things. It remainsr
to cha.racterize the writings of the last decade, in which
the tendency\toward phenomenalism continues*
6* The Phenomenalism of Moore’s Latest Logical Studies *
Save for the enlightening essay on ”A Defense of Coimncn Sense"
Moore’s recent studies, largely contributions to symposia,
are concerned with special logical problems arising from the
epistemological position of realismi* Changes in his system
can thus only be inferred indirectly* In general these point
to an increasing phenomenalism, the beginnings of which have
^ I'bid
.
,
p . 281
.
2 Philosophical Studies
.
The concluding essay in this
collection, an address on "The Mature of Moral Philosophy", is
a popular restatement of the moral implications of his value
theory,
3 Contemporary British Philosophy
.
London: Macmillan,
1925* ii,pJ.91-223*
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already been noted in his suggestions (a) that differences
between experience of the same spatial sensa are phenomenal
and due to some indefinable psychological relation, (b)
that the sensum may itself be phenomenal, a manifestation of
the real thing. There is also a tendency\to consider mind
from the relational view of James and the American realists.
Beyond these, the tendency to define sensa as universals
seems to point back to the first period of Moore’s thought,
except that his materialism is retained.
In his contribution to a symposium on "Knowledge by
Acquaintance”^ there is no longer knowledge by acquaintance
without judgment, as Russell had contended. All perception
is judgment. In 1921, criticizing J, W,Scott’s paper on
. 2
"Is the Concrete Universal the True Type of Universality,?"
Moore reveals the idealistic logic he is now mainly interested
in refuting, the type resting on the dogma that "the universal
is the real" and "contains its particulars," Universal is
synonymous with characteristic, property, predicate, or attri-
bute', Sensa are universals and in this sense cannot contain
each other. In discussing them, Moore now stresses their
reference to mind and recognizes fully the significance of
3
their relativity. Differences in appearances of the same-
thing are no longer phenomenal in respect to the sensa, the
sensa themselves are different and relative in reference to
things. Though he still thinks that this makes only some
sensa appearances, and speaks of appearances being contained
^ Su£, Arist , Soc, . 2 (1919), p. 179-194,
2 Proc, Arist, Soc , . 20 (1920), p. 132-140,
3 Ibid,
, p. 134-136,
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in things ( in spite of his criticism, years earlier, of the
idealists' use of the notion of content) he feels "surprised
that one could he certain about it*"^
Criticizing Laird's paper on "The Character of the
2Cognitive Act” Moore agrees with him in distinguishing
between act and object of perception, but disagrees in denying
that each mental act has a unique and peculiar "content".
Cognizing is an act of relationship between a sense datum and
a universal’. Both are objects constitutive of it,
"My present seeing of this sense datum is something
the existence of which follows from the fact that I am
now seeing it. But, so far as I can see, the only thing
which follows from that fact is the present holding of a
relation of a certain kind between this sense datum and
some character, I am v/illing to admit that the relation
in question may possibly be one which consists in their
both being related in a certain way to a third entity,
v/hich is what I am now calling '!' v/hen I say that am
seeing this; though it seems to me possible that what I
call '!' is nothing other than the event which consists
in the relation holding between them, on the lines of „
James’s view that^the present thought is the only thinker,"
It is not clear that this revision of his theory of conscious-
ness is to be regarded as permanent.
Two years later appears a discussion of a question
related to that of the symposium of 1920, "Are the Character-
istics of Particular Things Universal or Particular?","^ attack-
ing Stout's thesis that " every character v/hich characterizes
a concrete thing is particular," A concrete thing may or may
not "really" have the color "which it presents to me,” Sensa
as indicating their object may thus be mere appearances or
real'.
i Ibid ,, p. 137.
J Pro£. Arist .Soc . , 21 (l92l) p. 132-140,
? I~bid . .pJ.39,
^ Sup. Arist. Soc ., 3 (1923), p. 95-114.
r.-f
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This remains the tendency of the papers of 1926 and 1927,
“The Nature of Sensible Appearances”^ and "Facts and Iroposi-
2
tions*" Moore agrees with Broad that sensation is "a comi^lex
whole that is analysahle into an act of sensing directed upon
an object, v/hich may be called a sensum” and that "whenever
v/e see a physical object A under the stated conditions, then
the sense datmu corresponding to A, of vdiich we are directly
aware, is never identical either with A itself, or with the
part of A*s surface which we are seeking, or with anything
else which is a part of A in the plain sense in which my
3
thumb is a part of my hand." Thus ail of Moore *s previous
views of the sensum-thing relation are discarded for a type
of phenomenalism which still stresses the reality of the
sensum but makes it a manifestation of some kind. His interest
shifts again to the relation of sensum, universal, and mind,
and his logic becomes mentalistic. The paper on "Facts and
Propositions" considers the relation between two series of
facts - judgments and the judging process. The relation
between them is that of correspondence. More recently still
Moore has restated the meaning of direct and indirect knowledge
4
in harmony with his growing phenomenalism. Knowledge is
"a certain faculty" of mind,
'•An actualized knowledge of a given fact, which
you have at a given time, will be ’indirect’ if and
only if it is in this sense ’based upon’ an actualized
knowledge, which you have within the same specious pre-
sent
.
of some other fact."'^
^ Sup. Arist.Soc,. 6 (1926) .n, 179-190; ^Ibid.
,
7
(1927), p. ^71-296:
3 Sup. Arist.Soc., 6 (1926), p, 183.
4 "Indirect Knowledge". Sup. Arist
. Soc,. 9 (1929).
p. 19-51.
^
. P. 27.
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Direct knowledge is far more inclusive than in earlier writings,
just as sense data have been growing more complex.
That Moore does not, however, mean to surrender his
realism and its basis in common sense intuitionalism the out-
line statement of his position in Contemporary British Philo -
sophy
.
already referred to, shows'. It is more illuminating
than his other writings, moreover, in revealing the motives
and interests that find logical expression in his thought'.
There is a general faith in the universality of certain
existential judgments, and the emphasis on the in^ortance
of realism in explaining the knowledge of other persons.
Physical things are primary reality and are known directly.
Experience is more readily reducible to jjhysical things than
physical things to experience. Ideas of God and immortality,
and all other viev/s which threaten the independent existence
of physical things, space and time, are to be rejected. The
sensiun has less reality than things,
”I think it quite possible that some philosophers
(including myself in the past) have used these terms
(sense data and sensa) in senses such that it is really
doubtful whether there are any such things."^
He is still unable to accept or reject the liillfRussell view
of the relation of sense datum to thing.
It should be obvious that Moore is far from having
achieved system in his thought. He reflects all possible
viewpoints, methodological, epistemological, metaphysical,
open to realism, and accepts none in an^^ v/ay other than
^ Contemporary British Philosophy
, ii, p, 218,
mp^
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tentative. Proceeding from realism to nominalism, from
rationalism through empiricism hack to intuitionalism, from
analysis to common sense, his thought offers a few fixed and
unchangeable certainties. Chief of them are its negative
aspects - the rejection of naturalism and of idealism.^- and
his theory of intrinsic value. Positively he is driven, hy
his efforts to keep his system from splitting at the seams,
from logical pluralism to the substance-attribute metaphysics
of pre-Berkeleian speculation, only to modify that in favor
of phenomenalism. The realism on the basis of v/hich he
criticized idealism itself grounded on the problem of the
relativity' of sense data'. He achieved logical coherence only
to recognize the demands of empirical epistemology, and defined
identity in reality only by reintroducing dualism at another
point. In a true sense his thought may be said to be pre-
Berkeleian, passing from Plato through Aristotle and scholas-
ticism to Reid and Locke - a development that is instructive
for the understanding of the difficulties in realistic thought.
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CHAPTER III
r
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERRY’S THOUGHT
The incompleteness and dialectic movement of Moore’s
realism stands in sharp contrast to the unity of position char-
acteristic of the works of R, B. Perry, merely implicit in his
early critical papers hut emerging more clearly as the details
are developed in successive studies. He confesses:
’’that when, for the purpose of recovering the
past, I re-read my earliest writings, they impress
me as extremely convincing, affording cn unexpected
confirmation of my present philosophical bias.”^
Rather than a dialectic development, then, his thought repre-
sents the gradual emergence and practical application of a sys-
tem rooted in four or five problems of major interest among
which his early work alternates: (l) a dissatisfaction with
idealism, particularly absolutism, which led him to critical
historical investigation; (2) an appreciation of science,
particularly its objectivity; (3) an interest in the humaniza-
tion of religion; (4) a desire to restate the problem of ethics
and of value theory; (5) a deep concern for the status of psy-
chology. His work is thus not only more systematic than Moore’s
but broader and more completely, though no more firmly, oriented
historically - and, it must be added, less cautious and thorough
This difference is reflected in the method of writing. Like
Moore’s, most of his work has appeared in journals, but almost
all such independent studies have been organized, in intervals
of from three to seven years, and published, not merely col-
lectively, but as systematic unities.
^Contemporary American Philosophy ; K. Y. : Macmillan,
1930. ii. p. 187,
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Yet, though his realism is more systematic and less con-
cerned with controversial details than Moore’s, it, too, runs
afoul of the problems which led to the readjustments which Moore
had to make. It is the thesis of this chapter that what Moore
seeks to accomplish by constant revision. Perry accomplishes
by a certain elasticity which his system possesses by virtue of
its ambiguities - his use, to use Moore’s phrase, of Pickwickian
senses. Thus his logic shifts with his varying emphases, from
relational to pragmatic, his psychology from narrow behaviorism
to personalism, his theology from humanism to theism, his value
theory from subjective to normative, his metaphysics itself
from a positivistic logistic emphasis to a common sense realism.
The Sources of Perry’ s Thought . Perry himself has
recently outlined the significant factors in his philosophid
training and development. ^ His native New England inheritance
included "a vague eagerness ’to do good,’" an eagerness which
"an intense adolescent religious experience" led him at first
to identify with the Christian program, and 'which, he confesses,
"has sustained me ever since," His undergraduate work at
Princeton, "where an emeritus McGosh still walked the campus,
and where ’Jeremy’ Ormund
,
ponderous, high-minded, unintelligi-
ble, accustomed the ear and the pen to a polysyllabic vocab-
ulary," was by his own admission, merely "pre-natal" though one
wonders if the Scotch realism and Ormund did not create within
him a leaning toward realism and away from absolute idealism.
At any rate it was his graduate study at Harvard, where
he received his A. M. in 1897 and his Ph. D. in 1899, a year later
^Qp
. cit .
, p. 187-189.
Ir
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than '.T. P. Montague and two years before ii. B. Holt, his real-
istic colleagues, which was decisive, not merely for his career
but for his thought. Transition to Harvard was "an abrupt transi-
tion from faith to criticism."
"The vocation -of the ministry was gradually
transformed, without reaction or bitterness, into
that of the teacher and scholar.”
After teaching for a year at '•'Williams, and two years at Smith,
Perry returned to Harvard as instructor in 1902, and has re-
mained there except for a short period of service during the
war.
An examination of the department of philosophy in the
nineties reveals the factors which led Perry and his associates
into realism. Positivism was in the air, along with that de-
ceptive faith in the objectivity and value of scientific method
that James, his teacher, helped render less dogmatic. The stu-
dent of philosophy was confronted by one fundamental choice -
James and Royce. The choice was that between a modified em-
piricism and a modified rationalism, between pluralism and abso-
lute idealism, between a new psychological approach and a tra-
ditional epistemology, between the flippancy v;‘ith which Creighton
charged James and a veneration for tradition. Though Perry and
his associates cast their lots with James, it was not without
being influenced by Royce and by the other members of the de-
partment. Palmer and MUnsterberg advanced value theories of a
i)\ constructive, idealistic type, '^’he religious interest was
fostered not merely by James but by Royce, whose investigations
in the new relational logic delivered them from pragmatism,
though that did not make t-.j idealism the more attractive to them.
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Santayana was already showing the possibility of a realistic
metaphysics based on scholastic models - a combination of Platonism
and materialism. Added to the influence of these teachers, the
influx of contemporary European thought, particularly two wings
of the Neo-Kantians , , one of which Munsterberg represented, the
empirio-criticism of Mach and Avenarius
,
and, somewhat later,
the logical atomism of Russell.
In regard, then, to the most significant historical ante-
cedents, Perry and Moore differ distinctly. Moore begins with
a Platonization of the rationalistic tradition culminating in
Kant. Even the empiricism of the period after 1900 is mediated
by the intuitionalistic Scotch school. Perry, on the other hand,
belongs in the empirical tradition of Bacon, Locke, Berkeley,
and Hume, mediated in two lines - most directly throi:g,h J. S,
Mill and James, less directly, and with a positivistic and
scientific emphasis by Mach and the German empiricists. But
as Moore had to supplement his rationalism with empiricism.
Perry supplements his empiricism with a rationalistic, Platonic
tendency, different grounds for which were provided by Royce
and Santayana.
The direct influence of Moore upon Perry cannot be defined
with any exactness. For his refutation of idealism Perry is
unquestionably indebted to Moore’s "Refutation," which he re-
viewed in 1904. But so are all other neo-realists, though
Moore’s criticism is not without American parallels. The
realistic logic and "logical atomism" is mediated by Russell,
who arrived at it contemporaneously with Moore but probably
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independently . 1 The American realists were directly aware of
their debt to Russell in 1912,^ Holt’s theory bein^ a develop-
ment of Russell's save for the theory of consciousness, which
Russell adopted from the American school.^ There are sometimes
striking parallels in the tv/o thinkers. Perry begins his crea-
tive thought with a criticism of Kant’s notion of freedom that
repeats the criticism of Moore, v/ritten two years earlier. Ferry’s
ethical, religious, and axiological views on the other hand have
little in common v/ith Moore’s, whose conception of intrinsic
value he frequently criticizes. The interest in the logic of
relations had been stimulated at Harvard by 1. 3. Pierce and
Josiah Royce. The traditions of the two men are different, and
hence their development is. relatively independent. There seem
to have been only the interrelations one would expect between
two contemporary thinkers of different countries. Moore con-
sidered the theories of consciousness and of physical things
advocated by Perry and his associates, only to reject them,
while Perry s^mipathized with Moore’s general emphasis but re-
jected the conclusions, even of his famous "Refutation.” It
remains to consider the positive tendencies of thought whose
influence is reflected in Perry.
a. By the last decade of the nineteenth century the re-
action against Hegelianism was rapidly gathering momentum.
That Jaiiies
,
as Russell points out, was in the nineties "almost
the only eminent figure, except among the very old, that stood
out against German idealism"^ is far from true, the American
^Skeptical Essays
,
quoted in D. S. Robinson’s Anthology of
Recent Philosophy, p. 292.
2The Hevf Realism
, p. 137.
^Cf. Hasan, Op . cit .
, p. 200, 229.
^Q,uoted in D. S. Robinson, Op
. cit
. , p. 292
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disciples of Lotze having been as zealous in their attack of
the reputed intellectualism and indisputable monism of the
absolutists as was James. ^ Pluralism and voluntarism were in
the air, the English "personal idealists" at Oxford and the
descendents of the spiritualists in France having their Amer-
2 3ican parallels in G. H. Hov/ison, G. M. Bakewell, H. P. Bowne
,
and preeminently James himself. Sven Royce
,
the greatest ab-
solutist in America, strove more freely than his predeoessors
to do justice to the
'
plurality and discontinuity of the world
- particularly the finiteness of personality, though his epis-
temology resulted in a demand for monism. His influence, on
Perry, however, was negative. The anti-monistic and anti-
absolutistic element in this movement of thought, but not its
anti-intellectualism (best expressed in Jamefe^s works), Perry
and the other Harvard realists appropriated.
b. But stronger than this voluntaristic and personalistic
motive, in Perry’s thought, is an opposing one which leads him
to naturalize his voluntarism. The emphasis upon scientific
objectivity and the demand for an adequate philosophical foun-
dation for science J^'an interest which Perry developed inde-
pendently of James, since it led him to supplement his em-
piricism. The empirical foundation given scientific method
by J. S. Mill had failed to provide a basis for the objectivity
^Cf. the unpublished evidence gathered by G.G.Gell on the
bitterness with which B.P. Bowne attacked Hegel in his early
essays, stronger, if possible, than the attack of James in "On
Some Hegelisms."
^The Limits of Evolution
,
R.Y.: Macmillan, 1901 . Gf. his
debate with Royce, The Gonception of Godc , H.Y. 1897.
^"Pluralism and Monism’’. PhilT Rev. 7 (1898), p. 355-373.
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of scientific truth. Karl Pearson, the empiricist, and
Poincare, the Kantian, alike had failed to bridge the gap be-
tween their epistemological subjectivism and their naturalism.
Pragmatism was itself dogmatic. Meanwhile the naturalists had
extended the conclusions of science into invalid realms. There
was need on the one hand, to fix the limits of science, and on
the other to establish its objectivity. The Kantian basis, upon
which this was being most commonly done
,
established the
universality and necessity of scientific truth, but sacrificed
the independent reality of its object. It made scientific truth
"partially true or real,” not "simply parts of reality,"^ for
it achieved logical objectivity only by introducing the dis-
tinction between phenomena and reality. Its error, according
to Perry, was its dependence on the Cartesian dualistic epis-
temology. Metaphysical objectivity had been incompletely
achieved by Mach from the empirical viewpoint, and by the
mathematical logicians by emphasizing the relational structure
of the world, both on a basis of immediate experience. These,
then, were the two directions, according to Perry, from which
science was to be justified and assigned its place in experience
"Pragmatic experiraentalism and dogmatic idealism signify more
or less consistently the abstract isolation of the scientific
and philosophical motives."^ Mow this bifurcation is to be
transcended.
^ P. P. T. p. 108. Gf. Perry’s first essay "The Abstract
Freedom of Kant”, and his comment In Contemporary American
Philosophy
,
ii
,
p. 189.
2 In criticism of «Vard
,
Pearson, and Mlinsterberg,
Jour. Phil
., 1 (1904) , p. 170.
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c. The most direct line of historic antecedents is to be
traced to traditional empiricism, mediated through 7\filliam
James and the writings of Ernst Mach. The role played in
Perry’s thought by sense data as constitutive not merely of
consciousness but of reality was anticipated by Hune himself,
as was pointed out by Mont&gue in 1905.^ This position was
explicitly developed, as we have seen, by Mach, whose writings
Perry acknowledges as deserving "to be numbered among the
classics of modern realism," although he recognizes that they
are "colored by the author’s naturalistic predilections" and
that Mach "neglects the logical aspect of knowledge" - the im-
portance of "certain more fundamental formal relationships
p
such as implication, order, causation, time, and the like."
For this supplement to empiricism Perry found authority,
not only in the new logic, but in the "radical empiricism" of
William James - the discovery that "the relations between things,
conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of
direct particular experience, neither more so or less so, than
the things themselves . "^ James’s limitation of knowledge to
the immediately experienced, the fundamental nominalism of his
doctrine that ideas are to be tested by direct knowledge, and
his view that relations are immediately experienced as the facts
of sense, all open the way for the "neutral" pluralism of the
realists. These positions, as Perry points out,"^ were implicit
^"A Neglected Point in Hume’s Philosophy," Phil. Rev., 14
(1905), p. 30-39. Of. P.P.T., 306-307.
Sp.P.T.
,
p. 310.
^The Meaning of Truth
, p. xii.
^P.P.T.
,
p. 365-366.
i
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in the Principles of Psycholor.y , although they were still inter-
preted phenomenalis tically
,
the oommon sense realism of the Meaning
of Truth , ^ and Pluralistic Universe undoubtedly being influenced
by the realism of Perry himself. James’s nominalistic pragmatism
Perry adopts and interprets realistically.^ He rejects the "subjec-
tivistic pragmatism" of Schiller, the difference of whose System
from his own James himself did not, according to Perry, fully com-
prehend. James has saved pragmatism from absolutism by interpreting
it realistically— by recognizing, in distinction from Bergson, the
independent reality of concepts and thus reconciling immediateness
and intellectualism.3
Upon Perry’s realistic interpretation of James’s pragmatism,
the comment of F. CJ. S. ^chiller who vies with Perry as his inter-
preter, is trenchant.
"Prof. Perry’s account of Janes’s philosophy,
which is appreciative and on the whole meritorious,
is somewhat disfigured by his straining to convert
James’s immanent epistemological realism into the
transcendent metaphysical realism of a "new realist."
It fails also to bring out the intimate connexion
between James’s psychology and his philosophy; but
its most serious mistake would seem to be that it
attributes to him an ’existential sense-manifold’
a la Hume-kant-riussell
.
d. The sources of the "relational view of consciousness" are,
of course, also to be found in James’s version of "radical inperi-
cism," again supplementing Hume. In the Principles of Psychology
James rejects the idealistic notion of self experience, holding it
to be reducible to the “feeling of bodily action.
lOp. cit.
, p. xiv, 190-197.
^P.P.T.
, p. 214.
^Ibid., p. 220-221.
4i'..ind, 22(1913), p. 282.
5Vol. i, p. 300-302.
"5
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This view had already been given its realistic and behavioristic
interpretation by Mach, substantially that which Perry gave it,
though Bradley had argued from a similar position toward abso-
lutism. Perry’s own statement of his theory of consciousness
appeared in 1904,^ a little before James wrote his fanous essay
on "Does Consciousness Exist?", in which he recognizes Perry’s
view as "coming closer to mine than any other with which I am
acquainted."^ In the following year F. J. E, Y/oodbridge adopted
a similar view of consciousness as the basis of realism.
e. If the demands of science for a just measure of repre-
sentation in philosophy constitute one motive of Perry’s thought,
the demands of religion not merely for philosophic justice, but
for reconciliation with science, were equally insistent. Here
it was easy for Perry to find his place in the philosophic
tradition; it was determined for him by his general position.
He chose against Royce and his emphasis on rationalism and stood
with James in his insistence that religion he approached em-
pirically and pragmatically. James’s ovm failure to find the
Kantian basis of his pragmatism transmitted itself to Perry, who,
after all, does not do justice to the "will to believe" aspect
of James’s thought. Kant’s principle of the primacy of the
practical reason he interprets as the primacy of belief, "the
prototype of romanticism" which belongs with the other ideelis-
tic excesses which realism, rather than pragmeti:e-ism
,
must remedy
by actual experimentation and analysis. ^ The appearance of
^"Conceptions and Misconceptions of Consciousness," Psych .
11 (1904), p. 64-82.
2Jour. Phil.
, i (1904), p. 486.
3"The Nature of Consciousness," Jour . Phil . , 2 (1905), p.
120- 125.
4p.P.T. .,p. 37.
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James’s The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902) , the spiritual
descend ent of Hume’s Dialogues and Mill’s Three Essays , made the
beginning of Perry’s own attempts to found religion on a plural-
istic, melioristic, and economical basis. The sublimation of
the finite Ood of James and Renouvier into a melioristic ideal
finds authority in the naturalistic interpretation of religion
in Gomte
,
Feuerbach and their disciples.
f. Last of the contemporary movements agsiinst the background
of which Perry’s thought is to be understood is the movement of
which he himself is a part - the revival of realism. Any incli-
nation to common sense realism absorbed as an undergraduate at
Princeton was dissipated at Harvard, for there is no direct
dependence of Ferry’s thought upon Reid such as v/as found in
Moore’s intuitionalism.^ American realism combines Plato and
Hume, in the sense in which English realism in the thought of
Moore, Platonizes Kant. Nor is the influence of Santayana upon
the Harvard realists clearly observable. As Morris Cohen has
2pointed out, Santayana’s contemplative and valuational emphasis
was eclipsed, at least in the nineties, by his more active and
scientifically minded colleagues. Santayana undergirded his
Platonism with a naturalistic realism or materialism, while
Perry
,
following Hume, rejects the concept of substance. San-
:tayana’s Platonism and Scholasticism may have strengthened his
faith in the independent reality of categories and relations.
It was not until later, after Montague and Perry had defended
realism against the absolutistic attack of Royce
,
that (bthei*
^Cf. P.P.T-.
. p . 306 on Reid’s limitations.
^The Cairihridge History of American Literature, iii
,
p. 262,
y
4i
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American thinkers rose to its defense and further development.
In 1903 F. J. E. Woodbridge
,
in his presidentfeil address
before the Western Philosophical -Association emphasized the need
of a new scientific metaphysics, resting on a logic of defini-
tion and dealing with reality and all its properties without
the distinction betv/een phenomena and reality.^ In 1904 there
o
appeared G. S. Fullerton’s System of Metaphysics
,
which recog-
nizes Reid’s thought as the prototype of its epistemology,, in-
sisting, as opposed to "hypothetical realism" and idealism (sub-
jectivism) that common sense demands an external world, which
is perceived immediately,^ Berkeley was acute in seeing that
an objective order cannot be deduced from subjective experience
es Descartes and Iccke had held, but the subjective consequences
which he drew v/ere untenable. The influence of Fullerton on
Perry is evident in the latter’s essay on "The Knowledge of
Past Events" (1906)
,
in which he draws upon B. Russell as well.
But the immediate occasion of Perry’s first defense of
realism antedates the constructive work of ?/oodbridge and Ful-
lerton. It is to be found in the hypothetical realism set up
and refuted by Josiah Royce in his lectures on metaphysics, and
published in The World and the Individual . In his discussion
of the "four historical conceptions of being" Royce had assimaed
the problem of the one and the many as crucial antithesis of
all metapl^^cs, had opposed to the intuitive method of mysticism,
the "ostentatious although never - very thorough^ng empiricism"
^The Problem of Metaphysics," Phil
.
Rev., 12 (1903)^ p. 367-385.
Y: Macmillan, 1904.
^Qp. git
.
, p. 412-413*
Y: Macmillan, 1899, i^ p. 47-141,
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of realism, and criticized both on epistemological grounds.
The key to realism is the doctrine of independence, and
though realism does not affirm that the objects of its ontology
must be "outside of any knowledge v/hatever" but only ‘independent
of any knovang that is external to themselves (thus admitting
Lotze’s personal realism),
"any realistic world must contain some objects
that are outside of any knowing process whatever,
since the relations between the various knowing
processes and their objects, even in a v/orld of con-
scious minds, would have to be external relations
in order to serve the realistic type of independence."!
Realism obscures more issues than it clears. Appealing to
common sense, it does not even define what it means by independ-
ence (a challenge accepted by Perry in 191^). So Royce himself
attempts for purposes of refutation, to supply the realistic
need of an analysis of this concept.^ The realist does not
mean "total independence;" his theory is merely that "knowledge
makes no difference to its real outer object," or that "there
is no logical necessity that any change in 0
,
or in the whole
Being of 0...need correspond to or follow, from any of these vari-
ations of the idea of 0."^ This definition of independence, when
extended to the world of objects itself makes relationship,
either causal, or logical (common characters) between objects
impossible. Universals, as well as causal relations, are impos-
sible, in pluralistic realism.^ External relations are there-
fore impossible; they imply no relations. But monistic realism
is also impossible, for the forgotten thesis of most realistic
!lbid
. ,
p. 84, 69.
^
^XHd . , p. 112-126.
^Ibid.
,
p. 115, 118.
^Ibid.
, p. 129-120.
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systems” is epistemological dualism. The doctrine of independ-
ence implies that the ideas themselves are real or are parts of
an existing entity.
Realism can thus consistently be neither monistic nor
pluralistic; its metaphysics is incapable of logical consistency.
Its central technical difficulty is its failure to solve the
problem of universals, since its reals are not universals but
particulars, and the two can be resolved only in thought.^ It
is the "breeding place of a wholly marvelous race of meta'physical
paradoxes - atoms and monads, the unknowable things in themsel-
ves , transcendent reals,’ the Eleatic one, Spinoza’s Substance,
the Unknovmble of Spencer, the Souls of the Sankhya.” Royce
finds the social motives of realism in individualism and social
and theological conservatism. In stressing the "sanity" of his
views the realist is stressing the "social convenience" of
authority.
Royce’s refutation of realism, it will be seen, rests on
the relational logic taken over from Bradley, but evaluated more
highly.^ In this the realists follow Royce
,
though rejecting
his view that relations are internal. But the realism which
Royce criticizes is nominalistic, and rests on epistemological
dualism. The realistic reply will be the gradual development
of a realism of universals, and based on epistemological monism.
llbid.
,
p. 105-106.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 109
.
^Royce acknowledges his debt to Bradley for the relational
logic, but does not follow him in ultimately rejecting it. Brad-
ley fails to note that the contradictions resulting from the
analytic method are resolved in the "internal movement of thought
itself." Ibid .
.
p. 474,481, 494.
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2, The Formative Period
,
1900-1909 , Perry’s earliest essays,
like Moore’s, were controversial, hut unlike his they are at once
directed at two purposes dominating his entire philosophy - the
development of realism through the refutation of idealism. His
maiden effort was a criticism of Kant’s doctrine of freedom
strongly similar to Moore’s earlier discussion, reducing Kant’s
principle of rational freedom to "hare objectivity hypostatized
,
and used as an explanatory principle," If Moore Platonized Kant,
Perry interprets him in the temper of Aristotle.
"The noumenon can have no possible mode of ex-
istence apart from the phenomenon. . .It exists merely
by virtue of the ability of the human reason to dis-
tinguish between the ’that’ and the ’what’ in the
subject and to hypostatize the former in, order to
limit the claims of the latter."
Kant’s doctrine is "that freedom is not a power
determining the nature of the world through genuine
choices, but a logically separate aspect of an ulti-
mately fixed and changeless world. -^he universe in
the last analysis is contingent ,. .No philosophers talk
so glibly of freedom as Kant and his successors, and
yet none have provided for a world more strictly in-
evitable in all its details."^
Kant has failed to provide a basis for a freedom that has moral
value. But Perry, unlike Moore, is not a determinist. From
this paper an aim arises - to find a basis for indeterminism in
a contingent world.
To this discussion of Kant may be added Perry’s review of'
’"//alsh on Kant’s Trsnscendental Idealism and Empirical Realism."^
The realist retains Kant’s transcendentalism but interprets it
logically. His "doctrine of the function of the category in de-
termining the unity of a realm or system of truthT.-*-is a pbilo--
sophical classic. The best philosophy of nature since the time
^"The Abstract Freedom of Kant," Phil. Rev.* 9 (1900), p.
634, 632, 646^647.
2jour. Phil*
. 1 (1904), p. 159-160.

Ill
of Kant has been built upon this foundation.”
In 1902 both liontague and I'erry attacked Hoyce’s refuta-
tion of realism.^ Though neither can define the relation be-
tween idea and object, since their epistemological viewpoint is
still dualistic, both attack Royce’s statement of the doctrine
of independence, and his theory of internal relations. The
constructive note of these essays is therefore not strong. Perry,
in particular, insists that philosophy must return to common sense
and assume reality rather than admit it.
"',7e are safe in standing by the eommon sense
assertion that being is an irrational term, con-
tained as an aspect of the first^ experience
,
and
connoting nothing but synonyms."^
Tv/o objects are independent if "one could vanish without the
other." To avoid Hoyce’s dilemma between monism and pluralism,
he introduces Moore’s distinction between conceptual and numer-
ical identity, but his emphasis is empirical throughout. Nu-
merical identity is experienced; similarity is to be defined in
terms of "possible ex;^5e rience . " Truth and error are "the hy-
pothetical fulfilment or defeat of expectation."^ Universality
thus is an aspect of particularity, rather than particularity
being, as in Moore’s early realism, relation of universals.
If this is a fundaiaental difference betv/een Perry and Moore,
the criticism of the latter’s "Refutation of Idealism,"^ shows
others particularly in regard to the nature of consciois ness . He
agrees with Moore in refusing to make the object reducible to con-
standing
sciousness of it, though there appears at the saiae time a misunder-
^Montague
,
W. P.
,
"Professor Royce’s Refutation of Realism."
Phil. Rev
. ,
11(1902), p. 43-55. Perry, R.B. , "Professor Royce’s
Refutation of Realism and Pluralism," Monist , 12(1901), p. 446-458.
^Perry
,
R. B., Op . cit . , p. 448.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 456, 451.
^Jour. Phil., 1(1904), p. 76-7/7.
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of his analysis of "esse is percipi," namely, that the idealist
means to assert an identity, Moore’s chief defect, apart from
his "prolixity and obscurity," is his failure to give any pos-
itive account of consciousness beyond the fact that it is some
"unique relation." This view presents itself as "the realist’s
more serious task."
a. Perry’s problem is thus formulated. He turns now to its
development in the various fields of thought which interest him.
The first field to command his attention is the scientific, where
he criticizes both idealistic and naturalistic philosophies of
science from a realistic viev/point defined in his evaluation of
Kant, This thought is developed in a criticism of V/'ard’s
Naturalism and Agnosticism
,
Pearson’s G-rammar of Science
,
and
Munsterberg’ s Grundzuge der Psychologie . ^ All three, as idealists
"in pursuance of the rationalistic motive, reconstructed nature
to meet the demands of knowledge."^ The result is either posi-
tivism ( do,gmatic experimental ism ) or dogmatic idealism . Both
rest on the divorce of metaphysics and science, the distinction
between reality and phenomena. This distinction can have no
meaning save as "the phenomenal world is true of the noumenal
world, but not exhaustively or fundai.aentally true of it. Science
must be true of reality." Metaphysics cannot deny the reality
of space and time; it must "define their reality,"^ Munsterberg ’
s
error lies in assuming reality to be "experience prior to its
transformation by science." It may be added that this is the
error also of Mach, and indicates the point at which Perry’s
Aristotelian rationalism is to supplement his empiricism. Perry’s
^’T^ecent Philosophical Procedure with Reference to Science,"
Jour . Phil
. , 1 (1904), 169-174.
Sibid
.
,
p. 169.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 174.
(C
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article involved him in a controversy with Creighton and <Vard
,
v/ho maintained that the latter had attacked, not science, but
naturalism. His replies do not interest us, save as they raise,
for the first time, the most acute problem of Perry’s thought, as
of all realism, the relation of particularity and universality .
Perry solves it by denying its existence, but implies also that
the difference lies in the selective activity of thought.^ His
position through the entire discussion is a defense of the objec-
tive validity of the conclusions of science, against the subjec-
tivistic and empirical emphasis of naturalism and idealism.
Three years later he attempts a similar defense of the objective
reality of time and space , in answer to Taylor's analysis in
p
his Elements of Metaphysics . The same problems are raised. The
"ineptness and futility of a method which solves problems by
turning them over to an absolute appointed for the purpose" is
•
again pointed out. Taylor's distinction between perceptual and
conceptual space and time is "inaccurate and confusing"; the
distinction- between particular and general is again denied
rz
(while again tacitly referred to the relating activity of mind).*^
The mind's demand for synthetic unity is something of which
Perry, following James, denies the existence. Pluralism is as
tenable
.
b. Meanwhile, the task recognized by Perry of defining the
realistic conception of consciousness, is at once undertaken,
though the first results, which antedate Woodbridge’s essay (1905)
are largely interested in clearing the ground through historical
^Jour . Phil . , 1 (1904), p. 350.
^"Professor Taylor's Treatment of Space and Time", Mind
,
16
(1907)
,
p. 249-253;
.
oX’bid
.
,
p. 249.
rr
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and critical considerations. The series of essays attempting this
cover the years from 1904 to 1909, though the first of the series,
"Conceptions and Misconceptions of Consciousness"^ implies the rest
The article criticizes the ambiguity of consciousness, end the
tendency to assume it as a metaphysical entity. This tendency
rests on a dualistic epistemology, and results from the idealistic
refutation of materialism. Perry attempts an empirical definition
of consciousness as the "psychological aspect of experience." (The
objective conception of experience as greater than consciousness
conceived psychologically is Kantian, Jamesian, and Roycean; Perry
follows James). Experience is primarily immediately objective;
only secondarily ( in dreams, memory, introspective attention,
feeling) does it become psychological.
"I can analyze my perceiving on the one hand and
the object of my perception on the other with quite
different results, and yet in the perception they are
indistinguishable. The difference must be in my in-
terest, or in the direction of my attention, and it
appears here also that one interest is fundamentally
determinative.
”
In all cases the psychical aspects of experience depend on and
contain objective experiences.
Hence "these psychical data cannot be called things or
reals in the same sense as the standard objects, for
they are completed and replaced by the latter."^
Here are the psychological implications of Perry’s realism al-
ready developed. Consciousness as the "psychological aspect of
experience" is constituted, so far as content is concerned, by
the objective elements in experience. The metaphysical conse-
quences are readily drawn. Basically, experience is not private.
^Psych. Rev., 11 (1904) p.282-£96
.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 288, 289.
t
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It is due to the secondary function of interest, centered on
consciousness, that the current epistemologies are dualistic and
relati(v*istic . ^ Epistemological monism, the extreme form of the
theory of direct apprehension, is implied. Berkeley's and J. S.
Mill^s failure to make an objective order out of the psychologic
cal realJP-:' "is due to this fallacy - to the consideration of
content and subjectivity as coextensive,"^ This is the reputa-
tion of psychological idealism.
The "transcendental idealist" overcomes psychological
idealism and attains objectivity by assuming a purely logical
transcendental ego immanent in consciousness which apperceives
the object. The Post-Kantian transcendental idealist may become
either an absolute idealist or a Platonic realist (so Moore).
Absolute idealism contains a thinly disguised contradiction -
the escape from subjectivity by a transcendental absolute which,
hov/ever
,
is my transcendental self. The synthetic activity of
consciousness in establishing truth is disproved by the con-
sideration that "my judgment does not attest its own indispen-
>X
sableness." Like the empiricist, the transcendentalist here
confuses psychology with logic. Nor can self-consciousness serve
to terminate the relativity of perceptions, since the only re-
lation between M and "itself" can be identity. "The term con-
sciousness has reference to relativity and exclusion within a
world of reals, and therefore cannot signify a principle con-
stitutive of that world itself." Last of all, if consciousness
is specific and unique, it cannot be centrally important in the
^Ibid
.
,
p . 290.
^Ibid
.
,
p . 291.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 293-294.
f
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consomnat ion of value.
Only if consciousness is "taken to signify selection
within the realm of things, then, though it cannot be
the ontological first principle, yet as the most gen-
eral category defining a self it will apply either to
psychology or to the religious aspect of metaphysics."^
So Perry’s realism emerges, in the subordination of consci-
ousness to the relatiiig activity of the "self" directed to an
objective order. For the criticism of idealism and for Perry’s
own constructive thought it will be seen that this essay demands
careful consideration.
Its position is presupposed throughout Perry’s later psy-
chological studies, both in this first period, and in his later
analysis of purpose and interest. In "The Knowledge of Past
Events"^ Perry, under the acknowledged influence of B. Russell
and Gr. S. Fullerton, discusses the difficulties raised for the
theory of "direct apprehension" (here first explicitly enuncia-
ted as the nature of all knowledge) by the problem of memory.
Time must be regarded as real and "intelligible ini abstracto ,
"
not derivative from non-temporal quantities and their relation.
All knowledge of past events is reducible to three terms in two
relations, immediately present. The distinction between con-
ceptual and perceptual knowledge is not that of indirectness and
directness, but only of the degree of abstraction. The past
event is present not as "absolute event" but in one of its
"aspects" only. Perry, like Holt, then adopts Russell’s theory
that memory is "knowledge by acquaintance," a view which Moore,
in so far as he discusses memory at all, rejects.
^Ibid.
,
p. 296.
^Jour. Phil .
.
3 (1906), p. 617-626.
^Ibid
.
,
p . 625.
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The three psychological papers of 1909, "The Hiddenness of
the Mind," "The Mind’s Familiarity with Itself," and "The Mind
Y/ithin and Without" ^ merely repeat and elaborate viewpoints
expressed in 1904. The hiddenness of mind is denied on the basis
of epistemological monism. The traditional philosophical con-
ceptions of self-consciousness and "mental content" are reducible
to certain complex ways of organic function plus objective enti-
ties. Introspection is recognized as a valid approach to this
objective content, though not the . only one. The key to the un-
derstanding of mind is found in interpreting it as an organized
complex determined by organic desire or interest. Desire and
purpose are defined from the_ ^ behavioristic viewpoint, and the
foundation thus laid for the detailed psychological analyses of
Perry’s third period.
c. The interest revealed in Perry’s early papers in the
pproblem of values, ^ soon narrows down, under the influence of
William James, to the discussion of religion, to shift, later,
when religion and morality have become indistinct, to ethics.
If Perry’s philosophy of science rejects naturalism, his philoso-
phy of religion carries James’s pluralism and pragmatism to its
naturalistic conclusions. The introductory study is an analysis
of "The Religious Experience"^ in which religion is defined be
"man’s sense of the disposition of the universe to himself." In
critical religion "G-od tends to vanish into an ideal or universal,
into some object of theoretical definition."^ This humanization
^
Jour . Phil., 6 (1909), p. 29-36, 113-122, 169-175.
^"Poetry and Philosophy," Phil . Rev . , 11 (1902), p. 576-591;
"The Practical Man and the Philosopher, Int . Jour . Ethics , 13
(1902), p. 482-493.
^vlonist
,
14 (1904), p. 752-756.
4Ap
.
to Phil.
.
p. 66, 80.
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of religion continues in the second article, which arrives at
a separation of the imaginative and cognitive elements, both
essential to religion.^ The cognitive content of the conception
of God is
"an idea of my own interests, an idea of the disposi-
tion of the universe towards my interests, and some work-
ing plan for the reconciliation of these two terras... God
is neither an entity nor an ideal, but always a relation
of entity to ideal; reality regarded from the standpoint
of its faiarorableness or unfavorableness to human life."^
The distinction between cognition and imagination or fancy, which
is found not in the objects intended but in the "intending ex-
perience" is also the subject of the paper "Theories and Beliefs"
which serves as the introductory chapter of Present Philosophical
Tendencies .^ The distinction between beliefs and theories, the
most coimnon example of which is the controversy between science
and religion, is not basic. Both forms of knowledge, they both
have the same value - "the illumination and guidance of all con-'
scious action." Present philosophy has the task of bridging the
gap found in the Renaissance and left open by Descartes.
"The Moral Justification of Religion",'^ incorporated in
The Moral Economy which appeared in the same year, represents
the complete intellectualization and moralization of religion
in Perry ^s thought. Historical religions sometimes validate,
sometimes invalidate ethical principles. In a sense it is moral-
ity in its total environment, but it must be corrected by man’s
understanding of nature and of his own highest interests. Its
^"Truth and Imagination in Religion," Int. Jour. Ethics,
15 (1904), p. 64-82.
Phil., p. 87.
^Harvard 't'heol . Rev.
, 3 (1910) ; P.P.T . p;. 3-23.
harvard Theol . Rev
.
,
2 (1909)
,
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optimistic bias must always be subiject to rational criticism to
assure progress. Superstition and tutelary religion, thus cor-
rectedj develop into philosophical religion of which two types
are to be differentiated - metaphysic al idealism_ (Buddhism,
Christian other-worldliness
,
mysticism, pan-logism, and estheti-
cism are examples) and mo ral idealism. The former is "bankrupt"
and "sinister" for it tears down moral distinctions and initia-
i-v >.
tive; Perry himself endorses the moral idealism Y/hich he later
describes in the Present Philosophical Tendencies .
Perry has thus laid the foundations of his conception of
religion in his second period - the humanistic and melioristic
interpretation of a religion of "moral progress" in line with
James, but with its theistic basis obscure.
d. It remains to discuss Perry’s two attempts at comprehen-
siveness in his thought of the first period^- the first a syste-
matic introduction to philosophy, &nd the second a value approach
p
to ethics.*^ Both works are filled with the spirit of concilia-
tion, particularly in regard to the old controversy between ideal-
ism and realism. The criticism of naturalism is penetrating,
though superseded by that in Present Philosophical Tendencies .
Idealism is of two kinds - subjectivism, which arises from the
psychological criticism of the representative theory of epis-
temology and has two aspects - phenomenalism and spiritualism,'
series of historical studies in this period, the conclu-
sions of which are later incorporated into the P.P.T. do not di-
rectly concern us. Among them are, "Review of Pragmatism as a
Theory of Knowledge and as a Philosophical Generalization", Jour .
Phll »< 4 (1907) ,p.365-374, 421-428; and Reviews of books of Eucken
and Renouvier, Jour. Phil.
. 5, ( 1908 ),p.6 9 7-698 ; Ibid., 6 (1909),
p. 467.
^The Approach to Philosophy
,
N.Y: Scribners, 1905, and The
Moral Economy
.
N.Y: Scribners (1909).
€a
IJO
and absolute idealism which adds to the epistemological motive
of subjectivism the transcendental recognition of logical neces-
sities to which reality must submit.^ A penetrating criticism
of Berkeley as subjectivist concludes that Berkeley’s spiritual-
ism is inconsistent with his phenomenalism. Berkeley’s phenom-
enalism may be completed in a pluralistic realism, as was done by
Ernst Mach.'^ For spiritualism the immediate knowledge of other
spirits is essential but this contradicts phenomenalism. Berke-
ley must lapse into mysticism to develop his objective idealism.
The ethical implications of subjectivism are egotism or pessi-
mism (self-denial). Absolute idealism’s universalization of
spirit is either meaningless or prejudicial to our spiritual in-
terests. It adds further difficulties to the fundamental ones
already involved in subjectivism. In value theory absolute
idealism is mystical and too optimistic; it culminates in the
"religion of exuberant spirituality."
But insofar as absolute idealism places the absolute over
against the finite as the standard of truth, it is less distin-
guishable from the realists'* order of independent beings.^ The
dialectic movement of thought from naturalism to absolutism has
culminated in personal idealism which is allied with pragmatism
and realism in stressing individuality. Terminology alone keeps
the transition from being recognized; the ambiguity of such
words as "sensation" and "experience" is cleared when it is rec-
ognized that there is nothing beyond to which they refer. (Mach,
Bradley). On the other hand, the idealistic movement in realism
^Ap . to Phil .
,
p. 218.
?Tbid.
,
pu H^81-283.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 410-411.
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is shown in its emphasis upon (1) reality as that which is di-
rectly known, (2) the "strain of pure rationality in the universe."
Perry thus closes his discussion with a pluralistic, ethically
"'rieutnal" interpretation of the world
,
and a sharp division of
the problems of reality and of value
,
which opens the way for
the subjectivism of his value theory.
His subjectivistic ethics is developed in 1909 in "The Moral
Economy . The problem of ethics is interpreted as the "economical"
realization of conflicting interests in any situation. His account
of this economy is distinctly descriptive and intellectualistic
.
Duty is merely "the control of particular actions by a full rec-
ognition of their consequences."^ The end of conduct is a maxi-
mation of interests resting on two principles; their objective
validity and a quantitative basis of preference. Interest itself,
2however, is defined naturalistically
,
and the ground is thus
prepared for Perry’s peculiar combination of a naturalistic and
normative value theory. On this basis he develops the tables
of virtues, a theory of progress, and ultimately concludes that
"the success of (man’s) enterprise is conditional, in the end,
on the compliance of the universe, thus modifying his rejec-
tion, in the same chapter, of metaphysical idealism.
In the first, decade of Perry’s creative thought, we have
seen, all the pathv/ays leading to his final metaphysical system
are opened, and the synthesis itself is worked out in its out-
lines, though chiefly from the psychological viewpoint. The
pathway leads directly from epistemological subjectivism to the
^The Moral Economy
.
p. 72-73.
^Ibld
.
,
p. 11, 43.
^Ibid
.
,
p . 253.
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realism which rests on (i) biological naturalism, (ii) logical
objectivism, (iii) the direct apprehension of independent objects,
by avoiding the pitfall of representationalism
,
and (iv) a theory
of consciousness as selected relations in the realm of natural
and logical objectivity. This is Mach’s view, but Mach must be
supplemented in view of the element of universality in the world.
It is Aristotelian, save for its logical analysis of reality. It
leads to a behavioristic psychology of interest, a relational
view of consciousness, a sub jective' rationalistic ethics, and a
religion resting on experience that is metaphysically neutral but
hopeful - all in all a unique blend of positivism, naturalism,
and intellectualism.
Program of the Six Realists
,
1909-1915
. There fol-
low the six years of Perry’s most systema.|:ic literary creativity,
beginning with his cooperation with the "six" and culminating
in, the complete exposition of the outlines of his system, and
its relation to the great philosophic types - naturalism, ideal-
ism, pragmatism, and realism. The beginning is marked by the
discovery, on the part of six men, at the New Haven meeting
of the American Philosophical -Association in 1909, that their
agreement on certain points raised in the discussions, warranted
the publication of a joint platform. Two were ferry’s earlier
assopiates. Holt and Montague, both of whom had cleared the way
by preliminary studies, as had Perry. ^ The other three, #. T.
Marvfn, W, B. Pitkin, and E. 0. Spaulding, reflected the general
dissatisfaction with idealism in America, -England, and Germany,
Marvin and Pitkin having been schooled in the realistic tradition
^For their early essays, see the bibliography.
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at Bonn. Their platform appeared in 1910^ and was later re-
printed in their cooperative work The New Reali^ in 1912. The
unanimity of opinion on the general position arose from the pre-
vious discussions, the chief divergences being the accounts of
consciousness and the relation of the logical structure to the
particular spatio-temporal nature of the world. B. Russell’s
influence is apparent as well as that of the ob jectivistic psy-
chologists of G-ermany.
Meanwhile Perry continued his preliminary analyses of philo-
sophical problems and their solutions. In the paper "A Division
2
of the Problem of Epistemology," he proposes "epistemological
monism" as the assertion that knowledge and the thing known are
"distributively identical". In opposition to ontological ideal-
ism he proposes that being known is "accidental to^^in the
scholastic sense of "insignificant to the nature of") reality.
The general problem of the internality of relations is raised
but not discussed. Perry advocates rather psychological ideal-
ism and epistemological realism, pointing out that both subjec-
tive and objective idealists are psychological realists, while
epistemological dualism tends to reduce objective idealism to
subjectivism. Realism is a combination of epistemological mon-
ism, ontological realism, and psychological idealism. Perry’s
attempt at a schematic account of various systems arising from
all possible combinations of fundamental notions shows a criti-
cal superficiality that is later remedied by more careful cri-
ticism of the systems themselves. Meanwhile, this paper shows
^Jour. Phil., 7 (1910)
,
p. 399-401.
^Jour. Phil
..^
6 (1909), p. 309-718.
m0
,
4
,
4 ^ ^
1S4
that he does not follow Marvin in repudiating epistemology,
though he does deny it the function which Berkeley gave it of
determining metaphysics.
The next four papers which constitute a penetrating criti-
cism of idealism are important not only for this paper, but for
Perry’s thought, since he later insists that "if idealism is false,
realism is true."^ His criticism follows Moore in its two funda-
mental lines of attack - the analysis and attack of the idealistic
"cardinal principle,” and the logic of internal relations; though
it adds to these an attack of the motives and consequences of
idealism in Present Philosophical Tendencies .
"The Cardinal Principle of Idealism"^ is its epistemological
doctrine that knowledge generates its object; its burden is the
religious interpretation of nature, as against the scientific
tendency to alienate the world from man. Berkeley’s idealism
must be sharply distinguished from the realistic elements in his
thought, as developed by the alternative view of the Immanenz -
theorie of the Germans, the "immediate" theory of the English,
and the doctrine of epistemological monism. His argument re-
futes the dualism of Descartes and Locke, but does not establish
idealism. His false predicament (ideas are either mental or can-
not be known) arises from the conviction that mind and body are
mutually exclusive in content. All idealism thus rests on a
petitio principii . - Its cardinal principle is induced entirely
on the method of agreement. The ego-centric predicament under-
lies all idealism from Berkeley to the present. A refutation
of Berkeley refutes all idealism. This paper shows the strongest
^Jour. .Ighll,
.
10 (1913), p. 459
^i..ind
,
19~1T91Q ),(>.322-336
.
c
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similarity, at this point of I'erry’s development, with Moore *s
refutation of 1903.
"The Ego-Centric Predicament"^ now becomes the object of
closer analysis, also distinctly in the style of Moore, but giv-
/
ing an independent analysis of the "cardinal Principle," Does
the ego-centric predicament constitute evidence for ontological
idealism? Idealism may have three theories of the relation of
the ego (E) to thing (T)
;
E creates T, or forms T, or is iden-
tical with T. The first view is inadequately analytic, resting
on the method of agreement. The second proves "that knowledge
is a function of things, not that things are a function of
knowledge."^ The identity theory is similar to the second, but
adds the doctrine of internality of relations. This problem is
a valid one, and the identity theory is a possible answer, tho-ugh
previous expositions have rested on incomplete analysis. Posi-
tively, the paper ends in a recall to the method of analysis, .
"Realism as a Polemic and Program of Reform"^ advances this
suggested reform of scientific method by exposing the fallacies
of idealism, and describing the methodological virtues of which
realism should possess itself. The adoption of this paper as
introduction to The New Realism shows the strong emphasis upon
rigor of method which has been the outstanding mark of the real-
istic school as a whole. Idealism in the past has committed the
fallacy of arguraent from the ego^centric predicament
,
the falla-
cies of "pseudo-simplicity" and of "transcendent implication", and
the "error of exclusive particularity. " It has been influenced
^Jour . Phil .. 7 (1910), p. 5-14.
^Ibid
. ,
p . 10
.
Sjour
. Phil .
.^7 (1910), p. 337-353, 365-379).
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by the "speculative dogma" (that monism must be achieved), and
the error of verbal suggestion. Realism agrees with idealism in
assigning limits to science and with Platonic and Kantian ideal-
ism in asserting the categorial and articulate structure of the
H
world, but finds its basic defect in its subjectivism. Its me-
thodological reform aims at the scrupulous use of words, their
concise definition, adherence to analysis, regard for logical
form, the independence of research from history and establi'shed
belief. The fourth paper of the group is an at task of absolute
idealism.^ Before the rise of modern idealism, absolutism, as
represented by Plato and Spinoza, had a long history in v/hich
it was guilty of formalism, equivocation, and dogmatism. Abso-
lute idealism adds to these fallacies that of arguing from the
"cardinal principle." Its devotion to "the speculative dogma"
makes its results sterile of meaning and value for human life.
The most critical work of this period is the essay contri-
buted by Perry to the volume on The New Realism entitled "A
Realistic Theory of Independence." It is the absolutistic logic
of internal relations that he attacks in this penetrating logical
study, at the same time giving both an intensive and extensive
interpretation of the doctrine of independence. The realists
had been attacked by Royce
,
Schiller, and others for using a
concept which they had not defined. The same ambiguity in the
idealistic conception of dependence, shown in Royce and Joachim,
|) had tended to obscure the issues, as had also their confusion
of realism with substantial ism. The demand for a nearer defini-
tion also arose from recent discussions by McGilvary and Dewey,
^"The Futility of Absolutism," Hibbert Journal
,
8 (1910)
,
p. 621-640.
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sympathetic with the realistic viewpoint. Having analyzed the
cardinal principle of idealism, Perry now examines its logic.
Independence is defined as non-dependence, but does not
imply non-relation. Dependence is a special type of relation-
ship in which the dependent contains, implies, causes, or is
exclusively caused or implied by that on which it is dependent.
Parts are not dependent on wholes, nor is the relation of de-
pendence in general reciprocal. Some objects are independent
of consciousness though related to it in knowing - among them
all simples, and some complexes (physical, logical, mathematical).
Values, and v/orks of art, and higher complexes of history, scciety,
life and thought are dependent on consciousness as are also con-
tent-patterns, which are determined by the relatiTig^ and combining
activity of the "subject of consciousness."^ Primary conscious-
ness is itself independent of the secondary conscious relations
into which objects enter.
Present Philosophical Tendencies
.
appearing in the same
year, is the comprehensive exposition of Perry’s thought in its
relationship to the systems previously criticized by him. There
are no new positions developed in the work, though the notion
of "neutral entities" is developed to facilitate understanding
of the principle of epistemological monism. The book is based
on previous articles already discussed, and gives a systematic
exposition of the new realism in its relation to naturalism,
idealism, and pragmatism'. It will be central in the future
discussion of the present paper. The fact that the volume ap-
peared at the same time as The New Pealism
.
whose function is
^Ibid
.
,
p. 140.
_4 f
^**
,'_ . > 'i>
.' \vn.f »S‘^'^i^ -.i^r*y.-* ^Ox. ^:'a
.
,.' '
. : > ^:•.^
.
:iCi; i.,c'
,
00 tia. ^rrf' r':
c
^ i’-'-r jc'lc.:- , . i -*o,:t>i'''. ,^oj.
<'
*
,
••.
,
•'•
,
xi;»iijV:ico ;
-i, eJJ U'o'u'y. i h
•;
•..
-‘i J-f /itl-.Vf no JV:" Vvf :.k... i.ocr'O Tt-
C- '-yC' . ‘i.'r
,
.• I ..,':? .!0 -O ' -•n^.q'.'rj 'jo.; '>iu • T.jI
: ;i ri ; 'in f j o-?*' I
.
r^-?; J ...
«
..
. 0 .:
i; i l^':
•
' ^ ^ a i •’
) ^
••-tr
-“-.v
•
-= 1
'i <
.'c.**;! rr.‘: : c..j i .'•:)i\t -,'nt3’.'.'.\n'
i
,
^ ^0-iP.jji : ] -J xfXq«;ob->)rxo- ;i--- , •: Ixb
\\ •:* •?•.:?• ’jtxf' X-i
,
Ui£T
«
•./;*;o„ dr..
•
“" i'!?Mnob .*0 ^ ; 'V vf-' '•-V.^ .*;:•:. JO.' J tfw
r:^ V(f CTIC:.^ : L-’ ' t-biiy, ^ j j
•'
.
•=:' j'xjo ».c 0
,
'jv. ,'io : o":)o •.
‘
'
•, y
\':adrn:.6’3a. *^o 4 a5>r5.1t< t : II As v%- :.i i'
.
/I Kvfc- ,^oi;fv. OJl* •
l‘
' :• rh - rl
i. i Ji'Vi.. .xi’< •', ,i xG x’i.x»4 -. I «& v*»t^xii'-.'i Xi* ’ U 1 V-i 'I (J;'JC i' •: x'w ? .*
o-c^n'r , "f:; ; r-io''*Vi;’<i:'' ^ cJ, '.ii.. al,s nc L'^ .
'
•v.iJ-
,
ri » tuvid enoJ 4'i .Vwi. v-
'^. ’ iii^ at'a-u c- . v.u>- nl ijne
. rjcl yfr>c:f e-iT . n,:n--r i •' . . J . 'ix o j b'O'r'u'i^^
ol? .'I'i'j.tcoy; - e •vgt .' ;.> . rx-
,
.a . a, try LI: ^lo'o'xXd <v'w iO‘.J*r& . ac .. .i* Vb*i q i
^
:nn^ I o*rt-»x;n ^rnJ uc<o:^.ivX 3
»
' V
• ':' i>
-r . i'»i i'.li, v . O 1 i C I 3 «>l1
0 V..
' ;:' O’T.j'^
.
;'If?
1
'
- *-*v! J .-. L'riTSrt
J t^C ts ' f ‘, 1 • . ' ‘ ? o r r> i -: :r * l -j: : j
^ ^ o : *
128
not systematic and historical orientation of the new school,
but its critical defense, made it authoritative for the group
in tracing its historical relations, c ‘
Consequently, Perry at once found himself engaged in the
task of clearing obscurities and misunderstandings as reviews
of the two volumes appeared. H. 0. Brown had, two years pre-
viously^ criticized the neo-realis tic platform for its '^Dlind"
adherence to an unclear, unestablished, and unsuitable logical
method. Now Love joy, and J. B. Pratt, ^ point out possible gaps,
(a) in Perry’s criticism of idealism, and (b) in his proofs of
realism, while at the same time F. 0. S. Schiller attacks Perry’s
estimate of James and his relation to realism.^ Perry’s answers
are in the main conciliatory and attempt to clarify the obscuri-
ties in his position."^ Pratt’s criticism reveals the naive and
uncritical use of the term "experience” of which idealism in
general is guilty. He defends his position that "neutral enti-
ties" are included in experience without prejudice to their
neutrality. He shifts the burden of proof for dependence as
Moore had done it, bank upon idealism, and suggests that on two
"non-sectarian” problems at least, neo-realists and idealists
collaborate - on the problem of perception and that of the cat-
egories. To Schiller’s charge that Perry has misinterpreted
James by making him a psychological atomist aid a metaphysical
realist Perry answers in greater detail by trying to demonstrate
1Jour . Phil
. ,
7 (1910), p. 491-496.
^Lovejoy, A.O., "Present Philosophical Tendencies," Jour .
Phil.
, 9 (1912), p. 627-640; Pratt, J. B. , "Perry’s Proofs of
Realism," Ibi d
. ,
9(1912), p. 573-580.
3feritj.caX Notice of P.P.TJ', Mind , 22 (1913), p. 280-284.
4Touf. |Eil., 10 (1913), p. 449-463; Mind, 22 (1913), p. 544-548;
Ibid
.
,T4~(l?l5y p. 240-249.
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the sense-atomism of Uames’s later Y\fritings. Far from assert-,
ing ''unknov/able realities," neo-realism asserts "the independ-
ence of the immanent that conscious "correlation is accidental
so far as the thing that appears as object is concerned." In
\ 1915 Perry repeats his realistic interpretation of James' and
defends his argument that the ego-centric predicament does not
justify a causal or logical dependence between thought and things,
in a passage of great interest for Perry’s general method.^
So the period closes, with Perry’s realism fully developed
on a basis of logical atomism, but with the following gaps
pointed out by his critics and not fully answered by him.
(a) The inconseq^uence of his metaphysics for his ethical
and religious views.
(b) Ti^e emptiness and ambiguity of his "neutral entities,"
or the nature of the "immanent which is independent."
(c) The inconsistency between his emphasis upon their in-
dependence of cognitive consciousness but dependence upon the
selective and purposive function of "the subject of consciousness,"
(d) The nature of existence, particularly with respect to
the problem recognized by Royce ill 1899 as the dilemma of all
realism - the metaphysical relation of particular and universal.
In so far as Perry refuses to solve this in the spirit of Moore’s
early "liature of Judgment" and Russell’s logical atomism, by a
reduction of reality to logic, but holds that reality is at the
^
same time particular and universal, he has no theory of reality.
^The Present Conflict of Ideals
,
N.Y: Longmans Creen, 1917,
really belongs to this systematic period, as it is intended as
a companion volume to P.P.T
^ ,
studying, against the cultural con-
flicts of the World War, the practical presuppositions and im-
plications of the philosophical views whose theoretical analysis
and criticmsm he had undertaken in the earlier volume. It is
more popular and less critical than the earlier work.
rc
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In his next period he returns again to detailed studies of these
problems, primarily of the psychological basis of (i) his meta-
physics, (ii) his axiology,
4. The Behavioristic Psychology of Purpose and Interest
,
1915-1926
. In a sense the problem indicated in (c) above is
the most important loose end in Kerry’s system. The "subject
of consciousness" had been referred in Present Philosophical
Tendencies to the biological organism in the spirit of Jaraes and
preeminently of ^^ach. But Perry had rejected the nominalistic
pragmatism of these writers and had made universals a structural
part of independent reality. Selectivity and purpose must there-
fore be redefined to harmonize with the Aristotelian element in
his realism. But value experience had also been baaed in the
behavoristic psychology of desire and interest. Thus value,
truth, and the relational view of consciousness all required il-
lumination from more penetrating studies in the foundation of
psychology. For the first time, Perry’s thought begins to live
as the dynamic concept is superimposed upon his intellectualistic
system.
"The Definition of Value is the rather aprioristic be-
ginning of this series of studies. English and continental
thinkers of the realistic school (Moore, Russell, Brentano
,
Santayana), consistently with their realism, have asserted the
indefinability and unanalyzable nature of value. Perry, in
opposition, considers this as "due to lack of analysis," and
©ESumts that value is definable in terms of an "act of liking"
or "interest
,
which, however, involves no "judgment of value.
^Jour . Phil ., 11(1914), p. 141-162.
^Ibid,
,
p . 161
.
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Three years later he critizes the subjectivistic value theories
of Rickert, Urban, and the instrumentalist and relativist theory
of Dewey from the same viewpoint.^
Another rationalistic beginning of the psychological analy-
o
sis is his study of "The Truth Problem," a paper in which he
follows Russell’s terminology most closely. Truth has four
meanings
,
‘ only one of which is psychological and correlative to
error. Logical truth asserts positivity (N.B. not possibility)
,
ontological truth asserts factual! t:/ . existential truth (the re-
lation of a universal to its instance, a variable to its value)
asserts validity
,
psychological truth asserts correctness. Renee,
since "it is possible to discover truth-properties of a sort
that do not contain my mind as a constituent, or depend on it
as a part of their evidence
,
then it is proper and necessary to
ignore the fact that my mind is discovering them." The differ-
ence between logical terms and real things is reducible to mere-
ly different "general structural properties of propositional com-
plexes."^ Hypotheses have ontological truth but the hypotheti-
cal act assigns them particular value; if valid, they possess
4
existential truth. The irrationality of nature is found in
the fact that existential truths are not always formally true.
Some laws are true only in the sense that things obey them.
Perry’s approach to psychological truth is anthropological
and behavioristic. It arises as language develops from the
holophrastic to the analytic. The definition of intentions
(physiological complexes) by their objectives (using Meinong’s
^Ibid.
, p. 161.
Phil.
,
13(1916)-, p. 505-515, 561-573.
Sibid.
,
p. 506, 511.
^Ibid
.
,
p . 514.
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term) constitutes truth of the faith type, a type over and
above the principle of contradiction, and factuality,^
' The pjroblem of error then becomes the definition of the
fallible mind. Truth and error are alike and indistinguishable
in involving belief-intentions and objectives. The distinction
between subsistence and objects is unsatisfactory. Error con-
sists in giving the wrong existential purport to a propositicn al
complex which itself has no existential status (as a complex
which has "significance as a..whole"). Psychological truth and
error thus involves creative attitude of committal (the truth of
pragmatism) and an objective containing a law and an independent
datum which must be integrated according to the laws of contra-
diction and universality (the truth of coherence) but also ”an
external factual test "^n whose decree the act of cognition
o
depends (the truth of correspondence).
Perry’s solution of the i)roblem of truth and error, it
may be noted, seems, after all, to reduce psychological truth
to existential or categorial t ruth.
In the following year begin the series of studies in the
psychology of purpose which are not completed until 1921:-
Purpose as Systematic Unity, Monist
, 27(1917), p. 352-375.
Purpose as Tendency and Adaptation, Phil . Rev .
,
26 (1917)^
p. 477-495.
Docility and Purposeveness
,
Psych . Rev . , 25(1918), p. 1-20.
A Behavioristic View of Purpose. Jour. Phil., 18(1921), p.
75-205.
The Independent Variability of Purpose and Belief, Ibid . ,
18 (1921), p. 169-180.
The Cognitive Interest and its Refinements, Ibid . , 18(1921),
p. 365-376.
The Appeal to ^^eason, Phil . Rev.
,
31(1922)^ p. 131-169,
llbid.
,
p. 567.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 570-572.
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The definitions of pui^pose as systematic unity
,
tendency
,
and
adaptation seem inadequate to give any meaning to the experiences
described by "in order to" or "for the sake of", Adsptation
maj? be construed as complex automatism. Purpose involve? a gen-
eral relative propensity which dominates a process involving
lower eligible propensities, a view similar to Thorndike^
s
analysis and agreeing in general with Holt’s behaviorism. The
process of integration is to be explained in teims of muscular
antagonism, neuronic resistance, and distribution of nervous
energy, though behaviorism needs to recognize that purpose deals
with "objects" outside the field of nature. The explanation of
learning in terms of pleasure and pain is a fal2a cy of obscurum
per obscurius
.
Learning on the part of a docile cxrganism results
when a "controlling impulsion" selects and acquires the specific
instrumentalities through v/hich it may be realized and "completed."^
To use the "mental aspects of the process" to explain it would
be another case of the above mentioned fallacy; one may rather
obtain light on the problem of consciousness by reference to
certain aspects of the organic process. The Engli^ thinkers
who identified ideas with mental contents were so far right as
human conduct is "guided by ’ideas’ (signs or stimuli that
p
excite anticipation or arouse expectation.") Ideas may be
centrally stimulated signs, but must excite anticipation or
expectation.
The series of articles in the Journal of Philosophy in
1921 merely elaborate this position. They constitute an ex-
IPsych . Rev
. , 25(1918), p. 7, 11.
^'Ibid
.
,
p. 17, 18.
1
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position of behaviorism as "a return to the original Aristotelian
view that mind and body are related as activity and ocgan," aband-
oning the "introspective theory of consciousness."^ Perry now,
however, advocates that "consciousness be given a place among
the determining conditions of a perfonaance" and be "construed
dynamically from the outset." Instincts and complexes are to
be reduced to a physiological basis, and Perry repeats his
definition of purpose in terms of a determining tendency di-
recting the organism to a "course of action." Jameses doctrine
of "subjective interest" as resting on consciousness is rejected
as unnecessary, as denying the unity of the organism, though James
is right in defining consciousness as "at all times primarily
rz
a selective agency."
The "Independent Variability of Purpose and Belief" cor-
rects pragmatism by making the two variants of a basic act of
"supposition" of which Perry presents a "schematic physiological
interpretation. " The dynamic view of consciousness as organic
response is clear in this essay as a result of Perry’s rereading
of James, as is also a tendency to modify his epistemological
monism,^ though he agrees in rejecting ’*the image theory of
knowledge," and defines meaning as "experiences to be expected."
His conception of truth is here distinctly pragmatic.
"The Cognitive Interest and its Refinements" discusses
thought as a specific but "not necessarily autonomous" function
of interest. It is one type of tentative activity, possibilities
being thought rather than actually tried. Logic is still inde-
^Jour . Phil ., 18(1921), p. 85,87.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 89, footnote in criticism of H. G. Warren.
Sibid
.
,
p. 100-102.
4lbid.
,
p. 172, footnote.
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pendent of mind as "the study of the fundamental types of rela-
tion," and becomes more clearly so as mind is more successfully
analyzed. But truth, in its psychological significance, is
conceived more and more pragmatically, Moreover Perry shares
Moore’s increasing uncer taini^ty
,
shown in the same period, as
to the independent nature of sense data. They are still inde-
finable, though "peculiarly dependent on correlated stimuli."^
The "Appeal to Reason," presidential address of the American
pPhilosophical Association,^ constitutes a defense of reason, as
"evidentially attested belief,” fron the viewpoint of his be-
havioristic philosophy. His interest lies in the defense of
reason, against the charge of rationalization ( the impelling
occasion seems to have been Hart’s PsycholOryv of Insanity ) and
its justification as the only hope for present life. The paper
is, as he calls it, a challenge to "practical idealism."
Perry's behaviorism v/as the object of an attack by M. W.
Calkins, who had previously insisted that behaviorism is incom-
plete unless based on the primacy of consciousness.^ In 1927,
(after the appearance of Perry’s General Theory of VeOlue)
,
she
published a comment, "Biological or Psychological?"^ pointing
out an implicit introspective approach in Perry’s nominal be-
haviorism.
"Perry holds explicitly or implictly a psychological
conception of interest, or valuing, as conscious ex-
perience. The conception of psychology at the basis
of this doctrine differs even more radically from the
^Ibid.
,
p. 368.
2phn. Review
, 30(1921), p. 131-169.
3**The Truly Psychological Behaviorism," Psych. Rev
. ,
28(1921)^
p. 1-18.
4Jour . Phil . . 24(1927), p. 577-581.
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merely biological theory which ignores or denies
consciousness than from the strictly, or narrowly,
personalistic conception which attributes consci-
ousness to selves as distinguished from concious or-
ganisms , "I
The period closes with the appearance of the General Theory
of Value in 1926, an extensive though preliminary analysis of
Value as "any object of any interest," in the sense of the
biological definition of interest previously developed. The
greater part of the book is based on the previous essays of this
period and incorporates and further develops their axiological
and psychological analyses. Only the last section, which at-
tempts a normative study in the sense of setting up a critique
of value and an outline of the 'highest good," rises above the
behavioristic level and strikes a distinctly personalistic note.
The three standards by which value is to be measured are in-
tensity, preference, and inclusiveness— strictly empirical
standards, but themselves standing in an order of subordination
to inclusiveness as the supreme standard. But the standard of
inclusiveness can be applied on the basis of an "ideal object
of an ideal will," The basis of good conduct is ultimately the
fully integrated "personal will," v;hich Perry has already shown
to demand a ground of common unity of interests for which a
purely behavioristic psychology furnishes only scant basis,
5, The Present Period , In Perry’s present thought, given-
over chiefly to historical studies and the conciliation of con-
flicting views, his emphasis shows the influence of Whitehead,
Alexander, and critical realism, though only in moderation. In
PhUnsonhy of the Recen t Past ‘ he shows that he has not, at any
>
rate, given up his realism and opposition to idealism. But the
^Ibid,
,
p. 581,
^G.T,V
. ,
Ch. XXII, cf. p. 102-104,
€
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conciliatory tone is clearly evinced by the essay '*Peace Without
Victory— in Philosophy."^ The "disjunctive" mode of thought has
been succeeded by the "conjunctive" method which regards exist-
ents as interpenetrating and sharing their content. Three con-
cepts prominent in contemporary thought illustrate the conjunctive
emphasis
—
pattern
,
aspect
,
and emergence
.
"The tendency 4f the
disjunctive way of thinking has been to rob entities of their
2
empirical attributes." The most familiar case of disjunction
has been that between perception and' its physical object, the
fault of representational and idealistic epistemologies. The
super mind M cannot provide the remedy for this disintegrative
epistemology, nor can it provide for the social nature of thought.
But the concept of patterns may. Physical entities may retain
their specific natures despite their community of qualities.
Minds may share experiences, ideas, and purposes without loss of
identity pr forfeiture of independence. Perry’s logical atomism
is reinterpreted as holding that things are the sums of their
"aspects" or attributes. The concept of substance is still
abandoned, and the mind-matter gap is bridged, not by the re-
duction of one to another, but by making each a distinct pattern
of common aspects. The concept of emergence is appropriate to
reconcile the continuity of nature with its specificities. As
a result there is a greater emphasis upon the interpretative
function of thought. "Each science is ... justified in employing
both the analytic and the synthetic method."
^Jour . Phil .S^. ,5 (19 28)
,
p. 300-312.
^Ibid
.
,
p . 301
.
c
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"Integral activities in purpose (the "higher pro-
pensities" of 1917) such as perception, will, and
speculative thought are mental; subordinate activities
(the "lower propensities") such as circulation, res-
piration, metabolism and grov/th are bodily’".^
Perry also shov/s here a reaction against his earlier behaviorism
and analytic rationalism in the interest of increasing nominalism.
As for behaviorism, its ’bure is worse than the disease."
6. Summary . In the psychological emphasis of Perry’s
thought in his later periods, particularly a result of his study
of James and certain behavioristic psychologists, there may be
noted the following adjustments of certain earlier emphases in
his system:
-
a. A certain loss of faith in the finality of analysis as
philosophic method. His method is still predominantly analytic,
but analyzed wholes have properties which their parts do not have.
b. A revision of his account of consciousness, arising from
his psychological and value studies. Consciousness is no longer
a relational system, but a mode of organic activity.
c. Miss Galkin’s insistence that Ferry’s psychology is
basically introspective is easily justified in the light of
Perry’s insistence that behaviorism must consider "ideal" as
well as natural objects. The psychology of ideas also points
in this direction.
d. The "indefinability of sensation" destroys Perry’s ear-
lier account of sense data as integral elements (neutral entities^
in reality. Ihey are merely dependent, in some peculiar way, on
correlated stimuli. Moore’s exhaustive treatment of the possi-
^Ibid
.
,
p. 319
,
311.
f
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bilities open to realism may be compared with this.
e. All this implies an activistic energistic metaphysics,
while Perry’s earlier thought had been purely static and logical.
Perry seems to be moving, influenced, no doubt, by the cri-
tical realists, emergent evolutionism, and predominantly by
Whitehead, in the direction of a less analytic, and hence more
nominalistic interpretation of reality, and a distinct modifica-
tion of the behaviorism of his third period for some type of
personalism in which consciousness is at least a more significant
aspect than body. How far this movement will carry him is yet
to be seen.
The development of the thought of both Moore and Perry thus
illustrates the dialectic element in realism already pointed
out by Hoyce that carries it beyond itself, Where this has not
happened, their realism is still empty and meaningless— "the
neutral entities" of Perry, whether or not they have become
"aspects" of particular things, are as meaningless as "his in-
definable sensations" and the "sensibles" that are identical but
"seem different" of Moore. The thought of both is caught in
the midst of its final modification. But neither has surrendered
his realism, for each regards his criticism of idealism as the
most certainly established element of his thought, A closer
indication of parallels in their thought will appear in the
ensuing discussion, which is limited to that aspect.
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CHAPTER IV
THE METHOD OF MOORE AIJD PERRY IH RELATION TO THEIR REFUTATION
OF iJiEALISM
"I am one of the philosophers who have held that the
* Common Sense view of the world* is in certain fundament-
al particulars wholly true.** **Philosophy largely consists
in giving reasons; and the question of what are good reasons
for a particular conclusion and what are had, is one upon
v/hich philosophers have disagreed as much as on any other
question. *'l
**The philosophical method with- which I should like
to associate myself aims. • , to bridge the gap between
common sense and science; by refining the former, and by
extending the latter. **2
The quotations show a distinct difference between Moore
and Perry in their evaluation of the importance of common
sense and of the role of philosophy. The difference has already
been revealed as that between traditional rationalism and
empiricism, Moore moving from the rationalism of Plato, Leibniz,
and Kant to the less critical intuitionalism of Reid, Perry
disowning Kant and identifying himself with English empiricism.
But the old distinction is relatively meaningless as applied
to followers of Kant and of James, It will be the purpose of
this chapter to show (l) that the appeal to common sense intro-
duces ambiguity and confusion in the method of both, though
especially in that of Moore, (2) that in spite of different
emphases the methods of the two are in essential agreement,
(3) that the dependence of both on analysis, more explicit
in Perry than in Moore but involved in the method of both,
is inconsistent ?/ith their appeal to common sense and with
Moore, Contemporary British Philosophy
,
ii, p, 207;
Phil . St.
. p. 39.
2 Perry, G. T. V .. p. vii.
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their own criteria of truth; and (4) to point out some
respects in which their refutation of idealism is incomjjlete
or faulty when measured h3^ their own methodological norms
•
1, The Appeal to Common Sense. A general characteristic
of contemporary realism, as of its Scotch antecedent, is its
position that the "common sense" view of the world as objective-
ly real and of knowledge as immediate is in its essentials cor-
ect. But in spite of the frequence of their appeal, there is
an appalling divergence of opinion, not to say ambiguity, in
their opinion of the meaning of common sense, and of its logical
significance. As to the first question, it is not clear whether
they regard common sense as based on universal rationalistic
principles that are "innate" in the Cartesian sense, or whether
common sense is merely a case for empirical determination.
It follows that it is not clear whether cominon sense principles
are (i) to be accepted uncritically, (ii) whether they are
to be accepted only if reasons can be given for them, (iii)
whether they themselves can be used as reasons, (iv) or
whether they must be subjected to analytic criticism. All of
these views can be defended on the basis of Moore’s and Perry’s
writing,
Definition , The conflicting definition of common sense
can be illustrated by comparing the Scotch tradition with more
recent discussions on an empirical basis. In his notes on Reid,
Hamilton says, "To argue from common sense is simply to show
that the denial of a given proposition would involve the denial
of some original datum of consciousness . In this case, as every
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original datum of consciousness is to be presumed true, the
proposition in question, as dependent on such a principle,
must be admitted.”^ H, H. Price, onthe other hand, has recently
defined comi/ion sense as "a body of very general principles
coinmdnly accepted by ordinary non-philosophical men in the
ordinary affairs of life .”^
Though Moore never defines common sense, his discussions
show similarities to both empirical and rationalistic concepts.
With Reid and Hamilton he sometimes makes it an original intuition
structural in consciousness; he often makes it self-evident,
"The expression (self-evident) does not mean that
the proposition is true because it is evident to you or
me or all mankind, because in other words it appears to
us to be true. That a proposition appears to be true
can never be a valid argument that true it really is.
By saying that a proposition is self-evident, we mean em-
phatically that its appearing so to us, is not the reason
why it is true, for v/e mean that it has absolutely no
reason.
On the other hand, the synonyms v/hich he uses to express
common sense often emphasize its relativity and its determination
by what "we” think. The predicate "it seems to us" is the
clearest expression of the term; things violate common sense,
are "too absurd" if "we cannot continue to believe them for
4 /long together" (startling in the face of Moore's criticism
. R
of James's use of "the long run")r We are using common sense
when "in ordinary life" we constantly talk of such things as
that that is a door and this is a finger. Hot even the limits
of "we", "seeming", and "ordinary" are indicated. There is no
^ Reid, T., Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man .
Cambridge; Bartlett, 1850, p. 455,
2
"The Appeal to Common Sense", Jour . Phil . St, ,5 (1930),
p. 24,
f ^rinc . Eth . , p', 143,
‘ St., p. 1, 93, 157,
5 Ibid
., p. 118-119.
® Ibid
.
.
p, 226-227. Cf, "A Defense of Commcn Sense."
;o
I
T£ -.
, .
. w J. ^JLoh
:< i
-jz o?
0 . • t , ..
< -.-
w - V-
, I * ' • «. i-> • t
w
- u
:.': it 0 o-.v: I
r- . o ! i c ‘ 'ioLD'rCf
,
' 1 ' :;:i;i j.-
r *; . I •
_
.. - f
'
.'ll , .: -A) . .'
•-
. r ^ ,’. .- -I- ;. 1 . • i-.»
^
O'j ’J ' - - ! • ' ••
i „ ' t
' '
.
/.i.
;
I \ SCO ) i'o.i lo t','
:\i :•*.. It 0
r
,
/:*J 10 ' . '. I'J
-4. , , , • • .
*
; v'l ' j f/ "J. ^ • • ''
"
•>
,
.• ' •' L t 'j
^
'
,
^ '.Kici '^ . :
• .,' O / ,'V' J I
X -/
•
'3 :;'
-V .. ; h.i-
.
i *
J
:c;
,
' :XJ I
, ->
t
i X :
144
criterion "by which common sense is to he distinguished from
"prejudice” and in some of his appeals to common sense principles
he himself is "no longer able to see" whether" he is talking
"sheer nonsense or truth. This relativism of the concept
resembles the definition of Price, save for one great differ-
ence - not merely "very general principles" but very concrete
beliefs are common sense in this sense*
Perry offers a compact definition which agrees v/ith
that of Price save that it is somewhat broader, "Common sense
consists of the manifold things that can be taken for g ranted
2for the purposes of every day life." It is therefore relatiire
and not based on any further unanalyzable intuitive principle
in consciousness',
b. The Logical Significance of Common Sense . Here again
Moore is obscure and ambiguous, v/hile Perry is more consistent,
"If we know that (certain .views ) are features in the
Common Sense view of the world it follows that they are
true ."3
It is an indictment of idealism that for it "the universe is
very different indeed from what it seems." Theories of the
status of sense data are rejected because they "seem repugnant
to Common Sense" or are " too' absurd to deserve any serious
consideration ." Hor is this absurdity to be referred to a
•violation of the law of contradiction; "it is, in fact, absurd, "4
Positively, he has no reason for his own theory of the perman-
ence and independence of sense data beyond "a strong propensity
to believe,"^
^
^hil, St
.
.
p. 182, 245.
2 P« P. T,
.
p. 8.
5 Cont . Brit . Phil
.
,
ii, p. 207.
^ St., p. 1, 93, 157.
^ Ibi^, p. 181.
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On this basis the function of philosophy
,
as the quotation
at the head of the present chapter indicates, is merely apo-
logetic; it consists simply ip giving reasons for the common
sense faith that is in you - reasons, moreover, which are not
necessary to you, since common sense stands^n its ovm ground,
but which merely serve to establish the necessity of the
principle.^ A common sense conviction may serve as such a
p
reason for another conviction.
Perry on the other hand, and American neo-realism in
general, are more critical of the conclusions of common
sense in this empirical meaning of the term. Their general
attitude is found in the introduction to The Uev/ Realism ,
"The new realism is, broadly speaking, a return to
that naive or natural realism which was the first of
our three typical theories of the knov/ledge relation,
. . .
The first and most urgent problem for the new
realists is to amend the realism of common sense in
such wise as^to make it compatible with the facts of
relativi ty
The issue involved is, of course, whether or not naive or
comraon sense realism carijbe retained and at the same time
be refined. Perry’s own utterances indicate this position.
"Theory must correct and enlighten belief, but
it cannot, consistently with the conduct of any consider-
able enterprise, replace belief." "Common sense is not
to be conjured with as it once was, ... I am not sure
that in our day the burden of proof does not lie v/ith the
familiar fact. "4
"Common sense is denotative, not/connotative, " and has "no
repugnance v/hatsoever for contradictions,"
"Science and common sense agree in unconsciously
accepting a classification or map of experience v/hich it
is the business of philosophj^ consciously to criticize. "5
I Eth., p, 143-144.
^ ^bil . St.
.
p, 45.
^
The ITew Realism
, p. 10,
^ T,
.
p. 20, 19,
5 Jour
. Phil., 6 (1909), p. 710; P. P. T
. p. 46, 49,
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Thus a difference between the positions of the two thinkers
is made apparent. For Moore common sense, though subject to
no criterion beyond itself, is ultimate. For Perry it con-
stitutes the data of philosophy but must be criticized to
conform to science and experience in general.
c. The Application of Common Sense to the Problem of
Knowledge . The present problem is a narrower one. The epis-
temological foundations of realism are the doctrines of direct
apprehension and of independence
. To v/hat extent are they
rooted in common sense, and in what sense are they therefore
final? In regard to the first, it is difficult to find any
universality in ordinary belief. Common sense will dictate,
depending on the degree of acquaintance vmth science, either
that perception is direct or dualistic. Berkeley, it will
be remembered, proposed to defend the common sense proposition
that in i3erception "the real things are those very things I
see and feel and perceive by my senses" and that "colors and
other sensible qualities are on the objects,"^ opposing it
(i) to materialism, (ii) to the transfigured realism of
Kewton and Locke. But what was then the refinements of
philosophy has now become coimaon sense, as an inquiry directed
toward introductory classes will show. Moreover, in the
realm of conceptual thought, memorj^, and other fields of
mental activity in which error is common, common sense is on
the sid^opposed to the theory of direct apprehension. It i.s
clear that for this foundation of the realistic epistemology,
it does not provide a clear and undisputed warrant,
^ Works, ed, by A. C, Fraser, i, p. 445; cf^.454, 462,
484-485
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In regard to the doctrine of independence
,
one seems
closer to an ultimate and universal intuition. Solipsism is
universally abhorrent; the existence of a plurality of persons
and an objective and common ground of experienced objects is
deiaanded by reasonable experience. But here again, the
validity of this intuition of common sense rests, not upon its
being an intuition commonly recognized, but upon its necessity
for thought and experience as a whole. Though solipsism
has been regarded by some as the only consistent and empirically
grounded epistemology
,
it becomes incoherent in the face of
my experience of higher values.
The final estimate of common sense must be that of
Perry rather than Mcore if the dfetinction between true and
false is to be retained at all, for Moore's solution wants
a criterion of any kind beyond the old Stoic criterion of
evidence. If philosophy ceases to recognize "the opinions
of the vulgar" as valid data, its usefulness is at an end.
That there are universal intuitions which claim validity is
an indisputable and indispensible fact. But the dema.nd of
these intuitions for self-evidence is not ultimate, as Moore
holds it to be; they must be subjected to logical ana-lysis
and criticism. Mor is the line between common sense and
^
"prejudice" to be drav/n where Moore sometimes draws*f intuitions
concerning the physical world are no more numerous and ultimate
than are intuitions concerning the vaiuational or logical
structure of the world that point to idealism, With philosophy
grounded in common sense as Moore would have it, it would re-
main where it begins - in a conflicting chaos of opinion and
speculation. Among fundamental intuitions are the following -
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the validity of the laws of logic for thought and faith in
the rationality of experience, the existence of persons,
the objectivity of perceptual objects constituting a world
of coimiion experience (this intuition and the preceding are,
as Moore pointed out, not independent ) , and a less easily
definable moral intuition. Moore is correct in assuming that
these (to which, however, he adds many more detailed ones)
are fundamental to thought. But in each case they are valid,
not as common sense insights, but, as Perry more clearly points
out, merely because they have survived theoretical investig-
ation of some kind. Perry in his turn errs when he holds
that analysis is adequate to this investigation and criticism;
the natur^of the necessary criterion will become more apparent
as we proceed,^
2, The Limitations of Moore’s Rationalism . Y/e have
already seen the transition in Moore's thought from rationalism
to a modified empiricism reflected in his criticism of idealism -
a movement from an abstract logical analysis of the :j.udgments
involved in the idealistic position to a considersition, cru-
cial for his own thought, of the nature of sense data - parti-
cularly of their relativity. In either case, the fundamental
rationalism of his methdd remains invariant. The chief task
of philosophy "consists of giving reasons", and a reason is
. 2determined by the logical lav/ of implication.
If the essence of traditional rationalism is interpreted
as consisting of three aspects - (i) the doctrine of innate
ideas, or intuitionalism, (ii) faith in mathematical demonstration
and the ideal of mathematical certainty, and (iii) a resulting
^ On the relation of common sense and philosophy, see
Bowne, B. P.
,
Personalism. Ch. I; TIrban, W., op, cit,, p, 48.
~ PMl. St., p. 40- 43.
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distinction "between truths thus demonstrable and "matters of
fact”, it will be seen from what has already been said,
that Moore is a rationalist only in the first aspect, and
that onl3^ in modified form, having surrendered the element of
universality in intuitions, and admitted their relativity.
His intuitionalism in this sense is applied not only in his
epistemology, but in his Sidgwickian ethics. Empiricism is
too prone to the “prejudice” that "there are only certain
kinds of facts which I can know immediately.” ^ Perception
of physical things is intuitive, and the mind has irmnediate
knov/ledge of some "matters of fact”, different from both
2direct apprehension of sense data and memory. His intuitional-
ism is similar, on his ov/n admission, to that of Hume in the
3
positive half of his thought. In the field of moral judgment
intuitionalism is true, though not in the extreme sense
of intuitive knov/ledge of the rightness and wrongness of par-
4
ticular acts. To his intuitionalism may also be referred his
tendency to resort
»
particularly in ethics and in the problems
of the sensum-thing relation and of consciousness, to the
5
use of "ultimate, not further definable relations,”
This intuitionalism, it v/ill be obvious, is already
identical, with a broad common sense empiricism, superadded
on the narrow empiricism of his sensationalistic theory of
knowledge. Intuitions are not universal and do not rest upon
a disti.nct”faculty” . They may be false as v/ell as true, Moore’s
^ Proc . Arist. Soc.
. 3 (1903;, p. 92.
^ ^tiil . St., p. 167, 196 .
^ Itid
.
,
p. 163-164.
^ Princ. Sth
.
.
p. x, 77, 143.
^ Phil. St ..pl7Q-171, 245-246, 249; Princ. Eth .,^4Q.
6 Princ. Eth.
,
p. x; but cf. Ihil . St. , p, 167, 196,
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and Sidgwick’s intuitions regarding tlie significance of
pleasure in the definition of the good conflict, and "neither
can prove whether it is true or not",^ though the absence of
proof causes no difficulty. The dilemma is final for Moore,
and he accepts it as such. There is ultimately no criterion
for the truth of intuitions, whether perceptual, or moral.
His intuitionalism thus eventuates in the same relativism as
2
empiricism, narrov/ly or sensatiorialistically conceived.
But though intuitions themselves constitute the "reasons "
for our holding them, the philosopher, as we have seen, has
the task of advancing logical reasons for them. Moore’s
definition of such a logical reason is far brosder than the
old deductive ideal, and is, of course, inspired by the logic
of implioation.
"A good reason for a belief is a proposition v^hich
is true, and which would not be true unless the belief
v/ere also true." "I do not mean to restrict the words
•reason for a belief’ to propositions from which the Laws
of Formal Logio state that the belief could be deduced.
- “
- I am using the word ’reason’ in the wide and popular
sense, in v/hich it really might be."4
A reason may be an intuition of the kind "which (as we commonly
assume) eachjbf'us believes"; indeed, as we have seen Moore’s
chief positive argument for the independent realitj^ of physical
things rests on such an intuition. Traditional ratonalism
is thus given a broad extension, and Moore, having criticized
the idealistic logic of possibility, resting on the law of
contradiction alone, also sacrifices the necessity for whic h
he sought in his early papers, for a logic of mere probability.
^ l^rinc . Bth .
,
p. 75.
.
^ Phil. St.
, p. 223, 226, 182, 245.
^ Irinc. Eth
., p. 143-144.
4 Phil. St.
.|>.35. 40-41, 45.
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The limitations of intuition, which have led Moore
close to a loosely interpretated empiricism, and his desire
to prove that "singular” propositions may he adequate reasons
for the neoessary truth of propositions implying them, lead
Moore to investigate the empirical method in logic - the
process of generalization. Early. in his writings he quarrels
with empiricism for limiting^ov/ledge to experience in the
narrow sense of direct apprehension, for its implying certain
fundamental principles which it begins hy dehying, and for its
tendency to reduce all necessity either to analytic or to.
existential and causal necessity,^ "An inductive argument
always needs, as empiricists put it, to he supplemented hy
p
the assumption of the uniformity of nature." In fact, he
uses this limitation to prove Kant a deterrainist. But his
early rejection of empiricism is due largely to the result of
his acceptance of the traditional narrow meaning of "experience",
as direct experience. As such, experience does not, for
him, include memory, imagination, and "that part of our know-
ledge v/hich is not itself experience."^
But later he himself v/ishes to make a generalization
to the objective existence of other selves, and to criticize
the generalization made hy Berkeley and the idealists. To
accomplish this refutation he needs to set up the necessary,
though not the sufficient conditions for the validitj^ of an
induction. The following conditions must he met hy a valid
generalization. To infer that A is universall3^ preoeded by'-
^
"Experience and Empiricism", Proc, Arist. See,
,
3
(1903), p. 93-94, see above, p.5S-s6-
2 "Freedom", Mind
, 7 (1898), p. 188,
"Experience and Empiricism", p. 92.
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B, (i) b must have been observed preceding a at least once,
(ii) b and a must both have had real existence, and (iii) the
relational complex involving A and B must be conceptually
identical with that involving a and
This tendency to recognize a broad empiricism which
either recognizes the relativity cf knov/ledge or obscurely
desiderates a new type of necessity appears inMoore*s thought
relatively early. Empiricism is defined in terms, not of actual
2but of possible experience, and includes all concepts and
3
relations, not merely the "empirical concepts". In thus
interpreting empiricism as including logical possibility and
objective relations, Moore makes it approach his ovm empiricism
and stands clcsely related to James’s "radical empiricism", and
(with the added Kantian principle of the activity of conscious-
ness and the mental nature of logic) to the "transcendental
empiricism" of Bovme
.
The inner conflicts of Moore’s method stand apparent,
and become more so when his emphasis on analysis as the ulti-
mate philosophical method is recognized. After defining
reason as implication, he admits, for constructive purposes,
inductive generalizations and prchable truth, A Kantian in
his emphasis on objectivity, he finally concludes that the
ultimate grounds of knov/ledge, intuitions, cannot bj^ any
criterion be distinguished from prejudice and falsehood. The
relativity and claimed universality of intuitions are nowhere
reconciled. He defines experience narrowly to offer the
^ ^bil
,
St
. ,
p. 5o-68.
^
"Experience and Empiricism", p, 93.
^ "The Mature of Judgment", liind
, 8 (1899), p. 189,
X
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rationalistic criticism of it - Leibniz’s "nisi intellectus
ipse" - and then extends empiricism to include "possible ex-
perience* in true idealistic vein. His method resembles that
of Leibniz, but unlike Leibniz, he stresses, as his own
empiricism grows, the significance of "truths of fact",
themselves to be known intuitively.
Moore’s difficulties might have been resolved but for
his abhorrence for any type of logic smacking of monism. Logical
implication as Moore describes it in the "wide and popular
sense" is not adequate tc define a good reason; he himself
had earlier found logical implication depending oh the law of
contradiction and of positive systematic relation as the
only adequate basis of necessity, only to reject this appro-
ximation of the coherence criterion because of the danger it
involved for his pluralism.^ Even later he sometimes uses
the coherence criterion v/ithout adopting it, admitting^as
v/e have seen, that thought imx)lies the rationality of the
universe. Thus the madman is to be persuaded that a chair
is a chair and not an elephant "bj^ shewing him that our viev/
is consistent with something else which he holds to be true,
whereas his original viev/ is cont radio to r3/ to it." The
practical determination of truth thus rests upon intuitions
which he is unwilling, themselves, to submit to the criterion
of freedom from contradiction and positive coherence.
Moore’s motive for rejecting the coherence criterion
of truth has already been pointed out. As an absolutistic,
,
^"The Mature of Judgment" and "Identity". See above,
P.
Mnc. Eth.
, p. 75-76.
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monistic conception of truth coherence tends to identify
logic and reality, as do the American realists, and therefore
also the origin and validity of a judgment. Moore, on the
other hand, insists on the distinction between origin and
validity of a view; this is the basis of his criticism of
naturalistic and empiricistic theories, both of knov/ledge
and of ethics. He is as bitter^pponent as any idealist
of what Urban has recently called “the unscrupulous empiricism
of modernism""^ that attacks systems on the basis of their
origins, not their validity*. As a result, as our discussion
of his intuitionisra has ajnply shoi.'m, he considers monism
the only alternative to a common sense relativism and cheeses
the latter. But, if the distinction between the origin and
validation of a view be retained, the coherence criterion,
no longer implying the internality of all metaphysical rela-
tions because it distinguishes between logic and reality,
but also no longer resting on epistemological monism, not
only remains possible without a complete surrender to monism,
but affords a working basis of reconciling the concepts of
relative and absolute truth. This position is open neither
to absolutists nor to Moore in so far as both reduce knov/ledge
to direct apprehension and are intellectualistic. But the
fact remains that Moore might have saved himself from a hope-
less coKimon sense relativism and empiricism without criterion,
by a recognition of this third alternative which his ov/n
2distinction betv/een intuition and reason suggests.
1
Urban, ’j7.,
^ Princ. Eth
The Intelligible \7orld , p. 41.
., p. 143-144.
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3, The Modified jjlmpiricism of Perry. Before the rise
of contemporary realism Royce had already defined the method
of all realism as essentially rationalistic, thought it
"sometimes loves an ostentatious although never a very thor-
ough going empiricism",^ More recently, R. Kremer has some^7hat
paradoxically said thaf'the empirical method of the neo-realists
is intellectualistic and analytic."^ Moore's rationalism
has Been seen to approach empiricism in its development; it
can he shown even more easily that Perry, an avowed empiricist,
is neve:^th^^ess rationalistic in spirit. In his ea,rly
reply to Royce, this a priori element in iiis thought is asserted,
"He is not seeking to discover what is real, so
much as v/hat it is to he real, - - - This
,
it seems to
me, is an essentially fruitless metaphysical method v/hich
found its reductio ad ahsurdum as long ago as the time of
Parmenides. Its essential fruitlessness follows from
Mie fact that it is untrue to the o riginal philosophical
consciousness" ^
Perry subscribes to James's empiricism in both broad and
narrov/ senses, (i) in insisting "on the testing of an idea
by a resort to that particular experience which it means,",
and (ii) in the sense "that knowledge is to be limited to
4
what is presented."
"According to the empirical method we are not to
start with a category and then find instances of it,
but must proceed in the reverse direction, first collect-
ing instances and then analyzing out their common char-
acteristic. In collecting instances, hov/ever, one has
to employ a principle of selection; which v/ill turn out,
unless one is cautious, to be an assumption of the^very
concept of v/hich one is supposed to be in search,"^
This quotation suggests two respects, at least, in which
^
Thw V/orld and_tjie_ Individual
,
p , 68,
^Xa .Thlprle ;Te- la' Connalssance . chez -lbs H^o-r^aliste s,p.l46.
SHonist
.
l¥ tl^^Oli. P. 446. cf. 447. ^
^
P, P. T. .p. 363.
- G. T.V
.^
p. 22.
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Perry has modified traditional empiricism, (l) His application
of the method to the study of values shov/s that he is not nar-
rowly sensationalistic
. (2) He admits that the empirical
method rests on the selective activity of the mind (or organ-
ism) and on certain ”heliefs’' which themselves must he subject
to criticism. Empiricism is therefore in need of an external
criterion. In his description of "Realism as Program of
Reform", careful definition stands at the head (save for a
general insistence oii the scrupulous use of words) of the methodo-
logical reform urged hy the school,^ It v/ould seem, then, that
like Moore, he holds the method of philosophy to begin, necessa-
rily with common sense beliefs, and to proceed by description
and analysis to give reasons for them,- and, in Perry’s case,
to criticize them. Both define reason in the same v;ay, using
almost identical phrases. For Moore a reason is "a true
proposition from which the truth of the belief follows"; for
Perry it is "evidentially attested belief,
In"Tlie Truth Problem"^ Perry finds the basis of his
empiricism in the distinction between existential and formal
truth. Existential truth does not necessarily conform to
formal logic as, according to both Moore and Perry, idealism
would have it. All existential truth contains formal truth,
but is not determined by it. Thus empiricism is extended by
Perry to include all possible experience, including its logical
structure, which can be singled out by the process of analytic
universalization,
^ The Hew Realism
, p. 22,
^ Pb.il , St ,
.
p, 40-41; Perry, "The Ap|)eal to Reason",
Phil, Rev
, . 30 (l92l), p. 138.
^ Jour. Phil,
. 13 (1916), p. 315,
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It may be pointed out that coherence, in the dualistic
sense already indicated, also admits the distinction of Perry
be'tv/een existential and formal truth, between actuality and
logical possibility resting on the law of contradiction. The
term "existential truth" is either meaningless or redundant -
redundant for the panlogist .who identifies truth and reality,
and meaningless for the dualist who defines truth as corres-
pondence', Coherence recognizes the laws of formal logic as
a negative norm; their violation establishes falsehood, though
conformity to them implies onlx possibility, Meanv/hile, as
we shall see. Perry is not at all explicit as to the ground
of unity between existential truth and the universally valid
logical structure in it; his dilemma here is that of all
realists; their position arises from their refusing to recognize
the basis of this unity in consciousness.
Summarizing, we may say that Perry and Moore are in
method substantially agreed, Moore rejecting only traditional
empiricism. Perry only traditional rc.tionalism. But Perry’s
empiricism succeeds beyond Moore’s intuiti cnaLism in subjecting
common sense itself to criticism by analysis and reference to
the immediate dat4 of experience. Cant belief be so tested?
Perry’s answer is ultimately dogmatic and rests on his episte-
mological monism. Hence his position is ultimately a faith
in the orderliness of the universe v/hich Moore also confesses
to and which is the ultimate intuition of idealistic logib.
The method of both needs completion, as both do atten^t to
complete it in application, by the positive, "material" ration-
alism of the dualistic criterion of coherence. Meanwhile another

methodological principle on which both are agreed is to he
reconciled with their general method only with difficulty -
their faith in analysis as a sufficient philosophical method,
4, The Limits of Analysis, In formulating the realistic
program of reform Perry demands adherence to analysis as "that
method of procedure in which the problematic is discovered to
he a complex of simples”^ stressing, however, that analysis
does not seek merely a collection hut an arrangement of facts,
Moore is in essential agreement, in spite of his criticism
of the tendenc^ybf empiricism to reduce all valid universal
Judgments to analytic and causal ones. The position is the
only possible logical consequence of the view that relations
are external, and that reality ultimately consists of a
plurality of particular or universal simples.
The chapters on the historical development of Moore
and Perry have already shovm, however, that both surrendered
their faith in analysis as they began the constructive half
of their thought. The following points tend to show the
limits within which their method is actuallj^ restricted to
it.
a. Prom the beginning Moore rejected analysis in the
field of value theory, and so made use of the distinction
between reality and value v^hich mars all positivistic axiologies
2
Reality is analytic; value is organic.
~
b. In his later intuitionalistic period, Moore modifies
his view even further, because of the substance-attribute
scheme of categorial analysis v/hich his materialism leads him
to adopt. Intuitions (and perceptions) are ultimate and not
The Mew Realism, p. £4. Royce’s criticism of Bradley
rejection of an^ysis is the background of Perry's thought
Per comment see Urban, The Intelligible World, p, 201.

su‘’oject to analysis, and the part-v/hole relation becomes
significant for reality v/ithin limits,
c. Perry's recent use of the concepts of "pattern",
"emergence", and "conjunction vs. disjunction" also point
toward a more synoptic viewpoint,^
The American s^chool, whose position is most fully
developed by E ,G . Spaulding^ is here more extreme than Moore,
its extremity consisting in making^vary valuable methodological
analysis into an exclusive one, and in making unjustifiable
2
generalizations from it. Its motive is to be found, of course,
in the criticism of the method of idealism, many of whose con-
clusions are held to rest on insufficient analysis. The analy-
tic method is opposed to the mystical or romantic . The
fallacy of pseudo- simplicity^ can be removed only by applying
the method of careful analysis, familiar to science, in
philosophy as well. As a corrective, it must be admitted,
the emphasis on analysis is Tdiolesome and needed'. But two
problems of great significance for the conflict bet¥/een
realism and idealism immediately present themselves - what
criterion may be set up for the limits of valid analysis,
and can analysis alone, v/ithout the synoptic viewpoint,
give knowledge?
Spaulding distinguishes between experimental or
material and formal anal3^sis based on rational principles,
A
and holds that the experimental always precedes the formal*,
‘
^ J'our, Phil. SjU, 3 (1928), p, 300-306, Cont. Am.
Phil,
.
ii, p, 200.
"A Defense of Analysis," The hew Realism, p. 155-247;
See his definition, p. 159,
' *
3 ^e Hew Realism
, p. 12> P . T, T , .p. 60-61, 83,
4 Oip. cit., p. 155-156.
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Perry, on tlie other hand, criticizes "critical (or anali'-tic)
naturalism” for neglecting reality of the logical and mathe-
matical character of nature, not subject to eucperimental ana-
lysis,
"The concepts of physics are special values of the
variables of logic.and mathematics; the hypotheses of
physics are alternatives supplied b3^ the most abstract
principles of logic and mathematics.”
Thus, contrary to Spaulding’s viev/, logical anal^^sis precedes
physical - the ideas of Plato and the forms of Aristotle are
more basic for realism than the atoms of Democritus, This
rationalism seems to be basic to the new realism, as Perr^/
himself recognizes. Again we confront the dualism which
realism does not solve - between the particular and the uni-
versal.
By what criterion, then, shall the limits of valid
analj^sis be fixed. The material analyst is limited by physical
indivisibility or b^^ a minimum sensibile : for the formalist,
however, the limit is obscure; one can onl^' say that ultimate
concepts limit analysis. But here, too, the rationalist
finds himself in unstable principles unless he assujnes a
relational criterion of truth,
a, If Hcore’s intuitionalism is correct, analysis cannot
overstep the bounds of "ai?surdity” or disagreement with
common sense. So Broad holds that a priori truths are the
2limits of valid analysis,
b,But particularly in their criticism of idealism,
realists do not recognize such a limitation, but press their
analysis to the limits of language, Russell has recently point-
^
• I’ » T
«
. p. 83,
2 Quoted in D. S. Robinson, Anthology of Recent Phil.,p. 73
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ed out that many realists are prone to this error. Thus,
when Holt says that "to he" is simpler than "to he real",
it v/ould seem to he an instance of this, the sophistical
fallacy? The distinction of most realists between mental
act and its object may he an example; certainly that hetv/een
thought and content is from which their distinction arises.
An example of purely verbal analysis is Moore's tentative
suggestion that the relativity'^ of sense data he explained by
distinguishing between what sensa are and what they seem .
Such also is his conclusion that since x can he discussed
3
apart from percipi it is probably distinct from percipi ,
Perry himself points out this danger of confusing v/ord and
4
meaning. But those passages in v/hich he accounts for
thought as subvocal speech would make the distinction
impossible,
c. It is clear that meaning must in some v/ay determine
the limits of valid conceptual analysis, as a minimum sa^a^bile
provides the limits of material analysis. The empirical
criterion Moore rejects with his rejection of empiricism;
Perry cannot, like James, retain it because he rejects just
that element in James’s thought on which it rests - his
5
nominalistic pragmatism. It is at this point that Perry
abandons Hume, and with him, pragmatism, and he, like Moore,
is left without an ultimate criterion.
Here again the coherence criterion vfould provide both
thinkers with v/hat their systems need, for meaning is determined
^ Sceptical Essays
.
quoted in Robinson, op. cit
.
. p, 295,
2 So called from its failure to distinguish betv/een
word and meaning.
2
St
.,T3. 246-247, 10.
^ The Hew Realism, p. 25, P. P, T.,p. 234-236,5
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Tdv positive relations to experience. Forraal coherence is
not adequate, as Perry points out i^^iticizing the idealistic
argument from the antinomies of pure reason. The categories
cannot be tested by the a priori foims of the mind; they
must be tested in relation to the data of experience themselves.
This is coherence, but not the formal absolutistic type; rather
the dualistic, material coherence which distinguishes between
the data of knovirledge and its validity.
Thus it appears, from a consideration of the need for
a criterion of anal3^sis itself, that it cannot be thejultimate
philosophical method, though it is an important step in it.
The realists emphasize the fact that analysis implies synthe-
sis; their distinction betv/een numerical and conceptual iden~
tity points to positive relations of a necessary nature.
May it not be possible that emphasis on analysis is itself
a case of the fallacy of ’’exclusive particularity”, attributed
by Perry to idealism? It is certainly unevenly applied by
both Moore and Perry, depending on whether they are engaged
in negative dialectic or positive constructive thought;
whether they are dealing with material things or values,
and their logic, correspondingly, moves from Russell to Hegel,
^
Their conception of philosopiiy itself demands a method
beyond analysis. If, as Moore says, ’’philosophy largely con-
sists of giving reasons" analj^sis is onlj^ a preliminary stage
ih its task, "Metaphysics," says Perry, "must construct
^ For rSjievant passages, see Phil . St
,
, p. 278-279,
Princ, Eth. ,p, 27-37: Jour, Phil,
.
13 (191G), p, 174, where
"Abel slew Cain" is false and has no existential standing,
though Abel and Cain exist and slew subsists.
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the reality that shall contain nature,”^ As soon as philo-
sophy assumes a constructive role, it must abandon analysis,
not as a method, for inadequate analysis has been a fault
of all systems, but as the exclusive method. As a dialectic
method it becomes unfair when it exceeds the criterion of
validity and resorts to verbalism,
5 • The Criticism of Idealism in Relation to the Problem
of liethod . The discussion to this point has been a circuit-
ous route to a conclusion that can be stated briefly, though
the remainder of the present study will consist solely of the
attempt to justify it. The necessity under v/hich Moore and
Perry find themselves as their systematic thought advances,
of modifying empiricism and rationalism for intuitionalism,
of abandoning analysis for a correlationdand systematization
of results, arises from the nature of philosophical truth,
•'In the case of a philosophical theory, the only
ultimate kind of proof that can be given is that the
theory seems to make the universe intelligible to us,
and that we cannot think of any alternative theory that
does
.
'*2
In philosophy it is the strife of systems that is important.
The truth 'Of a philosophical theory, always relative, depends
not on a deductive demonstration of its central propositions,
but on their comprehensiveness and consistency - internally
and externally v/ith the facts of experience'. The most coherent
world view is the most true - that is the ultimate intuition
upon which the philosophical endeavor must rest.
Of what, then, must a refutation of such a theory con-
1 Jour , Phil, , 1 (1904), p, 174,
2 J. S. Mackenzie, Mind, 15 (1906), p. 323
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sist? Four considerations may be suggested in lieu of the
more detailed logical investigation which is beyond the scope
of this paper,
a. The principle of contradiction is fundamental for
purposes of refutation. If a theory contains inner contra-
diction it is faulty. If it contradicts the "facts of
experience" or of science it is faulty, but the critic must
guard against contradictions that are merelj^ apparent, and
the "facts of experience" must themselves have been criticized
and made consistent,
b,A complete refutation must be internal and external.
It must examine the adequacy of the theory to be criticized
on its own rights and on the basis of its own motives and
presuppositions, as v/ell as from the alternative position
which the critic considers more coherent. To this demand
the realists conform; the present section of this study is
devoted to their internal criticism, the third section to the
alternatives which they propose,
c,A distinction must be made between the motives and
presuppositions of a system and its conclusions, No one has
insisted more strongly than Moor^upon the distinction between
origins and validity of a theory or institution. Every
system rests upon corm'non sense intuitions that ma3^ be examined
on their own ground, though Moore admits no criterion is possible
on that basis, but the validity of a s3''stemb conclusions is
independent of the question of its motives, Moore is more
honest here than Perr3^',
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d. The cumulative effect of the arguments for a position
must he considered, for no theory in philosophy rests upon a
symple sorites, A true system may he defended on false
premises, hut justified on other grounds. Its arguments are
in that case faulty hut its conclusions correct, Moore
hopes that idealism is true, and proves only the falsity,
as he sees it, of one of its arguments, which he, however,
considers its only historical argument.
The critic of a system, approaching it internally,
must therefore examine se^iarately (i) its arguments, (ii)
the consistency and comprehensiveness of its conclusions,
(iii) its consequences for the various fields of hume.n
interest, among them science, moralit3^, and religion.
That outline the present study v/ill follow in anal3^zing
Moore's and Perry's criticism.
With this noimiative statement before us, several
respects in which the criticism of idealism under examination
fal]s short of the ideal become apparent,
a. It may he said that both Moore and Perry demand
a degree of certainty on the part of idealism which they
do not claim for their own thought. After all, the major
conclusions of Moore claim only prohahl^e and relative cer-
tainty, The appeal to intuition is frequent. Perry's views
are developed more categorically, hut even he is conscious of
certain postulated presuppositions, Botii recognize incomplete-
ness in their thought. Yet they cannot forgive idealism its
great argument by analogy.
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"For my part, if I cannot be sure that all the sensations
presented to me are affections of my mind, I do not see
how I could possibly be sure that they are affections of
some raind,"^
b. Thus, idealism is criticized by both Moore and Ferry
2for arguing from mere possibility to actuality. But Moore
himself appeals to possibility against Hume’s scepticism,
and Perry establishes his doctrine of independence on the same
negative grounds. Kreraer points out that realism is interested
"not in the real world, but only in the possible world." 3
That is their criticism of idealism. Both idealism and realism
are Leibnizian in logic, though their logic i s different.
To the argument from :spbssibility the mathematical logic is
no safeguard for the very adequate reason that it cannot be
used in constructive thought at all. Both the mathematical
logic and the Hegelian dialectic are empirical, but the one
is sterile
,
thejisther, in modified form, fruitful because it
is venturesome.
There is a deeper defect beneath this criticism, that
has often been pointed out, ITeo-realism is itself too largely
dialectic and negative, not enough constructive,
"Hous reprocherons plutot aux neo-realistes de s’^tre
trop places, dans leur critique, au point de vue n^gativ,
qui consiste a r(^futer 1 ’ idealisme ,
They tend to neglect, as wel shall see, the positive foundation
of their alternative epistemology,
5
c. The criticism of the cardinal principle' reflects an
unwarranted restriction of viewpoint to one of idealism’s
arguments, the eepistemological. They do not consider the
^ Hoore, Proc. Arist, Soc,
, 17 (1917), p, 420.
2 See chapter VII,
^
> P* 148,
^ I'oid
.
,
p. 143.
5. See chapter IV .
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cumulative effects of idealism* s arguments, but only the
epistemological motive of Berkeley and Kant, and that only
in its negative aspects. This, we shall set, is an over-
1
simplification of its case.
d. The ccmmon sense intuitionalism of Moore, in par-
ticular, and only in less degree of Perry, limitsi arbitrarily,
valid intuitions to those of the perception of the material
world. This is the result of the old positivistic and sensa-
tionalistic motive of the last century stili^working in them.
Hocking has recently pointed out, v/ith great skill, the intui-
2
tions of idealism and of realism. " The former are rooted
in valuational interests, which both Moore and Perry tend to
cast aside as "dogmatism", "romanticism", and Mysticism",
Common sense is a basis of defense for realism, but a "prejudice"
to be analyzed away in the case of idealism. Though Perry
is the more cautious in his use of cemmon sense, he is far
more prone to attack idealism on the ground of^ilts motives
than is Moore,
e, Hot only does realism use analysis as a method
of refutation and refuse to adopt it as a method of constructive
thought; we have already cited exairxples in which its dialectic
use of analysis loses meaning because of its verbalism.
The unfairness of Moore's and Perry's criticism, then,
rests in their failure to view idealism on the same methodolo-
gical grounds which underlie their own thought. The result
^ See F, C, S. Schiller, Mind
, 22 (1913), p. 283;
A. 0. Lovejoy, Jour. Phil,
. 9 (1912)
,
p. 674-677.
2 Types of Philosophy, p’, 251- 254, 333.
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is a tendency to approach idealism too externally and ration-
alistically, and to neglect the a posteriori empirical argu-
ments which it advances. "The sort of truth that is in most
danger of getting itself ignored," as Perry himself points
out, "is the whole truth. In the ensuing discussion, it
is hoped that we shall not overlook the positive values in
the^detailed analysis to which Moore and Perry have subjected
certain idealistic arguments, premises, and conclusions'. In
sc far as they are justified, they reveal defects in idealistic
reasoning, though they do not prove it false until its results
are shown to he incoherent v/ith experience as a v/hole, ration-
ally examined and criticized.
] The Free Man and the Soldier
, p. vii
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rCHAPTER V
THE "CARDINAL PRINCIPLE" AND ITS RELATION TO IDEALISTIC TYPES
The definition and classification of idealism, strangely
enough, is not sharply drawn by the neo-realists. In his recent ' •
philosophic credo Perry expresses his indifference by saying,
"It. is unprofitable to quarrel over the diverse meanp
ing of the term idealism. That idealism which I
went out to slay was born of the marriage of subjec-
tivism and universalism
,
and then devoting almost two-thirds of his essay to a renewed dis-
cussion of this attempted infanticide. Nor does he restrict his
criticism to the children of this union; in fact, his criticism of
Berkeley is the latter’s failure to overcome subjectivism. Moore
is even less concerned with a scrutiny of idealistic types. The
result is a disparity between the inclusiveness they claim for their
criticism, and the principles v/hich they attribute to idealism and
on which their criticism is based. It is the puiq)Ose of this
chapter to reveal this disparity still further by examining their
definitions of idealism, the scope of their criticism, and their
analyses of the chief of these principles.
1. The Definition of Idealism . Moore’s first definition of
idealism appears in his criticism of McTaggart’s Studies in
Hegelian Cosmology . It consists of two parts. Hlhat McTaggart
would call idealism" is "any philosophy which maintains that the
universe is wholly spiritual and perfectly good."^ By 1904 one
qualifying phrase has been dropped: "Klodern idealism, if it
asserts any- general conclusion about the universe at all, asserts
that it is spiritual . This is obviously a definition broad
^Contemporary American Philosophy
, ii
,
p. 189.
!
^Proc . Arist . 3oc ., STtoqS) , p. 187.
^Philosophical Studies
,
p. 1.
(
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enough to include all the particular systems against which Moore
directs his criticism. The essential characteristic of idealism
is its claim that the world is exclusively spiritual, though it
may be noted that Moore omits this restriction in his second de-
finition. Two further qualifications should be made in criticism
of this definition.
a. If Moore means, in his first definition, that idealism
holds the world to be "perfectly good," he is evidently mistaken.
That view has been taken by absolutists and by many personalists
or spiritualists in the past, but is by no means implied in ideal-
ism, as Schopenhauer’s thought shows. On the other hand realists
have found the objective world good. What is implied by idealism,
as we shall see, is a definite ontological significance for value.
But there are degrees and types of value other than "perfect good-
ness.”
b. The term "spiritual" is ambiguous, the chief ambiguity
being the extent to which it connotes consciousness. G-eist
,
for
example, is not a psychological concept, and is incorrectly
translated mind
,
though it is attainable by mind. Hegel’s distinc-
tion between subjective and objective spirit is the distinction
between psychological relativism and objective, coherent valie
experience. Systems of idealism other than mentalism recognize
the distinction and conceive the spirituality of the universe
in impersonal or aconscious terms. Plato realistically interpreted,
the absolute experience of Bradley, the concrete universal of
Bosanquet, and the absolute of Groce, are of this type, which is
distinct from the idealism v;hich finds the unity of the vvorld in
universal consciousness, as did Hegel. Idealism from this point
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of view stresses the logical and axiological structure of the
world. It combines the absolutistic interest v/ith the critical
Kantian caution, and its results are correspond ingHy meaningless.
But only if '^spiritual" is conceived in an impersonal sense will
Moore's definition include them, though he means it to include
them.
But Moore defines "spiritual” in the more restricted sense,
conforming with English usage.
'h'/hen the whole universe is declared to be spiritual,
it is meant not only that it is in some sense conscious
,
but that it has what we recognize in ourselves as the
higher forms of consciousness. That it is intelligent;
that it is purposeful; that it is not mechanical; all
these different things are commonly asserted of it.”l .
Only those systems, then, are idealistic v/hich conclude that the
world is conscious. Certain types of self-styled idealism, objec-
tive tout refusing to reduce the logical and value structure of the
world to_conscious activity, are excluded. This fact is not ade-
quately recognized either by Moore or by Perry, who does, however,
see that as idealism stresses "the impersonal life of thought...
without a live Thinker” it develops into a bare rationalism and
p
necessitarianism that is rather naturalism than idealism.^ It
will be the position of this study, that idealism of this type is
metaphysically incomplete, and to that extent positivistic. How-
ever, it may be pointed out that a large idealistic tradition
originating in Platonism, is not included in Moore's definition,
although his logical criticism applies to it.
Perry's broader definitions of idealism are in substantial
agreement with Moore’s.
"Idealism is a form of spiritualism in which man, the
^Philosophical Studies
, p. 1-2.
^P . P . T
.
,
p. 149, quoting J. Lindsay, Studies in Euro^^e an philos -
ophy
, p. 223-224. Gf. P.Jk*T.,p. 177, on the idealistic recogniticn
of Hegel’s "mistake of forcing 'psychological' categories bn nature
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IP
finite individual, is regarded as a microcosmic rep-
resentative of God, the Absolute Individual . Ideal-
ism in this sense "is a distinctly modern movement.
It consists essentially in the assertion of the pri-
ority of spirit over matter.
In the same passage he defines spirit, as did Moore, in terms of
consciousness. But such broad definitions "throw little light
upon its technical philosophical meaning." Technically, idealism
is a theory of the metaphysical implications of knowledge. Perry
therefore ventures as definition, what Moore had proposed as a
necessary presupposition or a cardinal principle. "In our day it
has become inseparably associated with the doctrine which attri-
butes to being a dependence upon the activity of mind. This fairly
cautious statement is discarded for one which reflects Perry’s
logical analysis of the cardinal principle. Idealism is the doc-
trine that "to be and to be known are one and the same.” (Esee is
percipi expresses an identity ) , or that "to know is to generate the
reality known. This definition reduces all idealism to an:r
epistemological motive. Another ambiguity suggests itself here.
Is the I, the knower, conceived merely logically, or is it the
finite knowing person, or a type of particular supreme conscious-
ness? Perry means to include all three theories, but expresses
himself in ambiguous and fluctuating' ways, and often implies that
the knowledge of the finite individual must be held to generate
all reality.
The definitions of both Perry and Moore thus are seen to fix
the limits of the idealism criticized in such a way as not to
^P.P.T
., p. 113.
^^he Cardinal Principle of Idealism" Mind
,
19{1910) p. 322.
•^Approach to Philosophy, p. 173.
4Jour . Phil ., 19(1910), p. 326.
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include those systems which stress the impersonal reasoi^leness of
the world, but to limit it to the types to v/hich Sidgwick first
gave the title "mental!^." Ferry’s further definition limits
idealism to those forms which arise from the epistemological motive,
while Moore, in practice, draws the same limit because he regards
the cardinal principle as a necessary stage in all idealistic
argument
.
2. The Scope of the Criticism of Idealism . The examination
of the development of Moore’s thought has already shown that in
practice he criticized, of traditional idealists, Hegel, Berkeley,
and Leibniz, and Kant, whom he interpreted idealistically, and that
most of his detailed criticisms are directed at contemporaries—
notably McTaggart
,
Ward, Bradley, Joachim, and Taylor, whose article
was the occasion of the "Refutation.” In these criticisms two
distinct motives, however, appear. Beginning as a Kantian, his
first criticisms are directed at Hegel and the Hegelians, and
Leibniz, and rests on the logical attack of their doctrine of
internal relations, and the Leibnizian logic of possibility,
though McTaggart is criticized also for his theory of consciousness.
At this time Moore oppsjses only absolute idealism. Only later, when
his own logic has driven him to choose between empirical idealism
and nominalistic realism does he turn to the attack of the epis-
temological motive in idealism. Henceforth the two idealistic
motives which he attacks are the logical and the epistemological
— Leibniz and Berkeley. Thus his criticism involves a wider scope
than his definition j\istifies, though Plcto is for him as for
Ferry, not an idealist but essentially a realist, stressing the
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independence and ultimate reality of the objects of thought.!
The scope of Perry’s criticism is as wide, though he is more
explicit ' in emphasizing that logical and the epistemological
motives must be combined in modern idealism. Beginning with a
criticism of the empirical and transcendental traditions of ideal-
ism, Berkeley and kant
,
his criticism is extended to all who
follow in their banner, whether interpreting them voluntaristical-
ly, intellectualistically
,
esthetically
,
or mystically (Fichte,
Scheliing, Hegel, Schopenhauer). Regardless of the other person-
alities included in his criticisms, they are almost entirely a
refutation of them. Certain exceptions are more instructive for
our understanding of Perry than the men he includes. Contrary
to many historians he classes Schopenhauer with the ideslists,
and Bergson, whose similarity to Tames obscures to him his close
relation to Schopenhauer, with realistic pragraatisn.^ Leibniz is
not an idealist, but "the great modern -w-ristotelian" and indi-
vidualistic absolutist Plato, as we have already seen, is a real-
ist "in the preferred sense," though, as an absolutist, he is also
V
subject to criticism. These exceptions provide a ground for the
following generalizations that Yilll be justified in the course of
the further discussion. Perry is critical of absolute idealism
and personal idealism only in so far as they arise from the epis-
temological motive. In the former group he criticizes among others
Green, Laird, Bradley, Royce
,
and Miss Calkins— but always for the
^Hote Moore’s appeal to the authority of ^ lato
,
in Princ. Eth
. ,
p. Ill; Prop. Arist. qoc . , 1(1901), p. 114; cf. Perry, Approach to
Philosophy, p. 174, footnote; P.P.T. , p. 114, 166.
Rp.^T
. ,
p. 267 et. al.
^Approach to Philosophy
, p. 337-338.
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subjectivism he finds in their thought, while his later discussion
of Creighton’s paper on ’’Two Types of Idealism" relegates that
idealist’s solution to the general category, not of idealism, but
of absolutism.^ Among the pluralistic idealists he criticizes, on
one score or another. Ward, Taylor, J. Lindsay, R. Eucken, Baillie
,
Renouvier, Henry Jones, and McTaggart, though often in terms that
show his sympathy with their pluralistic and voluntaristic empha-
sis, rejecting only their Kantian and Berkeleian epistemology. On
the general position of personal idealism he maintains a silence
broken on only four occasions— in two of which he offered no cri-
2
ticism, in two of which he rejects it as being in unstable equi-
librium between absolutism and subjectivism,^ We have seen that
his own system tends to approximate a form of this in so far as
he emphasizes its dynamic aspects and modifies its behaviorism.
We may conclude that his criticism includes both of these forms
only in so far as they tend toward subjectivism, a conclusion
justified by his sharp distinction in recent writings between
idealism and spiritualism."^ With their difficulties in gathering
the complexi ny of spiritualistic types into comprehensive defini-
tions before us, we turn to the attempt to discover a classifica-
tion of idealism in their writings,
5,. The Glassification of Idealism . Whereas Perry classifies
and reclassifies various types of idealism, all attempts to dis-
cover that Moore recognizes a clear arrangement of systems will
meet in failure. "Modern idealists are chiefly distinguished by
ip.c.i
.
,
p.
^Approach to Philosophy
, p. 405.
^P.C.I
.
,
p, 201-219; G.T.Y ,
,
p. 88.
^ Philosophy of the Recen t Past
. p, 82,
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certain arguments which they have in comiaon.”^ ’''Of one, broad
distinction, however, both are cognizant. It is that between
"practical idealism" and "metaphysical idealism," developed most
clearly by Perry, Both consider "practical idealism" justified
as "faith in the ultimate significance of goodness" and regard
it as logically unrelated to metaphysical idealism, hence both
criticize only metaphysical idealism and its basis in epistemo-
logical idealism or "subjectivism" in the sense in which Perry
first uses the term. The first distinction that both make within
idealism proper is in this epistemological basis. It is roughly
the distinction between Berkeley and Kant, and rests upon the analy-
sis of the "cardinal principle" that "esse is percipi ,
"
"Some hold that to say exists* is to say neither .
more nor less than *A is perceived’ — that the two expres-
sions are perfect synonyms; and others again would say
that by ’A exists or is real^ we may mean more than that
’A is perceived’,* but that we must at least mean this. "3
Perry first criticizes idealism on the basis of the same distinc-
tion— either esse is percipi expresses an identity or it is an
analytic judgment. In line with customary terminology he calls
the two types psychological and transcendental.^ But these types.
Perry recognizes by their metaphysical implications, which vary
from scepticism to absolute idealism, and which he classifies in
the Approach to Philosophy^ in the following arrangement.
j^Phil . St.
,
p. 3.
^^erry
.
The Moral Economy
.
p. 242, 251-252; Moore, Princ
.
Eth., p. 140-141
^Phil . St., p. 72.
^Conceptions and Misconceptions of Consciousness", Psych . Rev .
,
11(1904), p. 290-294. By psychological idealism Perry means what
is more commonly known as "empirical idealism" from its origin in a
sensationalistic epistemology, "Psychological idealism" later signi-
fies the doctrine, held by Perry himself, that mind is conditioned
by its content or object. See "A Discussion of the Problem of
Epistemology," Jour . Phil . , 6(1909), p. 713.
5pp. 267-305, 349-394. Definitions on p. 267, 349.
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Personal Idealism
Stimulated by a "skeptical relativism," empirical idealism develops
into subjectivism "which construes the universe in accordance with
the epistemological principle that all knowledge is of its own states
or activities." The avoidance of skeptical relativism, then, ’’be-
comes the most urgent problem of any philosophy which proposes to
proceed forth from this principle'!^ Berkeley’s system overcomes
phenomenalism in spiritualism
,
and these constitute the "distinct
and alternating phases of subjectivism. The former is its critical
and dialectic conception, the latter its constructive and practical
II
O
conception. The principle of self-knowledge is appropriated by
the idealist to give reason for his spiritualism . Spiritualism,
however, ceases to be subjective, and becomes objective in such sys-
tems as Schopenhauer’s. Objective idealism involves the rejection
of the epistemological principle on which it was founded. Absolute
idealism is a form of objective idealism which, however, rests on
transcendental .idealism and completes it in a monistic metsp^sics.
^Qg
. Git.
,
p. 270-271.
^id
.
,
p. 272.
(,
ajT a ;i ' •*:;] \< cy i: i a a i o <.• '
Sc^. >; Jeil't :r7.^ '/-
/
..^‘K . Mi/J I'l A '.iS 1 : -je ’ '
/ WSri Ct. ;.-Oi.:"':I**.J ”r;' 'V.'v^'r
/r
'
. r'
l%i
r/'
‘ / • AcYH^jV-a^
.,
' fv.i J'^'r ‘‘ .Ah ll^ht r; sjr.* ’" j/t?;, v’i^aia'i \*y -jy. ,
'.. :7’ d0fl2f)':0009 ?i! S'J' .iO^‘?-''‘ . L^C C'*zl
iiAi# n.:o -I j { '1‘- : I I£fi Jfj\i 'jr fr, jL 'j i'j ', .*0 * >v 'cncfcv vilj*
'
>c2 \ :xt:iy..^v,Lt*i 1 <J- dC'itf<r..'jVr ’./i J cg *10 \*
.
', 0({cn:-: jioX-iit lo, (/o-so Jl'';,.,.' -tf tcJi 't»nr :ji..oo ijSj
>
.
•.:flwr,Gciftvd ^ vai “'crlyu Giifj .iivi‘.i if’J a . v :-o*i^
i- 1^ .^. . Si'fJ i-4 . \t i' : £n:co »e ^W I>r^* , .ri»i;g .t.*? toe-. ci '5
jr. .I«o ? ^ -• '^wi si •:-:..'rc'i ©ji’/ . ::" I. ^ ?<>2 i,
A''
.
L-:-’? t»vi j' ouji £ '< y 'iv 1' j«"ci>r , nc i i c^oiict) xi ;• c i (icjy
i»-
'
.'. •
• ••',
:r>i.J X'iirH . ri^i 1-r efc ^p'-. gc?*s©'I ?»vlg v-i ^&1..'..••£.! 4]iJ '41
-dy (.'.v'uf! ri ©ri.j{5 '.?'^ cj c ^.’C! 'va? < ryirft^'g>(^cfL od J d‘.-?o^s:
S9 il i9^ 5 i e*v io.wick' iJ-- ‘ .•;..b -vco;,^o<.’ <^^5 ziap4^ /
I *t *.*
i.r*'
J
$5 :.'lOodA . : • iv. V* i .IcifTff rrc i »
t / ’
. fil J.l i^i I-- .-^c.uo
^ '
’t*
178
Absolute idealism
,
however, is unstable and in so far as it tends to
stress the object, may mean a return to the bolder realism. of the
Greeks,^ Personal idealism or humanism develops from absolutism by
an emphasis upon the individual.^
In the paper on ”A Division of the Problem of Epistemology,”
subjectivism or subjective idealism is defined much more narrowly.
His classification here rests on the possible combinations of the
following dichotomous distinctions; (i) epistemological monism S/s,
epistemological dualism; (ii) ontological idealism Ws. ontological
realism("Is the nature of the tning constituted by or conditional
on its being ’known?”); (iii) psychological idealism S/s, psychologi-
cal realism (Does the nature of the person necessarily involve his
knov/ing something? Is mind a specific organization of its content?)
Subjective idealism is a combination of epistemological monism,
ontological idealism, and psychological realism, while objective
idealism combines epistemological monism, ontological idealism, and
psychological idealism. Both types of metaphysical idealism, then,
subjectivism and objectivism, are epistemologically monistic, and
Berkeley and Kant are their prototypes.
By 191E, however. Perry has given up these efforts to trace
the logical relation of the idealisms. The division in his Present
i^hilosophioal T&ndencies aims at a simple c enumeration of the
types of "ontological” idealism on the basis of their epistemologi-
cal approach. Idealism begins in relativism and representationalism
,
and to escape solipsism, moves successively from subjectivism to
objective idealism
,
or positivistically interpreted, critical ideal-
ism, and, wedded with the absolutistic tradition in philosopjiy
,
^Ibid
. .p.349, 351, 339-340.
^Ibid
. ,
p. 404.
II
}
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absolute Idealism
,
capable of intellectualistic
,
voluntaristic,
esthetic, or mystical interpretation.^ Against all of these Perry
launches the same criticism, since, according to him, all involve
,
in greater or less degree, the cardinal principle. It is this
classification which the future discussion will follow.
4, The Meaning of Subjectivism and Subjective Idealism . The
exact limits of the terms subjectivism and subjective Ideal ism
are to be deduced only with the greatest difficulty from the writ-
ings of Moore and Perry, though it constitutes the criticism they
finally make of all idealism. Moore, indeed, says that the term
is easily defined though he refuses to "attempt a perfectly ac-
curate definition” and points out that it is "desperately ambiguous."^
"To say that ’beautiful’ stands for a subjective predicate, means,
roughly, that any statement of the form, ’This is beautiful’ merely
expresses a psychological assertion to the effect that some particu-
lar individual or class of individuals either actually has, or would,
under certain circumstances have a certain kind of mental attitude
toward the thing in question. ""’Objective’ simply means the same as
’not subjective’"® and does not imply intrinsic or independent ex-
istence. Subjective idealism v/ould mean, according to this defini-
tion, merely the fact of the ego-centric predicament— the psycholo-
gical fact that there is no object of my experience unless I experi-
ence. It involves no metaphysical conclusions, and provides no
basis for a distinction between subjective and objective idealism.
Moore does give a statement of solipsism, which is
,
of course,
the extreme of subjectivity, and holds that it is the logical
^In P.C.I. Perry returns to the more detailed classification
of the Approach to Philosophy in order to include panpsychism and
personal idealism.
^Phil . Studies
, p. 253.
5lbid
.
,
p. 254.
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implication of the idealist^ s cardinal principle— that to be is to
be perceived— though it does not necessarily follow from idealism.
”0n his (the idealist’s) own theory, himself and that other person
are in reality mere contents: of an awareness, which is aware £f
nothing whatever.”^ This conception is of no aid, at least in
defining idealism.
Similarly there is no uniformity in Perry’s writings. By
matching appropriate texts it would be possible to prove that he
defines all idealism, a nriori , as solipistic, since sometimes
solipsism and subjectivism are synonymous, sometimes absolute
idealism is called sub jectivism.2 Three interpretations of the
scope of subjectivism or subjective idealism may be pointed out in
Perry’s writings and must be kept distinct,
a. The general epistemological proposition that mind "generates"
its knowledge. This is the most usual case of the use of the term,
and, it must be remembered, is capable of several different meta-
physical interpretations,^ This proposition he, together with
Moore, claims as a step in every spiritualistic argument.
b. The identification of reality with the "individual and
momentary consciousness," This sense is equivalent to solipsism."^
c. The reduction of reality to a "possible" or "universal"
or "absolute" consciousness?- the Kantian argument in pluralistic
or absolute idealism. That this is the sense in which Perry gen-
erally uses the term is dvident from the following passage in his
^Phil. Studies
.
p. 28.
^Cf . P.P.T .
,
p. 317, with Cont . Am. Phil ., ii
,
p. 191. If
both passages are accepted, idealism =: subjectivism = solipsism,
^Ap . to Phil ,
,
p. 267; The New Realism , p. 143.
^Ap. to Phil ., p. 218; P,P.T .
.
p. 162, 317.
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autobiographical statement.
"If * sub jectivism’ be used to mean that all being is
the dependent creation of some subject, or self, or
mind, whether finite or absolute, then, I think, the
terra can be applied to the idealist without offence.
In accordance with this usage absolute idealism is
that species of subjectivism in which the uncondi-
tioned and all-conditioning subject has, over and
above such properties as make it a subject, those
other properties of infinity, perfection, and systemat-
ic unity, which the term ’Absolute* is intended to
convey. Vi/ith this understanding I shall hereinafter
use the terms ’subjectivism’ and ’idealism’ interchange-
ably.
It is in this sense that the term will be used in the present
discussion. But several points must be emphasized at once. Sub-
jective idealism in this sense must include objective idealism in
the sense in which Perry himself uses that term, as for example in
P.P.T
. p. 135, the only type excluded being the "speculative” ab-
solutism of Bosanquet, Creighton and related thinkers. Moreover,
the peculiar consequence must then also be recognized that even
subjective idealism in its broadest metaphysical sense may be
equivalent to realism in so far as it stresses the fact that some
reality is independent of finite consciousness.
A similar ambiguity appears in the definition of objective
idealism
,
which reduces reality to a universal consciousness. In
his discussion of Kant, Perry classes him as an objective idealist
because of his deduction of the categories from ”a non-paychblogical
or logical mind,"^ thus proving the necessity of the principles of
of order, sameness
,
and permanence. Kant held his transcendental
idealism consistent with empirical realism. So contemporary
thinkers, especially those who seek a "meeting of extremes," hold
objective idealism to be consistent with neo-realism. According
^Gont. Am . Phil. , ii
,
p. 191.
^P.P.T.
, p. 140.
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to Mackenzie, Moore has criticized only subjective idealism, not
objective.^
If subjectivism is synonymous v/ith dependence on a finite
subject, no idealism is subjective. If it is synonymous with
dependence on a universal logical subject, or a particular Abso-
lute, then all complete idealism, in the sense defined by Perry
and Moore as spiritualism, is subjectivistic. The distinction
between subjective and objective idealism, as made by Perry, lies
somewhere between these extremes. Sometimes it is to be found,
where we would place it, between the relativistic, empirical con-
siderations of Berkeley and Kant’s emphasis on universality. But
in that sense, no post-Rantian idealist is a subjectivist. Berke-
ley’s neglect of the problem of universals and his failure to solve
the problem of identity can only be regarded as a deficiency in
his system. Perry’s and Moore’s further charge— that all idealism
2implies subjectivism in the narrow sense— will be examined later.
In conclusion it may be pointed out that Perry explicitly, and
Moore implicitly mean two things by subjectivism. (a) As synony-
mous with all mentalism it is definable by the cardinal principle,
and includes both subjective and objective idealism in the narrow
sense. (b) In the narrower sense objective idealism involves all
idealism resting on the Kantian transcendentalism. In the first
case subjective is definable as ’’dependent on consciousness in
in general," objective as "independent of consciousness." In the
second case objective is used in the Kantian sense of universal
and necessary
,
and these two sharply contrasted meanings of objec-
%ind
,
15 ( 1906 ), p. 314 ; cf. Hasan, Realism , p. 9 . "Objective
idealism is but realism plus the hypothesis of an infinite subject.”
2See Chapter VIII, below.
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tivity appear interchangeably in the realistic literature. But as
we have already seen, neither Moore nor Perry hese any place for
universality in their thought, but reject it because of its ideal-
istic implications. Thus the three conceptions of the scope of
subjectivity, noted in discussing Perry, parallel the various state
ments by realists of the scope of the doctrine of independence.
a. The general doctrine of independence conflicts v/ith the
general proposition that mind constitutes its object.
b. As asserting that some reality is independent of the finite
knower, realism refutes only solipsism or "sceptical relativism."
c. To affirm that some reality is independent of a supreme
consciousness requires much further defense than (b) though, of
course, it follows if the conception of independence in (a) is
universal and necessary. This, however, the realists, as we shell
see,^ have no way of proving.
5, The Meaning and Analysis of the Cardinal Principl e
.
"Esee is percipi , . . .That this is, in some sense,
essential to Idealism, I must for the present merely
assume." It is "to the best of my belief, considered
necessary to their position by all Idealists.
Perry’s statements of the inclusive significance of the principle,
already noted^ are equally categorical and unattested. All idealism
in the sense above defined uses the principle as a stage in its
arguments
,
It is to be understood that "percipi " is not to be construed
in the narrow sense to which Berkeley’s viewpoint was too largely
restricted. "I quite agree v/ith (the idealists) that, if esse be
percipi at all, percipi must be understood to include not sensation
^See Chapter X, below.
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only, but that other type of mental fact, which is called ’thought.’”!
So Perry would extend percipi to include the cognitive consciousness .
Neither, however, grant volitional and affective aspects of exper-
ience a role in the cardinal principle. Perry obviously because of
his behavioristic interpretation of these functions, Moore because
they are ultimately types of cognition.^
To this sweeping attack, which we have already pointed out as
unv/arranted
,
the following restrictions must be pointed out.
a. Though it is true that the cardinal principle is a step
in the argument of all idealism resting on Berkeley or Kant, the
principle is asserted by both in a restricted sense; for neither of
them does the mind create all of its knowledge. As W. H. Sorley
has pointed out,
"Berkeley never used ’esse is percipi’ as ex-
pressing his philosophical position, nor did he use
the general formula at all. It was only of ’sensi-
ble things’ that he said ’their esse is percipi.’
For him the ultimate nature of reality is not passive
but active."^
The saiae is true of Kant. For both subjectivity is applicable only
to "sensible things" or "appearances"; both emphasize metaphysical
objectivism depending on the reality of conscious activity.
b. It is true that the cardinal principle in its universal
scope is the conclusion of Berkeley’s end Hegel’s thought. Both
finally conclude that reality is reducible to consciousness. Far
from resting his case upon epistemological considerations, Hegel
was exceedingly skeptical of the significance of epistemology.
V,Tiat theory of knowledge he began with was a return to the naive
!phil. St
.
, p.7, 8; P.F.T . , p. 114.
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, p. 141.
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view, similar to the realists’
,
but with a different logic. But
both Moore and Perry seek to make the principle, in its universal
sense, a postulate, not a conclusion of idealism.
c. Many idealists repudiate the cardinal principle entirely.
"Idealism,” says Mackenzie, "as we find it put forward
by its best exponents, such as Plator among the ancients
and Hegel among the moderns, does not depend, even in
the slightest degree, upon the principle that ’esse is
percipi . ’ . . .All idealism worthy of the name— including
even that of Berkeley himself— depends on the absolute
rejection of that principle."!
d. At least the following motives must be added to the epis-
temological motive in accounting for idealistic arguments
—
(i)the
logical structure of the world, which, on the view that relations
are internal, points to monism; (ii) the val national structure of
the Y/orld— the Platonic motive; (iii) the causal or activistic
interdependence of th« world, capable of voluntaristic and monistic
interpretation; (iv) the significance of the human person and his
ideals. Only the first two of these factors are at all adequately
recognized by Moore and Perry, the third not at all. As we have
already pointed out, the idealistic argiunent is not a sorites of
the type Moore has imagined but is cumulative.
'iVhat type of relation is expressed by the in the cardinal
principle? At this point in their analysis Moore and Perry strange-
ly disagree. At no point is the danger of abstract intellectualis-
tic analysis and the neglect of positive empirical considerations
more dangerous. Moore considers three possibilities :
^
(1) That esse is percipi expresses an identity.
^Mind
. 15(1906)^ p. 314; See also Creighton, Phil . Rev . ,
26(1917 ) , p. 520. We have already concluded that systems which do
not ultimately find reality conscious are but incompletely idealistic.
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(2) That it is an analytic judgment; that esse includes
percipi as part of its meaning.
a. Then reality is a complex whole of which percipi is a
part.
b. Being experienced is part of a whole. There are other
parts.
c. The whole is organic to the extent, at least, that other
parts cannot occur without percipi .
(3) Therefore it asserts a necessary synthetic relation be-
tween percipi and other elements in reality, X.
Moore’s criticism is that idealism has followed the second view,
because it has failed to carry through the above analysis. His
analysis of the idealistic position we shall examine later.
Perry’s analysis is more empirical and his conclusions are
different,^ though they seem to be merely an extension of Moore’s
analysis. The cardinal principle "(E) R®(T) defines T," (where E
is the ego and T the object, and R° "any form of consciousness that
relates to the object”), may be given three interpretations by
ontological idealism:
-
a. E creates T. This rests on a failure to analyze, and on
the exclusive use^ of the method of agreement.
b. E forms or organizes T, "This proves that knowledge is a
function of things, not the reverse."
c. E is identical with T. The identity theory or the part-
whole theory. This rests upon the principle of the internality of
relations. This case corresponds with the first tv/o of Moore’s' the
judgment is either an identity or analytic.
An examination of the empirical arguments of idealism will
^"The Ego-Centric Predicament," Jour . Phil
.
,
7(1910)^p. 9-13.
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show (1) that esse is percipi is not analytic for idealism, (2)
that, as Moore realizes, the proposition is not universal. No
idealist ever attempted to demonstrate the proposition by a method
of analysis. For Berkeley it is not even "synthetic apriori," as
' Moore suggests. It is synthetic a posteriori, a consequence of the
relativity of primary and secondary qualities and the meaningles^qf^of
the concept of material substance. True, it must be apriori for
idealism, but all idealists have regarded it as a synthetic judg-
ment. Moore. tried to deduce the object from my perception of it.
Perry’s criticism, on the other hand, though far more empirical,
assumes the finality of analysis as a philosophic method. The fur-
ther implications of his criticism will appear in the future.
6. The Special Case of Value Theory . It remains to point
out the special application of the cardinal principle to the the-
ory of value —the view that values are not determined by conscious
activity. This view is peculiar to E. Moore, not to Perry, whose
conception of value is subjectivistic and naturalistic. Moore’s
position here is but the consistent extension of his realism into
the realm of value, which he holds, does not denote a real property
of things, but is an ultimately indefinable quality. He rejects
“the epistemological doctrine that to be good is
equivalent to being willed or felt in some particular
way; a doctrine which derives support from the analo-
gous error, v/hich Kant regarded as the cardinal point
of his system and which has received immensely wide
acceptance— the erroneous view that to be ’true’ or
’real’ is equivalent to being thought in a partic-
ular way." Just as "the object of a cognition must
) be distinguished from the cognition of which it is
the object," so the proposition ’this is good’ can-
not be identical with the proposition that its sub-
ject is the object of a volition or a feeling."!
The argument is analogous to that of the cardinal principle in
!princ . Eth
.
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cognition. The "idealistic” position deduces "goodness" from a
mental act (volition and feeling as attitudes of mind toward an
object are instances of cognition, according to Moore), just as
it deduces reality from it— as an analytic judgment apriori. In
opposition to this, Moore defends not merely the objectivity, but
the intrinsic and indefinable nature of value.
This, again, is the result of iv'^oore^s analytic rationalism.
In his more empirical discussion of the ideal, he points out that
though consciousness does not constitute value, it is, as a matter
of fact, a constitutive part of all complex wholes of intrinsic
good or bad.
"All of them involve consciousness of an object,
which is itself usually highly complex, and almost
all involve also an emotional attitude towards this
object; but, though they thus have certain charac-
teristics in common, the vast variety of qualities
in respect of which they differ from one another are
equally essential to their value. "1
Value is thus independent (in Perry’s sense) of consciousness, though
as a matter of fact, it always involves consciousness. Perry’s
view, as we have seen, abandons the cardinal principle, in direct
opposition to Moore’s, and regards interest as the selective and
determining element in value complexes. Moreover, Moore’s theory
of value, which rests on "organic wholes involves a logic different
from the one on the basis of which he criticizes the cardinal prin-
ciple of idealism. That value inheres in organic wholes is for him an
empirical or intuitive principle, but that organic wholes are sig-
nificant for reality, the idealistic intuition, he denies on the
basis of his negative analytic method.
7. Conclusion . -E. Brightman has recently distinguished
four types of contemporary idealism resting on four distinct motives
—
^Ibid
. ,
p. 224.
p
W-I
I I i
,
>
'i
' &< Oj 1 tf^- »roiJ i •'.r,'*5 ’’ r i f ': ; I*'' ; -
''LT-^ioJ • iJ.i'ii.'! IC r-*, r i /J ?U-. " -o-i: ’jiI^'V} c?.s '
'5
- 3 i/t , v'i - :•> • , nai Jiff .-roc !</ 3 L.i tio iost.^4
\
.iTt'i'rqft j;it'os£jat. oi^Ylea^ aa — ji .roil .vtUjiSL'I fc rl *
;’" ijd
,
on'.: ^crr e5fio^-.'j o*ico’4 oj aoiJiao'yc
.^t;Ia’/ lo ri'iuJnn ‘:>Iu'tmi !-:>l.Xii .^is;":?'-: ! c*n7
-s
•
. naiiarf-.-'i Jai ^’ot:qo» aC ait.-coi: (? .: - i , .. T /o
ir.:.': j.,D (B^JCiloc V. . 1 'ol'i srfJ to XT Cl T -'. " j .? j-
0
SAO i'l I ;?':c.i «!;». tJ •?
-- A*
:;.;.» e*
,
'i Ci
,
*b JjcJl%>afi0.i- Jon roct? •-^.^Mi'-i^ciaacfco ^nuAZ^-iA
__
' l-ijr';, Ic aalOilfr jceXtX'aiOO lie X. iJanoo a 'lo
. , JW 1 -:. i>005
:f054.co ca lo B?^ons-ic /< anoc '>vIo7Ai ci;,.j' 16 liA'
jBCtila Las XA?»Lcj'5ecv vljiv. :fi v^ll-5ar,c 'gL rio^Xv/
<'; 0'i.s^oc :>nuJlvJJa Isnv 1 jo0i<3 n :o/3 svJoVnJ: Xlo
-a^'Wilc r!rsJ!roc s-vsd v viw ' '•' -S’ , L ' -i# ,;Cp^>j.uo
- *>i: j / iiii.':' -': jLy3 6it* T-*r.; ? '«C- -TC' i1 vt co'jcIts;
:i^-':t aetlJtfc -;6 ?:y Lcl^^v '!.
^ ( ir- 1 1 «>;13 c?- L si rai: IS v Xi -^ypc-
V . * A - *: :.©>^OiO-3 nrO' lo • ?. ’ ili / J fT Ci' - .i C 0";i OO’ri? 3X 'J'ji
^
. i sorr".;'. iC'-* :-''r> po.v.i ' vnf SYSris ci
,
Josl lo 'ic j Jc.'i-e 23
livi 4‘-o^iL ;.r . - ’
-x
:.^> T9 oiJ. .Xiei»c‘ ovarii :-v
rcvi Jo-?i ?• • ' :j. Gs iso7f>Jf:i ebT«:- T X..
,
3 otco-.' cl noi J i'cc^io
PV
•‘'ict'
.
,
Oi/I.nv al Stj-^^X^ pniirl^rraS -yb
L ol’V.I B :?F£cv;ii oixtifS,'''-''*’ c^: ei::^T .icl/- t^jjlsv^'ic
\
^:iiTC r j. '. x'^iso 9:-;j -LrinlciTu ort dC'lil- Xo alosO t}dl no ?66' oriJ ...ctI
^ v'- .4 "
*'
'
..nr. ;:L"^ '^•>‘: *'1 Zitr-z s OiSe.*^- '. fi? Tey Icrfl . Ic sI jLo
;;T3 .r. j ro.Xv'' 0 in «vTo j i.- j . ^;;v
,
..^^.ic ci Tq SYx
;
Li/ori ^'*: ? /sciiicm#
V- o:*! r? sainn- i- cn li.'j-.u al 43 ir»s 5 i -^xiv ,'ciis 1 laapilln
\'f. lidrZc.i.-., . nii'? viJ.; .»r.,:T eon . •- . ;:oj -• '.o
brA'i
189
(a) the Platonic (belief in the objectivity of value), (b) the
Berkeleian (Reality as conscious), (c) absolute idealism (which adds
to (a) the identification of value with logical coherence), and (d)
Personalism (which introduces the pluralistic and voluntaristic
motive).^ Of these types both Moore and Perry criticize all of
the first three. Perry alone the fourth. Their definition is more
restricted, however. Perry’s including only (b) and Moore’s (b) and
(d). The cardinal principle is applicable only to (b), and to (c)
and (d) in so far as they make use of the epistemological argument
of Berkeley or Kant, Solipsism is merely the narrowest type of
(b)
;
empirical idealism and transcehdental or critical idealism
are merely possible non-inetaphysical foundations for (b) and (c)
intellectualistically interpreted. An emphasis on the voluntar-
istic or activistic elements in idealism renders them less signif-
icant, Of the four motives— the logical, epistemological, axiolo-
gical and pluralistic— only the second is made central by the real-
ists in their attack, and the first secondary.
In other terms, the cardinal principle of idealism as stated
by Moore and Perry is not cardinal for all types of idealism. The
other types rest upon their own cardinal principles— that the
logical structure of the world constitutes its unity and reality
(the internality of relations), that the scientific analysis of
the world implies a unity of activity, that man’s value and social
experience imply a plurality of minds. Both Moore and Perry err
in holding all idealism reducible to one cardinal principle; both
later recognize that a second must also be considj'ed— the inter-
nality of relations. Both fail to see that a system of idealism
Philosophy of Ideals
.
p, i;67-172.
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may be constituted that avoids the first principle because its motive
is activity rather passivity, will rather than knowledge; avoids
the solij^istic implication because it supplements epistemological
dualism by a basis, in God, for the unity of the world; and
the internality of relations by being pluralistic,and personalistic
.
Their scheme of theoretical motives as indicated in the table
following, is too simple.
Motive
Type
Epistemological
(Cardinal Principle)
Subjective Idealism
Logical
(Internal Relations)
Objective Idealism
y
Subjectivism
To the criticism of these motives, and their practical basis, we
now turn.

CHAPTER VI
THE MOTIVES AND PRESUPPOSITIONS OF IDEALISM
‘•Nowadays one does not so much refute a philosopher
as explain him.” '•Unearthing of prejudices and prepos-
sessions is thus the most joyous part of that gay science
to which the unscrupulous empiricism of modernism has
given birth, "1
The criticism which Moore and Nerry make of idealism centers
about the validity of the cardinal principle which they set out to
overthrow. The scope included in their refutation of it v/ill deter
mine, as we have seen, whether they succeed in refuting mentalism,
v/hile their success in refuting the principle of internal relations
would doom absolutism. But they mean to refute all idealism, and
their criticism penetrates behind these principles to the practical
motives and intuitional emphases on which they rest, as v/ell as
forward to the consequences which follow from them. To the examina
tion of this broader criticism the following three chapters are de-
voted, examining (1) their investigation of the motives of idealism
(2) their criticism of its methods of reasoning, and (i5) their
analysis of the inconsistences in its conclusions.
A
A. The Practical Motives of Idealism
1. The Significance of Motives for Refutation . We have al-
ready pointed out that an analysis of the practical motives of
idealism cannot consistently be a part of its refutation unless
(1) those motives are themselves unjustified, or (2) idealism is
a rationalization
,
setting up principles merely to fulfill wishes,
or (3) the content of the motive is implied by the position reached
%rban
,
W., The Intelligible «^orld
.
p. 22, 41.
4
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i.e., unless idealism implies as a consequence what was also its
motive. An idealist may have as his motive the defense of immor-
tality, and yet conclude as a result of his thought that immortality
is impossible. Whether he find it plausible or not, his system
should have other grounds, and should be criticized, not on the
basis of the wishes behind it, but for the consistency of his con-
clusions and the cogency of his reasons for it.
Moore recognizes this. Only once does his attack become
personal and bitter, when he implies that Hegel’s logic, and the
synoptic logic of his followers, are fathered by the "speculative
dogma" or the desire for monism. ^ As a critic he is interested
primarily in their arguments, and secondarily in their conclusions,
not at all in their wishes and practical interests. In spite of
his interest in ethical theory his o\¥n practical and religious
convictions could be discovered only by conjecture until his auto-
biographical statement in 1925, His emphasis upon the distinction
between psychological or historical origins and validity is too
frequent; as a critic he respects it.
Perry is more inclined to emphasize the motives of idealism.
When he is most cautious he does not imply that these motives are
to be criticized, i^en he is less cautious he seems to impljr "Chat
there is a direct relation between idealism’ s "burden" and its
epistemological assumption— that its cardinal principle is deliber-
ately chosen in the light of its burden. V/e may safely say that
he regards the "burden" of idealism as a part of its arguraent
,
in
a degree valid, but to be attacked. It is the heritage of James’s
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to Believe" and his distinction between the tough and the
tender minded, that is carried over by Perry, in spite of his re-
jection of "subjective pragmatism.
"
A broader question is here involved— "Tiay a neo-realist be a
Pragmatist?" In the sense of a psychological or behavioristic
pragmatist he may not.^ For Perry the "will to believe" cannot
determine truth or falsehood. Both are objective. Will, interest,
and "desire" are selective
.
not creative . Validity is not a matter
of temperaraent
,
it is a matter of logic. No one needs, as Moore
sees more clearly than Perry, to distinguish more clearly between
the source of ideas and their truth than the logical realist, whose
system is only secondarily, if at all, genetic— for whom continuity
and change are extremely uncomfortable categories. Perry may point
out the "burden" of idealism; his pointing it out may influence
readers for or against it, and thus control opinion, but he cannot
thus refute it. When he does it, he is propagandist, not critic.
2. The Religious Motive . The fundamental burden of idealism
is religious. Perry agrees with the pragmatists in finding this
to be true. Science and religion, “the two masters" whom "philos-
ophy has from the beginning served" have moved apart and become to
a degree opposed to each other— science tending to remove man from
his central position, and religion seeking the certainurty of the
cosmological significance of human motives.
"Corresponding to this dualistic fashion of thought,
there appeared in the course of the last century the
scientific philosophy, or positivism, and the religious
philosophy, or romanticism. Each of these types of
Montague, V/.P.. Jour. Phil . . 6(1909), p. 561-565.
Swendell Bush, "A Factor in the Genesis of Idealism," Essays
Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of Y/m. James
.
N.Y: Longmans,
1908, p. 83-102.
.'\7T ’
,
’'‘.'‘I
har' ii-.uvi’ o’ds rt.-^ ;<r/(r»4 u^l'So-i
'•
- 1: bjo " ‘.v ; UliV**
'
'
. *
^
t .
'-i .
^
-
, V* 'i^vx^ reflex -I.
' ' ^' ;/-r'‘ { • -tf*:fir
7 ' .• j
V.. ." , u‘-Uv feV : .: 'ji'v
-
‘ 1C aC'J^^orc
»• -. j „
V O ^ .1
Kr-‘-
f-.- ...
^;.:§
‘ r ,J
.'
IX^5^ f- v'^
”’’
— I'iiv .". 7vr. ' -'r<- rl >'>0i..' <’• ai,;* •.'
-
"’V *
io l6oXstcJ.criov?v 6 .. &di nl
'
.-vs*X>rf oO Xfift’* 0i;a . -re/-.. '.wC'j t#irr 5ii :
,>!lr c>Ttc5o S'i/i '.o c:?;7'r3 or
-r.' X'siti A-; ^<71 r t '’o'-, La--
W
_
^
C« • ^ '- *'.C '..©V J i’.' /) 3fX- j - -. . 3*!!
*
; >-
• ce xJii^'^So v't:..;; ac.ff.-\-.:iv vv xj.-taeio ? ••?••
.j.;,
^
tti* .\0 *r-1 r-.-ic Of.'* i;0O''- 10 d£J'» JOC Ci v
,c.:aQc jkorfM 'ro ; — c J i-afi-3. , •.:>. ia •: . , nobrco‘^^ vlao^ ei .ryX^'^e
4.. ..^^,
,-i-Tt. . .
'
•
'rtijo f l'j-^7 a/^'roccu.' V o^^vf'o.'lo buc
.;>r’9-f;n fi.; M.^r :^rc :i ‘.naXXii tl '»if3 tx/0
Ji
,
'C!i7i(,r .CgTiii'MC X.- ,J- ^cri,j0;.3 'TO ' I'r. C'l^.U’^'r
< r: - -.
,
L^'-»vc- •-;(<,
,
J t 3CC’' '-a aeiiW ,o = ;i''ie'r -smi^
.rfliiO/: *!- • /'i t-: ' :••€: fiii. *5 6 > ,- r •.XoAa . gijOlXtl &iLAlLj^ ' *3'
'< l.r t Ti- jC ' •i’X r.
i
.
Ti«J 3i J Lji s.:*v ..iv X w 7“ .,"4v‘T'.b s-'j <- j.
'‘fl. ',' 0 cv.'iJ ;'rfT' ' ^noivXlu' on.-.^. junxioS • 9(f 0«t
OHf'.'Obv. l:':i X’laois bf*vofi; dvad %r.'Xi-*7TX' : X -'U7 riorf ''Cil<{0
'x'l ;;.c;. tvc-ibTi or '..al
aC2 ' i Xjt r . f.-ri®0 tJiiJ
t
’
•
*
.•s;;,; 1: IlOf ,0
Silt \'U‘Jf:-''0 d
'
0 i>
ir^ r.80/ Oio.^'CO
10 .),; X r.«‘^0‘n :io‘
.
i^c'
- a . «r , 4 i X ,- 4 Tjr v'X .•* , J* .'C
:.'Qtcp:i 1C .. .-U ,4ev-i,
^
i^.. . -J '7 . U.' f' 'i.OiiO^ .ni f 1 •\0.J '"'0' C
;
—
.
194
philosophy was connected with one of the great destroyers
of the philosophy of the past— positivism with Hume, and
romanticism with Kant."l
"The service which modern idealism offered to religious belief" was
the defense of religion
"not, as in the days of Socrates and Plato, against the
prejudices and blindness of unthinking men, but against
the claim of science to have alienated the world from
man . . « .That nature which religion had conceived to be the
handwork of God, or the stage-setting of the moral drama,
or at most merely the principle of negation in the spirit-
ual life, threatened to swallow up both man and God. A
new philosophy must redeem nature from mechanism and re-
store its spiritual center.
In a passage hardly in tenor with the remainder of his dis-
cussion, Perry adds that the "burden” of idealism was "not the con-
scious aim of the idealists and their forerunners," but that it is
"the factor that accounts for the great human importance of ideal-
ism, for its stimulating power and widely diffused influence.".
It is indisputably true. Idealism has been consciously the
defender of religion, i^erry need not have qualified his stat’oment.
The motive is strong in Berkeley and Leibniz, in Hegel, even in
Kant. It may be stated in other forms. Perry points out that
Kant’s Gopernican revolution "was virtually a counter revolution,
through which the spectator again became the center of the system.
One may even go further, as he himself does in The Approach to Phi -
losophy and The Present Conflict of Ideals and distinguish the
various religious motives between which the types of idealism
vacillate— human autonomy and divine omnipotence, human freedom
and divine omniscience, moral responsibility and mystic dependence-
anthropocentrism and theocentrism. ^ The religious motive in all
Ip.P.T.
,
p. 36-37.
^Ibid
. ,
p. 117-118.
^ Ibid
.
,
p. 118.
^Ap. to Phil .
,
p. 303, 304, 391; P.O.I .
.
p. 186-197, 207 et. al.
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idealism may thus be admitted, though the fact does not, without
further analysis, serve to characterize idealism, far less to
invalidate it.
‘6 , The Metaphysical Basis of Morality. Moore suggests, in-
diirectly, a closely related motive— the demand of man for a basis
for his moral activity in the nature of the world. His section on
"T'ietaphysical Ethics” in the Frincipia Ethica is a refutation of this
position, of which idealism of certain kinds is the outstanding
example
.
"7/e may, then, attribute the obstinate prejudice
(why not intuition?) that a knowledge of supersensible
reality is a necessary step to a knowledge of what is
good in itself, partly to a failure to perceive that
the subject of the latter judgment is not anything
real as such, and partly to a failure to distinguish
the cause of our perception of a truth from the reason
why it is true."l
With this motive of idealism Perry is in substantial agreement.
But Perry’s own ethical theory is evidence that an idealistic ethics
does not necessarily imply an idealistic metaphysics, though it has
its fullest significance only in such a system.^ Perry is also
correct in maintaining, as we shall see later, that some forms of
idealism defeat this moral purpose.
A quoque may be added. Though ’’practical idealism" is
possible on a positivistic basis, when the practical idealist
allows himself a speculative moment, he is inclined to ”hope" for
"a compliance of the universe" to the efforts of man. In such
passages Perry implies idealism.^
4. The Anti-Scientific Motive in Idealism . According to
Perry, however, the service Y/hich idealism renders religion involves
Iprinc. Eth.
,
p. 12B; See also
2cf. E. 3. Brightraan in Jour
.
^Ap. to Phil
., p. 422; P.F.T.
,
Perry, P.G .1
.
.
p. 188 et. al.
Phil
. ,?“6tl929) , p. 606-607;
p. S44-347.
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it in another more serious and reprehensible one— a negative atti-
tude toward, man’s intellectual conquest of nature. Its teleologi-
cal emphasis (which as early as Plato "tended to contradict his
rationalism" and of which- rationalism was purged by Spinoza^) is
in direct opposition to science, Inuthe modern period, science
e-xtended its method to the study of religion (in the Deists, Locke
and Hume)*' and demanded a negation of the older rationalism.
2
Idealism thus took up the glove in the old warfare 9 f science and
religion.
This was, it will be remembered, one of Perry’s early motives
in criticizing idealism. It was partly the result of immediate and
direct circumstances, primarily the appearance of James V/ard’s
Naturalism and j^gnost icism
,
which Perry in 1912, eight years after
his criticism of the anti-scientific motive in idealism had in-
volved him in controversy with 7/ard and Dpeighton, calls "perhaps
the most monumental critique of science that has recently appeared
in the English Language, It is interesting to note that in his
earlier criticism Perry opposes to positivism, the philosophy of
science, not "romanticism" but "dogmatic idealism," the tv/o being
apparently synonymous.^ The attitude of dogmatic idealism is shown
in the philosophy of nature of Schell ing and Hegel,
It is peculiar that Perry should have repeated his criticism
of Ward’s treatment in 1912, Ward and Creighton had both insisted
that they were criticizing not science, but "dogmatic positivism,"
Perry pointed out that ’Ward stresses continually the incomplete
lp,P,T ,
,
p. 115.
^Ibid
. , p. 32-35.
3lbld
.
,
p. 93,
^Jour, Phil , . 1(1904), p. 160,
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success of science, its "lacunae" and the uncertainty of its
hypotheses. These he not only admits, but holds are admitted by
science itself.^ Ward’s entire argument attempts to delineate the
valid limits of science and point the possibility of extra-scien-
tific viewpoints in philosophy. Perry agrees upbn the need of
limiting science as "not all of truth" though he insists that its
truths must be recognized, "as they stand." Ward’s objection is
that they do not stand. He points out the changes v/hich the con-
ceptions of matter
,
man, force
,
and energy have undergone in science
and their increasing symbolic nature; Ferry objects to the pragmatic
9
symbolistic interpretation of science. He objects particularly to
the idealistic criticism of causality and its completion in pov;er
or activity
.
and to the doctrine of the ideality of space and time .
"Science must be true of reality. It would possess a
contradiction in its very heart if it v/ere not so. It
is not metaphysics to deny the reality of space and
time but to define their reality.
Nowhere does Perry reflect the bit-cerness in his attack so strongly
as here. Quoting a series of orthodox Presbyterian pamphlets enti-
tled "The Fundamentals," as stressing "the utter futility of setting
up the deductions of the human reason against the assertions of
the Wordv of God," he adds that "to such ideas as these Professor
Ward virtually gives countenance,"'^ He fails to see that the pas-
sage quoted is not idealism; it rests upon an extreme Zoroastrian
dualism to which the idealistic interpretation of nature and of sci-
ence could not be more diametrically opposed.
Perry’s statement of the attitude of idealism toward science
^P.P.T.
, p. 91, 92.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 95.
^Jour. Phil ,. 1(1904), p. 174.
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is a complete misunderstanding of the latter. It is quite definitely
not true that "the major part of contemporary religious philosophy
is devoted to disproof of science,^ Certainly no philosophy, idealist
or realist, can seriously reject the sound and generally accepted
conclusions of science. But science does not give a complete ac-
count, even of physical nature, as Ferry seems to suggest that it
should. If it follows its Baconian lead, it does not even try. The
lacunae, and the relativity of scientific concepts
-are- facte. To
specify the gaps of thought left hy the "descriptive method" is not
to "disparage" it. When Perry says that "there can be no victories
for science that do not promote man and all his works, including
religion, nor any defeat of science that is not a common disaster, "2
he is a more romantic idealist than many who acknowledge the name. '
There remains a task, for a theoretical philosophy which the realists
assume solved by their method of empirical analysis, but which, as
we shall see, they do not even approach, because of that limitation
— the task of establishing the proper relationship and unity between
rZ
the sciences. Idealists and realists (though not as pure analysts)
have worked together at this task—-Idtze, Fechner, Helmholtz, James,
Poincare, Bergson, Boutroux, and Vifhitehead being examples. The
scientists themselves have contributed to the task by showing the
relativity, in successive order, of primary qualities, secondary
qualities, space and time, and energistic concepts themselves. The
criticisms of the ultimate concepts and presuppositions of science,
^P.P.T,
,
p. 85.
^Ibid
.
.
p. 95.
^Note, for example, the breach between Perry^s atomistic plural-
ism and his behavioristic activism, which he nowhere bridges.
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and the warning against their illicit extension into unwarranted
fields, is not an attack of science as such.
The motive of setting up the limits of science is therefore not
peculiar to idealism, but extends to all anti-naturalistic philoso-
phies. If idealism is anti-scientific, then pragmatism is even more
so. Idealism does not, as Perry implies, reject the conclusions
of science; it gives them the further interpretation their incom-
pleteness and descriptive character demands. There is no alternate
controversy between the "objectivity” of science and the "great
subjectivism" of idealism.
5. The Heality of Values . The most general practical motive of
idealism is also the most important. It is the intuition that value
is not something superadded to reality, but structural within it.
Here again Moore’s criticism of ‘Metaphysical Ethics" is basic, T
though Perry’s value theory, more subjectivistic, implies the same
2duality between value and reality. Both argue from a narrow con-
ception of reality, the one materialistic, the other logistic, that
values^ being the object of desire, cannot be real.
This "great divide in value theory” is one of the ultimate,
irreconcilable alternatives which divide realism and absolute ideal-
ism; the other one being the problem of the status of logic. V/e
shall meet it again in the final section of the present paper. Suf-
fice it to say that the reason for the dualism of being and worth is
to be found in the positivism that provided the background of the
rise of modern axiology. The development of the thought of Heinrich
Rickert is most instructive in this problem. Beginning in positivism,
^Princ. Eth.
.
p. 120.
^The New Realism
, p. 240; Q. T. V. , p. 98-99.
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his earliest axiological works advanced from the distinction of
being and value to the construction of a "drittes Reich," the world
of experience in which being and value blend; while his more recent
writings show that this "drittes Reich" is really prior to the ab-
stract dualism.^ Here the idealist is a far better empiricist than
the realist, whose logical propensities have led him into an abstrac-
tion. Moreover, his emphasis on the distinction is less consistent
than that of the naturalist, for he cannot reconcile the analytic
logic which is, for him, a part of reality with the value experience
which has a logical structure and yet is not real. As we have al-
ready seen, Moore is forced, in his extremity, to develop two logics
for the two realms,,
,
while Perry distributes the two realms to the
two unreconciled parts of his thought— his behavioristic pragmatism
and his logical realism. The position of idealism is admirably
stated and defended by W. Urban in The Intelligible World
,
who
quotes E. Troeltsch’s development, which, in the main, follows
2that of his former colleague, Rickert. Nowhere is there more
justification for the view that neo-realism is fundamentally pos-
itivistic than in its attitude On this problem.
Of the four practical motives of idealism indicated by Moore
and Perry, we reject the third as a fundaraental misunderstanding of
idealism’s motive. The other three are basic in most idealistic
systems, but are purely formal, since there are many different re-
ligious and moral motives. Thus, they need not culminate in an
idealistic metaphysics. Further, we need only repeat that as motis^es
they are incapable of refutation; as consequences, or steps in ar-
^System der Philesophie
,
Bd. I, 1927, p, 109-111, 253 ff.
.
^Op. feit. p. 160; see also Dewey, J., The Quest for Certainty ,
p. 65-68.
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giiment. they help determine the coherence or incoherence of idealism,
and hence its truth or falsity. As such we shall meet them again.
B. The Theoretical Presuppositions of Idealism
The Cardinal Principle
, which, we have already seen, is con-
sidered somewhat ambiguously by Moore and Perry to be the corner-
stone of all idealism, itself rests upon two more ultimate presup-
positions— the one about the significance of human knowledge, and
the other about the logical structure of the universe. The Cardinal
Principle is not a postulate of idealism, but the central proposition
which it seeks to establish, and is to be refuted by showing the
intuitions on which it rests to be false, and the argimients by which
it is developed, fallacious.
The two presuppositions may best be designated in the terms
which Perry invented for them, '^'he first is the view that "the
ego-centric predicament” is significant for metaphysics. It is
presupposed by the epistemological reduction of the world to knowl-
edge. The other is the "speculative dogma,” that the world is one
and that, therefore, relations are internal, and that logic is
concerned with "organic unities," Both of these are ultimate in-
tuitions. The latter has two significant aspects— the general
theory of internal relations, significant only for absolute ideal-
ism, and the special case of consciousness, which, together with the
"ego-centric predicaiaent " furnishes the two premises from which the
cardinal principle is deduced.^ The special epistemological case
of the internality of conscious relations does not imply the general
proposition that all relations are internal, but may be treated in-
^This analysis follows the statement of 7/. H. Sheldon, The
Strife of Systems and Productive Duality, p. 5£,
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dependently of it. We turn to the separate exsanination of the two
idealistic presuppositions as Moore and Perry understand them, and
shall endeavor to show that in the general form as stated by them
they are not only not essential to all idealism, but not true to the
spirit of all idealism— particularly the voluntaristic type.
1 . The Primacy of Consciousness; The Significance of the
Ego-centric Predicament. The Cartesian principle of the primacy of
consciousness— the cogito
.
ergo sum— is. according to both Moore
and Perry, an unproved assumption from which the idealist falsely
reasons to the validity of the cardinal principle that all being
is conscious . Both interpret it intellectualistically and limit
their discussion to the cognitive consciousness. As Moore conceives
and rejects the principle, it means (1) that consciousness is a
necessary element in reality because we experience nothing without
it; (2) and that therefore self-knowledge is prior to and more sig-
nificant than the knowledge of external things. For Descartes sum
is logically prior to cogito .
"But modern idealistic descendents of his constantly
claim superior certainty for the cogito itself on the
ground that it is Ibgically prior to other propositions.
Many will say straight out that thought is presupposed
in all existence and all truth, and will drew the con-
clusion that the existence of thought is therefore the
primary certainty. Others will say, in more popular
forms; you cannot deny that, whatever you' think, it is
implied that you do think it and therefore the ultimate
certainty is that you do think it, not that what you
think is true: if you deny that you are making a statement,
it is impossible to argue with you."l
Perry defines the priority of consciousness as "beginning with the
assumption of the knower and his ideas,” only to meet the difficulty.
l"Necessity"
,
Mind, 9(1900), p. 302. See also Phil. St.,
p. 16, 24-26.
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as Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume did, "of establishing the
existence of anything else,”
”It is a fact that everything that can be men-
tioned, such as the sun, gold, or Napoleon I, can be
classed as an element of knowledge, or idea."l
This fact, which cannot be disputed, confronts realists and ideal-
ists alike, as Perry admits. Both must face it, Ihe fallacy of
idealism, according to him, consists in considering it important.
It is the assumption that the "ego-centric predicament" is signif-
icant for the interpretation of reality— "the circumstantial pre-
sence of the knower in all cases of things known. It is, to use
Perry’s term, “subjective iimaediatism" as opposed to "realistic
immediatism. " Berkeley was obviously committed to it, but Kant,
whom many idealists recognize as the founder of idealism, is also
controlled by it, in spite of his polemic against psychologism,
since he regards logic as the science of thought,^ How each uses
the ego-centric predicament as an argument for idealism we shall
see in the next chapter.
In so far as the ego-centric predicament exists, however,
it must be recognized and acknowledged. That "no thinker to whom
one may appeal is able to mention a thing that is not idea" is
admitted by Perry as self-evident, but is called "a peculiar method-
ological difficulty."^ Whether it is valid to conclude from it
that objects are dependent upon consciousness is another question,
to be discussed in the following chapter, as well as the question
as to how much t.je cardinal principle rests upon it,
%ind, 19il910), p. 326.
2p:77t., p. 271.
3lbid
. ,
p. 127, 142-143.
^Ibid
. ,
p. 131.
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The empirical evidence behind the exaltation of the priority
of consciousness is a subject of greater dispute. Is it true that
consciousness is more directly given or more immediate, than in-
dependent objects? This is the second aspect of the controversy
between idealism and realism on this point, and should be kept
distinct from the first. What is the original datum of conscious-
ness? Is it consciousness itself? Descartes’ answer is the pre-
supposition of all idealists, even though they neglect the syn-
thetic activity of consciousness as did Berkeley and Bradley, The
solutions offered by Perry and Moore are themselves different.
There is "awareness of awareness," which is to be understood "in
exactly the same sense" as awareness of blue. Consciousness is
not merely "distinct and unique" but may enter into relation
,
not
merely with independent objects, but with "awareness of objects"
as well. The primacy nor priority of self-consciousness ^ is thus
denied; consciousness is the object of consciousness in the same
sense as are external objects,^ Perry, on the other hand, is even
more explicit in denying it, in the tradition of Hume and James,
The predominance of the self in philosophy and the ascription of
peculiar metaphysical virtue to it "is due to the fact that it
is characteristically habitual with philosophers !'• If it means
anything, "it means mind functioning in an elaborately complica-
ted way," (therefore, reducible to analysis) and is ultimately
to be reduced not to "feelings of bodily action" (James), but to
"bodily action itself,"^ Thus, for Moore, consciousness is a
type of object on the same level, but distinct from physical or
logical objects; for Perry it is reducible to them. Meanwhile
^Phll, St,
, p, 24-25,
^P,P.T,
, p, 281-282.
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neither can account for the fact, not of self-knov/ledge
,
but of
self-consciousness, and of unity.
Is this an escape from the predicament? Moore’s solution,
more cautious than Ferry’s, culminates in the abstract notion of
an empty "diaphanous" consciousness, and can give no good reason
for avoiding a regressus ad infinitum . Perry’s culminates in the
unclear hylo^oism of which all extreme behaviorism is guilty. But
both escape the predicament only by a Gewaltsprung that will be-
come more apparent in the later chapters. As Love joy pointed out,
”it cannot be upon an empirical proof that the apologist of real-
ism relies;”^ he can escape the predicament only by the type of
consideration of possibilities with which Moore reproaches ideal-
ism. The idealist is here the empiricist.
Furthermore, it must be pointed out that the idealist does
not use the ego-centric predicament without further positive evi-
dence based on (1) the inadequacy of sense. data for knowledge, and
(2) the creative activity of the mind in knowing—evidence, which
we shall see in later chapters, both Moore and Ferry overlook.
A broader theoretical presupposition of idealism underlies
the postulation of the significance of the ego-centric predica-
ment, It is the notion, again attacked by both Moore and Perry,
this time, in essential agreement, that reality is not a datum
but is to be achieved through the interpretation of data. Here,
again, idealist and realist intuitions can merely be brought face
to face with each other and their merits pointed out. Perry first
becomes aware of the divergence in viewpoint in criticizing Royce.
^Jour. Phil ., 9(1912), p. 679.
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"Although he announces as his central problem,
^'/IThat is Reality?* it soon becomes evident that he
is not seeking to discover what is real, so much as
what it is to be real... He (the philosopher) would
never seek after reality if he had not already found
it."
Philosophy has merely to assume reality and seek to comprehend it
"in some thoughtful belief, Here again Moore*s analysis is more
extensive. The idealist, whether he holds that existence is
identical with being perceived, or (2) Existence is more than
being perceived but necessarily implies it, (i.e., is subjective
or objective) is tacitly admitting that besides his conception
of existence there is a more basic meaning— the existence of
percipients
,
or the existence of objects which does not include
their being perceived but depends on it. This simple meaning of
reality he refuses to define,, but holds that "we are all perfect-
ly familiar with its meaning."^
The distinction is a clear one. It concerns the significance
of epistemology for metaphysics which neo-realism denies. Is
reality to be assumed by philosophy to be that which common sense
(Moore) or "the original philosophic consciousness" (Perry) hold
it to be, or is reality to be defined in such a way to account
for our knowledge of it? Berkeley has usually received credit
for giving eplstemology/its central place in modern philosophy
—
making it critical for Wes ensdeutuiiig . The problem is an ultimate
one, and to be decided purely by one’s view of the relative sig-
nificance of uncritical intuitions and critical thought. In
spite of the above criticism of idealism Moore and Perry both
^Monist
,
12(1902), p, 445.
^Phil.St
.
.
p. 72-78. Cf. Perry, Op, cit . , 446.
T. Marvin, "The Emancipation of Metaphysics from Epis-
temology," The New Realism
, p, 45-95.
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decide in favor of the redefinition of reality to meet the needs
of knowledge, Moore particularly in his early logistic period, when
existence itself becomes a concept, and Perry as soon as his real-
and
ism becomes explicit systematic. But the nature of reality and
the realistic difficulty with it are problems for a later chapter.
But though all idealism recognizes that reality must be such
that knowledge of it is possible, the extent to which the ego-
centric predicament is of central importance varies in different
types of idealism. Perry’s and Moore’s description of the prin-
ciple applies only to idealism of an intellectualistic and nar-
rowly subjectivistic stamp. The fact of the "ego-centric pre-
dicament" is, for idealism, of secondary importance to the fact
that the individual knows a reality independent of him, and which
must therefore be of such a nature that his mental activity gives
him knowledge of it. There are here two intuitions, the idealis-
tic one that knowledge is more fundamental than its object, and
the supposedly realistic one that the mind nevertheless knows an
independent object. The two are consistent if the principle of
the creative activity of mind is supplemented by an epistemologi-
cal dualism that depends, ultimately, on the faith that reality
and knowledge are commensurable. This solution would resolve also
the second conflict of principles, to which we now turn— the
problem of the nature of logic and the relational structure of the
world
.
2. The Organic Structure of Reality and The Internality of
Relatioms . Idealism has been interested, since Plato, in the
rationality end universality of experience. This has involved,
as we have already pointed out, a certain type of logic which all
mi-
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realists seek to overthrow, among them both I^loore and Perry. For
our purposes this logic can be characterized by five principles,
three of which are structural to it, and two of which are ontolo-
gical consequences. The theoretical refutation of objective
idealism
,
beyond its reduction to subjectivism, rests solely upon
the difference of opinion which arises from this issue, as follows:
(i) The abstractive quality of analysis. The priority of
judgment over concept,
(ii) The logical significance of contradiction, and the
denial of its ontological possibilities.
(iii) The significance of organic unities.
(iv) The internality of relations.
(v) The resolution of logic in psychology, as opposed to
the reduction of reality to logic. The first four principles are
a unity and may be considered together.
The problem of analysis to synopsis we have already discussed
in connection with our discussion of realistic method. At present
we are interested only in revealing and analyzing the realistic
account of idealism’s logic. "The recognition that there ’organic
unities’ end ’illegitimate abstractions’ in this sense (that
either part "would not be what it is apart from its relation to
the other") is regarded as one of the chief conquests of modern
philosophy." Its convenience is shown in that it "may be seen
to assert that two distinct things both are and are not distinct,"^
—a plurality of appearances and a unitary reality, change and
identity, things and mind. It is by this means that idealism
^Phil. St
.
,
p. 15.
;T J.r:" M’looiS cUod '.,~rx:1
,
wottiii lt>VC o^» -4'-;-' '.'
'
't
,
. xd od iX30 tijjOu. ei/'v 1;/0
-
.• Tq.: mO sur: /lainV ‘ic ov;^ :. i- ,Ji oJ i3aA.''»^Ck:'ii‘C &*ie r^olriw T.r aei:
'
-ij 0? td'o 'to x:<i i I-^oi j sioo.ic ed" ’ . yondfpf i;noo IaoI;-.
no\/j 'HbIoc ;ot>\.dwe o? uoi^oi.b'Si sSi Jbaox^d tI3sii.3H^
: ,.U:tv oij r.<Ji a.} . »Rt*r'i noini;c 1o eonsTS'l'llb f>/l7
?-:• v: ' **0 a;i ,^.f^ylan^ *lo '{jAlriijp ^Ta:^0£•I^erfs fi)
.•jroonoc Ttivo iTrc^-iiiiLL-t
>
,
awXv olbai-fioo iiCrj^oitinglE Iaox:,oi iwi'i’ 111)
. iXio { ’::f‘cq IsoiftOloJiiG Bw'X lo i *!.:
i»iii.rU3i,'iv 1o aon^HOl‘Un5»ie ,I.J)
.anol73l&z tc dflT ( vi ) .
cl tis .oqqo sfl , eq fiX CjIsoS *10 ^oi;?£/Xose7 ‘^r'T Ivj
-I A •c'fTrqIx;rv’'rq iLOl .tR'iXl ar’i’ .oiiol oj *io aot^oub^z sstt
. 'T*' •‘•'v' &r\C * ?f^;: 00 . v,rj;,: *>na VJ ’r'' Z
b^:r.kToeih r^-5 avan -.'w nl,r»c. on\;;.'.- t>:f '5o awldoi*;;
i'^'. ‘lo ociaoccfeXX zuo sjiw no! Jotja^iv/o o'
oXj ‘I orf’3 i,i4iA - iXat-'T/rn- ai •ta •;
o}.a3} '\ ' L - .1 -li'wtJ' 'lomtivoo '*1 ?- ^ .•‘•ipol e saM Ic
. ji’o
,
.•,.!: «id.? ;ri: ' oo-f ili ' ' 'i ’ ‘ J
' jOJ '.^4 t'fe^ i'IO'JT: X-i^qa '.I "• ;j.“1w ao- ^or: bJ* ?»(&'«'' *r*dli.
«
• m 'it? l->da 'to a».fo qa a: r?i .’
'-.; VC:-;* ^ ^.3:iu iii /iwc-'. '• ooasln'jr'h’^v sj!
., ,c^oiIcij
\i:.X; :’:a 'Hoc icni^fcib CIJ iadv o?
5re. o*; r';d:> , '.-.j ;: '/'Te?lni. e j,':« e&ofteiftsqya "^C' •••rXi '*^0 /''' a--
«&!-•. IV'I J3' V'C >i ^T' . I^utiT-' bftS ^ j 'is> r
)
209
succeeds in reconciling a plurality of appearances and a unitary
reality, change and identity, subject and object.
"The principle of organic unities, like that
of combined analysis and synthesis, is mainly used
to defend the practice of holding both of two con-
tradictory propositions, wherever this may seem
convenient.
As an ontological validation of this view of logic, which
attacks the validity of analysis, there arises the theory that all
relations are internal. But Moore ^s view of the meaning of internal
relations is softened as his thought develops. In the "Refutation
of Idealism," from which the above quotations are taken, the inter-
nality of relations is considered only in its narrow application,
which for Moore lies at the heart of all idealism, ?. not merely of
absolutism— the internality of the subject-object relation in
consciousness. And to Moore the internality of this relation im-
plies, for the idealist, that the judgment esse is percipi is analy-
tic, or that activity and content of thought are identical, or
better, that the object is only a part of the mental activity.
Moore’s criticism of the principle In this restricted and in-
adequate meaning, which seems to be the question of subjectivity,
involves his criterion of valid analysis, already discussed.
"An abstraction is illegitimate, when and only
when we attempt to assert of a part— of something
abstracted— that which is true only of the whole to
which it belongs.** But in the case of idealism
,
"the
principle is used'^to assert that certain abstractions
are all cases illegitimate; that whenever you try
to assert anything whatever of that which is part of
an organic v/hole what you assert can only be true of
the whole.
Idealism, then, rests its synoptic logic, according to Moore, on
the criticism that logic cannot be purely analytic because all
^Ibid.
, p. 16.
^Ibid.
.
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analysis ascribes to parts properties of wholes, and on the as-
sumption that all valid and apriori judgments are analytic, and
therefore make the predicate a part of the subject. So far as his
interpretation is concerned, idealism is still on the level of
Leibniz and Wolff; it has never heard of Kant and of Moore’s essay
on "Necessity.” This is essentially the viewpoint of the Frincipia
Ethica
.
in which idealism is said to hold the concept of organic
wholes in the contradictory sense, that parts have no meaning or
significance apart from the whole. ^ But in the same work he modi-
fies his logical atomism to recognize that if the value of things
constitute a part of their meaning
.
meaning is a property of wholes.
Later Moore modifies his view of the principle of Internal
Relations in The gonception of Intrinsic Value and External and
Internal Relations . 'Whereas his viewpoint had previously been
analytic and pan-logistic as far as existential knowledge is con-
cerned, and synoptic as concerns value- judgments
,
his position now
is determined by his return to a substance— attribute metaphysics
and a productive logic. As a result he is nov/ content merely to
insist that some relations are external, among them all spatial
relations, though logical analysis no longer exhausts reality.
The doctrine now means that "whenever X has any relation whatever
which T has not got, X and Y cannot be exactly alike: that any
difference in relation necessarily entails a difference in intrin-
sic nature." Now he criticizes the doctrine on two scores:- (1)
The intrinsicality of relations makes the distinction between
the unconditional and conditional, especially in regard to the
^
Princ. Eth.
.
p. 31.

211
unconditiCLJially intrinsic nature of value. For the beauty I
experience cannot be the beauty you experience, if their nature
is changed by their relation to me and to you. This criticism
presupposes Moore* s conception of value, already mentioned, and
already seen to be untenable.^ (2) The second argument is more
empirical. It is a demonstration that there are some external
relations, and an analysis of the confusion between relations and
relational properties upon which the doctrine rests. A failure
to distinguish the two leads to the identity of indiscernibles
,
which
Moore, because of his newly awakened sense for the particular, must
reject. Though his substance— attribute metaphysics does not give
the best basis for relating external and internal relations, his
defense of the former is convincing and from the viewpoint of this
paper valid. The experience of individuality and indeterminism
demands that some relations be external.
Perry’s analysis of the problem is far less acute and pene-
trating, though the work of analysis had been done for the Amer-
ican school by E. G. Spaulding and B. Russell,^ Perry’s interest
in the problem may be considered to go back to his refutation of
Royce. Royce had criticized the realistic principle of independ-
ence as leading to a meaningless pluralism: no dependence, no
relations. Perry answers by distinguishing relations which do
not imply dependence, a view elaborated ten years later in ”A
Realistic Theory of Independence." The principle, an expression
Iphil. St
.
,
p. 270-272.
^^’The Logical Structure of Self Refuting Systems," Phil. Rev . ,
19(1910), p. 276-301, 610-631; "The Basis of Realism," Jour. Phil .
,
8(1911), p. 158-167. Of. Holt in The Hew Realism , p. 165-169 . The
"constitutive aspect" of the theory of internal relations is not
tenable, whether its ’underlying reality’ aspect is or not; analysis
must recognize both terms and qualifying relations .
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of the speculative dogma, is that the world is a unity modern
idealism uses it to prove that the world is consciousness; Perry
admits that the world is a unity of relations, but denies, as did
Moore in his later papers, that the relations are all those of
dependence
•
It is, of course, a presupposition of idealism that the world
is one. Idealism does appropriate Kant^s regulative idea and make
it constitutive in its effort to interpret reality. It is a philos-
ophy of organic wholes, insisting that the very task of speculative
philosophy makes analysis inadequate as a method. As a logical
counterpart it holds to the priority of judgment over concept in
logic, defining logic as a science of tnought. If logic be rede-
fined as the study of relations, and thus be made purely structural
it may assert the priority of terms over judgments. Moore, as we
have seen, has at various periods held both views. But idealism
does not as a matter of fact, consider all propositions analytic, it
need not, if it proceed empirically, deduce the plurality from the
unity, and it need not hold to the principle of internal relations
as described by realism. All relations are not internal to their
terms; they do define the place of their terms in reality as a
whole. The whole is relational, and all terms and relations are
internal to it, and individuality is to be defined as an organic
whole in this sense. But all idealism does not reduce the world to
one individual in this sense, as Perry recognizes more clearly than
Moore. Pluralistic idealism, by its very nature, must agree with
realism that some relations are external; that individuality and
^P.P.T
.
.
p. 156-158.
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totality are distinct categories. Idealism’s discontent with
analysis as an ultimate method does not, therefore, rest on the
principle that all relations modify their terms. Relations are
significant in the comprehensive account for which philosophy strives,
but are not always, though sometimes, as Moore insists, significant
with the parts they modify.
Both Perry and Moore thus fail to penetrate into the logical
motives of all idealism. The three viewpoints represented by (1)
Perry’s relational logic (2) Moore’s predicative logic, and (3) the
absolutistic logic of absolute idealism of an intellectualistic
type do not exhaust the possibilities. The first two are arbitrary
methods, both true in so far as they go, but both result in ‘an: ab-
stract view of
reality and consider it only in certain aspects. As soon as Moore
becomes a substantialist the problem of external relations becomes
of little importance for him. In so far as he is conscious of the
valuational structure of the world he opens the way for the specu-
lative conception.
A normative solution of the problem would agree with absolute
idealism (and with Moore in his paper on ”Necessity") that the
universe of meaning and value is an organic and contingent whole.
But this logical and axiological analysis does not exhaust the
reality of the world, which has meaning and value only for consci-
ous beings. If the universe ultimately is interpreted as an ener-
gistic and voluntaristic system, the logical problem becomes purely
relative; both relational and predicative logic contain truth, but
only partially. The question of the internality of relations must,
after all, be solved on an empirical basis. On this personal
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idealism and pragmatism are agreed. Causality in the physical
world is transeunt, or, relationally stated, external. Conscious
activity or causality, on the other hand is immanent; relationally
stated, internal; that is the basic intuition of pluralistic ideal-
ism. The activistic motive in the doctrine of internal relations is
recognized by Kreiner, Perry, ^ and others. The pluralistic motive
and this activistic motive combine in personal idealism in account-
ing for a world whose logical end axiological contingence itself
is resolved in the creative activity of a plurality of conscious-
ness— one supreme, the other to a relative degree free and capable
of creating the universe for themselves, through interaction with
its conscious source.
The theoretical presuppositions of idealism may thus be re-
duced, according to Moore and rerry, to two— the primacy of consci-
ousness, and the organic structure of reality. Only the former is
common to all forms of mentalism; the latter is a postulate of
absolutism rather than of idealism, as Perry recognizes. In so far
as both emphasize idealism’s rejection of analysis they are unfair;
idealists recognize the positive value of analysis but also its
incompleteness. 'He shall next examine the arguments v;hich idealism
bases on these postulates, as the realists understand them, to
discover the fallacies of method which they.^find are involved.
Perry, P.Q.I.
, p. 220; Kremer , Le N6o-r6alisme Am4ricaine ,
p, 39-40.
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CKAPT>]R VII
THE ARGUlffilTTS OF IDEALISH
A, SUEJFCTIVE lEEALISK
The cardinal principle is central for all arguments
for idealism according to both Moore and Ferry, We have
already discussed that principle, analyzed its logical
foundations as the realists understand them, shcv/n the
presuppositions upon v/hich they hold it to rest, and, most
important of all, contended that its importance for idealism
is exaggerated hy them. In so far as it is purely cogni-
tive it expresses merely the subjective half of idealism,
not present in all systems, and strictly limited in scope
in all. It remains to examine the arguments, as Moore and
Perry understand them, by v/hich idealism (i) establishes
its cardinal principle, and (ii) further develops its meta-
physical views upon it as a basis, V/e shall contend that
their analysis cf these arguments, for them fallacious, is
too taticnalistic and tends to give only secondarj^ importance,
where it does not entirely overlook, the positive, empirical
arguments which idealism advances. Since idealism has had
a history whose stages indicate the rising complexity of its
solutions, our discussion v/ill once more assume a certain
chronological arrangement, generall3' following Perry’s dis-
cussions, which are here more complete than Moore’s, The
criticism of the subjectivistic foundations of idealism
centers on Berkeley, though it is later extended to include
L*
^
'
. t
i, , j
-f'- -
;./. • J
. i i'd'il
~J
'}
.i *,
. oJ }') }
.,
- r :
-» -J'.. V.
i ' . . I.
0:1
^
• j vT-v-
; ^
-i" . ^ . '.'hi ' '" 'iij
/)
. :.; •:•.:•
.
^ i.f i Ijj) :•-
.•
'i..'.. i i :c CH ; .j ;
: xJ
' * « »-
-•
^
y uXj .t *- • I
^
i-' •
-'*J
J .
-
,
L -J 1., . J.',
J
'•
i . . J;
'n‘r ^
J
i .
J : 1 -.1
'. :yj
. i .Iv* c ': .
'•
y *, J J
<.
.
i- • >1 J ') , ' ^ 1
'
;»
j
•- y.l.j'-: ; I
X
,
-
= ;;
-X . ; rr;ai:i-;
:o J IK :
.. J .
,
X . .. '..v-i);’ .:
.',»>
-V
’ '
..i
J ‘C 3 5
,
xxy 1J-. ;> ' .• ' I \.j’0 ' ,.j •-'
r
'ijA-
c
t
216
Kant also.
It may "be pointed out at the start, that his
refutation of this subjectivistic principle contents Moore
for several years, until the facts of relativity, which were
the positive element in Berkele^^'s argument, threaten his
nominalistic realism as v/ell. He is aware that subjectivism
is but a half v/ay house to spiritualism, and maintains that
it is inconsistent v:ith spiritualism, but he merely sketches
the arguments by which idealism advances from the one to the
other, ^ From this point of view, Mackenzie’s characterization
is valid,
”Mr. Moore professes to give us a refutation of ideal-
ism, but vdiat he really gives us is a refutation of skep-
ticism - i. e. a refutation of the view that e sse is per-
cipi . His only arguments against idealism appear to be
XlT that it can only be proved by means of the doctrine
that esse is percipi
,
and that, apart from this it is a
mere assumption;” (2) that it is paradoxical, involving the
rejection of some inevitable beliefs of common sense. ”2
After all Hume, in the negative half of his thought, is the
most consistent defender of the reduction of esse to percipi .
Both realism and idealism, insofar as they are empirical,
escape him only by dogmatism or faith. It is the heart of
sensationalism, not of idealism, that he criticizes, as he
himself shows in his essay on Hume.
1, The Argument for the Cardinal Irinciple . In the
"Refutation of Idealism" as ?/ell as in other papers, Moore
divides his discussion of idealism’s argument into tv/o phases,
(i) the rationalistic argument that there is a necessary
^ l^hil. St,
, p, 6.
2 Mind
,
Ic (1906), p. 322.
I r itiir: il’j - Oi
K.
i -j j ')
..
'J ‘j
.
; i'
- J ,c j 1:0
I
_• I
•
'
-
i u « »
t •o ^ ^
_:
)
. . A
.
.,' i.
.) C ^ -.i
T.<!.rfy:r:
.
'
.
V
. J
.
'
’-'I
’10
-j ;.•
:>i..
1-I
,
. ‘fu) i: ? jt
I
• - i. .
'
' ; c< ii J
-
^ 0 .
0
.
- Oj.L .1 ^
7 . ‘;.o 'll- ..I... ,ijT 'to
c
* '
. 7 j.,j
,
'
J
; ZJCZ y'
I'-:: .}M'i 7 ; . 1 . ,U Aivi 1 .« J. _ •, 2
.
)
I. .
.4
^ JJ . .7 _
217
connecticn "be tween eese and percipi, and (ii) the empirical
argument that
,
since as a matter of fact they are never
separate, they are inseparable aspects of a synoptic v>rhole.
In either ca.se, idealism strives to establish the necessary
validity of a general proposition on the basis of certain
facts of experience,
a. In so far as idealism is dogmatic in asserting its
belief in the cardinal principle as self-evident, Moore cannot
refute it, especially since his ovm thought rests ultimately
upon intuitions for whose truth he has no criteria,
"We have then in esse is percipi a necessary syntheti c
proposition which I have undertaken to refute. And I may
say at once that, understood as such, it cannot be refuted.
If the idealist chooses to assert that it is merely a
self-evident truth, I have only to say that it does not
appear to me to be so. But I believe that no idealist ever
has maintained it to be so,"^
Unlike Perry, he does not accuse idealism of dogmatism in
establishing the cardinal principle; in fact, he admits that
as dogmatism he oannot refute it. Philosophy, it will be re-
membered, consists of giving reasons, and it is the reasons
which Moore seeks. It is true that he charges absolutism,
particularly Hegel, with dogmatism,
b. Idealism’s argument for its central principle consists
in all cases of a rationalistic inference from a second propo-
sition, itself a universalization of what Perry called the
ego-centric predicament; it is the principle that "the object
of experience is inconceivable apart from the subject," In
other words, idealism seeks to prove its principle by showing
^
Phil . St,
, p, 12, 14-17, 180-181,
^ Ibid , , p, 11,
"^ Ibid ,
.
p. 12,
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its opposite contradictory, or by the lav; of contradiction
alone. Esse cis nercipi has been shown to be a synthetic judg-
ment, and by definition, only analytic judgments may be proved
by the principle of contradiction. Idealism’s chief error,
then, is the rationalistic one of Leibniz and V/olff, of arguing
from the principle of contradiction, or purely negatively,
the denial of
It argues from^impossibility to actuality, rather than to mere
possibility. Idealism is rationalistic,
lloore explicitly recognizes that some idealists
giciinoiTledge that esse is percipi is a synthetic judgment, but
forces them into another contradiction. They can establish
its necessity only by the "fashionable” subterfuge of asserting
"that truths are both analytic and synthetic,”^ "In some
connections this assertion may have a useful and true sense,”
*
though he does not further explain these connections. If
"analytic" means v;hat is proved by the law of contradiction
alone, and "synthetic" means what is not thus proved, a pro-
position cannot be both analj^tic and synthetic,
(
This is the outstanding instance in Moore's criticism
of his unfairness in demanding of idealism
,
or better, of
ascribing to idealism for the sa,ke of criticism, a demonstrative
rigor v;hich it does not claim, and v/hich he admits himself
unable to secure for his own thought. It is true that the car-
dinal principle is synthetic and that the idealist claims for
it apriority , in the sense of universality and necessity.
But this universality is an ideal, and is usually not claimed
as an accomplished fa.ct. Only abstract conceptual structures
^ Lhil. St ,, p. 12,

219
are purely analytic, structures like the systems of mathematics,
V/hen Bosanquet and Creighton describe judgments as both analytic
and synthetic, they do not define the terms in the contradic-
tory sense indicated by lloore, but; as he himself earlier
defined them. Idealism of the logical variety maintains that
ideally truth is analytic, though empirically all truth is
S3'’nthetic - conceptual thought serving the function of relating
the ultimate terms of analj^sis. As Mcore himself earlier
1pointed out in his criticism of empiricism, some a nriori
knov/ledge is necessary if skepticism is to be avoided. But
the idealist of voluntaristic breed recognizes the element of
probability, even in the foundations of experience. Meanwhile
the rationality of which experience is capable is to him the
justification of his faith, Moore's arguiaent that idealism
is rationalistic in the pre-Kantian sense is intolerable to
the idealist of empirical trends. Even K-ant, as Moore points
out, presupposes a judgment of the kind for which he wishes to
pfind a logical basis, "and Hegel, far from being a rationalistic
formalist, is the empirical champion of the synthetic nature
of experience,
c. But how does idealism establish the principle that
"the object of experience is inconceivable apart from the
subject?" Here Moore and Perry agree in pointing out the
laxities of idealism's method - careless analysis an^a failure
to consider all possibilities.
"I am suggesting that the idealist maintains that
object and subject are necessarily connected, mainly be-
^ P^oc. Arist. Soc,
, 3 (1903), p. 81,
2 Ibid,
.
4 (19Q4T7~P, 133.
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cause he fails to see that they are distinct, that they
are two
.
at all,*' ^
This is the fallacy of "pseudo- simplicity", the error of
assuming "the simplicity of that v/hich is only familiar or
stereotyped," as Perry describes it,'^ The idealist fails
to distinguish between "yellow" and the "sensation (or aware-
ness) of yellow". Hence for him "to assert that yellow is
necessarily an object of experience is to assert that 3^ellow
is necessarily yellow - a purely identical proposition and
'7
.
therefore to be proved by the law of contradiction alone."
This distinction between mental act and object we shall meet
with again. It is one which Moore himself has difficulty in
sustaining as his awareness becomes more " transparent" and
"diaphanous", and v/hich the American realists recognize only
to abandon. Whether idealism or realism is right here,
experience itself must decide, as vie shall see in a later
section. Suffice it to say that science and common sense as
understood by the realists here part company, the scientific
account of the physical basis of sensation being in agreement
v/ith idea.list and pragmatist as opposed to realist,
d. But not all idealists are guilty of this slovenly
lack of discernment, according to Moore,
"There are, I admit, many v/ho not only impl3 ', as
we all do, that green is distinct from the sensation of
green, but expressly insist upon the distinction as an
important part of their system. They would perhaps onl3^
assert that the two form an inseparable unity, - - -
But foimiing such a unity, it is held, each would not be
what it is apart from its relation to the othe r. Hence
to consider either by itself is to make an illegitimate
abstraction . " ^
o
^kil, St ,, p. 13.
? The Hev/ Realism , p, 12-13.
^
» St
.
,
p. 14.
^ Ibid,
.
p. 14-15.
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The idealists, in other words, employ the principle of
"organic wholes” or internal relations to assert that though
subject and object are distinguishable, they are not distinct.
The consequence is that all idealism involves a contradiction—
"(i) Experience ^s something unique and different from any-
thing alse; (2) Experience of green is entirely indistinguish-
able from green; two propositions which cannot both be true,”-*-
But is this a contradiction, and does it imply that the
part is in all cases determined by the whole? Experience of
green may be altogether unique and distinct and yet identical
with green if_ green is itself mental, and distinct from the
phj^sical conditions which determine it in interaction with
conscious activity. As Strong has pointed out, the contradic-
tion is meaningless if for "experience" we substitute "exis-
tence", or if for "green" we substitii^ "pain". It is meaning-
less to distinguish the experience of pain from pain, or
the existence of green from green, except for the Platonic
realist., who, as we have seen Moore does not, has no need for
an empirical limit to analysis^, Moore’s criticism presupposes
his own distinction between subject and object, which, as we
shall see, clarifies nothing and introduces grea.t difficulties
into his attempts to describe consciousness. His vagueness
on this question is notorious, idealist depends upon
consistency with experience to justify his refusal to separate,
metaphysically, subject and object of experience. Conscious-
ness provides the onl3^ empirical instance of internal relations,
9 Phil. St. , p. 14,
^
Minh, 14 (1905), p. 178-179.
See below, ch, IX;. Phil. St
..p,17. 20-21.
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e, A further fault of idealism underlies its failure to
he sufficiently analytic. It is sometimes led astray hy
language,^ particularly hy the dual sense of such terms as
"sensation**, "notion", "idea" and "conception", which may
stand for either the mental act or its object.
"It is hardly likely that if philosophers had clearly
distinguished in the past between a sensation 'or ’idea and
what I have called its object, there should have been no
separate name for the latter.
One may ask, parenthetically, why a thinker of Moore’s inclina-
tion toward common sense should not reverse the direction of
the implication involved in this passage, and reason that
since language provides no basis for the distinction, it may
not be valid.
Another case of the fallacy of "verbal suggestion",
as Perry calls it, is found in the idealistic tendency to
distinguish, as Moore himself did in his early period, not
between mental act and its object but between mental act
and its content, thus stressing the inseparability^ of the
two. In his refutation of this use of the concept "content"
Moore (restricts its meaning to "quality". Here again he
criticizes from the viewpoint of his omi position - that of
logical analysis, and forgets the distinction betv/een reality
and logic, to say nothing of that between an activistic and a
conceptual interpretation of reality,
Moore’s further argument is directed aga.inst objective
idealism, and must be considered in the next section. His
^ See above, ch, IV, p,l 60 Hfo( for the realistic fallacy
of this nature,
? Phil. St, , p, 19.
Ibid
.
.
p, 21-22,
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charges against the idealistic argument for the cardinal
principle
,
or for epistemological idealism, convict it of
the following fallacies:
) a. It argues from the principle of contradiction alone, on
the assumption that the principle in question is analytic,
h. It uses the principle of internal relations to argue the
inseparability of separables,
c. It fails to analyze properly,
d. It permits itself to be led astray by language,
e. Nevertheless it is not dogmatic; as such it would be
irrefutable.
Before evaluating this general criticism, we shall
examine Berry’s statement of it, which, we shall find, is,
except for several details, merely a clearer statement of
Moore’ S'. Appearing fully developed five years after Moore’s
”Refutation"
,
in the papers of 1909 and 1910, and expressed
in sj^stematic form in his Present Ihilosophical Tendencie s.
they presuppose the direct influence of Moore’s earlier
analysis, already reflected in the Approach to Philosophy
.
1905, but given an empirical turn. His later statement of
this criticism reflects also the studies published in the
mean time by his colleagues, Montague, Spaulding, and Holt, ^
"The strategy of idealism depends on the adoption
of a certain initial viev/point. The world must be viewed
under the form of knowledge
,
Like Moore, Perry approaches his criticisn from idealism’s
epistemological approach, which, we have already shown, is a
^
Cf, bibliography.
^ T,, p, 119,
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large, "but not the exclusive line of reasoning open to ideal-
ism. Mcreoverp have already examined this "strategy”, and
found it to he partly the inevitable approach to philosophy,
and partly Berkeley’s contribution (anticipated by Descartes
and Locke) to philosophic method - the significance of the
nature of knowledge for reality. This significance of the ego-
centric predicam.ent
,
not even the realists can escape; they
merely interpret it more\boldly and less cautiously than the
idealists.
Beginning v/ith the representative theory of knowledge,
Descartes and Locke found great difficult^’- in establishing
the realit^^ of the physical world, either as corresponding
to our idea, or as causing it. This dilemma Berkeley rejected
by denying the physical world,
"He asserts, in short, that all existence may ade-
quately b,0 comprehended under the knower and his ideas;
and in this assertion modern idealism first sees the
light
,
It is noteworthy that in some of his discussions. Perry
seems to find the total of Berkeley’s thought in v^rhat he calls
his phenomenalism. So in his latest discussion of idealism
he illuminates "nature as Berkeley’s percept and Kant’s thought"
2by the remark of Pistol, "V/hy, then the v/orld’s mine oyster^’
though it must be admitted that even Shakspere meant more
than tc affirm that the world was Pistol’s idea, and that the
remark smacks of objective idealism of the voluntaristic stripe.
This emphasis, as we have already seen, is a false one, since
o J^~bid , . p, 122,
Cent, Am , Phil,
,
ii, p, 192.
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the intuition of idealism that immediate knovi^ledge is only of
ideas is secondary to the intuition v/hich idealism and realism
have in common - that the mind knows independent reality.
This interpretation of the starting point of idealism weakens
the realistic criticism in general, and it is doubly weak v/hen
the realist, intent upon proving all idealism subjective, fails
tc draw the line of subjectivism short of all idealism. In
his earlier analysis Perry recognized the tv/o strains of
"subjectivism** - phenomenalism (reality as reduced to states
of knov/ledge) and spiritualism (reality as reduced to an
internal active principle such as spirit or will ), and holds
the two to be contradictory in Berkeley, Yet his account of
spiritualism itself, as well as of panpsychism, lacks the
objectivity and metaphysical emphasis that such systems have;
he is inclined to reduce them all to the subjectivistic motive.
Thus he defines panpsychism as " a sort of mental atomism,
mental contents being conceived to have substantial existence
by themselves instead of requiring some support from beyond.*'^
The panpsychism of Leibniz cannot be defined in terms of the
mental contents of the knower. In such places Perry seems
to let his chief criticism of idealism obscure his sense of
historical fairness in ascribing to Berkeley's spiritualism
and Leibniz’s panpsychism the ontological foundation they
claim to have
,
By what arguments does epistemological idealism seek
to establish its major claim - that reality is conscious?
1 P. C, I, .p. 192-193
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Berkeley’s positive arguments are, as v/e have said, not pre-
sented, They are "too well knov/n to require detailed restate-
ment,", and not being stated, remain also unrefuted, ^ But
for purposes of disoussion. Perry distinguishes Berkeley, •’ the
vanquisher of dualism*’ from Berkeley, "the idealist**, approving
the former, but rejecting the second. His‘argument for ideal-
ism has two aspects, definition by initial predication, and
the argument from the ego-centric predicament. But since these
two aspects are to be separated only v/ith difficulty, we
proceed to a more analytic account of Perry’s discussion,
a, Berkele3^ proposes his idealism as the only conclusion
possible after a reductio ad absurdum of Locke and Descartes,
This much of his positive argument Perry recognizes. Against
Descartes he urges that an idea cannot be a true copj^ of a
material thing, since it is mental, and a copy must not miss
the essence of th^origina.1. Hence an independent v/orld which
corresponds with the mental world is arbitrar^^ and meaningless
unless it also is mental. Against Locke he contends that,
granted that mental content may have an external cause since
ideas are forced on the mind, that cause cannot be a m^-terial
sub-stratum, for such a sub-stratum is a gratuitous abstrac-
tion since all mental content is idea, Berkeley thus concludes
as the remaining alternative, that our ideas have an external
cause, but that that cause, to be an adequate^'one
,
may be con-
ceived as will or spirit. So that "nature siraply coincides
with perceptions caused by Gcd,"^
^ For the positive arguments of Berkeley, see ch, VIII,
p.2)0C)-i,\o.
^ P. P , T,,p. 124,
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This diagrammatic interpretation of Berkeley’s argiiment
has certain limitations that become apparent as soon as the
account is oompared with Berkeley himself. It is true that
Berkeley attempts a reductio ad absurdum of all dualistic
epistemologies that rest upon the concept of material sub-
stance. But his reduction alone would not prove his ov/n
position, as Perry insists, since it avoids the one possibility,
that ideas are mental, but not necessari l:> so. Only positive
empirical arguments can show that ideas do not have that
degree of permanence or independence that is necessary to
consider them independent reals. These positive arguments are
central to Berkeley’s thought from the Theory of Vision on,
but are nov/here considered by Perry until 1950, though they
were forced upon Mocre's attention in 1906, after his ov/n
refutation had been developed. These positive arguments are,
briefly, (i) the relativity of sense data, (ii) the consti-
tutive activity of the mind in knov/ing.
But other objections are to be urged against Perry’s
account. Berkeley’s position is not as clearly monistic
as he seems to indicate, nor is it so clearly a mere rejection
of Descartes and continuation of Locke, His spiritualism is
not merely an afterthought to supplement his subjectivism,
but is basic. The doctrine of the divine archetypes seems to
be, for instance, a Platonic correction of Descartes, not
easilj^ reconciled v/ith the concept of divine causality with
which he corrected Locke, save by synthesizing the two in the
particular notion of a divine person or consciousness.
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Moreover, Perry nov/here recognizes Berkeley’s correction
of his earl3^ empiricism v/ith the idea of "notions”. According
to Berkeley the mind has iromediate knowledge only of its ov/n
ideas; it infers, i. e, has notions of the existence of relations,
self, other selves, and God, Against the notions of relations
James’s position that the mind has ideas of relations may he
defended with justice. Descartes’ emphasis on the immediate
experience of self is valid as against his notion of self.
But the concept of notion shov/s Berkeley’s inclination to
recognize, as his thought progresses, the activity of thought
in' constituting kncv/ledge, and the increasing clearness of
his epistemological dualism. For notions the Kantian idealist,
abandoning Berkeley’s aasociationalism, substitutes judgment
and conceptual knowledge. However, there is implicit in
Berkeley’s system from its beginiiings, the viev/, in essential
agreement with realism, that the mind does know external
realiti^, though not immediately,^
With these limitations of Perry’s criticism of Berkeley
in mind, we ma3^ examine the fallacies which he attributes to
his defense of the cardinal principle.
b. The fallac3^ of exclusive parti cula.rity» Berkeley
errs in supposing that an idea is necessaril3' mental. This
fallacy arises from two historical facts, (i) the sharp dualism
between material and mental substance, for which Descartes is
chiefly responsible, and (ii) the conception of an idea as
^ The neo-realist’s tendency to limit Berkeley’s thought
to his early v/ri tings, and to overlook the second edition
of the Principles and the Siris is itself an injustice.
Though it v;as the early Berkeley v/ho influenced thought, his
own development is an effort to supplement his empirical
phenomenalism with a rationalistic spiritualism
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a kind of thing, rather than as an office or relation.^ The
fallacy, in its general form, assumes "that a particular term
of any system belongs to such system exclusively," In the
case of idealism, it implies "that v/hatever assumes the sta-
tus of idea, must be idea in order to be at all," Perry
maintains that "there is nothing v/hatsoever to prevent a
thing’s belonging both to nature and to mind, in which case
it is ijiipossible to argue that because a thing belongs to
2
. ^
mind it therefore owes its existence tc the fact," juso
as John Doe belongs to the class Republican Party and also
to the intersecting class of captains of industry.
The distinction is an interesting example of the realis-
tic reduction of reality to logic. In spite of his contention
that this false assumption of idealism is to be disproved
empirically. Perry loses sight of the empirical issue involved
and advances a series of arguments by analogy; green may
at the same time be part of my experience and ]part of the
tree, just as point b may lie on both lines abc and ebv .
It is true that the logical analysis may proceed to such
conclusions. But the discussion is not logical, but episte-
mological, and concerns not a universal green but a par-
ticular experience, a sense-datum. Two further questions
Perry merely begs; (i) Is it conceivable that the green I
experience is identical v/ith the green of the tree? Science
agrees with dualistic idealism in defining the tv/o in dis-
tinct ways; one need only compare the psychological and phy-
^ Perry’s definition of idea as relation is inadequate
for his own system, asjit rests on another raordultimate
sense of idea as datum or "entity" .
^ T ,,j)124-125: cf , The Hew Realism
, p. 14-15,
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sical accounts of greenness, (ii) Is it as a matter of fact
true that a sense datum green is objectively real? Perry
confuses also the two meanings of idea that his adherence
of James, with v/hich we agree, involve - idea as sense-datum
or universal, and idea as relation (that peculiar and unde-
fined relation which constitutes consciousness). The idealist
who interprets the world activistically will avoid the
verbal analyses involved in Perry’s epistemological monism,
and conceive the perceptual object as mental, since it is
conditioned b^’- mind, but net exclusively so, since it is the
product of the interaction of mental activity with activity
from without. This latter fact assures its truth, provided
the mind’s function conforms ultimately with reason.
There is thus a justifiable basis of Perry’s criticism
in those types of idealism which are primarily intellectual-
istic, whether empirically or rationalist! cally oriented.
Perry expresses more concretely what Moore means in maintaining
that esse is percipi is a synthetic judgment. The nature of
an idea is not deterrained entirely by the conscious exi^erience
of ?/hich it is an abstract part; as particular it is determined
externally to that percipere . These necessar;y^elationd. to
the objective order, certainly to be interpreted dynamically,
not logically, condition knowledge, which is not therefore
shut up to consciousness itself. But such knowledge is not
immediate; immediate knowledge's itself an abstraction except
as it refers, not to ulti:iate sense data, but to the mental
complex of which they are parts. In this sense, objective
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idealism may rest on the cardinal principle and yet be free
of the fallacy of exclusive particularity.
c. The second fallacy is that of initial p redication .
\ "A subject of discourse is viewed initially under one
of its aspects, or is taken initially as a term in some
specific complex or relational manifold. Then ov/ing to
the error of exclusive particularity, it is assiamed that
this subject/cf discourse can have no other aspect, or
belong to no other relational manifold. Thus the initial
characterization becomes final and definitive." ^
In idealism it is the error of inferring "that because the
tulip is seen, therefore its being seen is its essential
status.”^ Perry’s discussion does not distinguish this
fallacy from that of exclusive particularity. As distinct
from it, it is not a logical fallacy at all, but an evasion
of logic. As such it is essentially the fallacy of dogmatism
,
or petitio principii or romanticism or mysticism
,
depending
on the degree and motives of the pseudo-intellectual activity
involved, and it is as such that we shall consider it. Thus
to insist that Columbus is to stand for '’the man for whom the
Columbia River was naraed" or "the man I am now thinking of”
just because one of these possible classifications has iiiopressed
me or pleases me or has good consequences for me, is an
example of this fallacy.
Perry is bolder than Moore in attributing dog-
matism to idealism, just as he is freer in attacking it on
the grounds of motive and practical consequence. The "dogmatism”
^ 4
of idealism was his first objection to it. Absolute idealism
is of course particularly prone to it, but the speculative
J The hew Realism , p. 15-16,
i ^ » T
.
.
p. 127.
" Ibid
.
.
p. 128.
iPhil »
» _
1 (1904), p. 76, 170. "Dogmatic idealism
signifies the abstract isolation of the philosophic motive."
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dogma, "that there is an all-sufficient, all-general prin-
ciple, a single fundamental proposition that adequately de-
termines or explains everything',’^ is the starting point of
all idealism. Since Berkeley dogmatism has become a perni-
cious idealistic habit,
"So strong ..is this habit that many idealistic
books are v/ritten with no attempt whatsoever at proof,
¥e are invited to view the world as ’exj^erience*
,
’task’,
’situation’, ’truth’, ’goal’ or in some other terms, as
object of consciousness : and it is therefore assumed
without further ado that this aspect of the world, simply
because it is there and may be selected, is definitive.
But unless it can be proved that the relation of things
to life, when they do sustain such a relation, is the
relation which bestows on them both their nature and
their being, there is no difference between such idealism
and a sheer rcmantic or spiritualistic bias, "2
This quotation indicates both the criticism and the extent
to' which it is justified. Idealism has rested on its
laurels; it has indulged in "dogmatic slumber", and the neo-
realists have served to awaken it, as Hume did Kant, But Moore
is the wiser in recognizing that pointing out its slumber,
though it discredit its methods, does not refute it, A simi-
lar ansv/er ma^'' be made to the charge that it is ‘Romantic" or
"mystical" in method,^ Truth has been discovered by intui-
tion and mystic insight, but not as truth; its verification
consists in what Moore has called the "good reasons" that
are advanced for it. And Mccre, in the period in which he
seeks a new type of intuition for things and matters of fact,
is as great a roma.ncer as the absolute idealists, against
v/hbm., it may be noted by observing the idealistic terms used
in the above passage, the criticism is mainly directed,
" The Hew Realism
, p. 16-17, If the speculative dogma
is a criticism. at^all, it is a criticism of all non-positivistic
philosophies, includin^/pluralisms
,
^
^ . F « T .. n . 161-162; cf, Ap . to Phil
.
.
p, 277,
^ ^ » P* 38; A^, to Phil .^p.295.
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Another, more serious aspect of this criticism has
been discussed in its relation to Moore’s thought. Defini-
tion hy initial predication may he due to the fallacy of
pseudo-simplicitj7, or the failure tc analyze. Perry agrees
v/ith Mccre in making much of this fallacy, and it occurs
frequently in his argument,^ Not only subjective idealism,
which fails to distinguish between the perception of a thing
and its non-conscious nature, is guilty of this fallacy, but
all idealism which uses categories of activity and passivity,
will or purpose as ultimate principles, for ’’activity and
passivitj^ are gapable of being analyzed in a variety of
ways, logical and psychological, and their nature can be
regarded as simple datiun only in so far as such analysis is
2deliberately avoided,”
This argument falls v/ith the dependence on analysis
as ultiiaate philosophical method, which we have already reject-
ed, The fact that such categories can be analyzed "in a
variety of ways” should awaken the realists to the relativity
and possible abstract nature of such analysis, and to its
inadequacy for metaphysics, "Purpose" may still be an ulti-
mate metaphysical category, even if certain aspects are capa-
ble of anal 3''tic separation from the whole as conscious func-
tion, Some wholehearted empiricism would awaken the realists
to the absurdity Of their logical atomism with (in Perry’s
case) its ultimate surrender to behaviorism,
^ The Nev/ Realism
, p. 12-13.
Ibid,
, p, 14; cf. P . P . T . , p. 99-105.
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d. The third fallacy of idealism arises from its method
of arguing from the ego- centric predicament, which Moore
had found rested on the principle of contradiction and possi-
51^1 hility alone. According to lerry, there are two aspects to
idealistic arguments for the cardinal principle.
i. It may reason from the fact that knowledge and
its object are alwaj^s co-present in experience, to the conclu-
sion that the cognitive relationship is indispensible to
things. But this rationalistic procedure proves nothing at
all, for it reasons from a methodological difficulty to a
redundant conclusion - "that every mentioned thing is men-
tioned" or "every observed case of a thing is a case of a thing
observed."^ This involves the first two fallacies; to infer
from the experienced ubiquity of the knov/ledge relationship
itsinecessity is to fail to analyze and so to commit the fal-
lacy of exclusive particularity^.
"Since I cannot find a category without knov/ing it -
-
- I can find no category that is not a mode of thought.
But since this clearly has to do with the ciniumstances
conditioning my investigation if must be disconnected in
my conclusions concerning the thing investigated." ^
hot to do so is to commit \7iiat Perry also calls the fallacy
of illicit importance. *
If the case for the cardinal principle actually rest-
ed on this type of argument, a case might still be made out
in its defense. If no knov/ledge is conceivable without con-
sciousness, and both object and consciousness are abstractions
apart from each other, then it may approximate a safe induction
^
P
. P . T
.
.
p. lol.
^ The hev/ Realism
,
p. 19-20,

that the two are contingent in some v/ay. Such is the nature
of Hiss Calkinsi reply to Perry. "The hypothetical unknown
is utterly negligihle”
,
and the realists’ attack of idealism
for its use of the ego-centric predicament is “a startling
readiness to sacrifice empirical fact - admittedly universal-
to methodological theory.”^ But it v/culd seem vdser to limit
the scope and the significance of the ego-centric predicament
as has "been done in the preceding chapter.
ii.Moreover, Perry criticizes the argument also as an
inductive procedure. As an inductive argument can it have
a high degree of probability? In the paper on "The Ego-
centric Predicament", v/here knowledge is supposed, according
to the idealist, to "generate" the known, he accuses it of
the fallacy/^f post hoc, ergo propter hoc , a charge which he
does not repeat in his later attacks, particularly as it does
not apply to all subjectivisms,^ But in general, viewed as
an inductive aigument, it rests entirely on the method of
agreement; every experienced case of an object involves the
experience of it; therefore all cases of object are dependent
upon the experience of them. The ego- centric predicament
itself prevents the observation of negative cases. But the
method of agreement is worthless when the conditions of obser-
vation themselves involve a reason why only agreements are
observed.^ Hence it is invalid to advance the inductive method
of argument for the cardinal principle.
^ Jour. Phil
2 Jour. Phil
P- f T .,
7 (1910), p. 10.
p. 131.
. ,
8 1911), p, 450-451
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Perry’s refutation of the inductive argument for the
cardinal principle is in large degree, fighting a v/indmill.
It has the positive merit of shov/ing that subjective idealism
does not, in general, advance the cardinal piinciple as a
deductively established a priori ijrinciple. Moore had treated
it as such, and Perry does so as v/ell* But neither is it to
be established by a clear cut application of Mill’s canons;
not even scientific lav/s are thus established. It is advanced
rather as an hypothesis to accouht for the fact cf knowledge
as well as the exp<erience of r>urpose and value. Moreover,
it is doubtfuljwhether the ego-centric predicament, of which
many forms of idealism make onlj' restricted use, can be treated
as merely a**methodological difficulty”. Its unattacked uni-
versality makes it totally unlike the "blue green glasses” to
which Perry compares it, or at least give it an entirel^^
different aignificance, which the idealistic use of it recog-
nizes, the realistic does not. But the entire realistic
effort is miscarried in so far as it interprets all idealism
as attempting to deduce the conscious nature cf reality from
the nature of finite experience of it, and not from the nature
of the experienced. It is true that Berkeley does this for
"sensible things" but not for experience as a whole. Esse
is percipi is in this sense synthetic, but is derived
neL_J.ther deductively^, by the law cf contradiction alone
(so Moore) nor inductively, by the method of agreement alone,
but as an hy/pc thesis which increases the meaning and coherence
of experience itself.
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2, Significance of the Criticism of Sub.j ectivism.
The many similarities between Moore’s and Perry’s criticisms
undoubtedly^ indicate some extent of influence of the former’s
'
"Refutation" on the latter. Both attack idealism fcr its
logical methods in establishing the cardinal principle, Moore
for its pre-Kantian rationalism, Perry for its fallacious
inference from a circumstantial li.nitation of method. Both
find it, because both are analysts, to have committed the
fallacy of pseudo-simplicity in failing to distinguish between
subject and object. The criticisms of both, moreover,
presuppose the methods and assumptions of their own realism,
including this distinction, though Perry follows James in
holding the only thinker to be the thought itself, while
Moore, who takes seriously conscious activity as distinct
from its object, finds it an entity sc elusive that he never
succeeds in running it do¥m. Perry is freer than Moore
with the charge of dogmatism or initial predication, but both
find subjective idealism to have committed the fallacies of
exclusive particularity, verbal suggestion, and illicit impor-
tance ,
There are, it must be pointed out, elements of validity
in this criticism. Idealism, because it stands in line wit h
the most respectable traditions of philosophy, may take for
granted the considerations which gave rise tc it, and eventually
forget that such reasons are still necessary. It is the
permanent achievement of the new realists to have forced
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idealism to reconsider and restate its case. Moreover,
the realists’ argument is valid in showing that idealism
of the subjectivistic tradition cannot rest its case on
a demonstration or clearly convincing induction - hut, of
course, neither can any other tradition in philosoph3^, A
final agnosticism, such as the realists advance against the
cardinal .principle
,
is possible as opposed to any meta-
physical s3^stem, and it is in this final agnosticism that
the realists, as we shall see, prefer to rest. Yet the
criticism of subjectivism serves as v;arning tc idealists,
not to permit logic in particular, or knowledge in general,
tc exhaust their approach to reality, though it be retained
as the main one.
The limitations of the criticism follow directly
from what has been already said,
a. It assumes that idealism can rest only on a rigorous
demonstration v/hich idealism does not claim,
b. Its analysis is abstractive.
c. Its use of the cardinal principle is wider in
scope than Berkeley in particular meant it to be. He applied
it only to "sensible things", not to esse in general.
d. Berkeley established the cardinal x^^inciple by a
series of empirical considerations on the relativity of sense-
data to which they ascribe no importance whatever in their
criticism, but reccgnize only secondarily when it is neces-
sary’- to defend their own objectivism.
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e. They overlook entirely also those elements in Berkeley
which supTjlement his empirical subjectivism - his doctrine
of notions, his embryonic Kantianism, his account of identity
as resting upon the eternity of concepts and relations. Thus
they have reduced Berkeley to a raonist and subjectivist, and
criticized only selected arguments for it,
f. In general their criticism, as we have considered it
±0 this point, criticizes only idealism which rests on an
epistemological basis, and neglects the approach from the
analysis of external causality, value experience, and logical
structure
•
As we shall, see, these gaps in their criticism are
at Ifiast partly closed in their consideration of other
systems',
3, Berkeley’s Spiritualism . The second half of the
thought of the Bishop of Cloyne is his modified rationalism
and spiritualism. To what extent do Koore and Perrj^ecognize
this development of his thought? V/e have already seen that
the realists prefer to consider the cardinal principle in
its epistemological application as the heart of idealism, and
its objectivism as an afterthought. That is true also of
the thinkers under consideration,
licore leaves room for this second half, ’’Berkeley
supposed that the only thing of which I am directly aware is
^ 1
my own sensations and ideas,” the tacit assumption being
that Berkeley recognized the indirect awareness of independent
^ Phil, St ., p. 30.
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entities of some kind or other. He recognizes that Berkeley
used existence in two senses, with one of v/hich he agrees,
though he interprets percipi as more important than percipere
for Berkeley,^ He outlines three ways in which idealism
may advance from esse is percipi to esse is percipere . hut
has no detailed interest in the **vast quantity of further
argument” vfhich he holds necessar3^ for this step.
”It is said that since whatever is, is experienced,
and since some things are which are not experienced hy
the individual, these must at least form part of some
experience.
"Or again that, since an object necessarily implies
a subject, and since the whole world must be an object,
v/e must conceive it to belong to some subject or subjects,
in the same sense in which whatever is the object of our
experience belongs tc us,
”0r again, that, since thought enters into the
essence of all reality we must conceive behind it, in it,
or as its essence, a spirit akin tc ours, who think; that
^spirit greets spirit’ in its object, ”2
But he'’doesfnot propose to enter into the validity’ of these
inferences,” The passage quoted is the fullest statement of
the further argument of spiritualism v/hich he gives, the re-
mainder of his criticism being limited to the principle of
internal relations. It is clear that, like Reid, he considers
the argument from analogy to finite experience of supreme
importance for objective idealism; and that he continues to
discuss only the intellectualistic
,
not the voluntaristic,
strain, in spiritualism. But he does not attempt a further
refutation.
To this general characterization there is, however,
one exception. One phase of Berkeley's argument he examines
in more detail, giving it a wealth of elabofation v/hich one
^ St
., p, 73-75,
2 Ibid,
.
p. 6,
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will not find in Berkeley himself. Per spiritualism arguing
on a subjectivistic basis, the problem of the knov/ledge of
other selves becomes a crucial question. It is Moore’s thesis
that the knowledge of other selves cannot be inferred, as
Berkeley had taught, from my perceptions if they are purely
mental; only if the object of my perceptions be considered
independently real, can my inference to the existence of
other minds be valid. ^ Moore’s own solution cf the problem
v/e shall meet in the next chapter; vie desire here merely to
acknowledge and evaluate his only effort to refute an impor-
tant idealistic argument from subjectivism to spiritualism,
Berkeley had proved incontrovertibly, according to
Reid (but not according to Moore), that our observations
give us no reason for believing in the existence of material
objects, while Hume, as a consistent but insincere skeptic,
proves that they
’
give 'us^no reason for believing in the
existence of other minds, which, Berkeley had held, are
pknown by "reflexion and reason". This theory, "that my
observation of ray own thoughts, feelings, and perceptions
may give me some reason to suppose that another person has
thoughts, feelings, and perceptions similar to some of mine,"
Moore attempts to refute.
In a very acute analysis resting upon the conditions
he had already set up as necessary for valid generalizations^
Moore points out that this induction, from certain perceptions
^ The Thesis of "The Hature and Reality of Objects cf
Perception," Phil. St
., p. 31-96.
2 Berkeley, Works
,
ed. by A. C, Fraser, i, p. 336, 448-
450,
^ Moore, G. E., cit ,
.
p, 79,
4 See above, ch.' 'IV, p.l5i'l6Z»
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of my "body preceded hy other perceptions of my own, to certain
(of my) perceptions of another body preceded 'by "perceptions,
thoughts, or feelings" of aiother mind, has a fatal ohjection,
j^,;i For the feeling I infer in another person does not stand in
• the same relation to my perception of his body, as the feeling
I myself experience stands in relation to my perception of
my hody. Hence the induction is invalid, as it involves two
different types of relationships,
"The only kind of feeling of pain, which my obser-
vations do justify me in inferring, - - - is a feeling
of pain of own. They cannot possibly justif^^ the be-
lief in the existence of any such feeling except one which
stands to my perception in the same relation in which my
feelings do stand to my x^erceptions - one, that is to say,
which is my 0Yvn,"l
Cr the idealistic argument may proceed, not as did
Berkeley's on an inductive basis, but on a more pragmatic
basis. The idealist may reason that
"our observation of our own j^erceptions may be sufficient
to verify or confirm the hypothesis that other i^ersons
exist, - - - The assumption that other x^ersons have par-
ticular thoughts, feelings, and perceptions enables us
to predict that they will have others and that our own
perceptions will be modified accordingly; it enables us
to predict future perceptions of our own; and we find
that these predictions are constantli;- verified, "2
Strange to say, Hoore admits that my "notion" of other minds
is such an hypothesis, to be tested in such a way, in spite of
his general position, in harmony with Perr^^, that knowledge
3
of other selves is immediate and intuitive. But all possible
S) meanings of this pragmatic conclusion do not, he points out,
conflict with his own argmnent, that "no observation of my ov/n
Phil, St ., p. 82.
Ibid
.
.
p. 83-84,
Ibid
.
.
p. 87.
1
2
3
<•.> .' C J )
-..
:
,. >
•>
f f ) • •!
t
i ,
\
' j
si
; y ^ ‘ ‘
'1
-
-
. .
,j. > v:: \i f
I
i
I
.k
t
,4 ;
i
.
K
0 ^
243
perceptions, ^ itself . can confirm the generalization that
any one of them ^ just what v/ould occur if another person
had a particular feeling." V/hat the idealistic opponent
must affirm is
"that the observation of a perception of my own
v/i thout the assumption - - - that in that particular
instance any feeling or perception of another person, of
any kind v/hatever, has preceded it, may give me a reason
to suppose that that perception of my own is of a kind
which is generally preceded by a particular kind of
feeling in another person. And this - - - is plainly
false
.
Itoore’E argument is skilful and convincing against
subjective idealism. From the assumption that I can knov/
only my own mental content, the existence of other persons
cannot be inferred, either by causal inference or as an
h^/pcthesis - unless the independent existence of the object
of my experience is assumed. But how much does it prove?
Here again lloore’s argument rests on his ov/n distinction
between mental activity and its object. He seem.s to prove
only that the existence of other persons cannot be inferred
from my mental activity ( of feeling, perception, thought,
as abstract from its object) alone, but that the object, or
the objectivel3^ valid content of that activity must be
considered. His argument is a refutation of extreme subjec-
tivism only, and amounts to saying that the solipsist must be
solipsistic. Thus it rests on the cardinal principle in its
universal scope, and assumes that the idealist tries to infer
the existence of other persons on the basis of simple sensa
alone, not on valid perceptions. Positively, he proves that
1
Ibid ,'
, p . 86
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the inference that other persons exist depends on the objec-
tive validity of our perceptions, but he does not prove, nor
does his argument imply, that such perception must be iimne-
! diate. If idealism is able to account for my valid perception
of a human body other than my own, such that the laws of ph3^-
sics, biology, and ps 3^chophysical relations apply to it,
Hoore’s argument does not touch it. Moreover, it need not
hold that such perception is ultimate, nor must it hold that
such perception, limited as it is by physical and biological
conditions, exhausts the reality of the object.
It may be added that Moore does not i*efute' tfee grov/-
ing numbers of idealists, v;ho
,
like many realists including
Moore and lerry, hold that knov/ledge of other selves in intui-
tive and iimiediate, resting either on a monistic theory of
knov/ledge (lerry, Koernle) or the social nature of conscious-
ness. We shall return to Moore’s positive argument in our
discussion of subjectivism as a consequence of idealism in
the next chapter,^
To what extent does Perry recognise Berkeleian
spiritualism? The historical development of his argument
in the Present Philosophical Tendencies causes him to neglect
that phase of Berkeley in his discussion, though he does dis-
2
cuss it in his earlier as v/ell as his later work. But though
. he is av/are of it, he has little to say of the manner in which
subjectivists reason from their "phenomenalism" to their "spi-
ritualism". His spiritualism is for Berkeley "an afterthought,
^ See below, p. "iio -'h\3*
•
^ Ap. to Phil
., p. 281-3C2; P . C . I .
.
p. 192-210; in
these passages he does not, however, consider arguments, but
merely consequences.
r'^ ‘A
I
i 1 ..,
i
> ../'
.
,
.
.;
.-J ’it »i u
b:l
-
Oii J :
r
r
)
i
I
' f -
V
•
. J
.
' J j,
)
O ••
L
>
J , .. / ; ...
I
'/
'':r
'
' }ii
\ : s I i J - iji J r
'-•
t t I
i
k
I
never satisfactorily reconciled v/ith his first principles."!
His understanding of Berkeley’s arguments may he groupedclin
two sections.
a. Berkeley argues for the existence of other selves
from the immediate perception of tht^!^ consciousness.
"Particular acts of perception are said to reveal not only-
perceptual objects, but perceiving subjects." "The self is
both self-conscious and socially conscious in an irmaediate
exv)erience of the sai-ae type." This is a complete misreading
of Berkeley, vdio nowhere claims that the knowledge of other
selves is immediate in the sense in v/hich the experience of
"sehnible things" is. Berkeley teaches that knowledge of
self ‘.o is secondary and rests on'^r- eflexion and reason",
though he seems divideo^on the problem whether self-knov/ledge
is immediate > it cannot be shown that he held that the mind
"is socially conscious in an immediate experience of the same
tj^pe." That is consistent v/ith Schopenhauer’s intuiticnism
but not with Berkeley’s rationalism. Here Moore has read
him most thoroughl^^, v/hile Perry finds in him what he and
llcore both seek for their own thought - the denial of the
privacy of consciousness. Certainly the knowledge of God Is
not immediate for Berkelei'.
In line v/ith this interpretation of Berkeley he concludes
that his argument is "m3'’stical" . "Berkeley lapses into mys-
3ticism in attributing power to any spirit but his own," both
to God and to other men. To this we reply, that though such
! P
. P . T
,
p. 13^, footnote.
^ Ap. to Phil
., p. 285,
3 Ibid.
.
p. 2*95.
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intuitionalism would "be as consistent in Berkeley as in Koore,
he is rather a rationalist; knowledge of other selves is
inferred, or set up as a coherent hypothesis on the "basis of
1^-) our ohjective experience of the physical world,
h. This Perry sometimes recognizes, and to the extent in
v/hich he does so, gives up his criticism of the cardinal
principle, "In his later vm-i tings Berkeley abandons the
argument from analogy of human activity and interprets acti-
vity of God as moral and logical]!^ (This in spite of the
fact that Perry had earlier interpreted him as arguing for
the direct apprehension of other selves). He recognizes
here that Berkeley’s arguraent for objective idealism is made
to rest upon a valuaticnal basis. Subjectivism tends to
transcend itself and abandon its first principle. The
question remains whether the first principle is yet logically
implied in, or a logical consequence of, an idealism which
thus directly transcends it.
Perry’s further criticism of objective idealism
which reasons on the basis of the principle of self-knowledge
as immediate and ultimate will be noted later. As we have
already seen, he regards Hume to have made this argument
invalid for all time through his criticism of the concept of
self-consciousness. It will be seen also that Perrys
neglects completely^ Berkeley’s positive argujuents, recognized
by Moore, for a universal percipient or cause of my- ideas',
^ Ibid*
> P« 296
,
Ibid ,, p. 297,
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Those idealists who attempt to construct a pluralistic
theistic system on a Berkeleian foundation
,
hut correcting
his inadequacies, receive a minimum of consideration from
hoth Moore and Perry, The former nowhere recognizes them.
Perry considers their system an unstable mediation between
subjectivism and absolutism, and cannot refrain from forcing
it, as he does panpsychism, into a subjectivistic pattern.
What positive criticism he does advance against the arguments
of personal idealism we shall examine in the fourth section
of the present chapter. We turn now to examine the arguments
for idealism which rest on a Kantian basis.
B, TRANSCElTnENTAL lEEALISM
It has already been pointed out that both Perry and
Moore are interested in refuting two phases of.Lidealism -
subjectivism and absolutism - and that for both the two
corresponding principles to be criticized are the proposition
that being is the result of, or dependent on, knowing, and the
proposition that relations are internal. To this point, then,
their refutations tend to coincide. It is in their estimate
of the role v^hich Kant plays in the history of thought that
they reveal distinct differences in spite of certain underly-
ing points of agreement. Both recognize Kant’s contribution
to idealism in his emphasis on objectivity, but consider it
to involve a fundamental error; both insist that as a phenome-
nalist he is a subjectivist, though Moore emphasizes his sub-
jectivism more than does Perry, But their ultimate interpre-
I
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tations of the significance of his critical philosophy differ.
The maiden efforts of both aim at interpreting him, but Moore,
under the influence of Sidgwick, begins as a Kantian idealist,
then interprets Kant, as cbj activist, in a Platonic and real-
istic sense, and finally charges Kant, as idealist, with sub-
jectivism, while Perry, under the influence of James and in
the line of Berkeley and Hume, sees in him always the obj ac-
tivist who comes to grief in the ultimate antinomy of freedom
and scientific mechanism.
Both Moore and Perry recognize the tv/o contributions
of Kant to idealism, in the realm of the theoretical and
practical reason respectively, to be the following, (a) The
supposed avoidance of subjectivism through transcendentalism,
the assumption of a universal mind or a subject of knowledge
uberhaupt
.
a super-personal or impersonal logical conscious-
ness, with the resulting dualism, as they interpret it,
between empirical and objective self. (b) His emphasis upon
the ontological significance of freedom, ¥e shall examine
their criticisms of these principles separately,
1, Moore on Kantian Idealism . The references of Moore
to Kant in the Philosophical Studies are extremely rare and
unrevealing, and we are dependent, for our conception of his
estimate of him, on two papers written, the one in his Kantian,
period, the other as he was just emerging from his panlogism,^
In the first, Ka.nt’s problem is correctly understood as the
foundation of universal synthetic knov/ledge, but his objectivism
is interpreted Platonically and deterministicall3^. In the
^
"Freedom", land, 7 (1098), p, 179-204; "Kant’s Ideal-
ism," Proc, Arist, Soc ,. 4 (1904), p. 127-140.
I
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second, his transcendentalism is distinguished from his
idealism which is regarded as not only unessential to it,
hut inconsistent v/ith it, since it results in a suhjectiv-
1^;
ism more extreme than that of Berkeley, By '* transcendental
idealism”, Kant means
’’that he attributes merely ideal existence,
or existence in the mind, to certain entities which
are not indeed transcendent, since the^^ are not objects,
but which are also not parts of experience or particular
experiences, since they are, as he says, conditions of
all possible experience. These entities are not objects—
substantial individuals or things - but merely ’forms’ in
which the objects of experience are arranged; they are
the forms of Intuition, Space, and Time, and the forms
of thought, conceptions of the Understanding, or ’cate-
gories,’ of which one instance is ’causality.’ Kant’s
idealism is Transcendental
,
and differs from Berkeley’s
in that, whereas Berkeley onl3’ maintained the ’ideality’
or merely mental existence of particular objects, Kant
maintains the ideality of the forms in v/hich these ob-
jects are arranged. - - - He holds, what Berkeley did not
expressly'- hold, that space and time and causality exist
only in and for the mind.”^
In this there is little recognition of the element of uni-
versality and necessity in knov/ledge. Moore often speaks
of Kant as if he were a subjectivist bj^ intention and
2implication, Mever^the^ess, he is av;-are that for Kant
this mind is universal anc^ogical,
"Kant offers his theory a^.n explanation of how
we can know that certain things are true of all objects.
If, he says, we knov^ that the^ind always attaches these
predicates to everything presented to it, then we can
know that everything presented v/ill have these predicates.”'-^
Hov/ does Kant establish this conclusion? Moore answers
1^; that he does not. He gives a theory of the validity of uni-
versal propositions, but does not explain it, or provide
1
"Kant’s Idealism," p, 128-129,
5 I^hil, St, , p, 30; Prlnc, Eth. . p, 125,
"Kant’s Idealism," p. i29.

positive evidence for it. He postulates the constitutive
function of the mind and the ideality of categorial pro-
perties, There are thus two peculiar fallacies in his method
of reaching his conclusion, which commits, in essence the
same errors as Berkeley’s.
a. His premise is a universal proposition such as he
v/ishes to establish. That mind is so constituted as to
give every object a certain form is, in itself, a special
case of the cardinal principle and therefore a synthetic,
a priori proposition, unfounded,
b. His conclusion is such that he or anyone, cannot
take it seriously> it claims too much, and its claim is pure-
ly formal end meaningless. The activity of the mind is such
that it knows independent reality, not that it constitutes
knov/ledge,
"7/hat it is plausible to maintain is that the
nature of our mind causes us tc think that one thing
is the cause of another, and to think that two and two
are four."
Kant’s doctrine of the thing in itself shov/s that this is
what he really meant, though the principle of the creative
activity of mind determining necessary knowledge implies
more. Kant’s premise, when he himself takes it seriously,
reduces to the view that "the mind makes us think that the
objects presented tc it have certain predicates."^
Kant gives no other reasons for his transcendental
idealism.
^ IMd., p. lo5-136.
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*’He does not profess, "by an empirical otservation
of the mind, to discover that it always does cause events
to have effects or cause us to think that 2 and 2 are 4.
ITor do I know of any facts tending J;o show that this is
the case.”^
Meanv/hile the consequences of his epistemology, heyond this
unwarranted theory of the constitutive activity of the mind,
do not justify idealism - his dualism in regard to conscious-
ness and reality, and his skepticism. The significance of
Kant for idealism is thus quickly exhausted.
"The contention that our knowledge of universal
propositions is due to the ccnstitution of cur minds
- -
- appears to me to he the only idealistic contention
for which Kant offers any arguments, and I have tried
to show v/ith regard to these arguments (l) that it will
not explain the validity of universal propositions, i. e,
will not give us any ground for thinking them true, and
(2) that it will not follov; from their validity, and is
at best merel3'- a doubtful psj^chological assumption."^
So Kant is in essential agreement with Berkeley, who "also
held that everything of v/hich we are aware is an idea or a
notion - a constituent part, that is, of our mind,"^
Kant*s thought therefore falls into two aspects, his
emphasis on the categorial structure of the v/orld as the
.
basis of objectivity anc^niversality in experience, and his
doctrine of the creative activity of the mind. The first
is distinctly Platonic and retained by lloore, the second
is a mere "psychological assumption" he has in common owith
idealists of other schools, Iloore nowhere acknowledges the
distinction between the transcendental and the empirical
egos in Kant, whereb^^ he reconciles his universalism and
idealism, his omission undoubtedly^ being due to his recog-
nition that Kant ascribed to it none but a logical status.
Moreover, with Kant’s synthesis of consciousness and logic
^ P* 137, ~ Ibid .
,
p, 135, Ibid . , p. 158.
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V
through the concept of freedom. This point we shall notice
later.
Moore approaches Kant, as he approached Berkeley, too
Gu4)rioristically, He forces hoth into his own framework of
the argLiments which idealism ought to use, and so is able •
to show that hoth a’’^guilty of the same fallacy - argument
from the cardinal principle "based on an initial assuii^ion
of its truth.
Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories
has alwa^'s "been the most criticized phase of his thought.
The categories cannot he deduced from consciou-sness
,
because
the;^.re implicit in, and discoverable in experience. Por
the Platonic realist their independent objectivity is
ultiraate. As a. result he finds unnecessary the further
resolution of the forms of experience to consciousness,
v/hich the nominalist demands and succeeds in doing, unsuccess-
full3^ if he is a metaphysical realist, successfully if he
is a voluntaristic idealisii. Idealism does not deduce the
categories from consciousness, but advances a series of
empirical considerations which shov; that thej' ma-y be ex-
plained through the creative activity of consciousness.
This positive empirical argument in Berkeley and Kant,
Moore and Perrj- both tend tc overlook,
2, Perry on Kantian Idealism
.
Moore, in criticizing
Kant ’a idealism, overlooks the element of universality which
he himself has taken over from him, and reduces him to a
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Berkeleian subjectivist. Perry, on the other hand, has
in mind the ontological interpretation of Kant by the
objective idealists, and so deliberately ignores the element
of subjectivism in his thought to emphasize his use of a
universal ego,^
“The central conception of objective idealism is
the conception of a super-personal, or impersonal, lo-
gical consciousness. This consciousness conditions being;
and its enactments are binding on the individual thinker
as his ’objective reality'.” Kant's thought is “a reha-
bilitation of rationalism, - - - opposed to the whole
empirical movement.*''^
But the same tv/o elements are to be distinguished in Kant's
thought as Moore had separated, (a) his analysis of the
categorial structure presupposed by the fact of order and
necessity in the experienced world, and (b) his conclusion
that this order can be explained only on the assumption that
the mind itself furnishes it,
a. In proving the necessity of the principles of order,
sameness, and permanence Kant rendered a distinct service
to all future thought, for he validated the claim of science
to universal truth. This fact Perry brings out in the paper
on“The FiJitility of Absolutism."
“If Kant's list of categories be accepted,
together with his theory of the priority of space and
time, it follows that naturalism is justified, since
the fundamental concepts of physical science are proved
to coincide with the properties of object-in-general , “3
Though Perry here contradicts his later criticism of r.aturalism
for neglecting the priority of mathematics and logic, His
meaning is clear, Hegelian panlogism, v/ith its absolutism
^ ^ ^
•
I
»
» P» 143, footnote. Montague's esti late of
Kant in The Hew Realism
,
p. 8, is close to Moore's,
2 P. P. I..r
. 135, 136.
? Hibbert Jour .. 8 (1910), p. 628.
^
. I- . T.
, p, 82-84.
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decaiiitated by the "left wing" became one of the antecedents
of recent naturalism, Kant’s emphasis on logical priority,
unless his further synthesis in conscious activity is jus-
tified, provides naturalism with the logical basis which it
needs
,
b. The logical interpretation of Kant must be sepa-
rated sharply from the idealistic interpretation of him.
Kant not only stresses the categorial structure of reality;
he assigns to it an untenable status - conscious activity.
His deduction of the categories might have ^amounted merelj^
to proving that the elements of experience ^ stand in
other orders besides the order of their successive and tran-
sient appearance; and that there are principles of order,
such as space, time, substance, and causality," Instead,
he supplements Hume as follows.
"Recognizing that the merely psychological
order of Hume presupposed a more fundanental physical
order, he regarded this also as an order of phenomena
or representations, and its principles as forms of con-
sciousness^’"^
thus attaining the new conception of a non-psychological or
logical mind. Like lloore, Perry thus retains the transcen-
dentalism but not the idealism of Kant, According to him,
as to lloore, Kant ’s argument from his transcendentalism to
idealism is merely a presupposition, and therefore chargeable
with the fallacy of initial predication and formalism, or
dogmatism,
Kant’s reasons for supplementing his logicism (in
v;hich, contrary to Moore’s interpretation of him, he rejects
1
I . P . T ,p . 140 .
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psychologism) v/ith mentalism cannot he understood hy thinkers
resting on the tradition of Platonic realism as do Moore and
Perry, Thej^ arise out of his close adherence to his empiri-
cal predecessors, Kume and Berkeley, For the realist,
universals are ultimate hut themselves have no home in the
universe, and their relation to particulars, v/hether inter-
preted in line with Aristotle, as in the case of Perry, or
in line v/ith Plato, in Moore *s early period, remains an un-
resolvahle problem. Only as they are resolved in conscious-
ness, as the nominalist and empiricist v/ho follows -^escartes
rather than Hume holds they can he known empirically to he,
can they he comhined at all. Hence Kant assumes that logic
is ultimately a science/of mental activity, and that exper-
ience, including its categcrial structure, must he phenomenal,
Furthemore, for Kant, to point out that necessar3^ knowledge
has a logical structure is not sufficient, as it is for the
realists, t o account for this logical necessity. Apart from
his thing-in-itself
,
which leads Moore and Perry to call
him an ultimate skeptic, Kant is less positivistic than the
realists, for v/hom necessity, which caused Moore so many
perplexities, is ultimate hut unexplained. The Kantian
idealist merely points out its empirical explanation in the
conscious activity of the mind.
It would seem, then, in spite of the fallacies in-
volved in Kant’s attempted transcendental deduction of the
categories, there is a fundamental difference hetv/een his
apriorism and the apriorism based on the fcmal relational
a
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logic of the moderns. Abstracting from the "sense-manifold”
v/hich his earliest follov;ers found had no necessary’ place
in his system, his apriorisra is one that implies the synthe-
tic activit^^ of the mind, since the element of logic i3 not
the concept, but the dynamic process of judging upon which
conception itself rests. Perception itself is a process of
judgment. Experience for the realists is a static accumu-
lation of sense and conceptual content and relations. If the
associationalistic element in Kant be read out, and the syn-
thetic activity of consciousness in its Universal aspects
stressed, his raentalism is implied in his apriorism. In an
early discussion of Renouvier Perry recognizes this, though
he cannot accept the dynamic logic upon v/hich it rests, but
finds it "formalistic and barren,"^
Perry recognizes, more clearly than Mocre, that Kant
limited his idealism v/ithin sharp boundaries, and tried to
reconcile it with "empirical realism", as opposed tc the
"empirical idealism" of Berkeley. Since Moore wilfully
interprets K^tnt’s idealism psychologically, as vie have seen,
the onl3' ccnclusicn is subjectivism. Perry finds his
idealism limited in three ways. (a) Kant restricted the
creative function of mind to the formal aspect of experience.
Impressions are received from the thing-in-itself
.
(b) 0nl3'’
the concepts of ph^ sical science are constructive principles
of the mind, not many me taph^^sical categories generally adopted
by rationalists before Kant. (c) Ke was strict in recognizing
1 Jour, Phil
., 6 (1909), p. 468
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that this ccnstructicn of physical sciences is the only
possible knowledge."^
Kant is thus not a metaphysical idealist, but merely
a step in the direction of the objective idealism which
follov/ed him. He is capable of realistic interpretation,
either on nominalistic or realistic basis, but his attempt
to reduce experience to mental activity makes him. an important
figure in the development of idealism as well. His argument
for the creative activity of mind, we have held, the realists
cannot properly evaluate because of their positivistically
oriented Platonism; they have identified it with his positive
deduction of the categories from logic. Kant's further
argument based on the primacy of the practical reason and the
concept of freedom they do not recognize because they inter-
pret him as an ultimate determinist, as indeed, he must be
unless extended into a pluralistic system..
It may be added before we turn to that problem, that
Perry criticizes the "ciitical idealists", particularl 3^ of
the Marburg school, for the same formalism v/hich, he holds,
marks Kant’s reduction of logic to mind, Moore does not
even recognize the school. According to Perry, their analysis
of the logical and mathematical structure of experience is of
permanent value, but their reduction of logische Grundfunktion^
en to an original Grundakt der Erkenntnis seems "no more
than an accident cf emphasis and hereditary'- verbal usage.
^ C. I» .p. 222-223. Cf. Iloore in Proc . Arist. Soc.,
4 (1904), p. 135-136,
^ ^ • T
«
.
P « 146-147. See also Y/. H, Sheldon’s
criticism of Hatorp and Mtlnsterberg in The Strife of Systems ,
p. 120-141. See p. 13-14 of the present study'-.
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The Harhurg school is all the more open to this criticism
"because of its rejection of the concept of self-conscious-
ness .
The Kantian Doctrine of Freedom
. Concerning
Kant's other major contri"bution to idealism, his doctrine
of freedom, lioore and Perry are agreed in their earl 3^
criticism and in their later silence. The criticisms
of the tv/o men, which v/e have already examined, ^ agree
in making Kant a determinist , Both are concerned v/ith
his "bold paradox between phycical determinism” and the
concept of freedom, the moral freedom of man, and the
teleological interpretation of the world which is regulative
for Kant. Hoore, however, is still an -idealist, of the
deterministic, intellectualistic stripe of Bradley, when
he criticizes Kant's doctrine of freedom, and therefore
retains his ultimate determinism. Perry, on the other
hand, influenced by James, holds to human freedom as a
special case of biological indeterminism, and rejects
Kant's position. That the concept of "rational freedom"
is essentially^ deterministic and purely formal is shown
by three considerations.
a. The freedom which is an "ideal of reason" in
the Critique of Pure Keaenn is not free, "on the ground
that freedom has an essential reference to human volition. "2
It is "bare objectivity hypostatized and used as an ex-
planatory principle.*"^
^ See above, p. 45-47
,
no -\vi
.
^ ^'-ind. 7 (1898), p. 183.
Periy, Phil. Rev
.. 9 (1900), p, 634.
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"b. But Kant also argues from the fact of human free-
dom to the pcssihility of fre- dom as a regulative idea*^
The same mental act is determined by its place in an external
chain, and free in so far as it rests on intelligible (con-
scious) grounds. This attempt of Kant to reconcile freedom
and determinism, Moore rejects,
"That the belief in uncaused volition is illusory
the progress in scientific method, with the resultant
grcv/th of empiirical psychology, has rendered it more and
more difficult to doubt. "2
Perry, on the other hand, influenced at this early stage of
his thought by James, holds that
"the self-conscious individual will be free just
in proportion as he is conscious of his own existence
v;ith reference to the act; v/hile by an observer he
may justly be regarded as a part of nature, and^com-
pletely governed by its laws. "3
Perry’s view here differs from Moore’s, and is significant
for the pluralistic interpretation of Kant in so far as he
stresses self-consciousness as a basis of freedom, a viev/
v/hich he later rejects in favor of biological indeterisiinism,
only to return to it in the normative considerations at the
close of his value studies,
c. Finally, on Kant’s use of the principle of ration-
al freedom as the principle on which metaphysical antinomies
can be resolved, and as a basis for moral experience, Moore
and Perry agree in their interjjretation of Kant, but disagree
on their own position toward it. For Moore, rational freedom
is ultimate determinism and as such acceptable. As the re-
^ Moore, op. cit
.. p, 186; Perry, op . cit .,p. 639.
2 Moore, op, cit
., p, 187,
3 Perry,
.
op. ci t., p. 639,
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lations of things are defined, their determination hy others
becomes clear; Kant is thus interpreted as emphasizing the
ultimate IcgicaL structure of the world in his doctrine of
freedom,^
’•Will is cnl3^ a special form of natural causalit3^,
or, rather, a natural causal process, where the cause
is of one definite sort,”
Perry agrees in this interpretation. For Kant,
"Freedom is not a power deterraining the world
through genuine choices “but a Icgically separate aspect
of an ultimately fixed and changeless v;crld. The uni-
verse in the last analysis is contingent. Causal deter-
mination is a secondary process. - - - There is a court
of final fact from vdiich there is no appeal. It happens
that Spinoza called the fiat of this court Kecessit^^
But Kant has called it Freedom, and in this felicitous
su'bsti tution of terms he has 'been followed "by the major-
ity of those v/ho have "built upon his criticism. With
Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, and many recent ideal-
ists, this same a'bstraction, given a slightly different
rendering, hears the honored name of Freedom. ”2
The consequence is a clear dilemma in moral theory which
Kant and his follcwers cannot escape. The concept makes
"no provision for free disobedience to a moral imperative,"
for "if the individual in^^oses his own law he cannot disphey
it; if he ceases to obey it he no longer imposes it,"^
The consequence of Kant’s doctrine of freedom is thus the
peculiar idealism of the German people, whose freedom is
4
"made to consist essentially in obedience," This moral
consequence of Ka.ntian formalism v/e shall note in the next
chapter
,
Both Koore and Perry are justified in interpreting Kant
^
Moore, op. cit
.. p. 194, 197.
^
Perry, op. cit.
. p. 646-647.
4 P*
p. 236, 237.
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deterministically
,
because of the dualism in his thought
betv/een empirical and transcendental ego, between the
phenomenal and intelligible realm. Perry retaining the
empirical self, Hcore rejecting it. This interpretation
of Kant is common to the realists and to the absolute
idealists, both of whom approach Ka.nt Icgicallj^ rather than
1
nominalistically^. Both Perry and Moore recognize that
Kant made another effort to reconcile logic and v;ill,
deteminism and purpose, in the Gritioue of Judgment^but
their fundamental Platonism makes them indifferent to this
attempt. The criticism of both presupposes their refusal
tc find the principle of synthetic activity in knowledge
and to refer it to consciousness. Instead they^ substitute
a logical naturalism abstracted from the Critic^ue of Pure
Reason
.
Kant’s dualism, of positivism and rigorous moralism,
of determinism and freedom, so adequately described by^
Perry in The Present Conflict of Ideals ,'^ is ultimate for
any^ interpreter for. whom the^.ogical structure of reality'- is
ultimate, but not final for any- who finds in consciousness
the symthesis betv/een reason and purpose. Tc v/hat extent
Kant himself left the dualism unresolved is o^uesti enable; it
depends partly upon how seriously/ critics take the last tv/c
"Critiques’*. It would seem, on their basis, that Kant hi.'iself
•would sympathize most fully/ wi-th those who, like Richte, and
^ See Moore on Bradley, bp, cit ^, p. 202,
2 Ibid
.
,
p. 185. A significant acknowledgement, by-
Moore, that Kan-t can be internreted indeteri/iinistically
.
p. 225-225.
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more empirically, like James, sulaordinated reason to will,
as he himself did in the Critiojj.e of Judfgnent . After all,
the discussions of Perry and Moore here rest on an unwarrant-
I-
ed reduction of reality to logic, and a divorce "between
reason and will that Kant himself recognized. Perry later
resolves this dualism on a "behavioristic "basis which Miss
Calkins and others have shov/n is not narrov/ly "behavioristic,
Moore and Perry cannot ultimately do justice to Kantian
analyses "because they refuse to synthesize, and thus
cannot do justice to consciousness as a creative and active
principle, Moore rejecting the self in this period} and
Pe^ry within the next four years.
The two elements in Kant which point toward ideal-
ism, the reduction of the categorial structure of reality
to the activity of the mind, and the doctrine of freedom,
are "both rejected "by the realists, the first as an unproved
and unwarranted assumption, the second as not only that, but
contradictory as well, Keither can do justice to these
views because both are restricted to a logical (and in Moore’s
latei^eriod, a materialistic) viev/ of reality, and an analy-
tic method. The way is still open to interpret the categor-
ial structure of reality in terms of mind, and to relate
mechanism and freedom on the same empirical basis - the
t synthetic activity of consciousness. Such empirical studies
have been made, depending on the ultimate interpretation of
Mocre, op. cit
., p, 202,1
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reality in dynamic, activistic categories rather than static,
I '
logical ones. The further issue becomes one of conflict-
ing theories of consciousness, a problem to which vie have
yet to direct our attention.
C. THE OBJECTIVE COl^PLETIOH OF KAITT
Idealism on a Kantian basis may take either of two
forms, depending on whether it interprets the world monist-
ically or pluralistically, depending on whether the trans-
cendental ego is hyiDostatized into an absolute, or whether
it is interpreted as the logical aspect, v/hich it certainly
is in either case, of the activity of finite consciousness.
In either case, however, the completion of Kant into a sys-
tem of' metaphysical idealism, involves several stages
which deserve preliminary consideration before the tv/o
types are considered separately. Hoore does not discuss
the development of metaphysical idealism beyond Kant. For
him idealism has two sources - Berkeley's subjectivism
(shared by Kant) and Hegel’s self-contradictory logics the
positive values in Kant are on the side of realism. Con-
sequently our discussion for the remainder of the chapter
will largely limit itself to Ferry’s criticism. The follow-
ing stages mark the development of metaphysical idealism
from Kant’s objectivism,
a. The rejection of the thing-in-i tself as a symbol
of nescience.
The thought of Henouvier, the James of the eighties,
and Bowne
,
more rationalistically
,
aim at this resolution.
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Id, The hypostatization of the universal consciousness,
and its more liberal endov/ment v/ith qualities vdiich Kant
had not given it, Kant’s "regulative principles" are given
U*
"constitutive" validity. The result is, as both Moore and
Perry point out, the identification of reality and value,
^
c. The interpretation of the universal consciousness
in the light of the divergent motives of Kant’s followers,
resulting in critical idealism (reflecting both logical and
ajciological interests), intellectualism, voluntarism, neo-
romanticism, and, vrith the resolution of conscious functions
in the concept of personality and the recognition of a
plurality of such persons, personal idealism.
Perry’s understanding of the development of objective
metaphysical idealism from Kant is above criticism. How-
ever, his chief criticism of it is its consequences; v/ith
its arguments he is not concerned beyond pointing out that
they rest on the same fallacies as did Berkeley’s thought
and Kant’s - argument from the cardinal principle, dog-
matism, and formalism. But the cardinal principle is used
in a new sense, and its force is supplemented by a nev/
use of the principle of internal relations, which we have
2
already discussed in its general form. These two arguments
in their new form, we shall briefly discuss before turning to
^
the consideration of particular schools,
1, The Hew Scope of the Cardinal Principle, It is
no longer the finite kncv/ing consciousness which generates
^ Princ, Eth,
, p, 126-127> P, C. I
.
.p.250-252,
2 Above, chapter VII,
I
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or forms experience, ‘but a supreme consciousness
.
’’Knowing is declared to Toe the ground of "being,
hut knowing receives a new definition. It is no longer
the receptivity of an individual perceiver, hut the
system8.tizing activity of a universal thinking. - - ~
So that it is still dependent on subjectivity in some
guise, and the most essential feature of the situation
as Berkeley left it remains unaltered.” Consciousness
"in some form, especially in its cognitive form” is the
universal condition of being,
^
Thus, idealism is still subjectivistic, but in a new sense.
Perry holds, hov/ever, that this new sense does not free it
from the fallacies involved in the old subjectivism of
Berkeley. It too is guilty of the fallacies of initial
predication, exclusive particularity, and argument from
the ego-centric predicament.
Is this condemnation of ’’the great subjectivism”
justified? In advancing it Perry refuses to discuss the
"universal consciousness" thus hypostatized, on its ovm
merits, but purely on its analogy with finite consciousness.
But the cardinal principle, if one must discuss idealism
on its basis, has so changed its meaning, that this analogy
is not to be emphasized too greatly, as Perry himself
recognizes when he charges the new subjectivism v/ith
2
contradicting its basis in the old. Esse is no longer
percipi b^^ finite consciousness; indeed esse is defined
as in varying degrees independent of finite intelligence,
but reducible, not to the perception, but to the purposive
activity, of a universal mind. It is still possible that
^ ^
^
.
p. 143-144; see also p. 155-156.
^ AP. to Phil ., p. 282; P . P. T.
. p. 162-163.
.
.):
J
.,
•
4 .
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finite consciousness creates its imiiiediate objects, but that
these are conditioned also ( and this constitutes the know-
ledge relation) by the reality v/hich depends upon the
k activity of the supreme consciousness. In trying to charge
the new idealism with the fallacies of the old, and also to
prove it contradictory to the old, Perry shifts his inter-
pretation of the relation and significanc^f the two points
of view.
The same answer may be given to the fallacies
which Perry discovers v/hen he distinguishes more clearly
between finite consciousness and the universal conscious-
ness, and considers the latter a generalization from the
former.^ Thus, idealism equivocates : it makes use of
ambiguities in such terms as ‘'experience" which Joachim,
for example, uses tc Obscure - the distinction between things
and contents of consciousness , But if experience be regarded
as private and dependent on consciousness
,
certainly the
experience of the supreme mind may be distinguished from
mine, though idealists of absolutistic interests obscure the
distinction. With the charge that nescience (in the rejec-
tion of the thing-in-itself ) becomes a test of truth, v/e
have already concerned ourselves, in our discussion of the
ego-centric predicament, whose significance for idealism vie
sought to subordinate to the ultimate intuition that we do
I)
know independent reality. Finally, as idealism becomes
more speculative, its dogmati sm increases. But to this
^ Ap. to Phil ,, 558- 55 9': P. P. T,
, p, 155,
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our reply must be a tu guogue, and an insistencejthat the dog-
matic assertion of a fact determines neither its truth nor
its falsit3^; the advance of valid reasons, or logical
relations to accepted facts is necessary to validate them.
2 • Self-consciousness as . . o:,nthe tic Unit3^ . The
second argument advanced by objective idealism is recog-
nized by both Moore anc. Perry, and represents again, the
special case of the great iicgical issue between idealism and
realism.
"The nev; idealism does urge at least one new
argument - the argument from the ’s^mthetic’ fxmcticn
of consciousness. It is contended that consciousness
affords the onl3^ genuine unit3', and that since the
wcrld requires unit3^ it must derive it from conscicusness'l^
Or, it is the argument that since the worl derust be one (the
speculative dogma) and that relations are internal in some
sense, but that since the only case of internality of re-
lations immediately knov/n is the unifying activity of
consciousness; hence the world must be of the nature of
consciousness. Involving, as it does, the special case
of the problem of internal relations, this argument and its
refutation deserve special attention, although Perr3^’s own
discussion is brief and simple, and Moore adds nothing to
his rejection of the general principle of internality,
"The only possible justification for this train of
reasoning is the supposition that terms must somehow
penetrate their relations and relations their terms, so
that some peculiar agency is required to prevent their
either fusing or falling apart. This is the so-called'
•internal theory’ of relations, which is not onl3^ contrar3^
to the usage of science and common sense, but incapable
of being expressly formulated . "2
o P* 156.
p. 157 .
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With the general principle of internal relations we have
already concerned ourselves sufficiently to see the motives
which lead to it - not merely the monistic interest or the
speculative dogma, but the contingent and coherent nature
of experience ( which almost led Moore to become an internal
relation! st), and the dynamic and causal account of the world.
We have already seen that these considerations do not jus-
tify holding the principle in the extreme form stated by
Perry, but that it is itself an abstraction, since reality
is not exhausted by logic, Moore recognizing its validity
for the axiological interpretation of exterieiiae, and modify-
ing it when he returns to a substantialistic analysis of
reality.^ Y/ith these limitations in- mind, we may see the
weaknesses in the only objections which Perry makes to the
theory.
a* It is contrary to common sense and science.- The
first objection might be disputed is irrelevant since
Perry himself does not regard common sense as ultimate.
Science on the other hand abstracts from reality, and the
field of its inquiry does not extend to t!ie nat'-'^re and sig-
nificance of logic. Moreover, one of the motives behind the
principle is idealism’s desire to do justice to the world
view which science suggests, of a reality that is orderly
I and causally or dynamically interdependent.
b. That the theory is incapable of being expressly
formulated, as Perry illustrates by reference to Bradley,
1 See chapter VI
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follows from its abstract and relative nature. The theory
differs in meaning according to the categorial analysis
which is regarded as ultimate. But Bradley’s difficulty
is one that arises out of his own system, precisely out of
that aspect of it v/hich renders his idealism questionable
and meaningless - his rejection of delf as metaphysical
principle. ¥e are interested, at this point, in just that
interpretation of ’’internal relations” which Bradley,
follovdng Hume, cannot recognize. That relations are inter-
nal to consciousness in the sense that consciousness supplies
the necessary unit3^ in diversity in the world is certainly
Experienced, if not ’’expressly formulated,” Our conscious-
ness, it is true, recognizes unities not of its own making,
that is, it recognizes the categories as independent of it,
but that the supreme consciousness represents the internality
of all relations in reality, though not in the immediate
objects of our experiences, which are conditioned by him
but not internal to him, is an obvious solution of the
problem of individuality with which the realists, as we shall
see, have so much trouble. In the abstract relational
analysis of nature, then, there are cases of external rela-
tions; Moore is correct in holding that not all relations
are internal. We supplement and correct his position, hov/-
ever, by the empirical solution of the problem of individual-
ity - relations are internal to consciousness, whether causal,
attributive, or logical. The reasons for so re^rding them
are twofold: (a) by analogy to our self-experience as unity
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in multiplicity, and (b) b^^ a study of the logical structure
of experience and the sense in which judgments, in spite of
Moore, are both analytic and synthetic,
1^ But the issue involved in the argument under con-
sideration concerns the empirical evidence for such an in-
«
I
terpretation of consciousness'. Perry insists that there
is none, while Moore is not certain.
"For some inscrutable reason," says Perry, "Messrs.
Green and McTaggart find the intellectual operation of
relating, or the consciousness of many in one, more in-
telligible than bare relation itself. I can explain
their procedure only by attributing it to a willingness,
exhibited by modern thinkers in general, and by idealists
in particular, to abandon analysis and rigor of thought
when consciousness is in question. If there be any vir-
tue in consciousness to relieve the difficulty of *unity
in plurality* it is a miraculous virtue; whose secret,
if it has been discovered, has certainly never been suc-
cessfully communicated,"!
In other words, the emphasis on consciousness as the unify-
ing element in the world rests upon the fallacies of pseudo-
simplicity and of formalism. There is involved in Perry*
s
insistence that consciousness bg analyzed a peculiar contra-
diction when one relates it to his general position that
consciousness cannot be experienced at all, since he agrees
with Hume who, on looking within for a power to do, found
"sensations of bodily tensions, feelings of expectancy, etc.,
2but no *pov/er*." Against the charge of formalism the only
answer is an appeal to experience, added to the consideration
that the denial of the
position leads to ultimate positivism or skepticism. It is
a recurrence of the old division between Descartes and Hume,
1 T. . p. 157-158.
^ $ P* 100
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But the experienced fact of self-consciousness as unity,
though it may not, because of its nature, survive analysis,
remains never- the-less, and becomes an unsolved problem
for those, who like Hume and Mill, seek to reduce mind to
its objects*^
Moore first becomes aware of the significance of
the idealist's use of consciousness in his criticism of
McTaggart, though his earlier papers were somewhat sym-
pathetic with the idealistic conception. In the paper on
"Identity” he criticizes Leibniz for cofusing numerical and
conceptual identity and thus making possible the theory of
organic v/holes. But he is still sympathetic with Hegel
who ^ ''when he tells us that in asserting the law of identity
we also assert its opposite, only means 'that we must assert
something else of Mind as well as the fact that it is Mind;
not that we may assert it is not Mind. "2 Moore merely
denies that mind is the only thing which thus supplies
unity, but that "substance" in general has that property,
by definition. But idealism is wrong in its doctrine of
"concrete or self-differentiating universal", in confusing
conceptual with ontological identity.
"They then hark back and begin to invest the
group with the properties which belong to a real
universal; as that, without their relation to the
universal, the particulars would not be v/hat they are,
that the group, as a whole, possesses all th; attributes
that its particulars have singly, that they, conversely,
possess all its attributes - are microcosms to its
macrocosm. "3
^ See Brightman, E. S., Introduction to Philosophy,
p. 180-181.
2 Proc. Arist. Soc.
, 1 (1901), p. 118.
^ P- 126.
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So Hegel’s ”Liain service to philosophy has consisted in giving
a name to and erecting into a principle a type of fallacy.”
"The principle of organic unities, like that of
combined synthesis and analysis, is mainly used to de-
I fend the practice of holding both of two contradictory
propositions wherever this may seem convenient
.
But it is the study of McTaggart's wcrk^ that gives
Moore the occasion to pay his respects to the concept of mind
as unitas multiplex or, as he interprets it, "a whole
which is in and for each of its parts." His criticism
consists in showing (i) that McTaggart’s interpretation
of my knowledge of my friend as "my friend without and
within my mind" is the microcosm - macrocosm fallacy, imbuing
the part with the properties of the whole, and (ii) that
McTaggart commits the Berkeleian fallacy of argument from
the ego-centric predicament.
Moore's criticism is not convincing, for it lacks
the empirical emphasis which is necessary in the discussion
of this problem, and is restricted by the peculiarities
of McTaggart's view of consciousness, which depends on an
inner causal sequence as well as on outer cogitingency for
its principle of unity. McTaggart's view is not empirical
enough to serve as a basis for refuting all idealistic theo-
ries of consciousness. Hor, if the synthetic unity of con-
sciousness be based on a theory of epistemological dualism,
need it involve the viev/ that parts have properties of wholes
and are completely contingent upon a single whole. What is
^' Phil. St
., p. 16.
Proc. Arist. Soc ., 2 (1902), p. 177-214.
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needed is a redefinition of knov»rledge that will not make
it equivalent, as the realists hold, to direct apprehension
plus a undefined amount of interpretation, hut to the re-
lation of correspondence between mental objects, to the ex-
tent in which experience, to use Ward’s concept, has
become differentiated and rational, with independent reality.
It is to be noted also that in his interpretation of
value or intrinsic goodness, Moore recognizes that organic
wholes are present, not in the sense that parts lose their
identity, but in the sense that the relationship between
parts constitutes nev/ properties not implicit in the parts
as such,^ In the realm of value, then, Moore’s relational
and analytic viewpoint needs supplementing, though he
stops short of metaphysical conclusions. If he were to ad-
mit that value is necessarily a function of consciousness
(as Perry makes it a psychological function), and that
value has metaphysical significance, Moore’s value experience
v/ould lead him to objective idealism. And sometimes he is
2
close to making the first admission. In his value theory,
therefore, Moore approaches the idealistic position repre-
sented in this paper, while, restricting mataphysics to the
sphere of "supersensible reality"^ he claims that it has no
significance for value theory.
The objective idealism resting on Kant, therefore,
commits the same fallacies, according tc both Perry and Moore,
o frinc, Sth .. p. 189-191; Ethics . p. 246 et al,
^J^iuc. Eth. .pJ.S8, 224.
2 Ibid
. ,p . 112.
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which are implied in the spiritualism of Berkeley.
a. In rejecting the thing-in-itself it commits the
fallacy of arguing from the ego-centric predicament, with
all the attendant fallacies, and reasserts the cardinal
principle in a new fcrm which at the same time involves,
strangely, the subjectivism of the old, and contradicts it,
h. In adding the Kantian argument from the principle
of synthetic unity as a function of consciousness, it rests
on the speculative dogma and commits the further fallacies
of formalism, dogmatism, and equivocation, resting satisfied
with contradiction,
3', The Various Schools of Fost-Kantian Idealism,
Perry finds four general types of metajliysics arising from
this ohjectivistic interpretation of Kant; again Moore *s
exclusively logical and critical interest precludes his
relating his criticism to definite historical positions.
These are the critical idealists (logicism and moralism),
intellectualism (Hegelian idealism), voluntarism (Pichte),
and neo-romanticism (Schopenhauer, Ewald, Dilthey, Eucken,
etc.)* All are guilty of the fundamental Kantian error of
formalism, hut it appears in different places in their thought.
We therefore turn to a brief examination of their fallacies,
befcre turning to the broad distinction, possible in all of
the last three, between monism and pluralism,
a. Critical idealism
, both of the logical and valuaticn-
al schools, adds nothing to Kant’s argument except that, in
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so far as it rejects the thing-in-itself and uses the
transcendental ego only as a logical principle, it becomes
positivistic. Against it Ferry has two criticisms.
i. There is a basic contradiction between the two
schools, in as much as the Freiburg school regards logic
itself as a science of value, and tnith as an ideal, while
the l£arburg school regards value as in the end a form of
intellectual synthesis,^
This conflict is real and needs to be recognized*
It is the line between all intellectualistic and voluntaris-
tic schools, as Ferry points out* But it is a conflict
which can be synthesized by placing the emphasis neither upon
logic or value, but upon the function which includes both*
The Jlarburg school is less inclined to do this than the
Freiburg school, since self-consciousness is for it a doubt-
ful principle.^ Ferry, in his psychological studies, shows
us one, not completely satisfactory, way of synthesizing
them. Both are forms of interest, or the expression of
desire, but interest is defined as biological function*
Another form of synthesis would agree with Ferry in making
both truth and value, or intellect and v/ill, inseparable
aspects of the same function, but interpret that function as
conscious* This is the perscnalistic, and it may be added,
the Kantian synthesis* The liarburg and Heidelberg schools
emphasize two abstracted aspects of the same concrete exper-
ience; on this Ferry and personalism agree^* They disagree
^ P» T* ,p. 146*
2 See Ferry’s discussion of Hatorp’s account of
ccnscioushess; Ibid *
, p. 279.
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in interpreting the experience, the one purely formally, as
biological "behavior, the other concretely, in terms cf
conscious interest*
ii. Perry* s second criticism, particularly of the
Marburg school, we have already noted,^ In so far as they
merely assert "the absolute priority of logic with no more
regard for mind than for matter, they are in essential
accord v/ith the rationalistic aspect of nev/ realism. But
they go further and "regard logic as the science of thought
and knowledge." This emphasis, Perry suggests, is empty
and meaningless for their system, a mere reassertion of
the Kantian principle of the creative activity of mind,
which serves no purpose. This criticism we have already
answered earlier in the present chapter.
b. Intellectualistic idealism is a more metaphy-
sical interpretation of Kant, holding that being is depen-
dent upon "a process of thought governed by logical motives."
Moore’s bitter logical criticism of Hegel has been noted.
Perry largely limits himself to a discussion of its con-
sequences - determinism and, as its formalism becomes more
apparent, naturalism. This formalism and meaningless is
its outstanding characteristic.
Empirical science refuted him, and refused to compl^^ vath
his rationalistic scheme, so that it has now sacrificed all
J Above, p,Z51'15^i
In his early thought Perry even confuses such
logical objectivists as E. Husserl with the Marburg school;
"Hegel's account of the process of mind
>
soon shown to be inadequate
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of itg categories save one, "unity”, "coherence", or "an
ordei'of relations"'. But these consequences we shall note
in the following section; they seem to arise from absolutism
rather than from idealism.
But it may be pointed out that Perry, from his
first discussion of Y/ard in 1904 to his systematic work of
1917, has failed to see the empirical element in He^ l*s
thought and in that of his followers. This is not surprising
in view of the common interpretation of Hegel from 1860 to
1900, reflected in James’s estimate of him. His critics
find in Hegel only the systematizer, the formalist whose
scientific absurdities have been arranged so convincingly
in the second volume of Riehl’s Per pliilosophische Kriti-
zismus
.
They neglect the Hegel whose wealth of empirical
observations stil3/amazes those who really read him, who
sought the best scientific conclusions of his time, through
Schelling and other sources. Hegel’s system, if it is to
be understood at all, must be understood as an argument
that the concrete facts of experience are capable of reason-
able interpretation. With certain exceptions, particularly
in his philosophy of nature, it is empirical. Hegel did,
it is true, assume that his philosophy culminated the search
for spiritual penetration; that v/as the expression of his
consciousness of intellectual integrity. But he also conclu-
ded his most comprehensive work by admitting the primacy of
,'
’.t i
l; ...
I*
•nri'"
l. .»
>i • i V ’ 'J L . i t
I ( > i '.J
J. 4 * •• .
, .
J-* v;:j- iuo ot'
.j r ' o i ^ .i.
;
.>v ’-.'•.ui.- i.
^ . K j Oi'. •. ^rr* , p•* » 1. « ^ ^ J
O J • “ . J L i..w’ X •4 . » J
I • .
,• ;*' 5
j(i
;
'1 '-.1
'i ;i j n'D *
. j
,
t:..-: Xsl-
^
.'1C', :!;
i!
•.' J. i •. •: . 7:: ;;.. r*.-.
,
>
••
•»
—
.. .L^- ,7
Or.
'
.
,‘ 7 ' ;,Jr
l
'
j. 1 1-j 7 'u' 0 j -
fio 0 . 7^
J. - J
t
V.) •il ' 7 .!
0 ^ A'
'OJ
tj •••’XOifv -
; .'.V
vriaonol i.
>
, i :y^ ^ I . ^ i i
,
.
.
/{r 7 7 ri.; inrCt' 0... :r^' ,
^
: .J
.
'* J- ^ - ^ onaq X.: -- 7 :.-.
:•
.
,.; 0 . .' 1 rO 7 ;-.,.
'
‘XiC’Y.' -/ u:;.'vi. noo .!•; . 1 ,. d.ti'I
'.
“ 0
* .1
^ I
'
I •
'
I
. J
"i'4 -
278
life and empirical research, in his much quoted description
of the flight of Minerva’s owl. It is the interpreters of
Hegel, not he himself, who lost sight of positive content
in their exclusi^ve interest in system. His faith that
reason is a criterion of reality was one which he sometimes
carried to absurdities, and tried to force within too narrow
logical limits, but in the degree in which it is empirically
founded, may become a philosophical principle.
But it is exactly that aspect of Hegel which Perry
cannot accept. In the Approach to Philosophy he finds
absolute idealism* s ’pristine inspiration in its solution
' of the relation between the absolute and the empirical."
As such its difficulty is that "rational necessities and
empirical facts are out of jointy" and its task becomes
(i) either to overlook the empirical, or (ii) or to amend
the perfect to admit the imperfect Thus absolute idealism
must either revise its logic to conform with existence and no
longer regard it as normative, or it must deny or explain
away the empirical facts which contradict its logic.
Perry’s criticism here has the authority of history
behind it, and seems to refute intellectual idealism, which
has always stumbled/Dn the problems of error, evil, and in-
• determinism. He points out that those absolutistic systems
which surrender the principle of consciousness, and empha-
size merely the objective logical structure of the universe
without forcing it into the limits of a particular formula
^ Ap« to Phil
., p, 351-354.
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merely admit the formalism of their positioni. These de-
capitated idealisms we have already discussed,^ The
purely intellectualistic interpretation of thq^niversal con-
sciousness is as inadequate as is the panlogism of the real-
ists, Perfect rationality may or may not he the form of
the universe, hut it does not exhaust its content,
c. The voluntaristic interpretation , according to
Perry, arises from the ethical rather than the intellectual-
istic interest and the relation hetv/een the two is that of
unstable equilibrium, as we have already seen in discussing
Kant’s doctrine of freedom,
•’Intellect, so the voluntarist asserts, is only
a special activity of consciousness," Its "general or
fundamental activity - - - is not intellectual hut moral,
But this general type of solution, which we have already
suggested as ultimate, is subject to the criticism to whic h
both Perry and Hoorehad earlier subjected Kant, (i) Freedom
as creative activity, activism, creationism, "are not ultimate,"
They can be analyzed, as Bergson admits, and attempts to use
such categories as metaphysical ultimates are examples of
"the error which I have called the error of pseudo-simplicity,"
Activity "is not shown to be simple, in the sense of having
been tested and found unanalyzable. It is not an ultimate
term. As a matter of fact activity has proved definable,
both psychologically and physically
. For Moore, on
the other hand, will is reducible to cognition, asjwe have
already seen,
^ See Perry’s discussion of Creighton and Sorley;
P. C. I,
, p. 242-243.
? P» P» T. . p. 261,
P- 262-263.
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This ohjection needs no further examination. It
presupposes the realist’s faith in analysis and his in-
sistence that consciousness is reducible to objects, not
primary to them. It confronts us v/ith the old dilemma.
The idealist and the pragmatic voluntarist agree that
volitional activity, though gubject to analysis and reducible
to abstracted elements, is concretely given in experience,
since it is identical with experience.
(ii) Perry’s second criticism of the voluntarists
is their failure to account for nature on a voluntaristic
basis'. Voluntarism '* cannot succeed in moralizing nature
any more than Hegel succeeded in rationalizing it.”^ This
is Perry’s only recognition of an argument for idealism other
than those based on the cardinal principle and the principle
of internal relations. But he cannot regard highly the
effort of idealism to reduce the energistic and dynamic
aspects of nature to will; the contingency of nature sug-
gests rather its intellectual than its voluntaristic stinic-
2
ture> Moreover, activity and energy themselves are re-
ducible by analysis to static c-ncepts, as we have already
seeri. Beyond these considerations, the voluntaristic inter-
pretation of nature fails where Kant’s doctilne failed -
science and moral purpose, mechanism and freedom, cannot be
reconciled so easily. In so far as voluntarism fails to
accomplish this reconciliation, it is forced to become either
formalistic (“divest its categories of their narrower and
o ^ » T. . p. 151,
C, I
., p. 209.
mm
I
•r • J*' j.; jof: a .>.': jo :, t-O i.*: iT
4>Ji- j. ^ : i;.C rui.: ;
j 0 X
, f % 0 ^ ..a^r;. •r. „J: a?.: .'1
a.’ i I'JX ^ J , .',,, nil . £•' .a.'no.r’rj
riL*- J '..1 .L**£! *> J i J*
J. ^Zi’jb'?'j. . 1 : 7 : :i'; . tnnjv ox j J ' Kt •' '•<} ‘•wi'
^
. ,ii n aTl:; xoiioa 0 1
• : >rf ;' x'C-’ :'x-a > > ‘
'lo i'oi': L> i i" I. .'.0 . . '
no ritot.f.H -Z'j\ ina
0 xai •; >- .. ^ 1 . ..1 ot; > .;o;;a ..
;Xri.. . X
.
j.i X 1 '....n; '. i • :: l: i '' jb.- »
X":'- 0 xiai L' X ax • . . • ‘v ii.‘j 'I'j 7. ox
oi.' .'. a;- X - oiij ,^.‘..7 , lx :ox 2 ; '-X'r^O
.v».l .,;.L'l. . £-[ x : a »u i'Uu
J’ L-n;- J Di i: 6>..r
ov
^ ^ ai« ^ ^ . •
*.
I.
-
.
.: . ./ O"! o/v ;^njz
'•^:£.,>i 3 -.. - '.v.>
.
f^.V
4 . >J
oj:^''>rr';i-'. bnje 't IJ ' ''*') Oo" i\=^ 1
• rn .( ;j'£0 ‘ rvi:rrfOD 3a- ; oJ* .la :.Jv; ;.;
-a'r-.^ci o J K:/ia
V
al.?; ir'-i " J! • . . ^ C r.Ji
- »‘£ j'i,: ;’. j/C)i -j/L
^
/.':
.
• ; i/v: J'O jj (X-.7j.)*air " * 'I
’
' ;
'' jTi'.ri . '. i. ^atr)>x o oj.i' -J :: j.i ai'.: cf ‘'.j'tju;-
y
“7 j::J: •> j;j :. t'i. J '.iUXa / •/;• j:- . > ’".i .-.'1;) yi. :i”ao ^.joxiu vho ;?v. , f
- naX;. • 1 lij- n- . r '• I. '• LXijsl atuJ t.'it 'id .roJiJ---
j-j tjaar-.j
,
.
. *7 l ’:a >*’ > ji •
^
.^iwi vo.i
ol a i I -.3 a .-. oa r . * a;: L--.‘:.:V; 7
: *. X ; I .' ')iv£ j j -I : oJ b '. izat rrx :i J; < • :J‘ ili anca ''X .l.tJ /. a
M ID . .ti: xat) /*;'• ) oitiiixSiiEol
- p r
*
^ * .. _i^ I •
« •
281
stricter meaning in order to maintain their limitless scope")
or positivistic ("limit the scope of its categories to the
field of moral science proper,")^
In so far as Perry’s criticism here is aimed at the
epistemological monism of Fichte, and his identification of
the finite ego with the World Will, his criticism is justi-
fied; there is a conflict hetvfeen moral autonomj^ and the
moral law. It is onl^ When the problem is interpreted dual-
istically that this conflict is resolved'. Then the question
remains whether the mechanism of the natural order can he
resolved in a teleological interprets ticn. If so, the reduc-
tion of nature to will is not formalism, even if the supreme
v/ill he freed from certain limitations to which our y/ills
must conform, for there will he a Yexy positive meaning in
it'. The efforts at a teleological interpretation of the
world on an empirical basis, going out from the facts and
lacunae of science and the nature of scientific knowledge,
seme of them arising within neo-realism itself. Perry fails
2
to acknowledge. His discussion of the voluntaristic re-
duction of nature is entirely too a nriori . He is able to
accuse it of formalism because he neglects the empirical
arguments in its favor',
d. In so far as both voluntaristic and intellectual-
istic interpretations of objective idealism end in an un-
resolved dilemma - formalism or dualism - only the roman-
tic way of mystic intuition remains. Here, however. Perry
^ T ,. p, 151.
2 The admission of so positivistic and naturalistic
a thinker as John Dewey thst nature is purposive is aninstance; The Q.uest
. fn-r rertainty
^ p. 246-247.
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becomes obscure, and fails to differentiate this group
sufficiently from the last,^ including in it not only those
thinkers who teach an intuitive penetration into the ulti-
mate being, but those who lack a critical foundation to their
systems, Agnostic rome.nticism is typified in Schopenhauer,
von Hartmann, and ITietzsche, who were essentially voluntar-
ists, while the "syncreti Stic and developmental romanticism,"
resting on the conception of ’'universal spiritual life", in-
cludes such thinkers as Ewald, Dilthey (in positivistic
form ) and Eucken,
Against this type, so carelessly delineated, Perrj^
advances no new arguments. It "does not lend itself to
vigorous criticism: it is not so much a philosophy as a
faith." Its outstanding characteristics are "indeterminate-
ness and promiscuity,"^ and usually an uncritical, unanalytic,
dogmatic assertion of the significance of it s motive, "to
raise the whole of human life to a higher level," There
is nothing new in this criticism, which is valid in so far
as the romanticists are romanticists and fail to give
reasons for the faith which is in them. That Eucken*s
thought, and that of others, fails here is obvious; Scho-
penhauer’s immediatism, on the other hand, rests upon his
analysis of the "Fourfold Root of Causality", though it may
be made to rest, as Bergson’s system shows, upon more empiri-
cal considerations. Perry’s criticism of romanticism will be
met again in his discussion of personal idealism, which some
^ Ap, to Phil ..p.285-287: P. P. T, .y.152-155: in P, C .
p. 237-240 it has merged completely with personal ideal-
ism on the one hand and with absolutism on the other,
^ T
., p, 154.
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of its forms approximate* It reflects his distaste for
mysticism and his tendency to identify it with empty dog-
matism, and amounts to saying that romanticism is not
philosophy hut religious faith.
The general charge of Perry against all forms of
objective idealism is, as v/ill he apparent from the above
n© s s
discussion, their formalism and meaningless. In addition
some forms are involved in a dualism of intellect and will,
freedom and purpose. Our reply to the charge of formalism
consists in admitting that it is true of all systems v/hich
reduce reality to logic, hut that Perry defends his critic-
ism only by neglecting, as in the case of Berkeley, the
positive empirical elements in idealism's arguments and
reconstructs them aprioristically to suit his thesis.
The dualism between naturalism and idealism exists for those
systems which single out one aspect of consciousness at the
expense of the whole, and fail to take seriously the experienced
unity of consciousness. We turn now to the consideration
of the analysis of systems of objective idealism, not
according to the function of consciousness which is stressed,
but according to their solution of the problem of the one
and the many. The criticism of the arguments for absolute
idealism and personal idealism have all been discussed, and
need only summary restatement in their bearing upon this
problem.
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D . ABSOLUTE IDEALISM
Perry admits in 1917 what he categorically denies in
1912, that absolute idealism is “the only good idealism
in the sense of logical thoroughness,”^ while personal
idealism, though its ethical consequences • are more desirable
than those of other idealistic forms, is logically in
unstable equilibrium. In the earlier work he succeeds
in discovering three distinct and damning fallacies in the
marriage which idealists perform, when they are most con-
sequent, between objective idealism and the older absolutism
of Plato and Spinoza. That incompatible union v/e nov/ pro-
ceed to examine through Perry’s eyes, Moore again offering
little help since, when he has refuted the doctrine of in-
ternal relations, he has no more to say on the detailed ar-
guments and position of absolute idealism.
Objective idealism, we have seen, reduces the world
“not to the human mind of psychology, but to a universal
mind” variously interpreted as will or intellect or reason
2
or experience. Absolutism, older than idealism in the mo-
dern sense, and originally independent of it, “means the
assertion of a maximum or superlative ideal having meta-
3
physical validity,” and hence has two fundamental motives;
it is monistic (arising from the speculative dogma) and it
is normative “in that its cosmic unity is the limit or
standard of the activity of thought.” Absolute idealism,
1 P. C. I ..P.202; cf. P. P. T.
.
p. 164-192.
^ P« 135.
3 Ibid,
.
p. 165.
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then, comhines the two interests - the cardinal principle
of idealism ( in its second, universal form, of course)
and the monistic and normative interest of absolutism, defi-
ning reality *'in terms of an absolute cognitive conscious-
ness that is both prior to things known, in the idealistic
sense, and also a maximum or ideal, in the absolute sense,
As idealism we have already sufficiently considered
Perry’s refutation of this form. As monism Perry’s, but
preeminently Moore’s criticism of internal relations
sufficiently treats it. Its consequences are to be dis-
cussed in the next chapter. But with its norma.tive inter-
pretation of reality, normative for the knowledge of it.
Perry has an added quarrel as to method. He finds in it
three fallacies, all of which we have already found illus-
trated in objective idealism in general,
1, Formalism, Absolutism attains unity only through
the "power of words,” Contemporary interpretations of Fichte
and Hegel culminate in an absolute that is meaningless and as
a consequence "bankrupts the universe by holding it respon-
sible for what it can never repay, "2
"The absolute consciousness must contribute to
all things, by the thinking or willing of them, those
determinate interrelationships by virtue of which they
form a consistent and orderly universe. ”3
Difference, identity, all qualities and all categories of
reality must proceed from the ultimate unity. As a consequence
absolutism is meaningless. "It explains so little that a
p T, . p. 175,
3
Ap, to Phil .
.
p. 419.
P . P
.
T
.
, p. 176. Moore’s criticism of McTaggart con-
tains a brief attack of the formalism of idealism: Proc.
Arist, Soc ,. 2 (1902), p. 195,
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scientist, moralist
,
or religious believer v^ould be
Justified in conceding it without hesitation.”^
We have already met this criticism in two points -
the rejection of Kant’s principle of the creative activity
of consciousness and the formalism of Hegel’s intellectual-
ism. The personal idealist, like the pragmatist, would
it
agree heartily vdth Perry for stressing, so far as Hegel
is concerned. It is the “fallacy of the universal" which
the young Bowne flung so eagerly at the Hegelians of his
day, though, as we have pointed out, it does not do justice
to the empirical element in Hegel. Hegel did not err,
according to Perry, until he tried/to force his formal
principle upon empirical facts; ^ we should say that he erred
rather in trying to interpret the order of exi)erience v/ith
which he began into a too narrow logical order rather than
as conscious function. So the "over-individual will” of
Fichte as interpreted by the neo-Pichteans becomes formal
and empty as it ceases to be individual and conceived as
self-e::q)erience. The only solution is to stress the pri-
macy of personality in all its richness, as Perry stresses,
but v/ith better empirical evidence than his, the priority
of organic interest.
2. Equivocation. Idealism conceals its formalism,
or renders it plausible, by equivocation. To universalize
a psychological concept is certainly to change its meaning.
Q IMAi* P* 1'^^; cf. P, C. I. , p, 243.
^ Ibid
. ,
p . 177.
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Human thought presupposes the environment from which it
differentiates itself, hut universal thought is inclusive
of the mechanisms of nature as well as the purposes of man.
Thus consciousness, thought, will, personality, spirit, and
experience change their meaning when applied to the abso-
lute, But the outstanding equivocation is the use of good
and evil in idealism in such a sense that evil is no longer
opposed to good but partial good. The formalism of ideal-
ism is thus concealed by its use of terms in Pickwickian
senses or ambiguously. This was the essence of Moore's
criticism of Hegel; he developed a logic by which a thing
could both be and not be the same tiling,^ The mysticism
of absolute idealism is but a phase of its equivocation,
since "mysticism is the express admission that the first
2principle cannot properly be characterized at all."
Perry's argument here is valid only if the
idealist's concept of the absolute is as empty as he inter-
prets it as being, and as it is in the case of Plotinus,
Spinoza, and Bradley, Equivocation is not "the result of
an effort to escape formalism", as Perry holds; it is a
consequence of formalism plus the ambiguity of words.
Otherwise it is merely a restatement of the fact that the
idealist argues by analogy from finite consciousness to
absolute. This analogy Perry cannot refute by calling it
an equivocation; an analogy, never a conclusive mode of
reasoning, of course, is sufficiently justified by a few
^ ^hil, St, , p, 16,
~ T ..P, 183.
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essential similarities and the absence of essential
differences rather than by either an exhaustive enumeration
of similarities (in which case no analogical argument would
be necessary) or by the enumeration of superficial similar-
ities, For the realist the distinction between finite and
infinite is as broad as that between truth and falsehood;
for the idealist the limitation of finite consciousness is
secondary while the similarity - consciousness as integrating,
relational activity - is fundamental. In either case however.
Perry’s criticism again is exclusively rationalistic, and
overlooks the pcs itive reasoning involved in idealism,
3, Dogmatism, The dogmatism of absolute idealism
rests in its assertion that the ideal of perfect knowledge
exists. Coherence as a practical ideal is a plausible and
workable concept, "but between this and the supposition of
an absolutely coherent unity, there is an immeasurable
gulf,”^ To assert it, or the unity of the world, or the
reality of value, is a bit of dogmatism that is of no value
and is unverifiable in every way,
"That terms cannot be wholly defined by their
relations is obvious; nor is there any definite degree
of significance that must be attached to them in order
to satisfy the demands of bare relational unity. "2
This objection we have treated sufficiently. It is
the insistence that the speculative dogma a dogma
,
which
we admit; it is one of the common sense intuitions of ideal-
ist and realist alike. It is the further insistence that the
o T .. p. 186.
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speculative dogma must express itself in the doctrine of
internal relations, which we reject* The charge of dogma-
tism arises, as does that of formalism and equivocation
,
from the refusal of Perry and Moore, noted in chapter IV,
to recognize the rights of a speculative philosophy heyond
the methods and limits of a purely critical, analytic meta-
physics* They criticize absolutism against the back-
ground of a ideal of certainty which no speculative system
can attain, and as a consequence refuse to recognize the
cumulative effect of arguments, empirical considerations
advajiced by idealism, and the argument from analogy. The
only answer possible will be given in chapter X; it v/ill
consist in pointing out that the realists are guilty of the
same fallacies, particularl3^ of equivocation and dogmatism*
Speculative thought cannot limit itself to relational
anal3'-sis any more than it can limit itself to syllogistic
reason* That the ideal of a coherent whole logically
implies the "confusion and error" of making knov/ledge
negative and introducing "unrelatedness, incoherence, or
meaninglessness" may well be doubted* Perry sa^^s "it might
readily be proved" but does not do so* On the basis of
the epistemological dualism advocated in this paper, the
relativity of actual knowledge can be harmonized with the
ideal of absolute coherence, whether or npt that ideal be
perfect reality* Coherence must, like value, be referred
ultimately to consciousness* The formalism and equivoca-
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tion of which ahsolutism is in danger can he avoided, and
the contradiction in its ahsolutistic ideals transcended
hy making reality more than logic, and hy surrendering the
ahsolutism of its supreme mind for an indeterrainate and
dynamic interrelationship between a plurality of minds.
We may point out, in closing. Perry’s eagerness
to shoYr that, once the forma^lism involved in the logical
absolute is recognized and disowned, absolute idealism
becomes indistinguishable from realism,^
”As I see it the evolution of idealism con-
sists in reshaping ideals to fit the Procrustean bed of
facts, - - - He (the idealist) doesh’t knov/ v^hat to will
until he knows v/hat the world is going to do to him;
and then he wills that. In name the world then executes
his will, or at any rate has ceased to assert it ,*'2
His reduction is valid for those contemporary forms of
absolutism which, like Bosanquet’s, Bradley’s (if his
Experience be interpreted objectivistically rather than *
subjectivistically), and Creighton’s, lose sight of the
central significance of consciousness for idealism, and
reduce the world to a logical or valuational structure.
The desire for a”meeting of extremes" has largely come
from this group. But they, like the realists, reduce the
dynamic aspects of the world to a static one, and so fail
to do justice to reality as experienced. Any view of exper-
ience which subordinates logic to reality will oppose in-
tellectualism of both types,
^ Ap, to Phil ,, p, 385; P« P > T
.
, p. 186;
P, C, I ,, p, 242-244,
^ C . I,, p. 244.
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E. PLURALETIC IDEALISM
The present study has regarded as normative a type
of pluralistic idealism referring the uniformity and mean-
ing of reality to a supreme consciousness, and distinguish-
ing clearly finite conscious activity and the private ex-
perience v/hich it creates hut which is contingent upon the
objective order. Of Kant it retains his principle of
the creative activity of the mind, the nature of the
supreme consciousness being inferred only by analogy from
finite conscious activity, with added considerations arising
from the dynamic interpretation of nature'. The pluralism
which^ases itself on Kant may also be attained, more real-
istically through Leibniz, whom Perr3^ interprets as a realist,
but whose logic Moore criticizes, and more empirically through
Berkeley. All of its arguments have already been criticized
by Perry in his discussion of Berkeley*s spiritualism and
Kant’s apriorism. It remains to note his general estimate
of the logical validity of the arguments for the two types
of pluralistic spiritualism that have arisen in the history -
panpjsychism and personal idealism. Perry discusses both,
though not as to method of reasoning and fallacies, in The
Approach tc Philosophy and The Present Conflict of Ideals
.
In general, the first is too venturesome, the second is in
unstable equilibrium between subjectivism and absolutism,
and the general movement of idealism on a Kantian basis is
toward absolutism, whose fallacies we have already noted.
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and whose practical consequences are highly undesirable*
1, Panpsychi sm . We have already noted the strange
subjectivistic way in which Perry defines panpsychism in
The Approach to Philosophy, ^ In other passages he places
it on the same level, so far as arguments and significance
of its consequences are concerned, with hylozoism and atom-
ism*
“According to panpsychism, physical nature is
the manifestation of an appetancy or bare consciousness
generalized from the thinker’s awareness of his most
immediate self*"^ “It is a sort of mental atomism,
mental contents being conceived to have a substantial
existence by themselves, instead of requiring some
support from beyond,”3
It is not essentially Kantian* Panpsychism’s arguments are
correctly atated by Perry, though his accounts are primarily
descriptive only* The account of nature given by panpsy-
chism is to be distinguished sharply from all phenomenalis-
tic accounts* But its argument is merely a venturesome
speculation; its empirical basis being certain facts in the
atomic and energistic account of nature, some biological
considerations, and the psychology of the sub-conscious*
Its use of ajialogy in penetrating into the realm of the
unknown is warranted only as added empirical facts continue
to justify it* An underlying fallacy is that of verbal
4
suggestion* There is no ansv/er to be made to Perry’s
statement of the case* Of course, the panpsychistic inter-
pretation of nature is not essential to idealism, traditional
^ Above, p* m.
^ Ap* to Phil*« ID* 287,
3 P, C* I*
.
P.195*
Ibid*
, p. 194 on the use of v/ords such as “affi-
nity," “attraction", “repulsion."
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forms of which have more generally accepted the phenomenal-
istic interpretation of nature arising from considerations
of its uniformities and unity, and referred it to the activ-
ity of a universal consciousness,
2, Personal Idealism, The failure of the realists
to consider adequately this Y/ide spread group of thinkers
is only imperfectly corrected hy Perry, whose only exten-
sive criticism of them is limited to their practical motives
and the contradiction "between the two schools,^ Moore *s
silence is complete, even vrhen he enters into symposia
with, or criticizes particular points presented by such
representatives a^'/ard, McTaggart, and Taylor, His failure
to analyze the concept of ’’spirit’' in the "Refutation" is a
reflection of his indifference to the historical forms of
idealism, spirit being ultima.tely reducible to cognitive
terms, and the universe to logical determinism.
But Perry ^s interest in the school follows from
the similarity of its moral interests to his ovm'. In The
Annroach to Philosophy he mentions it as a school concil-
2iatory between realism and idealism. In Present Phil-
osophical Tendencies he discusses only its Berkeleian
foundation. But in The Present Conflict of Ideals he
criticizes its Kantian foundation and its unstable dualism
between absolutism and individualism, while he approves
3its melioristic interpretation of the world, Pinally, in
The General Theory of Value he identifies its implica-
^ P» C. I.
, p. 201-219.
2 Page 404-405,
^ Page 218,
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tions for value theory with those of absolute idealism*^
The motive of idealism is the need of saving individ-
ual moral responsibility from the absolute order into which
absolutism, resting on Kant*s strange doctrine of freedom,
resolves it* It consists therefore in limiting the
jurisdiction of the absolute in favor of finite personality*
Of this motive Perry approves*
"Seeing, as any advocate of individual responsi-
bility must see, the dangers of absolutism, we shall
prefer the personal idealist to the absolute idealist*
In this sense the only good Hegelian is an ex-Hegelian.”
But in its argument, personal idealism is, according to
Perry, less worthy of approval; it is less critical and
rigorous than absolutism, and tends to merge, as it becomes
so, either into absolutism or into a more naturalistic
pluralism*
"As advocates of logical thoroughness and desiring
to see an argument carried through when once it is
undertaken, we shall prefer an out and out absolute
idealism to a compromise personal idealism* In this
sense the only good idealist is an Hegelian. ”2
V/e turn to the compromises and incomplete arguments which
Perry has in mind* He indicates the following objections to
its position,
a. It argues from common sense* Pluralism, in oppo-
sition to the functionalism of science, adopts the common
sense dynamic interpretation, of nature, "^t has all the
values and difficulties of common sense, Its moralism
also, which stresses self-determination and self-realization,
rests on common sense* This, however, is not an unqualified
objection to it, as we have already seen* Only as the common
i 0 » T . V, , p, 88, footnote.
5 C. I. , p. 202.
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sense views of nature and morality are incoherent with the
rest of experience, and with each other, are they to he
criticized. With the common sense moralism of personalism
Perry is in agreement. But he maintains that in so far as
it rests on Kant^s a priorism, the above contradiction is a
reality.
h. The voluntaristic interpretation of nature is an
illicit analogical inference from the nature of physical
energy, and therefore ungrounded, the mdre so since, as
we have seen, the realists insist that concepts such as
activity, contuinuity, and causality are reducible by ana-
lysis to ultimate concepts.^ ”An unknown energy is not
in the least energistic." The voluntaristic interpretation
of nature, therefore, rests upon the fallacy of formalism
and that of equivocation.
Against this criticism our earlier defense of the
psychic interpretation of nature may be recalled. If the
view point of science be recognized as an abstract one in
need of supplementation, the idealistic conclusion is to be
justified in the measure that it combines the valuational
aspects of experience with the mechanistic without doing
2
violence to the latter.
c. The idealistic argument from self-consciousness
and Perry’s unqualified repudiation of it have been suffic-
3iently discussed. This argument is, of course, of central
significance for personal idealism. But its use in personal
P
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idealism also conflicts, according to Perry, with that
school’s appeal to the logicel consciousness of Kant, as
consciousness empirically experienced is not the conscious-
ness whose activity provides the structure of experience,
d. The result is that personal idealism is in unstable
equilibrium, and in the measure that it takes its Kantian
premises seriously, is endangered by absolutism. The person-
alists roughly fall into two groups, corresponding to the
two divisions of absolute idealism. The Oxford pluralists
,
Stout, Schiller, Rashdall, and their associates, represent
the more empirical and voluntaristic group, and G. Howison,
James Ward, and McTaggart the Kantian and intellectualistic
group, the two having "little in common but the affirmation
of a fundamental pluralism;'! The former, stressing the
empirical consciousness and its purpose, fail to account for
the element of universality and necessity in experience, while
the latter, as "good idealists, striving to be true to Kant,
and seeking to correct Hegel rather than reject him," cannot
2
avoid determinism and monism say.e by a dogma. Either case
involves difficulties, and the conflict betv/een the two
interests is the rock upon which pluralistic idealisms are
shattered. Its dilemma manifests itself in three fundamental
problems,
i. The intellectualistic interpretation of nature of
the second school is closer the truth of science than the
voluntaristic interpretation of the first, for this deimds
! Ibid ,, p, 2C2-205,
^ p, 205,
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upon the concept of causality, v/hich is subject to criticism,
’’That part of mind v;hose authorship nature suggests
is the intellectualipart, ITeture can scarcely be the
work of a lover of happiness or a lover of justice,"^
"V/e might say that the world is the outward embodiment
of the ideals of reasoji; and then, of course, we might
afterwards correct our moral, aesthetic and sundry other
human ideals, to confonn,”
But the purely intellectualistic interpretation of nature,
peculiar to realism because of its logic, fails to do
justice to the positive content of nature, neither does
pure voluntarism. Here again Perry fails to do justice tc
the concept of consciousness or personality as a unit,
ii. The voluntarism which moralism demands is in-
consistent with the intellectualism and a priorism of
Kant, This is the old antinomy between duty and freedom,
which we have discussed in connection with Kant*s ideal of
p
freedom,'^ Perry nowhere refutes Howison*s solution of the
problem of individual freedom,^ but merely asserts that
the Kantian theory cf knowledge places pluralism ”on a slip-
perj^ inclined plane with the Absolute waiting at the bottom,"
That there is still room for a limited freedom within natura.l
contingency and world purpose^ experience shows and Perry
himself teaches, though he reduces it to biological selecti-
vity,
iii. The last antinom;^' is more serious, and is the
most difficult problem for pluralistic epistemology^ The
empirical self which serves as datum for personalism, grant-
ed that Perrys* s denial of its existence is incorrect, is
Q I^id , .p.209,
i P‘ 213,
^ J'bid ,. p. 214, 218,

298
not the transcendental self of Kant, a logical principle
experienced onl^/ "by abstraction, ’’Thus the Kantian
idealism, as reflected in Howison, is apriori
.
Spirit is
not found at the center of things, or immediately felt to
he there, as with the voluntarists; hut it must he there,
it can he transcendentally proved to be there
The given, active self which the voluntarist postulates is
not the ordering principle in experience which Kant demands.
Personalism thus stands in a state of unstable ecuilihrimn
between empiricism and rationalism, between subjectivism and
absolutism.
Two ways are open for personalism to answer this
problem, one of which leads to absolutism, the other to
an abandonment of empiricism. The one finds the basis of
the categorial structure of experience in the supreme
mind, and therefore given in the objective order for finite
minds. This viev7 tends to epistemological monism and abso-
lutism. It is the solution of Malebranche and Hegel. The
other view, professedly dualistic in its epistemology, finds
the categorial of my private experience in the
logical analysis of my conscious a^ctivity, not empirically
given since consciousness is a continuous whole, but con-
tained within the ultimate mental act, within a ’’specious
present", and therefore a part of consciousness as a meta-
physical ultimate, by definition. This view presupposes
^ C. I
.
.
p. 210> cf. Ap. to Phil., p. 288-289,
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a correspondence between private experience and the structure
of the objective order, based in the logical activity of the
supreme consciousness,
e. Both solutions, of which the latter is advocated in
the present study* invalidate Perry’s last criticism of person-
al idealism, which is directed at the theism which usually,
though not always, is a part of it. The .lod of personalism is
not the lod who best meets the needs of science; such a God
would be Kant’s logical system of order. The God of personal-
ism is interpreted "by way of the particular presentations
of an individual conscience", and is near the animistic spirit
of primitivism,^ This criticism is valid only against con-
cepts of God that are unworthily anthropomorphic; beyond that
it merely reflects the stage of Ferry’s religious thought in
1904, when he regarded the concept of a personal God as dis-
pensible. The concept of personality may include the systematic
order of Kant,
A critical study of Perry’s discussions of pluralistic
idealism reveals the fact that, although he has grasped the
motives and the nature of that school of thought with his usual
sharp analytic insight, he is guilty of several inadequacies in
his criticism of it,
a. He discusses personal idealism as a single position
presenting a fundamental dualism. This is a fallacy of the
S universal, as the dualism exists rather between two schools.
Personal idealists disagree, as do neo-realists, on m?^ issues
and conclusions. The relatively loose huiaanism of Schiller is
hardly to be compared v/ith the intellectualistically conceived
community of McTaggart, or the psychological monadism of yard.
1 j p. 289.
’< |- :,
''
.
T. '^™'
'
—
'"
\ -
" * * *y
*>0 it/
-T
.
;: 3^
, r. . .,.
,,... ^pw «
A
-f’-k
• M
rT:^
'4i '«?w ii Jb.'. ^^Jii^i'jft-’W; «
^
y
'7lj(^4#
>
'
.
.
’**V.. . i 'w • i..''
V’*'
•
iTii^cIa iTt' Tc t cr.afif^'K^, e>ri^;A
*
"''15'' '
' < /'''' *' * ' ‘ .
-'"
«/viiH'raJ!f' ,»(i^ i^B’" Xa
’
**
aA *ix? •^, . I't®'tc .‘’bT»n^i . 'fl
’i6 .'^f jy4'>^^A5 J :i?or 'iojp.
*
'^’
-£/^xrci2^<.q^7o Oofe' ILQ ms^ex* X«otg«^X -
Yd” tt mi^t
oi^4jr/aJlijfi bflL3 ,^‘*i*oi;iSiioefrOT> { . di?X.YXI>al,^«e -|
•'.' > *:- .• \ . ; ,v t "• /''sv' .•
:< ’ iStso niHif'ti ^.m«Xi?X^iii;il*:<;^;;-;i;0^
iktox^d" 3«Ji 5oV' *
Cl>.©,^XXt)T ^ C \£o*Xgi4;d'|J’ .i^£4
-vi'0w.«»v'' febO' ,-^^OaX
',aj,i" r-7f- -&4T - dXffiiafltsa
MIKi
^
,
.
N, '-
.
\%v,
'
* ' ‘ . ''“
• ;^-
-I’ --tif ii^:4^tii
i 4.4^ .
,
\^yQ*atfi P.Ty r.tfr f »7'i tor:
r
)Xi'A I^XIXlOfe'X C9^«'tlD"3XX> . *» ’ ^'',
B/’ ^
'
'
!/>• 50 4SXd7''’’..anXXfliH»'
.
'.•,
•,
’'
..'
^
5* .-• * ."*' ' • j '^':
'y.2Xboi!O.M,‘€ffl^^ itH»v<i'^tf k 2I»Xyj* ;«3XI»irii , X4^'JQ;:^XW^
;'" • *'
.
'
ii‘-; ', \
ijff . ij.. , ' ,*
,
. t’
"**
3t ;jp{l
The ircilLuntarisiii of the Oxford school may contradict the in-
tellectualism of ilcTaggart without overthrowing pluralism
in all of its particular appearances.
b. Perry overlooks the fact that personal idealism has
sources other than Kant - the causal and logical argument of
Berkeley and the dynamism of Leibniz and Lotze. Both are capable
of being universalized and accounting for the logical structure
of nature. Moreover, there are the more contemporary evidences
of science that nature need not be regarded as purely a system
of logical relations or of material substances, but must be
interpreted dynamically, and possibly , indeterministically
within the limits of science itself.
c.. But it is true that personal idealism since Kant
has generally depended upon him. Thus the question of Perry’s
interpretation of him again arises. Both he end Moore are
interested almost exclusively in the Kant of 1781, and inter-
pret him deterministically. If Kant, thus liraited, cannot recon-
cile the theoretical and practical interest, the phenomenal and
noumenal orders, how can the personal idealists who follow hiia?
7/e point out that the full interpretation of Kant, upon which
pragmatism fell Ipter, is closed to Perry because of his
naturalism (in which purpose belongs to the organism, conscious-
ness to the realm of objectivity selected by organism) and to
Moore because of his postulated determinism. The solution of
the dualism lies in consciousness as creative and gctive princip-
le, Perry’s discussion of personalism is at fault because it
is carried on on the abstract basis of will or intellect, not on
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empirical basis of consciousness.
d. Pluralism is saved from absolutism if the finite
self be regarded in some way as the creative center of its
own experience, that experience being conditioned, causally
and logically, by the real order, and if rational
,
giving
knowledge of the reel order. Thus its pluralism need not
commit it to relativism, and the universality in experience
is accounted for ultimately, but not immediately, in the
supreme consciousness. It is true that relativism, both
theoretical and practical, is the most serious problem for
an empirical pluralism.^ The solution suggested avoids it
by finding the basis of universality primarily in a supreme
mind, and secondarily in finite minds. This implies a de-
finition of logic as the abstract uniformities in conscious
function.
We have surveyed at some length the criticisms which
Moore and Perry make of the arguments of idealism. All
forms of mentalism reduce to the ultimate error involved
in assuming the priority of consciousness, whether finite
or infinite. Some forms, further, are influenced more than
others by the speculative dogma - that monism is an ideal.
From these two presuppositions the two fundamental principles
of all idealism are inferred - the^ cardinal principle and
the principle of the internal! ty of relations.
The first of these principles involves, according to
both, the fallacies of arguing from a methodological difficulty.
of insufficient analysis, of dogmatism (or romanticism, or mysti
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ism), of verbal suggestion, and of exclusive particularity.
Objective idealism, the inner tendency of which is to
interpret Kant monistically, adds the argument from synthetic
unity, and thus adds further fallacies of formalism, dogmatism
and equivocation.
Against the condemnation of idealism -for employing these
fallacious arguments we have advanced the following consider-
ations, Some fallacies are unjustly attributed to idealism.
Thus the cardinal principle is not ultimate for all forms of
idealism, but is always subordinate, for them, to the more
fundamental insight that we do know an objective ocder. Hence
it is not valid to charge any pluralistic form of idealism
which distinguishes the finite person and his experience from
the objective ground of reality with the error of exclusive
particularity. Other fallacies arise out of certain unjus-
tifiable prepossessions of Moore and Perry, particularly the
following. They demand of idealism a rigor of demonstration
which a speculative philosophy cannot provide, and from the
viewpoint of what would constitute a perfect proof, they charge
it with equivocation, dogmatism, and formalism. Their devotion
to analysis prevents them from seeing the validity, to say
nothing of the significance, of consciousness as a unitary
and active principle. They neglect the empirical considerations
which led idealism to its use of the cardinal principle, and
construct for it a rationalistic argument which they succeed,
within the limits indicated, in refuting.
The chief merit of their criticism lies in Moore’s
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analysis and rejection of the principle of internal relations
in its absolute forms. This refutes not only absolute idealism
but all forms of metaphysics which reduce reality to logic.
This is a general fallacy of Moore ^s and Perry’s criticisms
themselves; their failure to distinguish between reality and
logic (the only exception being the materialistic substantial-
ism of Moore’s later period) prevent them from seeing that
metaphysics must account for the dynamic and active aspects
of experience, and that this cannot be done by analyzing them
into static concepts. This limitation prevents them from doing
justice to the positive arguments of idealism, the argument from
the conclusions of science, from the relativity of knowledge,
form the activity of consciousness in experience. The value of
their refutation consists in overthrowing intellectualism and
panlogism, and with them, absolutism.
After considering the consequences of idealism in the
next chapter, we shall endeavor to show that some of the fallac-
ies attributed to idealism can be traced to the doors of the
realists themselves, whose formalism and dogmatism is necessari-
ly a preeminent characteristic of their method because of the
distinct inadequacies of analysis as an ultimate method of
speculation.
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CHAPTER 71 I
I
THE CONSEQUENCES OF IDEALISM
A. THE THEORETICAL CONSEQUENCE— SOLIPSISM AND CONTRADICTION.
"...the denial of the given is not obviously
necessary to any of the characteristic theses of
idealism. Indeed, an unqualified denial of this
element in ordinary cognition is sufficient to put
any theory beyond the pale of plausibility.
1. The Charge of Solipsism in Relation to the Cardinal Principle.
Our discussion of the fallacies of idealism, as Moore and Perry
understand them, has already indicated some of its theoretical con-
sequences. Objective idealism combines two Irreconcilable viewpoints
— the psychological and the logical. It faces the alternatives of
formalism or realism, of being meaningless . ^ or a moral sedative,
of rationality or indeterminate voluntarism. Its conclusions are,
in short, contradictory. But it remains necessary to examine one
insistently mentioned consequence, and to determine the limits of
the validity of this criticism, made by both Moore and Perry. To
what extent, and within v/hat limits, does idealism imply subjecti -
vism or solipsism or ste^pticism?
Moore makes the charge in his epoch making refutation, end
includes all idealism in it. Recognizing that all idealism is not
subjective, he concludes, however, that it follows from the cardinal
principle itself that he cannot know anything but his own mental
states
.
"If the object of an Idealist’s sensation were,
as he supposes, not the object but merely the content
^Lewis, C.I., Mind and The '>Vorld Order
.
p. 48.
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of that sensation, if, that is to say, it really .
were an inseparable aspect of his experience, each
idealist could never be aware either of himself or
of any other real thing. ...The fact is, on his own
theory, that himself and that other person are in
reality mere contents of an av/areness, which is aware
of nothing whatever. ...And, similarly he is never
aware either of the fact that he exists or that real-
ity is spiritual.
Thus idealism is not merely solipsistic, it is self^refuting in
that its solipsism denies its metaphysics.
Moore immediately amends a warning note. The idealists may
still believe that other persons exist; such belief will be en-
tirely consistent with his view, but he knows only his own mental
content
.
”It will, of course, be possible that other per-
sons do exist; solipsism will not be necessarily true;
but he cannot possibly infer from anything he holds
that it is not true.”^
And perhaps this admission is adequate. Many idealists Ijase their
escape from solipsism upon the fact of order in experience and the
faith in the rationality and valuational nature of the universe.
Of such nature sfe Descartes* argument for the existence of the phy-
sical world, and Berkeley’s arguments for the objective validity of
notions
. For Moore himself, objective knowledge rests ultimately,
it will later be seen, upon a common sense intuition or a "pro-
pensity to feign." The startling fact develops that Moore ascribes
to idealism a consequence which it can escape only by faith, and
then, later, admits that he himself knows no other escape from it.
His difficulty appears in his refutation of "Hume’s Philosophy."
After pointing out the self-refuting nature of Hume’s solipsism, he
Iphil. St.
. p. 27-28.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 29.
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he concludes that
’’Such a position must, in a certain sense, he quite
incapable of disproof. ...Any valid argument which can be
brought against it must be of the nature of a petitio
principii ; it must beg the question at issue. 1 ...He
(the skeptic) can only do it by bringing forv/ard some
instance of an external fact which he does know; and,
in assuming that he does know this one, he is, of
course, begging the question. ...The only proof that
we do know external facts lies in the simple fact that
we do know them. "2
And the basis of Moore* s and Perry’s realism, still to be examined,
will bear this out. Their cardinal principle, in turn, will be
shown to rest on an unproved assertion, valid for Moore because it
is intuitive, for Perry because its analysis has preceded beyond
that of idealism.
Perry also asserts the general proposition that all ideal ism
implies solipsism, though without the caution of Moore in recog-
nizing its possible validity. If "nature is Berkeley’s percept and
Kant’s thought,” idealism is subjectivistic by definition and nothing
more needs to be said. In the Approach to Philosophy he deduced,
like Moore, the inevitable solipsism of idealism from its cardinal
principle . In Present Philosophical Tendencies he repeats the
assertion
,
although he treats it in greater historical detail.
"Idealism is beset with a difficulty of its own
invention— the difficulty of subjectivism or solip -
sism . If consciousness is construed as owning its
objects, so that they arise and perish with its sev-
eral acts or states, then the knowledge of the same
thing by different knowers or by ’the same knower at
different times becomes impossible. There can be no
real identity, but only a manifold of unique and ir-
relevant units of consciousness. ...#hen, in order to
escape this difficulty, idealism conceives of ’a world
already determined by thought,’ that is, ’prior to and
^One wonders how then it would be valid. Moore would ansv/er
that its validity is ultimate and intuitional.
^Phil. St
.
,
p. 159-160v
^Approach to Philosophy
, p. 415.
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conditions, our individual acquaintance with it,’
then idealism has naturally withdrawn its initial
version of consciousness as among its objects, with
the result that both the difficulty and the solu-
tion become gratuitious. In other words, idealism
cannot affirm its central thesis without taking
up a position which is on its own admission unten-
able. ”1
As long as the cardinal principle is supreme, idealism is commit-
ted to solipsism; when objectified it contradicts its initial
principle,
Tlfhat shall we say of these general characterizations, the
cautious one of Moore which includes himself in its dilemma, and
the more vigorous one of Perry? Does the card inal principle
,
not
as described by the realists, but as actually presupposed by the
idealists, involve solipsism? We have already limited the scope
of the principle in various systems. Berkeley asserted it only for
sensible things; objective idealism uses it in a sense which changes
its meaning entirely from its use in subjective idealism, so called.
On first examination, then, it would seem that in so far as ideal-
ism is objective, and gives grounds for the view that reali.ty is
the universal or supreme consciousness, it is not solipsistic, es-
pecially if the argument rests upon a dualistic epistemology. It
could be no great dilemma for us if the supreme consciousness were
limited to its own content, though many forms of idealism do not
hold that view, and although that view would imply a certain amount
of equivocation as to the meaning of consciousness. It remains,
however, to examine the particular arguments of realism for show-
ing that if subjective idealism is solipsistic, then objective
idealism also implies solipsism. We proceed with our semi-histor-
^P.P.T.
,
p. 317-318.
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ioal analysis, discussing the solipsism of Berkeley, Kant, and
objective idealism, including absolutism,
2. Berkeley's Solipsism
. It would have been fortunate, his-
torically, had Berkeley printed only the second edition of his
Principles
.
and based the Three Dialogues upon that, for among the
realists there is the tendency to interpret him as a solipsist by
definition end an objectivist only by virtue of religious interests
The interpretation of Berkeley as a Fro tagore an skeptic does in-
justice to the fact that his esse is percipi is always limited to
the primary and sec ondary qualities of things, and is always sup-
plemented by his spiritualism. This Perry and Moore recognize.
"A sceptical relativism is the earliest phase
of subjectivism, and its avoidance at once becomes
the most urgent problem of any philosophy which
proposes to proceed forth from this principle: And
this problem Berkeley meets with great adroitness
and a wise recognition of difficulties.”^
If this is consistently recognized by the realists, and spirit
ualism is not regarded as an inconsistent appendix to subjectivism,
idealists may be content to accept realism^ s criticism. Thus G. A,
Strong, commenting on Moore’s "Refutation,” admits that he "does
not recoil" from the subjectivistic consequences which Moore points
out, which he holds are as extravagant as Moore would meke them,
"7/hatever is thought of is eo ipso absent and
merely represented, and never in any case given as
an immediate experience. Nothing can be given as
an immediate experience except modification of the
knowing consciousness itself."^
Strong subscribes to Moore’s characterization but escapes ultimate
skepticism by a dualistic epistemology resting upon the distinction
^Ap. to Phil
.
,
p. 270-271.
^Ap. to Phil .
,
p. 271, Of. Moore, Phil. St. , p. 29.
^iind
,
14(1905), p. 174, 185.
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between feeling (including sensing) and thought as fundamental
activities of mind, and insisting that subjectivism must be sup-
plemented by metaphysical considerations,^ But to meet Moore’s
further argument; what reasons does Berkeley advance for escaping
subjectivism? Here again, koore and Perry at no point examine
these reasons in detail.
a. The causal arguraent. Some of my ideas must have an exter-
nal cause. But matter cannot cause them as a cause must be like
its effect,^ All empirical causality is volitional. This loose
adaptation of the Cartesian argument is not impressive for the
realists today. Perry would adopt whole heartedly Hume’s criti-
cism of causation, while koore, in his logistic period, reduces
causality to logical implication, in his later materialistic period
interprets it so broadly as to permit matter to cause sense data.
b. The need of a universal percipient supplements this ex-
planation, as it overcomes subjectivism not by causal but by logi-
cal implication.
"'/Then I deny sensible things an existence out
of the mind, I do not mean my mind in particular,
but all minds. Now it is plain they have an ex-
istence exterior to my mind; since I find them by
experience to be independent of it. There is
therefore some other mind wherein they exist.
c. The activity of mind and the concept of notions . This
aspect of Berkeley’s argument is distinct from Kant, as understood
by Moore and Perry, in that notions . for Berkeley, constitute in-
direct knowledge of reality-in-itself (Spirits)
,
while for Kant
the mind’s activity is limited to the categorical construction of
^Jbid
.
,
p. 178-180.
fWorks , ed. by A. G, Fraser, vol. i, p. 453.
^Berkeley, Works
,
ed, by A. G. Fraser, vol. i, p, 446-447.
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appearance, '»Ve have already pointed to the broader interpretation
of reason in Kant that covers Berkeley's use.
d. The inference of other personas existence from certain
ideas in our consciousness . Berkeley is ultimately a subjectivist
if, and only if, his use of the cardinal principle conflicts with
his account of our knowledge of the. reality— other selves
,
includ-
ing God. Both Perry and Moore hold that it does so conflict, as
we have seen. We shall simply restate our interpretation of the
crucial problem as Moore understands it. Is there reason for our
knowledge that other persons exist on the subjectivistic premise
that we are immediately aware of only our mental states? Moore
Moore answers no,
"The only reasonable alternative to the ad-
mission that matter exists as well as spirit, is
absolute skepticism— that, as likely as not, noth-
ing exists at all,"^
Moore wishes to defend the existence of both against Hume; Perry
agrees with Hume in rejecting both. But the crux of Moore »s ar-
gument, in The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception
,
is to
prove that any reasonable account of our knowledge of other persons
must rest upon a belief, not in the existence of matter
,
but in
the objective reality of the objects of our perception, i.e. ideas,
with which Perry would agree.
His refutation of the idealist’s arguments (1) that my knowl-
edge of other selves is a valid induction from my ov/n ideas, and
(2) that it is a true hypothesis because it leads to favorable con-
2
sequences, or is coherent, we have already examined. We turn to
^Phll. St
.
,
p. 30.
^See chapter VII , p.2Ml'lHH*
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Moore positive statement,
"It would seem, therefore, that if my own ob-
servations do give me any reason whatever for be-
lieving in the existence either of any perception
in any other person or any material object, it
must be true that not only my own perceptions,
thoughts and feelings, but also some of the other
kinds of things which I directly perceive— colors,
sounds, smells, etc.
—
do really exist: it must be
true that some objects of this kind exist and are
real in precisely the same simple sense in which
my perceptions of them exist and are real."^
We have tried to show that Moore’s entire argument rests
upon his abstract division between mental activity and object, a
distinction which may be maintained only as an abstraction, since
empirically only the object is given as determined by mental ac-
tivity. Just how is my "own perception, thought, and feeling"
to be conceived as abstract from its object? If Moore is right,
the idealist must begin his inference with a transparent "diaphanous"
somewhat. But he does start with valid perceptions of independently
real objects, and infers from them, by analogy with his mind, the
existence of other persons. When the idealist speaks of percep-
tions and thoughts and feelings (i) he includes the mental objects,
(ii) he depends upon a definition of knowledge, not as the relation
between mental activity and its object, for this realistic concep-
tion begs the entire issue of knowledge, true or false, by an
"initial predication," but as the relation between the mental ob-
ject, fulfilled in forms of judgraent, and the reality to which it
refers. That such a conception of knowledge is impossible, the
realists do not show. The habit of the American school in losing
all unique reTationships in the general term "relation" is far
^Phil. St
,
,
p. 90.
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more a pet itio prinoipli than this dualist ic conception of knowledge
which they ignore. For them Berkeley is an epistemological monist .
As a subjectivist Berkeley is a monist; as a spiritualist he is
a dualist.
Moore’s criticism, moreover, does not meet that growing number
of idealists which holds that consciousness in the finite sense is
socially conditioned, and that knowledge of other selves is, as
he himself holds it, intuitive.^ To this view idealists have at
least as much right as realists. But it is not the solution of
the present paper, which holds that knowledge of other selves is
inferred, not from simple, subjective sensations, but from valid
perceptions and the experience of communication, coherently inter-
preted. At the same time it is true that the self is socially con-
ditioned in its development, though that does not imply that it
knows other selves intuitively.
On the other hand, Berkeley’s description of ideas as "inert
and passive" as contrasted with mind as active does much to open
the way for the realist’s first wedge— the distinction between
activity and object. It is here that Berkeley needs to be Kantian-
ized. A "simple sensation" is not an empirical datum; it is an
abstraction or working tool of the analytic psychologist. It is
the activity of mind itself which constitutes its objects. "Abso-
lute simples" as Cohen points out, "are always relative to a
specific complex,"^ a point which Moore himself later recognizes
in admitting that in talking about sensibles he has often spoken
^We have already seen that Perry misinterprets Berkeley as
finding a "mystical" solution of the problem of communication.
^Jour. Phil.
.
10(iyi3), p. 209.
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about things whose existence is doubtful.
"A sensum which is not sensed, or a sense-
datum which continues unaltered while conscious-
ness of it changes, is merely a new kind of D ing
an sich
,
which is none the better for being in-
) appropriately named so as to suggest its phenom-
enological character."^
3. Kant^s Sub.lectlvism , Kant, as we have seen, is in unstable
equilibrium between the subjectivism which he sought to avoid and
the objectivism he aided in establishing. Moore and Perry both
interpret him however, as avoiding solipsism only to be caught in
it because of the unknowability of the thing in itself. Not only
the ideas of Berkeley are mental, but the forms of intuition and
thought in which the mind interprets them are mental,
"Kant holds that we cannot know ajb all what
properties belong to * things in themselves,’ What
I wish to point out is that if we examine carefully
the meaning of the statement, it merely amounts to
this: that we never can know that a thing, _it
in itself
,
really has, even for a moment, any pro-
perty whatever, (It would follow, therefore, that
in Kant’s view, when l think ’the fingers on this
hand are 5’ I do not really know that those fingers,
as they are in themselves, are five, and if I don’t
know that the only alternative is that, in Kant’s
view, I merely think them to be five.) A good deal
of confusion has, I think, arisen from the failure
to see the only alternative to the admission that
we do know things they are in themselves
.
is the
admission that we have no knowledge at all, Y/e can-
not escape this dilemma by contmeting with ’ things-
in-themselves’ the ’objects of experience,’ for, if
we know anything about the objects of experience,
then we know what properties the objects of exper-
ience have, as they are in themselves
,
Perry, considering Kant’s phenomenalism from the realistic view-
^ point, interprets Kant, in 1910, as having refuted Hume in the
interests of naturalism, since it agrees with him in considering
^Lewis, G. I., Mind and the World ^rder , p. 64.
2|k:ant’s Idealism”. Proc. Arist. Soc .. 4(1904), jc. 135-136.
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time and space aprlori for perception.^ He is far less ready than
Moore to interpret him subjectivistically, and eagerly discovers
the meaning of the "thing in itself" for the realistic epistemolo-
gical monist.
"The noumenon can have no possible mode of
existence apart from the phenomenon. ...It exists
merely by virtue of the ability of the humen reason
to distinguish between the ’that* and the ’what’ in
the subject, end to hypostfttize the former in order
to limit the claims of the latter."^
Moore’s and Perry’s interpretations are thus at odds; is Kant a
subjectivist? Avowedly an "empirical realist" as opposed to
"empirical idealism," Kant is a subjectivist only in a new sense,
"Matter is only a class of representations (intuition^ which are
called external, not as they are referred to objects external by
themselves (transcendental realism) but because they refer percep-
tions to space in which everything is outside everything else,
while space itself is inside us." "Both (psychological and phy-
sical orders) alike are phenomenel in respect of this universal
consciousness, precisely as in empirical or subjective idealism,
the physical order is phenomenal in respect of the psychological
rz
consciousness.
But this is not narrow subjectivism. E mpirically, Kant
emphasized the objective reference of knowledge; he accounted for
it by resolving subject and object into the same logical structure,
as do the American realists. But he conceived that structure syn-
thetically, as active, they conceive it analytically, as static;
he therefore conceived it as consciousness, they merely as being.
The thing-in-itself
,
Perry recognizes, has no metaphysical status
^Hi-bbert Jour
. , 8(1910), p. 628.
^he Abstract Fheedom of Kant", Phil. Rev . , 9(1900), p, 632.
Sp.P.T.
,
p. 142-143.
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in Kant’s system, but is merely the result of mental activity
assigning being to phenomenal qualities,
4, The New Subjectivism . Hence, it is obvious that
objective idealism resting on ^.ant
,
cannot be accused of solip-
sism unless the universal consciousness or transcendentalism
is not taken seriously. Here lies Moore’s inconsistency: he
himself accepts, he says, Kant’s transcendentalism but not his
idealism, while in interpreting him he forgets his transcen-
dentalism and sees only his Subjectivism. His transcendental-
ism
,
completed by his idealism, makes possible a realm of
possible experience, beyond any actual finite experience. Such
a realm had been demanded by Berkeley’s system, and by other
empirical idealists who seek to avoid the extreme of solipsism.
In this sense not even Hume is a solipsist; he recognizes the
perrr.anent uniformity of events as having an external cause, and
his outstanding disciple. Mill, assumes an objective realm of
"permanent possibility of sensation." Subjectivism has commonly
used "the category of potentiality as its crutch" and thus
pointed in the direction of objectivism, and transcended itself.
Objective idealism completes this and is therefore obviously
subjective only in a new sense. The realists may then criticize
this new subjectivity in two ways, both of which we find in
pPerry’s thought,*^
5. Absolute Idealism as Formalism . They may criticize
this "new subjectivism," i.e,, the definition of reality in
terms of a supreme consciousness, because of its paradoxical.
1
^Sheldon, W. H.
,
Strife of Systems
, p. 77-78.
2cf. P.P.T.
,
p. 144; Gont. Am. Phil , , ii, p. 191, con-
trasted with P.P.T
.
,
p. 16B, 163.
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loose, or formal nature.
"It (idealism) is paradoxical because it
seems to reverse the theoretical instinct itself,
and to define the real in those very terms which
disciplined thought learns to neglect. In the
early history of thought the nature of the think-
er himself is recognized as that which is likely
to distort truth rather than that which conditions
it."l
The criticism is in essence, the charge of formalism
,
which we
have already examined. Idealism uses a concept which will not
aid scientific investigation and the advance of truth. One
may reply that neither v/ill the realistic interpretation, either
in the common sense form of Moore or the logical atomism of
Perry. That is not the task of metaphysics.
Beyond that, as applied to objective idealism, the quota-
tion begs the question. It agrees with science in seeking
reality, not as experienced by the knower who "is likely to
distort truth," but as independent of him. It goes beyond
science in making the objective reference of truth itself de-
pendent upon a knov/er and. doer, who, far from distorting truth,
defines it, by determining objective reality. The answer is
here similar to the answer already given to the charges of
formalism and equivocation; you cannot make objective idealism
either subjective or meaningless by an assertion.
6. Absolute Idealism as Self-Contradictory . The other
criticism makes objective idealism, in so far as it escapes
subjectivism, invariably contradictory. "The argument for
absolute idealism is a constructive interpretation of the
^Ap. To. Phil ., p. 268.
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subjectivistic contention that knowledge can never escape the
circle of its own activity and states," but it interprets it
by making it dependent upon the activity and states of another
mind.^
"Idealism gets its proof from putting a
certain construction on human consciousness,
that being the only instance that comes under
observation. The idealist must
,
then, first
regard human consciousness as constitutive of
its objects, ''inhere this theory is strictly
maintained, it holds not only of the individual
consciousness, but even of the momentary consci-
ousness, But the idealist himself sees that
this involves contradictions. It provides no
way of distinguishing the true or valid cases
of knowledge from mere opinion, ...So objective
idealism is led to attribute constitutive valid-
ity only to some standard or universal consci-
ousness, which shall afford objects their true
and permanent ground,
’^ut this requires a correction of the
initial interpretation of the individual or mom-
entary consciousness^ We must now suppose that
•these instances of consciousness do not consti-
tute their objects, but either conform to them
or misrepresent them. In other words, objects
are now independent of those concrete instances
of consciousness which first came under observa-
tion.
Two corrections must be made at once in discussing this
account of the error of objective idealism. It is not essen-
tial to subjectivism that the mind constitute or create the
2
ultimate object of knowledge. Creation ^ nihilo is not a
part of Hume's subjectivism, nor of Berkeley’s, Mill's or
Kant's. No idealist has held to the constitutive activity of
the human mind in the absolute sense which is implied here.
For Berkeley ideas had an external cause; for the literal
^Ap. to Phil ., p. 383.
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~162-163.
^Sheldon, V/. H.
,
Op. cit .
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Kantian the empirical mind has no constitutive function what-
soever, but consists merely of content so constituted. It is
purely reproductive. No idealist asserts the absence of rela-
tions of some type between his ideas and an objective order,
though ell are dissatisfied with the realistic statement that
that relation is— merely a relation.
The other point concerns the possibility v/hich Perry and
Moore have overlooked. The finite mind may be constitutive of
a realm of objects distinct from the supreme mind’s realm of
objects but corresponding (a relation hard to define) to it,
in the sense that its categorical function and logical structure
are identical with the supreme mind but its empirical data differ
and are selected in terms of its interests. Epistemolog ical
dualism is the alternative to the monistic account of idealism
v/hich Perry’s criticism implies. Subjectivism in the narrow
sense is a Durchgangsstadium for idealism, as Rickert says,^ but
the realm of the subjective is not identical with the real.
77hen Perry suggests as a remedy that we "begin with the realistic
version of human consciousness," he is suggesting no more than
idealists like Hegel have done. If independence of human con-
sciousness is the essence of realism, we once more point out,
there is no conflict.
The entire point in Kant, interpreted in this way, is then
a redefinition of knowledge in which the realm of subjective
experience is true, or attains objective validity, only insofar
as it conforms to the logical laws of the objective order.
Ip.P.T
.
,
p. 163.
6
.'
•
^I. .
*
'
‘
:
-,>oiiw iTo^don ‘‘1 f.^v t J v:fj :: /do cn dr), i tJi'a:. leo i 7 j.qno naK^zO^'
3 ' - . on lo \‘l :<ma‘ 0 u;.: . v*)ov.
"io •:' 0 {T-:n:< : na,*ic('ae.B ni .if .o^I , j'xrji cl' y'. .'uc
,n.^c*.ro ortioi'^/jo a« br.fi ca^M alri .teew^ocf St .. ;• • n dKt
u.;.-d
.-i.lv J-’v^ ft: . i yj- or^l rfJU fe? . In ia«s^ : r- g>^a iifi
. . iQ ’.
T
- 5 j IS V j un tv. — o I no i yai t-i J
3
tins \ . r'o;r('.v :.; I'd i nac.-i n.:': t n.-,rc oaT
;
v.f jl'J I J (.’ .vi: i--' y.?Li hj'i.-; f*-' .LoT^ooI’irrD ‘jv^rJ loO^.I'
"c i':J'3 ni • ^ • hr In rm^rqu^ and incTi J.onilr:!^ -ocrfi-o^ t c lo n .-o*; :<
,
. cJ [ .5 ai.lsf> i/ia/i a) 'Pfii'daoc iO'l’O'j-o 'itaJ njo. ^cfo
* jl^. H
5 - • ;n i rroi?;^.: f)"'f no^Tomrl i "o j/' c?-*Jso i Tadc vKrroe erfs rJ.
•'
: . oi'-' ' '’cr-.* Dni'ai o.i;r rf;;iw :'eoJ:vraoX)i ax-s
i.::; .. %-•;
*'
....;w .; . . "-. =•• ti-*.-. ,ih i rJl to acn-Od mi qvJc'-jiior. 01." 'fiiio
u.'? ] :»' ni lo olufif'rorj ari J cJ v’-'i J : 5a uCiJ nl iit-r-.i lou
b
v:t>'tXj[)M Cii; ni n . v /jCj-jc:! . -Jj.qiil ar/. o 1 7 1 70 *7,77^'
1
ooifi..
jja. r *iO".oCI 3 cl qCGOCJ. /*ro.:ai;t e. . ^ lisa
.
•' j1:i'7 laol^iiol'l joir ei ov 17ob La y‘r erf>r ic ciIij-'t adl
oiJ..: • :J 'jlTf Il^,^o<3'’ ei'. vjc.n; ybo.’.’e-'r 0 eja •: 't t ;.:>•• nfi£W
.73 , J on *
,
co';j.tTBi;oiC' nos .'Tartirfi lo nclc'isv
-nfjo nasju.f Ic i-ou^
- ueqf-bni If .onofc 9veil ‘ Wlcliftobi
,
^-'
. 5r‘lOc vion ooao ,:*c;j=a3on lo bOiVJ'yab aa ' «i Sc»,-9ns//_olo'.
.4 0 ; I 'j n c o on r* i 9.
'1
,
. '3»v ii5 uJ fli b^'at.iqnvv '
< III ^fTloq_ Ot^''
9V j. / C 1
.
l.' 0 '' ic iLOOO ; /'j lit V'OJT?: O «iO I J X C Ki tDlvX 5
.ao ^waiL'Llev ovi 3 inla^vio xo
,
xrn-' ai soxo^tgcxo
>. •
.1 G?!. do •: r.‘> *0 iAOi^al Siij oj xctxot^'^ui .: x '’i;-
i t v:
,,’iV
iliKka
.A .J
Knowledge is true or false, as the subjective realm acquires
logical objectivity (universality and necessity) or is lost in
contradiction. Logical objectivity, however, remains distinct
from the ontological objectivity which constitutes reality,
which is essentially activistic and volitional, and which in-
cludes logic as its abstract structural form.
In conclusion, it may be pointed out that neither idealism
nor realism overcomes solipsism except by their "propensity to
believe." Coherence itself is a faith, vindicated in every day
knowledge and in science; the doctrine of independence is a
faith that is meaningless in the degree that "the independence
of the immanent" is of no interest while "the independence of
what will never become immanent" is highly problematic
•
B. THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF IDEAL ISJ-'I
1. The General Character of the Practical Criticism.
"In modern philosophy idealism is or has
been the System. It has largely controlled the
means of philosophical production, such as the
vocabulary, the professorships, and the public
ear. It has furnished all the teachers in the
philosophical i^unday School. It has enjoyed the
support of the authorities, and of the champions
of law and order. It has written the history
of philosophy so as to make it appear that the
mounting development of Europe’s thought culmi-
nates in itself. And then it has insisted that
the only proper philosophical scholarship is a
thorough knowledge of the great masters, thus in-
doctrining many generations of innocent and im-
pressionable youth.
'Me have seen that idealism has a religious burden which
it defends with an epistemological, logical, or spiritualistic
Iperry, P«C .1
.
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p. 199.
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doctrine. Or more generally stated, in terms of the religious
interest, idealism attempts, by a development of arguments which
we have already examined through realistic glasses, to defend
(1) the independent validity and significance of value ex-
perience (Perry) and (2) the reality of the ideal. 1 How has
it accomplished its self-imposed task of defending morality and
religion?
Moore has nothing to say on the subject. He objects to the
way in which metaphysics in general, and idealism more particu-
larly, are used to defend a particular moral theory, but on the
practical implications of idealism he is silent. Several rea-
sons may be given. In the first place, he is not at all inter-
ested in religious truth because he can see no reason for
believing that there is any.
"It is, I think, an important point in my
position, which should be mentioned, that I
differ also from all philosophers who have held
that there is good reason to suppose that there
is a god at all, whether or not they have held
it likely that he created all material things.
"And similarly, whereas some philosophers
have held that there is good reason to suppose
that we, human beings, shall continue to exist
and to be conscious after the death of our bodies,
I hold that there is no good reason to suppose
this
.
His materialistic metaphysics does not preclude the truth of
religion, but its emphasis is such asuto make him cxut interested
f in it. Secondly, although his Interest in ethical theory is a
permanent element in his thought from the beginning, it is a
theoretical interest. His studies on ethics emphasize the need
%oore, Princ. Eth .
,
p. 120.
^Gont. Brit. Phi l., ii, p. 216; see also his criticism of
Christian kthics: Princ. Eth
.
,
p. 178-179.
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of a classification of values and disvalues, but he himself
never attempts it.^ A new type of casuistry, an eenumeration
and classification of values exhausts the practical task of
ethics. Third, linked with these two interests, there is to be
kept in mind his conviction that theories are to be criticized
neither by their practical interests nor their practical fruits
but by their logic and, it must be added, their common sense-
.
In the case of Perry, however, the situation is different.
He has recently emphasized again what is apparent in much of
his writing— that the practical values of philosophy are upper-
most. It was religious interest that led him into philosophy.
Realism is to agree with idealism, as against naturalism on
the "validity and irreducibility of moral science;”^ philoso-
phy is to seek a "unitary conception of the meaning and larger
relations of human life" in which religion, as "man’s sense
of the disposition of the universe to himself" plays a dominant
role. Particularly in the conflict of purposes and systems
accompanying the upheaval of 1914 to 1918, he rendered a dis-
tinct service in unravelling the tangled skein of individual and
national Weltanschauungen in an effort, now antiquated, it is
true, to bring reason to men’s convictions. Hence it is again
to him that we turn for an indictment of idealism for its prac-
tical consequences, of which he draws a very detailed but not
always unified picture in the Present Conflic t of Ideals
,
but
a more boldly outlined, though less carefully drawn one in his
^Princ. Eth.
, p. 151-152; Ethics, p. 248-249.
^P.P'.T
. ,
p. 272.
^Ap. to Phil .
,
p. 32, 66'.
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earlier volumes
.
VITe combine the various accounts. The evidence
which he builds up against the moral, religious, and social con-
sequences of idealism is imposing, but, as we shall see (and this
is the chief thesis of this section), directed exclusively against
the formal intellectualism of absolute idealism.
The practical evils of idealism arise from its equivocation
and formalism.
"Through his assertion that things find
their real meaning only in the unity of all
things, the idealist virtually overrules the
flat differences and uncompromising oppositions
that guide the empirical and practical intel-
ligence. ...It is essentially the all-saving
philosophy, as opposed to the philosophy of
extermination. It encourages the supposition
that a profounder insight would reinstate what
ordinary discrimination rejects out of hand. It
rises above the plane of distinctions, and in-
vites attention to the broad synthetic features
of the world. This universalistic tendency in
idealism has contributed little or nothing to the
solution of special problems .But it also ac-
counts for the much more significant fact that
idealism does not really touch those special
issues with which religion is concerned.
It will be clear that Perry’s criticism is directed against ab-
solutism as opposed to subjectivism and pluralistic idealism.
That limitation is justified in his eyes, as we have seen, be-
cause he finds absolutism the system to which all other ideal-
isms drift as they seek logical completion. Subjectivism,
Kantian transcendentalism, and personal idealism have other
motives and other consequences, but in the measure in which they
find logical completion in absolute ideal ism they are
2
to its faults.
^P.P.T.
,
p. 190-191.
^P.O.I
.
,
p. 202.
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We are making the effort to defend an idealism that stops
short of absolutism by rejecting the doctrine of internal re-
lations and a monistic epistemology, and emphasizing self-con-
sciousness as independent, selective and integrating activity.
If our attempt proves successful, it is with Perry’s criticism
of personal idealism, rather than absolute idealism that we
shall have to be concerned. Hence we shall need to examine,
not merely his analysis of what are to him the most logical
consequences of idealism, but all possible consequences of its
various forms. To that more detailed examination we proceed.
2. Idealism and Moral Experience . Though the professed
ethics of idealism is essentially ^antian, the ethical impli-
cations of various types of idealism vary between the extremes
of egoism and quietism and "mystical universalism. " Most con-
sistent with its subjectivistic epistemology is the egotistical
relativism of Protagoras. "If all my experience is strictly my
own, my good must likewise be my own. Spiritualism on the
other hand may result in Schopenhauer's pessimism or in the
social constructiveness of Berkeley's pluralism. The anthro-
pocentric tendency which is the fault of idealism per se re-
ceives its strongest support from the Kantian formalism, and
is retained, inconsistently by absolute idealism, v/hose meta-
physics is monistic and deterministic, and therefore implies
quietism. The outstanding exception to this man-centered
ethics, whether ethical individualism, social quietism, or Kan-
tian a priorism , is the ethics of pan^sychism, whose "day-light
^Ap. to Phil
.
,
p. 299.
%bid.
, p. 388-390.
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view" tends "to a promiscuous valuing of life... in all its
primitive and v/ayward forms. Panpsychism thus supplements
idealistic ethics, not naturalist ically hut hy attributing
spiritual values of a low order to nature itself— an extremely
optimistic procedure. This possible supplementation of ideal-
istic ehtics, however, is not often applied .
The ethical motive is supreme in personal idealism
.
and
in so far as it maintains its essential voluntarism and its
pluralism, it represents a melioristic ethics of personal value.
With this ethical motive Perry finds himself in sympathy. "The
central fact in morality, according to this view, is the moral
agent himself, with his sense of duty, his power to judge for
phimself, his freedom, and his responsibility."^ It is, as we
have already seen, a protest against the evils of monism
,
and
in so far as personal idealism succeeds in establishing the
independence and autonomy of consciousness as purpose, it is
successful in its effort, adapting nature itself to moral pur-
poses because it too is the expression of purpose.^ It may be
pointed out that Perry’s own view of ethics is similar to this,
but with three significant differences, that make it naturalis-
tic. (1) Value is not related to conscious purpose, but to
biological purpose or interest. (2) He usually conceives the
cosmos as uninterested in value experience. (3) As a result
the normative emphasis in his ethics has no ground in his system.
But at this point, as v/e have seen, personal idealism is
not successful. Intellectual demands force it to fall back
^P.G.I .
.
p. 195-196.
^Ibid
. , p. 202.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 207.
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upon Kant*s conception of the universal ego, whic.hPerry considers
fundamentally deterministic, as we have seen, 'i’he world is
"the outv/ard embodiment of the ideals of reason," rather than of
purpose
.
"Ivantian idealism. is a priori . Spirit is
not found in the center of things, or immediately
felt to be there; but it must be there, it can
be transcendentally proved to be there. ...Thus
the deeper creative. reality is not,.pei*sonal will
regarded as a kind of forceful agency, but the
intellectual faculty regarded as a set of ideals
and principles."!
But this adoption of the intellectual a priori of Kant, neces-
sarily implies the adoption, also, of his moral apriorism
,
and
personal idealism must change its moral basis or tolerate in-
ner contradictions.
For, though the ethical motives of Kant are those of per-
ii
sonal idealism, his ethical consequences are less desirable.
a. Dualism . Chief of these is the ultimate conflict of
"the presuppositions of science and the presuppositions of duty."
"As a part of nature
,
man belongs to the
causal nexus; as a moral agent he is free. As
a part of nature man dies; as a moral agent, he
is
-.irrnor.tc.1. Nature so far as science is
concerned is ruled by blind mechanical law, but
in religion nature is created and controlled by
a benevolent God. Kant avoided contradiction,
or sought to do so, by dividing the world between
these two conflicting claims. There is the known
world of phenomena where science reigns, and the
. C . I
.
, p. 209-210. Perry again overlooks at least the
f purpose of Kant to harmonize reason and purpose in the Critique
of Judgment . The Intellectualistic and voluntaristic interpre-
tation of Kant must be harmonized in the concept of personalism.
2perry, indeed, describes the "practical tenets of meta-
physical individualism" as (1) The Personal and Iinmortal Soul,
(2) Freedom, (3) Theism— the recognition of irreducible evil in
the world leading to the concept of a finite God; P.G
.
1
. ,
p.
211-217.
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unknown world of noumena, where morality reigns.
...The strict Kantian is at one and the same time a
rigorous positivist and a regorous moralist.”^
This dualism is but another expression of the dualism be-
tween freedom and determinism which Perry and lloore early found
unavoidable in Kant, and revised, Moore in the interests of de-
terminism, Perry of indeterminism. This conflict we have al-
ready discussed.
b. Kant’s ethical formalism , intended as an expression of
the autonomy of the moral individual, supplements this, dualism.
"liaving no relation to outward success or
failure, it (duty) is accompanied by no expec-
tation of achievement in this world. The faith
which it begets has to do altogether with another
world. ...The moral life is an inner life, a con-
formity of will to the imperatives of the prac-
tical reason. As such it may be divorced from
the externals of life, and being so divorced it
does not interfere with the application there of
the mechanical principles of science."^
The result is the same conflict between moral autonomy of
individuals and obedience to the moral law. For the G-erman
idealists freedom is not "doing as one pleases,” but is "delib-
erate submission to general laws or larger corporate purposes,"
"For to act from reason rather than impulse,
means to act from principle; and a principle will
have an authority beyond oneself and will unite
one with all other rational beings in the same
jurisdiction.
Now that this is a misreading of Kant’s intent is clear.
In as much as Kant supplements his early formalism with the
ideal of the intrinsic value of personality, an emphasis leaaing
to a reformulation of the categorical imperative itself, such
^P.Q.I
.
.
p. 223-224.
^Ibid
. , p. 224-225.
3lbid
. ,
p. 236-237; cf. Phil. Rev . , §(1900), p. 646-647.
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a dualism is impossible in his moral theory. The description
of it, like Perry’s earlier account of the antinomy between the
moral law as dictated by reason and the autonomous moral activ-
ity of the self, rests on a divorce which it was the purpose of
Kant, even in the Oritique of Pure Iteason
,
to overcome. Reason
and purpose do not conflict; they are but two aspects of con-
scious activity. Kant teaches, not an unresolved dualism of
"starry heavens" and "moral law,*' but a synthesis of the two.
If the teleological interpretations of nature be added to the
abstract scientific account, this purpose may yet be rational
without jeopardizing man’s moral autonomy— if the purpose include
his autonomy.
c. optimism . In other contexts. Perry recognizes this reso-
lution of the Kantian dualism and formalism . It is the Fichtean
completion of Kant, roughly the one indicated in the preceding
paragraph, in so far as Kant and his first great disciple, a
voluntarist, escape the dualism they do it by means of an un-
justifiable optimism .
This is "the view which would affirm that
degrees of reality coincide with degrees of
goodness, that the more real a thing is the
better it is
,
and that therefore the ultimate
and all comprehending reality is at the same
time the summit of perfection."!
Or it is the view that moral values are real, or that the uni-
verse is constructed on a moral pattern.
In Kant this optimism asserts itself in the correspondence
between duty and pleasure, Kant’s solution", it is true. Perry
!p . G . I
.
, p. 235.
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does not discuss, but the Fichtean completion of it.
"The v/orld is to be construed as what spirit
would have it to be, as the perfect work of
spirit. ...7/e reach the Absolute .. .by complet-
ing our incompleteness, by thinking what would
be the perfect sequel to our imperfect ion.
7/ith this solution Perry, and l\';oore
,
cannot agree, and in op-
position to it both insist on the unreality of value, Perry by
making it subjectively determined, Moore by making it an im-
mediately known, intrinsic, but not reel aspect of being.
d. Consequences in Value Theory . A consequence of this
2
optimism is what Perry calls the fitting of "value to fact."
In the case of the Fichtean, "the ultimate reality is will
governed by duty. But this doing of what the inv/ard imperative
requires is not only the germinating principle of reality; it
is also the typw-value. Truth and citizenship are primarily
duties. Beauty, which does not readily conform to this stan-
dard of value, tended to find little recognition in the Fich-
te-an scheme."'
"The idealist starts out with some notion
of value, such for example as the doing of one’s
duty, lie then proposes to show that reality is
the very incarnation and embodiment of dutiful-
ness," Or, in the case of the intellectual, all
values must be reduced to "the ideal of coherence
or systematic unity.
Against this reduction, and the resulting imadequacy of
idealistic value theory of such types. Perry, follower of James,
protests with right, all value and duty are not commensurate,
as the world is at present constituted. The complexity ' ’
^P.G.I
.
,
p. 230-231.
^Ibid
.
, p. 240.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 231-232, 241.
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and diversity of values, as lloore has demonstrated so forcibly,
cannot be reduced to one type of conscious experience, be it
I
feeling, will, or intellect. But the concept of personality
as a whole, will, as Perry himself implies in his broad use of
the word "interest," which he is only successful in defining
biologically, provide a basis on which the world may yet be
defined in terms of value, without implying too much of opti-
mism or impoverishing, the diversity and richness of value ex-
perience .
e. A Monism of Value . The result of this "monism of value"
is the total confusion of values and the failure to do justice
to the diversity of richness of value theory.
"The idealist, in striving to shovi that
reality satisfies every human aspiration suc-
ceeds only by elirinating whatever is specific
and peculiar in every human aspiration. ...To
carry out a monism of values consistently would
mean that every good theory should be expected
to satisfy every desire and aspiration. A good
medicine ought to be palatable; a good fuel
ought to be beautiful; a good painting ought
to be edifying; all true news ought to be agree-
able nev/s; and whatever is morally right ought
to be true. ...Through trying to get every
ideal realized at once, one would be fairly
sure of getting none of them realized."!
This discussion of the confusion of values, in other words,
overlooks two empirically verifiable facts: (1) that values do
interpenetrate; a good painting i_s edifying, and the truthr.of news
I .is agreeable, and (2) that in actual experience values are re-
lated and built into a more-or-less systematic whole, the mea-
sure being their contribution to a pe rsonal life or an ideal
!p . C .
I
. t p. 244, 245, Incidentally, Perry here seems to
admit that truth is a value, contrary to his general panlogism.
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consciousness. Here again, the concept of personality will aid,
not merely in defining value
,
but in introducing harmony and
meaning in the diverse field of value experience— a true monism
of value for each individual consciousness in so far as its
ideal of personality is coherent, implying on the part of the
universe as a whole an ideal objective.
f. Extreme Individualism . In so far as Kant’s formalism
is not interpreted deterministically and monistically it has
certain other undesirable consequences. It ”may be entirely
innocuous when it is allied with traditionalism,” as Kant, the
pietist, allied it, but "like the theories of many gentle pe-
dants," it is "logically of the most menacing character imagin-
able, It implied that a man might justify his act by its inward
accord v/ith reason, whatever its consequences ." On this basis
Nietzsche’s Superman may be
"entirely emancipated from traditional social mo-
rality. He may then enter upon a couhse of con-
duct entirely subversive of the public interest,
and his course is completely justified provided
only his reason approves what he does."
In fact, it is the great fault of an ethics of self-realization
in the idealistic sense (as opposed to the naturalistic sense
of the Greeks and the universalistic sense of Spinoza) that
"the moral agent is encouraged to ignore every
form of external check. ...No one else can be
a judge of one’s action, even the injured party.
For all that is asked is that the action shall
be deemed by the agent himself to spring from
his deeper spiritual being. "1
It would seem that the same poisoned spring of Kantian
^P.C.I.
.
p. 181, 239-240.

formalism gives forth both bitter and sweet (poison) — extreme
individualism and extreme social conformity and quietism. Kan-
tian ethics is at the same time the imperative of "der alte
Fritz” end the license of the Superman. This will become more
apparent as we proceed. Need we again point out that the dual-
ism between motive and consequences is, as Perry, himself
recognizes, foreign to Kant^s ultimate meaning? If an individ-
ual’s reason dictates harmful results, he is not willing, or
valuing, reasonably. The strength of his moral theory, as of
his entire philosophy, rests not in its dualism of form and con-
tent, of will and end, but in their resolution in experience.
Absolutism inherits, as we have seen, Kant’s ethical dif-
ficulties. In tracing all activity of thought to the absolute,
're, in the reduction of all values to one, and all freedom
to reason, it becomes deterministic, tolerant to the extent of
indifference, quietistic, and fatalistic.^ It is here that the
"leveling tendency" of idealism becomes explicit.
"An absolute optimism must view everything
in the world with a sort of condoning tolerance.
One may distinguish' some things as better than
others, but nothing if it be real at all, can be
unmitigatedly evil. "2
For this position Perry can of course find abundant evidence in
the writings of Bosanquet, whom he quotes, Hegel
,
Bradley, and
Royce
,
whom he does not mention. One may admit the truth of
his criticism that such a view "contradicts an out and out
hostility to evil." As a result, the practical effects of ideal-
ism are null.
Ip . 0 .
1
.
,
p. 249.
Ibid
.
,
p. 246.
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"7/e are not to replace an evil state of things
with a good state of things, v;e are to make evil
good. ...Thus in his attitude toward men, the ideal-
ist v/ill tend on the whole not think of their suf-
fering and wretchedness as something that can he made
i away with, but rather as something that has its good
side, its spiritual significance 7hat is needed
is not destructive zeal, house-cleaning, the scotch-
ing of evil— but rather a deeper insight in which
the sound and perfect whole is revealed."!
The failure of absolute idealism to account for the posi-
tive character of evil is a part of the charge of formalism and
equivocation which Moore as well as Perry make against it.
"'.Ye cannot admit the actual validity of any of
the arguments commonly used in Theodicies; no such
argument succeeds in justifying the fact that there
does exist even the smallest of the many evils which
this world contains. ...Accordingly we have no
reason to maintain the paradox that an ideal world
would be one in which vi^de and suffering must exist.
The reality of evil cannot, however, for Moore be any greater
than that of good
,
which he divorces from reality. Perry
earlier stated the case against the solution of the problem
of evil -by absolute idealism,
"We do not judge of sin and error from ex-
periences in which they conduct to goodness and
truth, but from experiences in which they are
stark and unresolved.”^
The failure of absolute idealism and pantheism to account
for the empirical fact of evil is a real inadequacy in such
systems, though it is hardly to be advanced by naturalistic
thinkers who, like Perry, make it contingent upon subjective
^ interest, or, like Moore, distinguish it from the real. More-
over, the criticism of formalism does not do justice, even to
Hegel, in so far as the destruction of evil is usually the
^P.C. I.
,
p. 249; cf. P.P.T . , p. 178, 185.
^Princ. ilth
.
.
p. 220.
^Ap. to Phil
.
.
p. 367.
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completion and perfection of a state of being that had been
only partly coherent, partly unreasonable and contradictory.
It overlooks the fact that for Hegel the way to the absolute
way
is not merely the intellectual^of the philosopher but the way
of moral effort to reveal absolute spirit in subjective and
objective spirit. Yet the criticism is justified, for in the
light of 9ur personal ideal, evil is definitely positive, and
not merely negative. It must be regarded as such: pluralism
is the only solution of the metaphysical problem that can so
regard it.
This Perry recognizes, "Personal idealism, like common-
sense Christianity, holds to the goodness of C-od
,
and is corres-
pondingly doubtful of his omnipotence. Indeed the personal
idealist avowedly sets limits to God’s power; and has some
difficulty even in providing a place for God at all. In short,
the first interest of personal idealism being in the personal
moral consciousness, theology has to be cut to fit."^
Ethical generalizations, it is evident, are difficult
from idealism as a whole. Perry himself deduces from it extreme
egotism and a pronounced authoritarianism and traditionalism,
"absolute optimism" end Schopenhauer’s pessimism, quietistic
determinism and, in the case of Berkeley, ’booperative spiritual
endeavor. "2 We have tried to defend a pluralistic idealism
whose ethical consequences are an ideal of personality (con-
ceived as harmonious value-achievement), individualism supple-
mented by the fact that rational values are social, empiricism
^P.Q.I .
.
p. 215.
^Ap. to Phil
.
,
p. 303
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that recognizes evil, i.e, in the sense of meliorism, which
implies optimism, and cooperative spiritual endeavor. The same
confusion of consequences is to be discovered in his discussion
of the social consequences of idealism, to v/hich we briefly turn.
2. The Social Oonsequences of Idealism . Perry’s objections
to the social consequences of idealism are four in number; the
quotations given from Moore show that he is in essential agree-
ment with most of them. All arise from ethical considerations
already discussed, and need not detain us long.
a. Idealism is excessively individualistic.^ Nietzsche,
as we have seen, is the direct consequence of Kant, freed of
social inhibitions.^ Its individualism is a direct consequence
of its arrogant anthropomorphism, and according to Perry, finds
expression in absolutism, in so far as it involves the cardinal
principle as well as in subjective and pluralistic idealism.
The ideal of self-realization culminates in vicious individual-
Ism,
"There springs from idealism man’ s romantic
belief in himself; the pride that claims the world
in the name of those spiritual powers which are
man’s prerogatives. It is a short step from be-
lieving that you are like the Absolute, or a part
of the Absolute, to believing that you are the
Absolute.
b. But idealism also culmlnaii'’es in the subservence of the
individual to higher social groups— preeminently the state in -
Hegel’s and Bosanquet’s thought. Against the background of the
Ip.P.T
.
, p. 188.
2p.C.I.
, p. 181, 177-178.
3lbid
.
,
p. 239-240.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 233-234. Note the significance of the microcoam-
raacrocosm idea in idealism.
‘A
jj t
V'>-
y. .
•:c
ir. V-\' n;il*c; ajU ;: ,';v
.
.
jrt’i .. re‘I- V.. O'- i-.: :.;i oJ .€i *. y0 «: f- •.•>-••
'
***'•
-
^
t
’
.
'
-
.- .’i.-rOrw. : $;• ;i
-'*c
;.cf^ Vi.-- h r ;*!(;-> ^ i r ,
'.. w,. . .
-
'i. or-./ ijt v'J C*^'
.1. :i*c.C p.C‘:a. lie'll ivtig «.:”s.. ; ^ .i vXf (i
f&fioa '
..v-. i'."a Tr. i*i.< ,L ..,,i.'‘’v ': ;'iJ i J.Ttic;
.Ta -•: J ,.i
,
. ; ;: i/s a f
exSv l: ' . i 'yi j i '^nJt yJ.JvJ r.F:'yC'x t
? ^
^
' *
t
:! -j: ::
.‘"a
I %
«
'
'
•••'•'
t
.•
• it:
.•••.: at :/ no .n.i .! *>.*• ^
.;. : v.-' crv'^‘i rr r
- /. V ;: • „ i .!. 'iyi:;-;;
- ioiii r
. fL :'j :> vn nt
,
•: J
•;•..'
"•.
’;r3tX
,
... ,1;-
-
, V 1 J VS 1 /
; •••. - • -t ••'•/ M ..
,
.u • ;.l '>•'.
335
World War, Perry traces the "excessive” state consciousness
of the Germans to its idealistic source. The state, according
to Hegel, is an organic unity completing the individual, and
possessing internal and external finality. A similar anti-
ir;dividualistic concept is Royce’s "Great Community" to which
the individual owes loyalty;,^ and Bosanquet*s concept of the
gtate as an organic whole.
The charges of extreme individualism and of extreme
anti-individualism have frequentl;y- been made against idealism,
sometimes against the same type. Thus absolute idealism is
egotistical for Santayana, and subordinates the individual
2
to the social group according to Perry, Sheldon, and others.
But if the s 3^stem is both individualistic and social in
its ethics, it can hardly be said to be either in extreme.
Idealistic ethics, with its fundamental religious interest,
has succeeded better than any other ethical tradition in
reconciling the ideal of self-realization with the ideal of
altruism. Absolute idealism may be self-contradictory in
attempting to retain both its Kantian ethics and its absolutis-
tic and deterministic metaphj^sics, but more voluntaristic
and indeterministic types of idealism harmonize the two view-
points in the ideal, as Perry himself recognizes.
Idealism "emphasizes, it is true, the in-
dispensableness of social relations to a developed
self-consciousness; but the socialized self is
I only a step toward the realization of that absolute
self in v^hich a man is encouraged to find his true
sphere and onl3^ genuine reality,"^
P P* 251-271.
't The Strife of Systems , p, 169.
^
• T
,
. p, 189.
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That the two motives can be harmonized in an ethical ideal is
shown by the attitude of German morality— the state is an end
in itself, but at the same time, the state is a cultural ideal
and thus a cultural instrument for the individual.
Furthermore, it may be pointed out that the issue between •
individualism and social solidarity lies deeper than idealism;
that naturalistic schools themselves may be divided by it is
shovm by the laissez faire ideal of Spencer on the one hand,
and the collectivism of Karx and Comte on the other. Perry
himself reaches no solution of the problem of social ethics
that cannot be found in personal idealism.
1
c. Idealism is opposed to so cial pro,^^ress .
"As idealism tends to be out of sympathy
with the current notion of human society as
the working force of the spiritual life, so it
tends to discredit the complementary notion of
progress
,
as the measure of v/ork done."^
Its eternalism "contradicts the common man’s conception of pro-
gress. ...The tendency of such a philosophy is to cultivate a
sense for the values of the past
,
rather than a condemnation of
its futility and backwardness.”
Idealism justifies v/ar. Though Bosanquet pictures harmony
and peace among the nations, both he and Royce have a conception
of social structure that justifies war, since in the case of
Bosanquet it insists that external peace must rest upon ’liealthi-
ness and enlightment" within, in the case of Royce in so far as
he stresses the moral and cultural mission of distinct nationali-
ties . ^
^Note his demand for a "personal integration that shall
be socially justified;” G.T.V.
,
p. 676.
§P.P.T.
, p. 189.
*^P.G.I
. , p. 274-275, 279.
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d. As a result, idealism "is not at heart syiripathetic with
the modern democratic conception of philosophy," since its ideal
"is not the gradual amelioration of life through the human con-
q^uest of nature, but rather the perfection that was from the
beginning and is forever more."^ It opposes democracy (1) by
the extreme individualism of its ethical ideal, (2) by the subor-
dination of the individual to higher groups, (3) by its "level-
ing tendency" which "overrules the flat differences and uncom-
promising oppositions that guide the empirical end practical
intelligence
.
Perry’s criticism of absolutism as it arose in the days
of Napoleon and the Holy Alliance is thoroughly justified. Its
social consequences are implied in its system. The consistent
Hegelian can write only a descriptive ethics; but not so the
consistent pluralist and voluntarist. And this Perry himself
recognizes. <Uth the ethical and social conclusions of personal
idealism he has no quarrel, though he regards it as theoretically
unstable between his own naturalism and absolutism. If self-
consciousness collapses, personal idealism must become natural-
istic (as Perry does) or absolutistic
,
depending on the direction
of the collapse. If, however, self-consciousness is real (as
.
'7.
Perry admits when he discusses self-love),*^ any idealism which
is not deterministic, which recognizes the fact of evil, and
which bases progress upon the effort of consciousness toward the
realization of ideal values, is not subject to the ethical and
^P.P.T
.
,
p. 188.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 190.
^G.T.Y
.
,
p. 666.
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lit'
social limitations which Perry has described.
3, Idealism and Reli,s:ion . Moore, as we have seen, rejects
not only religious truth but religious sanctions in morality.
Perry’s interpretation of religion, on the other hand, is strong-
ly colored by his own early reaction against the ministry. For
him religious truth is valid only in so far as it sanctions mo-
rality. In the papers of his first creative decade he seeks (i)
to define religious experience in such a way as to make dispen-
sable the traditional conception of God, (ii) to distinguish the
cognitive factor in religion— the belief "that a certain correla-
tion of forces, moral and factual, is in reality operative, and
that it determines the propriety and effectiveness of a certain
type of living,” from the imaginative and derivative, including
the "personality of God," and (iii) to justify religion, thus
restricted, on a moral basis, ^ By contrasting his view with
that of orthodox Christianity, he arrives at a contrast which
distinguishes the religious consequences of idealism from his
own views as to its validity. Idealism may sanction either of
two types of religious experience. (a) The universalistic vol-
untarism of Schopenhauer and the universalistic intellectualism
of Hegel and absolutism, culminate in ”the religion of mysticism
and pantheism," in which "identification with the Absolute "is ’’the
consummation of life," and which is marked by "a profound willing-
ness that things should be as they really are." (b) Berkeley’s
spiritualism, and all pluralistic voluntarism, on the other hand,
^Ap. to Phil .
,
p. 53-ii3;'See p. 97; The Moral Economy ,
p. 214-256.
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ends in "the religion of cooperative spiritual endeavor," in
which "God is the general of moral forces." The religion of
pantheism, however, may become, as it did in the Romanticists
and Royce
,
"a religion of exuberant spirituality," "a knowledge
of both good and evil, and a will to serve the good, while
exulting that the evil will not yield v;ithout a battle.
In contrast to these views Perry himself advocates a
"religion of renunciation"— "the grim and ironical religion
of last resort" which is compatible with any philosophy, and
most of all with those philosophies which deny men’s first
hopes, because it "explicitly repudiates every spiritual or
moral ontology."^
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to determine from
this exactly the type of religion which Perry advocates. As
opposed to the extreme renunciation of Russell it advocates
"moral optimism," and holds that "renunciation is as fatuous
and unreasonable as it is gratuitous."^ Oa immortality it
is silent, on the nature of God it fluctuates. Perry being
sometimes a theist advocating a finite God, sometimes reducing
God to a social ideal or objective for the future. In so far
as he is theistic his view of religion is close to that moral
ideal of personal idealism.
It is the religion of mysticism and pantheism peculiar
to absolute idealism v/hich Perry chiefly opposes.
^Ap. to Phil .
, p. 303, 390-392, 304-305 ,,.394.
^P.P.T.
,
~193, 344.
3lbid.
, p, 345-346.
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"The religious consciousness proper to
absolute idealism is both pantheistic and mys-
tical, but with distinctions. ...In absolute
idealism both G-od and nature are resolved into
the self. For that which is divine in experi-
ence is self-conscious, and this is at the sarae
time the ground of nature."!
This conception shows the grounds for both Perry^s and Moore*
s
distaste for mysticism, which they know only in its pantheis-
tic form, not in the personalis tic "dialogue" form with which
personal idealism is compatible, and in this form it becomes
synonymous, as it is used by them, with the formalism and equi-
vocation of absolutism as a whole. ’Mysticism is the express
admission that the first principle cannot be properly charac-
terized at all."^ "Love of God" falls, for Moore, under the
head of "misdirected affection." !'erry, it is true, recognizes
the dualistic meaning of mysticism, which he finds in James,
and holds compatible with that thinker’s view of a finite God,
with which he himself is in at least partial sympathy.^ This
work shows a much stronger theistic emphasis than Perry’s
earlier and later work. (See below, p. *4>'7 . ) The mysticism
which he attacks as formal and empty is the absolutistic
"identity" mysticism which he learned from Hoyce, not from
James
.
But aside from its tendency toward mysticism, which is
meaningless, idealism, according to Perry, brings confusion
to religious thought at two of its crucial points— the nature
of God and the nature of immortality.
!Ap. to Phil
.
,
p. 391-392.
^F.P.T ., p. 185; cf. Princ. Eth.
.
p. 199-200.
SP.G.I
.
,
p. 345-346.
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a. Idealism and the Problem of G-od. The God of absolute
idealism is without value for religious life because of his
very absoluteness and perfection. He denies the demands of
the human individual and has the negative ethical consequences
characteristic of absolute idealism.
"As for an Absolute God in whom all evil
is contained, and by whose will or purpose all
things must be explained, I feel strongly at-
tracted to the view of Francis J^acon, who said:
»It were better to have no opinion of God at
all, than such an opinion as is unworthy of
Him. For the one is unbelief, the other is
contumely: and certainly superstition is the
reproach of the Deity.
This does not, it is true, do justice to the element of change
and conflict in the Absolute of Hegel, who is, as Royce points
out, "a man of war," But it is difficult to derive a chang-
ing reality from logic as Hegel and the realistic panlogists
do, and the criticism of an absolute God in the traditional
sense, completely undetermined and hence completely indefi-
nite is justified.
The idea of God held by personal idealism, on the other
hand, is that which arises out of the consideration of the
fact of evil in the world. "God, in this view, is a Power
p
struggling for ascendancy." .Vith this view, which Perry
finds in James Ward, Percy Gardner, Hastings Rashdall, and
George Howison, and to which he returns in discussing James,
the war seems to have made him temporarily sympathetic. He
finds in it "a sufficient ethical basis" and respects its
^P.G.I.
.
p. 250.
^Ibid
.'V p. 216 .
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"underlying motives of individualism and manly courage.
But, as we have already seen, Perry believes personal
^
idealism to be an unstable compromise between naturalism and
absolutism. Phis is true also of its idea of Grod. Though it
gives "unity to the moral enterprise,"
"God being in this philosophy divested of
supreme authority in the world, his position
is relatively insecure. He may for strictly
philosophical purposes be a superfluity. The
self-sufficient moral persons become so self-
sufficient that the world tends to become a
spiritual aristocracy or fraternity rather
than a spiritual monarchy."^
This general criticism of personal idealism we have already
noted, and have tried to show that there is a possibility of
giving i't stability and a need for a supreme person in so far
as the world is contingent and orderly, values are objective,
and human purpose presupposes a more ultimate purpose.
b. Idealism and the Problem of Immortality . On this
question Perry is far less clear. He attacks the notion of
immortality only as it is held by absolute idealism and by
Howison among the pluralistic idealists, while Moore had
criticized it only in the ambiguous forra, independent of
theism, put forward by McTaggart, The only immortality of-
fered by absolute idealism is not "even remotely relevant to
the religious issue" since "man’s chance of life after death
^ remains in as great darkness as before.
"Immortality, in this view, means not a
life in the time to come, whether in another
^Ibid.
, p. 330.
^Ibid
.
.
p. ^17.
Sp.P.T
.
,
p. 191.
^vi:
;
i 'i
.
;-) 'fV: tti> if Aitii ^:,i'iA
i\,.
,
nsf'S y 5/.v.n
'
•
^vn:-. :- . -..
"1
...
• i\ 'ri ji " ic, •> d;'.;.. r'j 5i|'
. ^eft 'Ic;* T'.,/ ^ c<«L«j s t: ^ih/V
,
i'*' I ^ 3vo»: o r-
I
'
rr’. p •" : jt t
,.V . :W
yo w'. .. vi'.'i.i v!i''.« Bill? ;zi
'./.*!& A •• ' '' \::i - . &*u/vH'ir.‘i vfrv.wnXtrf iii
i*i'*
.
.
J. iA yo '• f-%r-.o
,
fx;, '.
Gi, c • Xr.' iorj'i
& itcftots v;.' r, fcX'. s)’n mi3 Zo.i'^ SiTt-ici •'. •
‘li-rfi
-'i Y,*.tlKTi
',
)?“"•: TO \t. .riL-OJCiI-Ifl
,
ivK - t* .’ ; r r. 3>
y/AT '^r ^ ? tiv:'-.i; ?>V. •:.8 .:i.'50 f>| j Ic 0 r'.; i 1.0 XiA:t:..r';;,
’V
1 a.' v;’
I
:,:d i LriO':( ?'.ni 0 T 3 :.?. -Aj;':r v?c/^ r
,
T?5*. GA- /:i : >'• .' -^nyrt/ui? a loi ^icdjr a 6uir vwiU.dv?U' .+'•.
;
iJ'^i'dr •’ ,
:
jvX-'Ot^io r-fiB d ;iftv.: ; V ;o:' ^’ ' •• r .,
^i/'X UJor;:.; ,J’; _t:; c
-
cvi'i:: •
'
-‘ ^ '1 O"" '. • i PC' T : I ' L. -• rtfi t i.<a .
O P|A)..i^'’.*: '
:rt'J :
\. -• if f
>
•*'
' IXA j.,^.
4 - ^
• i.
O \Z Jt L
' « i-
“ T ! '
: 1 'j i. » 1 • . .
V j\ L . : ’r t,
>'* .:
.
.
''' ••
t' -.5
'’
-
-
. i.O'Z'; • : V:-T*i'.
.
.
' 5 ot>rir':flo *iLur. or. ir ^jj-.i:*,i '
. dTo'tfA'J u3 - jtt&T; - : 'f T*. '
.• '^'*1 ,we-iv ^ ^ : i.
,
Vvj iXea’*:o(jif[j j'
ni TvifdQ-- jif
rn
\idL
343
i)
world, or in the meaning of posterity, hut a
place in the eternal whole. Immortality of
this type is not a distinction. There is noth-
ing so humble nor so detestable, as not to find
its place. "1
Against this interpretation of the implications of abso-
lute idealism for immortality E, Brightman has clearly
stated the case for the opposite. Perry is included in his
criticism of the historians of our period v/ho "have not paid
sufficient heed to their sources, but have either ignored the
bearing of the systems or immortality or have deduced from
their interpretations of the 'systems what the philosophers
should have believed."^ Personal immortality is certainly
possible and consistent v/ith the theory of crganic truth, if
the autonomy of the personal individual be not denied, as it
is not if pluralistic idealism rests on epistemological dual-
ism, and truth itself is subordinated to the category of con-
sciousness, In the case of personal idealism, as illustrated
in Howison, the possibility of personal immortality rests on
the question of whether the moral autonomy of the individual
can be preserved in the face of the apriori principles of
being and morality— the Kantian dualism between freedom and
rational determinism which we have already discussed. In so
far as personal idealism surrenders to Kantian determinism as
interpreted by Perry, "the soul which survives death is not
that soul which v;as in the time before death, But v/e have
seen, in harmony with the Oxford school rather than with Howison,
^P.G.I
,
,
p. 280.
^^Immortality in T^ost-Kantian Idealism
,
Cambridge: Harvard
U. Press, 1925, p. 38-39.
^P.G.I.
.
p. 213.
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that on a dualistic and personalistic basis, the constitutive
activity of consciousness can be reconciled, both with the
^ organic theory of truth and with a pluralistic metaphysics.
From this viewpoint the Kantian epistemology does not make'
immortality impossible.
It is certainly not possible for Perry’s Aristotelian
naturalism and behaviorism, and, in so far as he and Moore
are indifferent to the problem, their criticism, even if jus-
tified, would not be a criticism of idealism, but only an
indication of its failure to defend religion. That failure,
we have tried to show, is unnecessary. It remains to show
that Perry’s and Moore’s fundamental naturalism and material-
ism cannot provide a basis of a normative personal value ex-
perience.
The criticism of the practical consequences of idealism,
it may be said in summary, is itself unstable. There are
two sets of consequences, depending upon whether Kant is de-
veloped pluralistically and voluntaristically, or monistically
ana intellectualistically. . ^/ith the first set of consequences
Perry is himself in sympathy, though he holds them to rest on
an unstable metaphysical basis. Against the second set his
objections, though they often fail to understand Hegel, are
ultimately valid. Pluralistic idealism, if it is theistic and
rests on epistemological dualism, retains the values of the
absolutistic logic though it subordinates it to personality,
and on the other hand, provides a basis for value experience
.
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which Moore’s and Perry’s systems lack, 7/e have tried to
show that such a system is possible; it remains to show that
it is the logical completion of the neo-realistic analyses.
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PART III
THE REALISTIC ALTERNATIVES

CHAPTER IX
THE REALISTIC EPISTEMOLOCY AM) ITS IMPLICATIONS
The dialectic attack oh idealism has, as we have seen,
centered in its use of a cardinal principle assumed as having
universal validity and as indispensable to all 1. u” forms of
idealism from subjectivism to absolutism, but also on its dog-
matism, forraalism, and equivocation. Perry, moreover, accuses
idealism, particularly in its logic of internal relations, of
false motives, and of failure to justify these motives. 'He
have attempted to show the possibility of a pluralistic ideal-
ism, resting upon the cardinal principle in the restricted
sense only, in which Berkeley and Kant themselves employed it,
and supplemented by a dualistic epistemology, a rationalistic
correspondence theory of truth, and a subordination of logic
to consciousness which retains the truth in both predicative,
and relational analyses. We have yet to examine the positive
views of knov/ledge which the realists substitute, and to point
out their disagreements and difficulties.
In their positive account of experience the new realists
of England and America, among them Moore and Perry, are in
outline agreed. In opposing the epistemology of idealism,
which rests, as they conceive it, upon the principle that
knowledge in some way "generates” its objects, both substitute
the principle which Perry has felicitously called "the inde-
pendence of the immanent"^ and which Moore, more cautiously,
Ip.P.T
.
,
p. 313.
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if less tersely, describes as the view
"that not only my own perceptions, thoughts and
feelings, but also some of the other kinds of
things which I directly perceive—colors, sounds,
smells, etc.— do really exist: it must be true
that some objects of this kind exist and ere
real in precisely the same siiriple sense in which
my perceptions of them are real."l
This theory of knov/ledge we shall examine more closely in
.
three component aspects.
1. The Distinction between Conscious Activity and its
Object . Moore’s revival of this distinction, first made by
Brentano
,
is the starting poirt, as we have seen, of the modern
movement. He first makes it in his idealistic period, v/hen it
is merely the distinction between "the process of thinking and
p itthe content of thought,”*^ but later becomes the basis of his
attack on idealism, when he criticizes the use of the word
content
,
and substitutes object . In the essay on "Freedom"^
his criticism of Kant rests on this distinction which opens
the v/ay for the principals of the independence of ’Concepts as
a genus per se "and his logical realism, formulated in the
following year in "The Nature of Judgment." In the "Refuta-
tion" the distinction appears, not as applied to concepts, but
to sensations
,
and idealism’s error is found in its failure to
recognize it."^ This conception becomes the dominant one in the
succeeding years until lioore’s msingj phenomenalism causes him
^Phil. ot
. ,
p. 90.
^Mind, 6(1897)
,
p. 236.
^Ibid
.
,
7(1898)
,
p. 198.
^Fhil. St
.
,
p . 13
,
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to modify it,^
But the formulation of the principle also occurs in a
broader scope, applied not only to thought and sensation, hut
p
to memory, feeling, will, as Brentano had formulated it.
In the broader sense every experience from simple feeling
and sensation to the complex processes of volition is separ-
able, in some way, into awareness and object, with the added
complication that the awareness may itself be an object of
awareness.^ Three stages may thus be noted in Moore *s use
of the distinction, a. The first stage applies it to all
experience. This stage is represented in the Principia
Bthica and early essays in Philosophical Studies . b. Later
Moore seems to surrender the emphasis as applied to feeling^
and retains the principle as applying to sense-data and
universals, c, With the increasing phenomenalism of his
latest thought sense data themselves are independent of
mental activity only in a most questionable sense.
With the distinction between thought and object
Perry, in general, agrees, though he does not make it
fundconental in his epistemological discussions. He recog-
nizes it as Moore's chief contribution to the criticism
of idealism. It is a "distinction that it
Proc, Arist. Soc. , 3 (1903), p. 82; Ibid . . 4 (1904),
p. 139: Ibid ., 21 (1921J, p. 133; Phil. St ., p. 169.
2 ”The Subject Jlatter of Psychology," Proc. Arist . Soc .,
10 (1910 J, p. 38; Princ. Bth ., p. 90; pleasure vs. conscious-
ness of pleasure.
4 Phil. St ., p. 25.
Due perhaps to such criticisms as C. A, Strong’s, Mind .
14 (1905), p. 176-179; In Phil. St. ,p. 79, feeling appears to
be mental.
- Jour. Phil., 1 (1904 j, p, 76; P. P. T. , p. 321.

will prove not only convenient to employ but important to em-
phasize’,'^ but he ultimately rejects it, as we shall see, for
a view which reduces consciousness to its object, following
the Humean rather than the rationalistic position.
The arguments for the position may be grouped in two
classes, the logical and psychological. I'he logical argument
is negative. Analysis must penetrate to ultimate elements.
Idealism has identified awareness and object through the fal-
lac y of pseudo simplicity; further analysis is possible and
2is justified by common sense. To assert their identity is
to assert a contradiction. If "experience of green" is sim-
ple and irreducible, then experience is both "something uniq^ue
and different from anything else," and is "entirely indistin-
guishable from green."
This type of argument has already been discussed in the
section on method. Moore’s difficulty is entirely verbal and
of his own making. The difference betv/een "experience of
green" and "green" has intimidated him. In the case of cer-
tain objects, as Strong has pointed out, the contradiction
is obviously meaningless. Thus, the experience of pain may
be something unique and different from anything else, and
yet indistinguishable from pain. All that needs to be done
is to separate the mental object from its external or objec-
tive reference. The realistic dogma lies behind Moore’s in-
sistence on the distinction.
^P.P.T.
, p. 308.
^Phil. St
.
.
p. 13-14.
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Another raotive is revealed in Moore statement of the
psychological argument, advanced as the only reason for the
\ distinction in"The Subject Matter of Psychology" Conscious-
ness and its object
"are always distinct entities .. .for the fol-
lowing reason. ....\liat I remember, what I
will, etc., may be in each case different, yet
what I mean by ’remembering’ or ’willing’ may
be in each case exactly the same."^
Consciousness of different colors is the same, but the colors
are different; ergo consciousness and its objects must be
distinct.
That Moore seems here to have a hidden source of infor-
mation concerning consciousness is obvious. It is not at all
as self evident that consciousness of blue is identical With
consciousness of red, as he insists it is. In fact, the re-
lational view of consciousness, and the distinction between
conceptual and numerical identity, his own theories, militate
against his view. Moore’s ovm attempt to defend his view in
opposition to Laird’s, himself a realist and holding to the
distinction between activity and object, in essence surrenders
the principle of identity of conscious relation, for here he
admits that each cognizing is qualitatively different from
every other, since its data are constitutive of it.^ But he
does so only by surrendering the unique distinctness of con-
sciousness apart from its object, and thus by approximating
Perry’s— and the idealists' view* To hold that conscious acts
^roc. Arist. 3oc ., 10(1910), p. 38; Gf. Phil. St . , p. 170.
<®ie Character of Cognitive Events", Proc. Arist. Soc.
,
21(1921)
,
p. 139-140.
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are identical though their objects are different is a glaring
instance of the fallacy of abstraction or the fallacy of the
universal, repugnant to nominalistic thinkers, t
I
Moore’s recognition that idealists themselves recognize
the distinction as an abstract one, but merely deny that con-
sciousness and its objects are mutually independent, and his
efforts to meet the idealist’s accounts, themselves involve
contradictions
.
a. He presupposes the principle that the consciousness
—
object relation is external.^
b. He insists that it is a contradiction to hold that
”two things are certainly distinct yet are not separable,
But two qualities which are dependent may be considered sep-
arately, as for example, the color apart from extension, the
being of things apart from their essence. His analytic pre-
suppositions are false.
c. He objects to the use of the term "content” instead
of "object" as applying to the relation betv;een sensum and
object. If blue is the content of consciousness it must be
in the same sense as it is the content of flower,— the whatness
or essence of an asserted existent. Yet that such a content,
in the sense of a quality
,
of consciousness may exist, Moore
is not ready to deny. We have no reason for supposing that
jh there are mental images, as did Reid, but if there are, they
would be such qualities.^ He merely doubts that they exist,
^Fhil, St
,
,
p, 15,
^Ibid ,
,
p, 15, 16,
^Ibid
.
,
p, 22,
^Ibid,
, p, 24; cf, Froc, Arist, Soc ,
,
10(1910), p, 58-59.
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But at any rate, sense-data are not mental; as against Stout,
7/olf is right in holding that only images are mental; they are
not acts of consciousness but their objects, Hume makes his
mistake in confusing the tv^o.^ They are not qualities or con -
tent of mental acts, whether they exist independently of the
activity or not.^
It. will be seen, then, that Moore nowhere proves the
distinction he insists on, but defends it ultimately as jus-
tified by common sense. That the distinction is an abstract
one in psychology Perry explicitly admits,^ thus in distinct
disagreement with Moore, who, in turn cannot prove the inde-
pendence of sense data from consciousness,^ Meanwhile, the
idealist has a strong case in his favor, who insists that,
though the distinction is an important one, as it makes pos-
sible logic, and indeed other sciences, as independent of psy-
chology and epistemology, it is after all an abstraction; that
by the principle of least action, r^tivancy, and valid induc-
tion, subject and object are separable but not independent
aspects of the same process. So 'J7ard replies in criticism of
Moore’s distinction by adhering to the philosophic tradition
from Locke to Avenarius,
^Prbcv Arist, Soc,, 10(1910), p, 58; cf. Perry, P,P.T,
,
p, 137-138,
.
^Ibid ,
,
p, 60-61; Moore, as we have seen, in his earlier
period, and Perry as well, use the term content in place of
object. Perry, of course, agreeing with idealism against Moore
that the distinction is an abstraction, ^ut reducing consci-
ousness to its objects rather then objects to consciousness,
^Ap . to ,Phi l
, ,
p. 216, quoting 0, Kiilpe,
^Phil. 3t,
,
p. 182; Proc. Arist. ^oc ., 10(1910), p. 60-61,
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’’The subject persists and changes, the
object (idea, Vorstellun^
.
das Vorgefundene )
likewise persists and changes--that is the mean-
ing of experience. The two together, acting
and reacting, constitute a whole for every
experient. - - - \71ien, then, we talk of a sensa-
tion, we mean, I think, primarily and properly,
a change in the objective whole, or continuLun
objectivum
.
as I have ventured to call it.”l
Perry thus rightly concludes that Mocre’s distinction
provides him ¥;ith a rjurely abstract and meaningless account
p
of awareness itself," Consciousness apart from its object
(psychological, net metaphysical^) is a meaningless abstrac-
tion, But by asserting the independence of psychological
object from consciousness he surrenders the only possibility
of accounting for it. By reducing consciousness to object,
he surrenders its autonomy and makes it necessary to define
individuality (inconsistently^ with his logical pluralism) in
biological terms. That Perry can readily be amended idealis-
4tically has been shown by liiss Callcins and others. It is the
recognition that his definition cf consciousness - ’’Conscious-
ness is selective response to a preexisting and independently
existing environment” - may be corrected with one v/ord; con-
sciousness makes selective response to an independent envir-
onment, In either case the distinction between consciousness
and its psychological object or idea is invalid, but the
dualism of idea and ontological object may yet be retained,
J Proc . Aris t. Soc, , 17 (1917), p. 156.
i P. Pr'T. . p. '321-323.
^ Cf. Ward, op. cit
., p. 458, for the significance of
the two meanings of object; so also Mocre himself in Princ .
Eth
.
.
p. 191, on seeing a beautiful object and yet seeing
nothing beautiful whatever,
^ Jour. Phil
., 24 (1927), p. 557-581.
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But this distinction is not adequate to establish the
realistic epistemology. Taken seriously, as it is by Moore
,
it leads to the definition of consciousness in terms of an
abstraction— a relation "unique" in some way, an activity
"transparent" or "diaphanous" in nature and therefore not ex-
perienced ,now considered as particular, now universal. But
it tends to destroy itself, as in the case of Perry, where the
form. It is presupposed by the two characteristic dogmas which
follow it.
2, The Pr inciple of Direc t Apprehension . Epistemological
Monism . Both Moore and Perry seek to revise epistemology by
abandoning the old dualism which arose in the representational
theories. In this they recognize themselves as having been
anticipated, not by the realists like xReid,^ but by the ideal-
ists like Berkeley and the post-Kantians This is, as we
have seen, unjust to both idealistic schools. Berkeley’s
epistemological monism extends only to sensible things, and
his monistic statements are due to the sarae abstract and fal-
lacious distinction between mental activity and its content
(or object) which I core has emphasized, while Hegel’s concept -
tual monism, almost anticipated by Malebranche’ s account of
the innate ideas "in God," are applied only to thought on its
absolute level, not on the perceptual level which the present
discussion is concerned with. Yet this is enough to indicate
that for realism the principle of direct apprehension is not
indefinable "uniqueness" of the relation remains in simplified
f. Phil 3t .
. p. 58; Pj.P.T. , p. 307.
j P* 1^3, 126, 144, 149. Jour. Phil., 6(1909P n
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to be separeted from that of independence; it is the latter,
not the former, which is its "cardinal principle,"
We turn to their statements of the principle in order to
examine the greatest difficulty involved in it— the question of
its scope. We at once discover a distinct divergence, within
lloore’s thoupght itself, in the scope of the principle, which he
variously calls "experience ("cognition of what is true"], "ob-
servation," "direct perception," and "direct apprehension,"!
8, In his Platonic period the knowledge of concepts and
propositions is immediate, and therefore all knowledge is imme-
diate, for reality consists of conceptual relations; time and
space being unreal, and existence itself a concept,^ Sensibles
are universals related to the concept of existence. This phase
of his thought is carried over into his later empirical period.
It shows itself in his definition of experience as a particular
type of cognition, and opposed to imagination and memory,^ and
in his characterization of volition and feeling as instances
of cognition. 4 if direct apprehension includes all concep-
tual consciousness, and this includes feeling and will, this
is obviously the broadest sense in which the principle is to
be taken. It is in this broadest sense, it may be added in
passing, in which Hussell in his early writings, but not in
the Problems of Philosophy, and Laird, interpret the terra. It
is noteworthy that Moore insists throughout that consciousness
may have immediate knowledge of conscious states.^ Here Russell and
!proc. Arist. i^oc, ,3(1903)
,
p.84; Phil , St . ,p . 69, 173-174,
^.lind
,
8(l899),~p. 183, 192.
Sproc, Arist. Soc
. , 3(1903), p. 84-86.
^Princ. Eth
.
,
p, 141.
5proc. Arist. ‘^oc.
,
2(1902), p. 187; Phil, 3t . , p. 25.
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Laird both follow him. Perry is in decided disagreement;
self-consciousness is merely the Immediate experience of
"characteristic sensations due to bodily posture and respira-
tory changes"— "sensations of internal motion and strains'.'^
b. But in his later empirical period Koore tends to re-
strict the principle to two pb jects—consciousness itself,
and sense-data. Other knov/ledge
,
in particular the concep-
tual knoviTledge and perception of reality gradually tend to
become indirect. In the ’’objects of perception" this empha-
sis is not yet complete
,
for sense data are still a part of
physical things. In the case of the perception of a red book
and a blue book side by side,
"we certainly observe (or directly perceive)
one color, which we. call blue, and a differ-
ent color, which vie call red; each of these
we observe as having a particular size and
shape; and we observe also these two colored
patches as having to one another the spatial
relation which we express by saying they are
side by side. All this we certainly see or
directly perceive now.
"
The properties ascribed to the objects as books are not direct-
ly perceived.^ Nor is memory a case of epistemological monism.
"I shall express this relation, which I cer-
tainly do have to a sensible when I actually
see or hear it, and most certainly do not
have to it, when I only think of or remember
it, by saying that there is in my mind a di-
rect apprehension of it,"^
sensibles being regarded as including images of all kinds as well
as "sensations proper," all of which have "some common intrinsic
^P.P.T.
,
p. 294-295.
^Phil. Bt
.
,
p. 68.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 173; cf
.
p. 148.
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property which we recognize, but which is unanalyzable.^
Perception now becomes an inferential judgment, of which the
subject now is a sensible or complex of sensibles.2
c. In his later v/ritings Moore, returning to the term
"perception" instead of "direct apprehension," seems to hold
that the knowledge of physical things is itself immediate,
sensibles tending to become phenomenal. , His intuitionalism
is thus strengthened, but he is put in the difficult position
of having to reconcile the immediate with the inferential na-
ture of perception.
may take Moore’s second position as characteristic of
his view, for the sake of contrasting it with Perry’s. Ac-
cording to Moore, perception (earlier confused with sensation)
is not immediate, but an inferential judgment;, so also are
memory, imagination (though not images), and thought. Imme-
diately given are sensibles only. In this stage Moore’s
epistemology easily reduces to the Kantian view of the con-
structive activity of consciousness upon a sense manifold
"given" from without, and is subject to the criticisms of
that theory. His view in this period tends also to contradict
his first position, that concepts are immediately given, for
the categories are now secondary to and derived from sensa-
tions. fhey are not, as in Kant, forms of the mind, but in-
here in sensations, which cannot, therefore, be simple. Either
categories must be given irrmiediately with sensa, or they must
llbid.
,
p. 170-171.2md
.
,
p. 227-230.
^Gont. Brit. Phil .
.
ii, p. 195, 198.
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be mental. In so far as Moore holds to the first position
rather than to the second, he must surrender his faith in
analysis. Intuition thus increasingly becomes a refuge from
problems which he dpes not successfully solve.
Perry’s statements are far less empiricel end more dog-
matic, and hence less easily separated from the third aspect
of epistemology— the doctrine of independence. His dogmatism
saves him from the dilemma of Moore, the v/ay of escape being
the broader application of the doctrine of epistemological
monism, in the sense of Russell and Laird, ^ Criticizing the
"immediatism" of James and Bergson for its anti-intellectual-
ism, his task becomes the resolution of the two interests
—
imiaediatism and intellectuelism; he accomplishes it by an
assertion, and thus merely pushes the problem of the relation
of sensum and concept a step back into the realm of the sub-
sistent.
'^Vhen I perceive Mars, the sun’s satellite
(body) is ray percept (mind); and there is no more
contradiction than in supposing that my uncle
is my father’s brother."
ViThy? Because "these are sensible qualities and logical cat-
egories common to both,"^ "Epistemological monism means
that when things are known they are identical, element for
element, with the idea or content of the knowing state, an
identity which is possible only because the structure of con-
sciousness and things is the same— relational,
^See his definition in Jour, Phil . , 6(1909], p. 712;
also, P.P.T
.
,
p. 231-239.
^P.P.T
.
,
p. 311, 310.
^Ibid
. ,
p . 126
.
V,.>:'
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It need not be pointed out that Perry’s monism is more
thorough going than Moore’s (except in the period of 1898-1900),
because the latter has become a substantialist end therefore
cannot remain satisfied with a relational account of the
world. Hence their epistemological theories are distinct in
meaning, in spite of the fact that both use a relational ter-
minology. For Moore to be immediately given is in his second
period a spatial event, ^ even the immediate experience of
awareness itself being a spatial relation^ (though later,
when sensibles themselves are no longer spatial, immediate
apprehension is no longer a spatial event). ^ kVhat space sig-
nifies for Perry it is extremely difficult to say; his dis-
cussions are shrouded in obscurity.^ It is real,'^ yet con^
ceptual, symbolizing non-spatial relations;*^ his analysis of
physical things implies that it is relational; in general it
is not to be defined as a whole, but reduced by analysis.^
thought
There is mediate knowledge in Perry’ s^that
,
itself, re-
duces to immediate knowledge. The evidence for immediatism
or for iramanentism is empirical and is not to be questioned
by idealists or realists. That something is given or imme -
diate ly known is beyond dispute and necessary for knowledge.
Perry recognizes that not epistemological monism, but inde-
pendence, is the crucial doctrine for realism? In’ other words
Iphll. St ., p. 70-71.
^Qf. Phil. St ., p. 92 with p. 184; 1906 with 1914.
Sp.P.T., p. 100-104.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 105.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 256-257.
^Ibid
. ,
p. 104.
'TpTpTt.
,
p. 313.
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as Dewey puts it, it is the "multitude of theories regarding
what is immediately and infallibly known"! that provides the
grounds of dispute, not merely between idealism and realism,
but between realists themselves, Loore holds to the immedi-
ate experience of awareness itself, of sensibles, and possibly,
certainly in his earliest period, of concepts, but not, except
in his latest writings, of physical things, nor of things
remembered or thought of. Perry, by his analysis of reality
into conceptual aind sensible structure makes all knowledge,
perceptual, cognitive, recognitive, imaginative, purposeful,
in the last analysis, immediate experience. He recognizes
that there is knowledge of a mediate nature, but insists that
it be reduced by analysis into immediate experience of sense
data and universals.^ Mind’s objects are therefore not merely
particular existents, but may be "non-existent or generalized."^
Moore’s theory must meet with the objection from the physiologi-
cal relativity of sense data. Perry’s both with that and with
the objections arising from the psychological relativism of
thought, We defer a discussion of these objections, however,
until after presenting the theory of independence.
The narrov/er scope of the principle as held by Moore is
not the only respect in which his theory of "immediate appre-
hension" differs from Perry’s "epistemological monism," The
latter reduces consciousness itself to its object (though Perry
is not consistent in this, as we shall see), the former usually
^The Q.uest for Certainty
, p, 183,
^P.P,T ,, p, 515,
^Phil, Rev,
,
26(1917), p, 477.
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asserts the distinct nature of conscious activity.^ Thus
for Ferry "experience" includes consciousness, while for
Moore "experience" is the immediate data of consciousness.
The doctrine of epistemological monism rests on the false
dilemma that reality must either be experienced iimaediately
or not at all. Hence it asserts the doctrine dogmatically
,
without proof, in order to escape skepticism. The overlooked
alternative is that reality may be known but not immediately,
knowledge consisting of the validity of the external reference
of the mental objects which I do Inow immediately. This valid-
ity is conditional upon (1) the activity of consciousness in
conformity to logical law, and (2) therefore upon the ultimate-
ly logical, that is to say rational structure of reality.
3. The Doc trine of Independence . The third fundamental
principle is capable of statement in various forms, the con-
tradictories of the varying meanings of the cardinal principle,
of idealism, some of which are-' consistent with objective
idealism in the sense previously stated, i'he following mean-
ings are to be distinguished in the somewhat ambiguous state-
ments of Perry and Moore themselves.
a. That some reality is independent "of experience,"
or of the finite experiencing consciousness. The doctrine
taken in this scope contradicts only solipsism. Consciousness
is aware of something independent of it*
b. That some reality is independent of all consciousness.
Isee Chapter X.
%hil. St.
,
p. 27; See Froc. Arist. Soc ., 17(1917), p. 420.
mi
tU -'i:
' }
'
. i
: .•L'U'.
' J' ' V
,
Jo.j ^
• Vi x»ri -. to*T
; . ., J ui
' tj'vt’O,'
' !• 1
"
>4 r".' N- >• l.^.
... ,v.ur:
,.. . 'jOnt. . /I ^
: V? 't- • I 'rv iw « ‘ v .
j
w
. <.
.
iii^v ' !:.;'J (. . . . .' ^
1 i lyiT • . •• 'iC',.
Ji . .xyiiC :. ... • 0
(i| Xcr .
. ''•J l?^oi .•*; ' . •
' cyitt. -v. ( ?-
tr. . vv v ,.
••'’
'i. .... »v
’
-;t ‘_c
~ K* i'W't . 'L JOf
'
. : v''£^ » t
' :v
f f t
.f,
»
.
A
,
A , y
j,,--.
>.U . >•
.
363
In this form the doctrine opposes all metaphysical idealism,
c. The particular epistemological doctrine that the
^ immediate data of consciousness are independent of it. The
earlier forms of the doctrine have been adequately discussed;^
we are here interested in the narrow epistemological view
which combines the doctrine with that of epistemological mcn-
ism. As we shall see, the crucial problem again becomes ~what
objects are independent of consciousness and therefore in
what sense "immediate ” is to be used.
0
For Moore the principle of independence is first asserted
in the realm of logic, where, like Husserl three years later,
he combats psychologism. Concepts and propositions are in-
dependent though he still reduces concept as well as sjilogism
to judgment "as the fundamental and unique act of intelligence."
But in the logical period he asserts the independence of pro-
position and concept of mental activity,^
In criticizing James, however, truth is no longer an
objective relation, and to stress the independence of propo-
sitions is to stress merely their "immutability and permanence,"'^
In this period and later the principle of independence is as-
serted only for sensibles and the physical things of which they
^The ambiguity as to the meaning of independence itself
^
has been admirably, though only negatively, cleared up by Ferry
himself in his well known article in The New Realism . 7/e are
discussing only the application of the principle to the problem
of knowledge.
%ind
. , 6(1897), p. 535, 538.
^Ibid
. , 6(1898), p. 178. The discussion of judgment in
the Principia Eth i ca rests on this view.
4Phll. S^TTp. 130-137.
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are sometimes representations, sometimes effects, sometimes
properties, "We can and must conceive that blue might exist
and yet the sensation of blue not exist. Sometimes "external
facts" is used, and the scope of the principle becomes obscure,
depending upon the inclusiveness of such facts, but they are
usually to be interpreted as sensibles and the relations be-
tween sensibles which in some way constitute or represent ma-
terial things,^
Perry’s statement of the principle is much more sweeping.
'
"A thoroughgoing realism must assert in-
dependence not only of thought, but of
any variety whatsoever of experiencing
.
whe-
ther it be perception, feeling, or even the
instinctive response of the organism to its
environment. ...It (the realistic theory of
independence) means that things may be, and are,
directly experienced without ow ing either their
being or their nature to that circumstance ."^
It asserts that "it is impossible to argue that
because a thing belongs to mind it therefore
owes its existence to the fact."^
This is the cardinal principle of realism, the negation of that
attributed to idealism.
'/Yhat is the meaning and scope of the principle? Perry
defines it clearly, but somewhat negatively in The New Realism .^
Simple entities, though the minimum cognoscibile may be a
complex, are independent of consciousness (both "impressions"
and logical indefinables ) ; so are sensible and logical com-
plexes— things, logical and mathematical propos itions —while
^Phil. St
.
,
p. 179-180; See also, p. 162-153, 163, 169,
179-180.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 188.
5eP.T.
,
p. 315.
^.iind
, 19(1910), p. 331.
^p. 126-150.
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parts of consciousness as such, all values, works of art,
and other human creations are dependent on consciousness.
Perry there differing from Moore in the direction of sub-
jectivity, though Moore also admits the latter point
—
goods
may, and usually do involve consciousness, but not necessa^ -
ily so.
The arguments advanced in favor of the doctrine cf in-
dependence (i) of sense data, (ii) of universals
,
(iii) of
complexes, physical and logical, (iv) of values (in the case
of Moore) may be again discussed as logical and psychological.
a. The logical argument is negative. The idealist has
not proved the dependence of objects upon knowledge, indeed,
his view leads him into logical fallacies and contradictions.
Hence independence must be true. This argxmient
,
in the final
analysis, largely suffices both Perry and Moore particular-
ly the argument, already examined, that though knowledge of
t'ther selves may yet be possible we have no reason for regard-
ing it so unless we assume the independent reality of seme
objects of perception, advanced by Moore in "The Nature and
Reality of Objects of Perception" and heartily approved by
Perry. ^ Thus independence is necessary to avoid solipsism.
But this argument is plainly verbal. To avoid solipsism it
affirms its opposite. May not the idealist do the same? Is
the realistic attempt to overcome solipsism any more justi-
fiable than the idealistic? Dewey’s comment catches the
^P.P.T
.
,
p. 317-318.
^The New Realism
,
p. 146. See Chapter YII, A.
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spirit of the realistic reply admirably.
"There is something querulous in the sweeping
denial that things as experienced, as perceived
and enjoyed, in any way depend upon interaction
with human selves. ...'/iHiat is it but arbitrary
dogmatism?"!
Moore frankly admits, with his characteristic leaning
upon comraon sense and intuitionalism, that the doctrine of
independence cannot be proved.
"There is no reason v/hy I should not confidently
assert that I qo really know some external facts,
although I cannot prove the assertion except
by simply assuming that I do."^
The basis of Moore’s intuitionalism we have already examined
and found to make impossible, by Moore’s own admission, any
criterion of truth whatever.
But the idealist, in reply, challenges the realist to
supply positive evidence for independence. Positive evidence,
if it is available, must consist in evidence that things ac-
tually experienced exist when they are not experienced. Moore
falls back here, again, upon his intuitioralism.
"Just as I am certain that I do know some
external facts
,
so I am also certain that there
are others which I do not know.”^
But when he comes to examinej the positive evidence for this
assertion more closely, he is forced to admit that there is
only the
"strong propensity to believe that sensibles
of a kind to be defined in some such way, do
exist unexperienced," though he admits "the
belief may, of course, be a mere prejudice."'^
^The '.uest for Certainty
, p. 183, ^76. Gf. his charac-
terization of the new realism as "still Lockean," p.,184.
^Phil. S t.
,
p. 163-164.
^Ibid., p. 163-164.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 182.
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Perry, too
,
restricts his discussion of this question to the
assertion that we can know that there are objects which we do
not know— a proposition which, from the idealistic viewpoint
may be eagerly admitted.^ For this argument rests, after all,
on the empirical fact that experience has an objective reference,
and that we may conceive objects which we do not perceive as
having existence independent of us. The argument is in com-
plete harmony with the position of objective idealism.
b. Perry, however, does a more surprising thing for an
empiricist. The arguments for the principle of independence
have been, thus far, purely dialectic. Purposing now to ad-
»
vance ’’the reasons for supposing that there are things that
are not known,” he advances, instead of fundamental deta, two
highly disputed theories— that of the externality of relations,
which makes it impossible to reduce dependence to mere rela-
tionship, and the theory that consciousness is biological func-
tion.
”'7e need, in other words, to forsake dia-
lectics, and observe what actually transpires.
7ie then find that consciousness is a species of
function exercised by an organism. The organ-
ism is correlated with an environment, from which
it evolved, and on which it acts. ...There must
be something to be responded to, if there is to
be any response."^
It is hard to see that the death blow of idealism has been
struck by these words. A few historical considerations con-
cerning the relation of Hegel to the evolutionary and natural-
^P.P.T
.
,
p. 318.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 322-323.
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istic philosophy would have shov/n that the individual may he
in interaction with an independent environment without (1)
necessitating a definition of personality in terms of biology,
and 12) v/ithout denying that the environment is itself con-
scious in nature.
The epistemological principles of realism as propounded
by Perry and Moore, we must conclude, are dogmatic and em-
pirically unfounded, save as the fact of objective reference
leads us to assume a reality independent of our knowing con-
sciousness. This Moore recognizes more clearly than Perry.
Moreover, in our own case, it may be shown empirically, that
objective reference is not essential to conscious content, but
secondary; thus making it possible to conceive a consciousness
for which reality is more largely than in our own case depend-
ent or internal. The realistic epistemology receives its chief
strength from its criticism of opposing views. It is not em-
pirically grounded, but rests, positively upon "initial predi-
cation,” which, if it be a fallacy for idealism is equally one
for its adversary. The realistic case for independence rests
(a) on a negative definition, as absence of dependence but not
of relation, (b) on the mere possibility of it, (c) on no posi-
tive empirical evidence for it, and (d) on the false assumption
that the only alternative for the independence of the immediate
objects of consciousness is skepticism. But as we have seen
in earlier chapters, these are exactly the faults which the
realists have found in the idealistic arguraent for its cardinal
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principle. Moreover, we have shown that idealism can do justice
to the truth in independence hy surrendering the principle that
knowledge of the independent order is immediate. The doctrine
of independence as here formulated may be shown historically
to have its origin in the soul substance doctrine of Descartes,
Locke, and Berkeley, the view in which an active soul contains
inert ideas. Moore most consistently preserves this basic
dualism, adding merely the assertion of independence of the
ideas. Perry, early recognizing the dependence of mind on con-
tent and surrendering dualism in favor of Kume
,
faces Hume’s
problem in regard to consciousness and becomes less consistent
epistemologically, gradually interpreting consciousness as
function rather than relation.
Meanwhile there remains the outstanding consideration to
be advanced against the realistic epistemology— the problem
of the relativity of laiowledge
,
in particular, the physiological
relativity of sense data, and the general problem of error.
After all,- it is by their success in meeting these facts of
experience, which gave rise (a) to Berkeley’s principle of the
mental nature of sensible things, and (b) the dualistic epis-
temology, that their systems must be judged.
4. The Relativity of Sense Data . We have already shown
that both Moore and Perry neglect the positive empirical ar-
guments for idealism, and thus only gradually feel the need
of attempting to account for the relativism of knowledge on a
realistic basis. This was not the case among realists in general.
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W, P. Montague, one of Perry^s associates, began a discussion
of the problem of physiological relativism in an article criti-
cizing C. A, Strong’s Why the Mind has a Body ,^ in v;hich he
brushed aside the problem as irrelevant for the controversy
between realism and idealism. 0. A. Strong replied in the same
Journal^"Idealism and Pealism','] in which he argues empirically
from the fact of correlation of perceptions with brain events
to subjective idealism as preparatory to panpsychism. From this
start the signific^ance of the relativity of perception to the
nervous system and to psychic factors was frequently discussed,
2Montague again in 1905 recognizing the element of subjectivity
in perceptual objects as- "consisting in their being tied up
with feeling tones," and insisting that
"there is in the argument an absolutely fatal
weakness
,
a fallacy so obvious that one marvels
at the fact that it has ever escaped notice.
The fallacy is simply this: the relativity from
which objects suffer is a relativity to other
objects and not at all to the percipient sub-
ject." ’What the argument really proves "is that
the existence of any immediately experienced
object is conditioned by the relation of other
objects (viz., the elements of the nervous sys-
tem) which are not themselves perceived at the
same time . "4
Further attempts to meet the idealistic argument were made by
McQilvary in America, and by T. P. Nunn in England,^ the former
Ijour. Phil., 1(1904), p. 293-300.
^Op. cit., 1(1904), p. 519-526; 543-551.
^"A Neglected Point in Hume’s Philosophy," Phil. Rev . ,
14(1905)
,
p. 30-39.
4lbld.
, p. 33, 34, 35.
5
"The Physiological Argument Against Realism," Jour, Phil .
,
4(1907), p. 589-601; "Are Secondary Qualities Independent of
Perception?," Proc. Arist. Soc . . 10(1910), p. 191-218.
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by denying the independence of sense qualia , the latter by
making relativity objective as did Montague.
Moore apparently becomes aware of the problem through
G. A. Strong’s essentially Berkeleian use of it to prove both
secondary and primary qualities subjective.^ His first attempt
at a solution does not, like Montague’s, objectify relativism
in some form, but avoids the difficulity by a distinction which
Moore derives from the realistic tradition. He distinguishes
between perception (which is immediate^, and "the process by
which we have come to perceive so much. "2
"The fallacy of this argument (for the
dependence of sensibles on the condition of
our nervous system) seems to me to lie in the
fact that it does not distinguish betv/een the
existence of the sensibles which we experience
and the fact that we experience them . 7/hat
there evidence for is that our experience
of sensibles always depends upon the condition
of our nervous system."^
Concerning this negative answer of the problem through a
distinction derived*, it would seem, from Reid,^ between the
conditions and the fact of perception, several comments are in
order. (a) It rests on Moore’s old dualism between the menial
act and its object, and is hence untenable for Ferry, who neg-
lects to retain this distinction, reducing mental act to object,
(b) In so far as Moore has already claimed that the activity
ICf
. ,
"Has Mr. Moore Refuted Idealism?" Mind 14(1905), p.
174-189. Moore, in overlooking the relativistic argument is
held to criticize only objective idealism. Parallel to this
is Love joy’s criticism of Perry, eight years later.
^Phil. St
.
,
p. 68.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 183.
"^See Rogers, A.K.
,
Ena;lish and American Philosophy Since
1800
,
p. 6.
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of perceiving red and blue are identical, it contradicts what
definite physiological evidence is available concerning sense
experience, for the physiological processes involved are not
identical. (c) Its background, in general, is psychophysical
parallelism rather than interactionism
,
end like that theory,
it ends in a question, a question which is carried over into
the metaphysical problem of the reality of the physiological
and physical processes usually considered as standing in cau-
sal relationship with sensations. Thus Moore hesitates to rec-
ognize the truth of theories explaining color in terms of wave
lengths, though he admits that ^the view that this is so deserves
a great deal of respect."^ The analysis of physical things
into objectively exacting sense data faces a dilemma when con-
fronted with scientific generalizations; either it must be
pragmatic like Mach, and call them conveniences of thought, or
it must ascribe sensibles to the ultimate entities of science
rather than to the physical things of common sense^ so that
it is the atoms or electrons which have primary and secondary
qualities. The latter view cannot be Moore’s, save in his
earlier logical period; his common sense and pragmatism alike
threaten the objective validity of science, but, unlike prag-
matism, he sacrifices the objectivity of science for the rel-
ative insecurity of Common Sense— interested in establishing
the material reality of inkwells and red and blue books.
^Phil. St
.
,
p. 89.
^See T. P. Nunn, "Sense Data and Physical Objects",
Proc. Arist. Soc
. , 16(1916), p. 176.
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(d) The truth in Moore distinction between the act and
object of sensation may be found rather in a distinction which
his theory makes difficult for him— that between sensation, a
physiological process not expressed in its simplicity, and
perception, which is mental activity. But for him the analyses
of sensation and perception are identical (though sometimes
perception is held to be immediate, sometimes it involves in-
ference .1)
The tendency of realists to regard relativity as ultimate,
to tolerate, as does Moore, distinctions between what sensibles
are and what they seem, to ascribe, as does Nunn, to the ulti-
mate abstractions of scientific analysis, color and other pro-
perties, shows hOT/ precarious is their frequently proclaimed
friendliness to science. And this is recognized by the most
penetrating realists today, who abandon the desire to defend
science and seek to remold it to epistemological and logical
considerations. Thus Hasan writes in rejecting the physiolo-
gical account of sensation,
'liOgic and theory of knowledge cannot allow
science to prescribe to them. The business of
science is to study physical phenomena and their
relations. When it undertakes to explain per-
ception and knowledge it oversteps its boundar-
ies and is no more science.
IbS rejection of the significance of physiological considera-
tions for sensations shows how thin the empiricism and scientif-
ic spirit of realism are.
^Phil. St.
, p. 67-71.
^Realism, p. 31.
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But granted that sensations are objective, how can one
explain their relativity? This problem, as we have already
seen, persistently perplexes Moore and causes him, in the end,
to surrender his original epistemological principles in favor
of at least a partial phenomenalism. (a) When the problem is
first raised he conceives the possibility of contradictory
sensibles occupying the same space, differences of perception
being due to conscious or organic selectivity. The false pre-
supposition of Berkeley’s arguments from relativity is "that
if a certain kind of thing exists at a certain time in a cer-
tain place, certain other kinds of things cannot exist at the
same time in the same place. "1 This involves, it may be pointed
out, a surrender of the common sense notion either of sensibles
or of space, for clearly, in this view, sensibles and space do
not have the close relation they appear to have. Yet it is
the view retained by most English realists, among them Laird,
Nunn, and Alexander.
(b) But Moore is forced to surrender the view, not because
it is inconsistent with science,^- but because it contradicts
common sense. The coin appears elliptical, but really is
round, as he later puts it. B[is answer is to admit some sen-
sibles phenomenal, others real.^ Again, he admits now that
it is impossible for two conflicting sensibles to be in the
^Phil. 3t
.
,
p. 94-95.
BThe entire distinction between primary and secondary
qualities arose in an attempt, shown by Berkeley to be vain,
to avoid the fact of relativism.
^Phil. St.
, p. 93, 94.
r-
•
•V'm : » ^ »•'*»•
Y/C. ,vvtj'0er'-ro f."cn ii/5"-
: >. r T*
.
'. ': ' *Ji1/ nijsl.isv
rf :^.t5^:. CO •bnr^' ^
t
*•
‘ I ^•
.
' (.
.••1
.
':-*/
-'
;;
''
';
:. :.:„•! ^ . “'*‘<S., .r. - •
. / J iJi.£:^ • f .• rC ‘in.; • : ., ..-
/t.. . '....J c. i.ai'UO t n 13 5S/X ' *:' i i
'ro.ivr*
.,
,
.3 S.-U3 ? c:i:- :v • ..
' .'• vlr-V^-rc c ‘O ivjt j.nfsrf
; v * if!-.^i'l ;2 j aTj'i'.in’rfi “ ^ . :v. . .r ^ "c
'*i'. c £! :ii sr ^^ ?!> e (JTj ’-..i .J *10 fc*ii>: n{jt»vi&p o *jfjp
br.j.tiOJ :5c<' '•. ; i
,
••^.•vj't T.:i
. t/r»
'
'
.
‘ :ii^ fjsrAe
’
^ J
-'
.1 ' -. .’. ‘-
'^.'.i 'J ' fo>.T ' ' 7 Tii*
,
Juo
,
*'•
' “
«V 'V '.'
,
\'f. 7 T._ -<o
iTiC-
,'c;f5 v;i>r' '
'
•'*: O'ccic j( -j
• •-
''-'fi : rn , --' .-••^3
. 1 . : r- ,
’’ '
''
U
: \v^
>l I
i
Jar. •, •.•.*«•** .. • '.
.
; of '5}SO j 3:';.
.b^jcroc.4i 01 o I iJi# ^cr?-?' iccooi^I ei^
,
: V : f. I n :,-./:;O0
‘ 70-;-:ia -.{: , ...
*.v5i J 3j / j.,or o¥/: v^; cr;.*’: f’i 3j
I . •»•.
rl - ' V
,
I n- J v‘ . ' '
, w' ,.i...‘ :’.; ;j i:
'
. t
•
'V c.jt* xii i' '.uiJ K'
. -vJ^i, .i-c-’i vi.^' i;lc<v*^ c-r
• I
^
375
same place, "but holds that both exist at the same time.^ Some
exist in ”my private space," some in "physical space. From
this stage it is a mere step to the admission, in 1916, that
sensa merely "represent" things "accurately," but are not phy-
sical, nor constitutive of objects.^ In the following year
sensa are real which are "localized and referred to an object,
and in "Some Judgments of Perception," this view is retained,
while the object itself is only secondarily known as coupled
in judgment with sensa. ^ At any rate, the fact of psychologi-
cal relativism causes Moore to surrender his theory of direct
apprehension either (a) for physical things, or (b) for some
sensa. In the latter case, he is unable to advance a criterion
for distinguishing real sensa firari unreal.
From these difficulties Perry escapes, at least verbally,
as Moore might have had he never advanced beyond his earliest
logical realism, by holding to the ultimate reality of univer-
sale, If the reality of space, time, existence itself consist
in their logical nature and relations, all difficulties can be
escaped, not only for perception, but for memory, which, Moore
holds, is avowedly dualistic. Perry monistic.
So it is not surprising that Perry shows a startling dis-
for
regard and failure to appreciate the significance for realism
of the problem of the physiological and psychological relativism
^Ibid
. , p . 184.
glbid . , p. 187.
^Proc. Arist. Soc .. 16(1916), p. 222, 223, 219.
4proc. Arist. Soc
. , 17(1917), p. 428.
Sphil. St
.
,
p. 234,
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of sense data. He does not seriously discuss the problem until
in his last utterance, in Contemporary American Fhilosonhv .
though continuous discussion must have kept him aware of it,
at least since 1904, He misinterprets motives in a way that
enables him to avoid it. In "Conceptions and Misconceptions
of Consciousness" he regards it, as he must ultimately do, as
final and unresolvable ,1 holding that idealism offers no solu-
tion for it, Berkeley makes primary qualities mental, not
because of their relative character, but because of his empiri-
cism.^ Hume’s motive for avoiding the principle of "the inde-
pendence of the immanent" is found in the fallacy of "exclusive
particularity," not, as it actually is, in the fact of physio-
logical relativism.^ Limiting his discussion to physiological
relativism, he shows it irrelevant for idealism.
"If relativity is to be advanced as an
argument for idealism, it must be, not a rela-
tivity of ideas to body, but of body to ideas.
It is in the essay on "Realism in Retrospect" that lerry
is most explicit in his discussion of the problem, and in his
exposition of his general position— that relativism is a pro-
blem for realism and idealism alike, and is not in itself an
argument for idealism but for skepticism.^ Physiological
relativism leads to skepticism, which *is idealism ofa sort, but
^Fsych. Rev
. , 11(1904), p. 296.
^Ap. to Phil ., p. 279-280.
Sp.p.T,
,
p. 137-139. Cf. Hume’s Treatise, ed . by L. A.
Selby-Bigge
,
p. 210-211.
"^P.P.T.
,
p. 138. Cf. "Some disputed Points in Heo-Realism,
Jour. Phil
. ,
10(1913), p. 462.'
bcont. Am. Phil.
,
ii, p. 193-194.
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a bankrupt insolvent idealism— patently self-contradictory,"
and is to be escaped only on the basis of physico-chemical
realism or "agnostic realism. ” So physiological relativism
is no comfort to idealists. Psychological relativism, on the
other hand, "Ls a skepticism of thought rather than of sense—
"thought is held to be an effect of emotion, v/ill, habit, imi-
tation, historical development, or social milieu . The only
idealistic escape from it is "the absolute idealism which modern
real ism -seeks to slay," an escape which consists of two steps
— the discrediting of sense-perception, and the conception of
thought as essentially creative. Both of these steps the real-
ist, as we have already sufficiently seen, refuses to accept.
Perry’s final analysis of the significance of relativity
for the controversy between idealism and realism seems to us
to miss the mark even more than Moore’s, It is true that Berke-
ley and Hume argued from the fact of physiological and physical
relativity chiefly, and that the data here permit the inference,
not of the mental nature of sense data, but of the absence of
a substratum of material substanc e. In this sense Bakewell and
Miss Galkins are correct in holding that the fact of physiolo-
gical relativity does not prove idealism but is an argument
in its favor. 1 But the facts of physiological relativity and
of psychological relativity as defined by Perry do not exhaust
the problem. The positive aspect of the question is entirely
neglected by Hume, negated by Perry, and only indicated by
Berkeley; it is the fact of the creative activity of thought
Iphil. Rev., 18(1909), p, 503; Jour. Phil,, 8(1911), p.
453
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in perception. The act of perception (non-existent as consci-
ous for Perry; real but abstracted from its object by Moore)
follows the physical object in point of time, if science is cor-
rect; how then can it be identical with it? Constitutive fac-
tors of consciousness in perception are being investigated as
empirical facts in psychology, particularly in the researches
of the Gestaltists; meanwhile their emphasis at the same time
makes it clear that not a sense-manifold in the old atomic sense,
but a state of differentiation in continuity, perceptual and
conceptual, is the primary data of consciousness. The dilemma
in which the realists find themselves, in short, is this. The
object of perception does not correspond to the object of science,
of which Perry, at least, claims to be the champion. The one
is relative to physiological and psychological functions, the
other, by the very aim of science, is objective and absolute
(even the ultimate relativism of contemporary physical science).
Either the relativity of perceptual objects is objective and
ultimate or it .is subjective, and the perceptual object is
psychologically conditioned. In the former case, science is
invalidated. The most consistent panob ject ivists are forced
to dethrone science (Hasan)
,
to make it subjective as does the
pragmatist (Mach), or tomake its ultimate concepts the basis
of relativity (Laird, I:unn)
,
which is unsatisfactory since the
perceived relativity of color is not relativity within the
atom but in relation to the perceived object as a whole. The
defense of common sense, and of scientific analysis are thus
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mutually contradictory.
He may conclude, then, that the realistic attempt at a
solution of the problem of relativity, which culminates, in
Moore, in a phenomenalism which is meaningless since it is not
referred to mind, and in Perry in making relativity ultimate
and objective, cannot adequately meet three types of objections,
(a) The scientific demand for universality and objectivity.
Here realism might agree with pragmatism in making the concepts
of science mental, but is kept from doing so by its inherent
Platonism. (b) In particular the objection of psycho-physical
investigation which shows the idea to be conditioned by, and
subsequent to, certain physiological processes. (c) The ob-
jection from the experienced fact of the activity of the mind
in creating meaning. On the problem of relativity the realist
can do justice to neither of the^ two interests which he pro-
poses to defend— common sense end science.
Meanwhile, is it so certain, as Perry wishes to imply,
that the absolute idealist, and in general, the idealist who
finds the criterion of truth in the lav/s of identity and con-
tradiction, cannot overcome relativity in the field of thought
without sacrificing the mental nature of thought, and without
denying the validity of sense experience as an abstraction from
science? Perry's error lies in accusing all idealists of ex-
clusive particularity. The object of perception may be con-
ditioned both mentally and objectively; its objective metaphy-
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sical relation may be causal and its objective epistemological
relation may be the unique one known as knowledge, A percep-
tion may, as the realists claim, be analyzed into sensa, con-
cepts and relations. All of these may have objective signifi-
cance, though in differing degrees, and the perception as a whole
may be valid for reality. But it is the perception as a whole,
not a mere judgment, as Moore in his later period finds it to
be, but involving an entire complex of judgments 7^^^he basic
mental fact, not its constituent elements. On the other hand,
the perception may be invalid,, either because of the invalid-
ity of the sensa, or of erroneous judging activity; it is, in
last analysis, the solution of the problem of error which be-
comes the crucial test of the realistic epistemology.
5. The Problem of Error . For the exhaustive analysis to
which the new realists, particularly the Americans, have sub-
jected the nature of truth and error, philosophy is permanently
obligated to them. Neither truth nor error is all of the same
nature nor from the same sources. But neo-realism fails, as does
absolutism, in ultimately regarding error not as the opposite
of truth, but, paradoxically, as a part of it, because it fails
to recognize the essentially mental nature of both.
Truth is for Moore a permanent, immutable, and independent
relation. It’s only relation to consciousness is that it may
be taken or left. Consciousness finds it— rejects it.^ It
is reality as apprehended by consciousness. Thus the doctrine
Iphil. St
.
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p. 137.
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of direct experience is perceived in its broader scope. In
Perry’s conception, on the other hand, truth is "a harmony be-
tween thought and things"; it arises when an object which is
already "some content of mind is further dealt with (by biologi-
cal organism) in a characteristic fashion," i.e. believed or
"adopted for. the purpose of action. Apprehension, speculation
and imagination are liable neither to truth nor error; only in
relation to purpose does truth arise. Perry thus seems to com-
promise his simple relational view of consciousness for the
more complex pragmatic theory of consciousness, and to sacri-
fice, so far as truth and error are concerned, his epistemologi-
cal monism, v/hich identifies thought and object, an identifica-
tion which becomes more and more meaningless and forraal as
Perry’s psychological analyses advance. This view of truth,
outlined in the Present Philosophical Tendencies^ is modified
p itin the paper on "The Truth Problem, in which appears that of
four meanings of truth, three are objective, independent, and
directly experienced, the fourth subjective end relative to
purpose; while error is possible only as failure in this latter
sense. Thus, while for Moore all 'truth is irmnutable and ob-
jective, but capable of verification by inference, for Perry
some truth is immutable and objective, and either self-evident
or capable of verification, while other truth is subjective,
(though his original concept of consciousness has no room for
subjectivity) hypothetical, and verifiable only valuationally
.
^P.P.T
.
,
p. 325, 326.
Sjour. Phil ., 13(1916), p. 505-515, 561-573.
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7/hat, then, is the status of error? Confronted with the
realistic dilemma, which Perry recognizes is a real one,l the
two men discussed emphasir^e complementary aspects of the entire
problem, and leave the rest untouched. lioore is concerned with
the problem of error in perception only. But he discusses it
only after he has already sacrificed his earlier theory that
perception is imraediate for the view that perception is con-
scious activity of judging a relationship between a given sen -
sible and an unknown physical thing. Some of these judgments
"are mistaken. ...Here my judgment is certainly
not due to the fact that I see it to be a sheep;
since I cannot possibly see a thing to be a
sheep, unless it is one. It, therefore, is not
a judgment of perception in this sense. ...How
to draw the line between judgments of this kind,,
which are judgments of perception, and those
which are not, I do not know."^
This view stands in sharp contrast with the earlier objective
theory of truth and falsehood in "The Nature of Judgment, "3
where *^judgment is objective of mind," and "equally necessary
whether it be true or false." Thus the problem of error has
been solved by Moore only after he surrenders his theory of
direct perception; (unless that theory of direct perception is
saved by returning from his nominalistic materialism to his
original logical realism, the judgment and its conceptual struc-
ture being made once more the ultimate nature of reality.)
The same is true of Herry. At first he is inclined, like
Holt, to regard error as itself subsistent and independent of
^Psych. Rev ., 11(1904), p. 296.
^Phil. St.“, p. 226.
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consciousness,! an extreme consequence of the strong pluralistic
motive he inherits from James, But he has a strong belief in
the fundamental rationality of the universe. 2 Error, in the
careful analysis referred to above ("The Truth Problem") is
correlative only to subjective or "psychological" truth— deter-
mined by valuing consciousness, i. e. error is an attribute
only of hypotheses "which the mind creates "^but which are not
conducive to value. Some propositional complexes (hypotheses)
are thus obviously not independent of consciousness since error
is not, and Perry’s earlier epistemological position is in need
of even further modification beyond the limits of "subjectivity"
formulated there. ^ Perry’s dilemma thus is as real as Moore’s,
Error is a consequence of conscious activity, and demands, like
value . itself
,
a realm of subjectivity (defined as "dependence
on consciousness"). But his epistemological monism allows for
no such realm, but only for objective logical subsistence and
biological selectivity. For Perry a proposition is neither
true nor false until advanced as an hypothesis. So, again, there
is a surrender of epistemological monism.
It should be apparent that realism’s simple epistemological
scheme shatters on the facts of relativity, conscious creativity,
and error', while a dualistic epistemology, if idealistic and
activistic, provides for all three while still making knowledge
and a criterion of truth possible. The remaining discussion
^Ap. to Phil ., p. 416.
^^id
. , p. 416-417; P.P. T. . p. 344.
^0 p . c i
t
.
,
p. 514.
4The New Realism, p, 129-139.
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must concern itself with the ultimate problems of metaphysics
— particularly the nature of reality in general, the status of
logic and the categories, and the reality of consciousness as
unitary and active.

CHAPTER X
THE METAPHYSICAL DILEI^IMA OE REALISM
1. Neo-realism as Positivism . Epistemologically the new
realism is a reversion to the naive realism of uncritical
thought; metaphysically, so far as its position is clear, it
substitutes for the "naive objectivism" of substance the "great
objectivism" for which the absolute distinction between act and
object in all experience gives it a basis. But as to the sig-
nificance of its account of reality it is far from clear. It
is the thesis of this chapter that this account must either be
interpreted positivistically or be found sterile and formal,
as Perry found absolute monism. If it is interpreted posi-
tivistically the way is left open for a further interpreta-
tion in terms of substance
,
either material or conscious. As
metaphysically ultimate, on the other hand, it is meaningless
and contradictory with only one fact to justify it: that real-
ity, however complex, may be analyzed and found more or less
uniform by the relational logic. That it is incapable of
analysis by any metaphysical logic, or irreducible to conscious
function is still not demonstrated.
In Perry ^s work the tendency toward an admission of posi-
tivism is strong. The desire "to be just as non-coraiaittal
as possible regarding metaphysical questions" deteimiines the
limits of many of his interpretations,^ Realism not only "ex-
plicitly repudiates every spiritual or moral ontology,"^ but
T. V
.
,
p. 332, footnote.
^P.P.T.T p. 344. This is the motive of its attack on
idealism.
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it explicitly abandons the "vicarious nostalgia” of tender
idealists who demand a metaphysical ultimate,
"The realist .. .must resist every impulse to
provide a home for the elements of experience,
even in experience itself. ...The idealist will
doubtless inquire how the facts can be ’there in-
dependently and in themselves ’’ without being some-
where; and will be uneasy until he has brought
them home to consciousness. But the realist must
be satisfied to say that in the last analysis the
elements of experience are not anywhere; they
simply are what they are. They find a place when
they enter into relationships; but they bring
into these relationships a character which they
possess quite independently and by themselves . "1
So much for evidence that ierry conceives of his limitation
of the task of metaphysics as positivistic; the question of a
substantial "home" is not to be asked. At other times he crassly
supposes that reality is fully known and is what it is known as
by common sense, indefinable but capable of enumeration. Thus
reality is "a collection of all elements, principles, relations,
systems, that compose it. All truths will be true of it, and
it will be the subject of all truths. Reality is at least
physical, psychical, moral, and rational,”^ The alternatives
are thus far clear in Perry’s position— naive realism, panlo-
gism, or positivism. But positivism, in the sense of agnosti-
cism, he rejects with the substance of common sense. The
Ip.P.T
.
.
p. 316; cf. The New Realism , p. 1E8-129. In 1905,
Perry had followed pragmatism in using experience as covering
the objects of consciousness but broader in scope than consci-
ousness (Ap. to Phi l.
.
p. 411-413). Now he abandons the term
( P.P.T . , p. 314-315); in his psychological studies on the the-
ory of value he tends to return to the earlier use.
^Ap. to Phil.
, p. 419. At this time Perry has not yet
abandoned the predicative logic; hence the monistic emphasis.
^Note his criticism of Haeckel, BiicHner, Bpencer; P.P.T,
,
p. 73-74.
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alternative which he seems to accept is panlogisn, though
Perry’s reluctance in further describing his conception of be -
I ing is an added argument for interpreting him as a positivist.
The elements of reality are "simple elements or qualities
"neutral entities,” the "alphabet of being as distinguished
from any and all of the familiar groupings v/hich its elements
compose," which embraces "both sense qualia and also logical
abstractions.
A part of the plausibility of realism as logical atomism,
it should be noted in passing, arises from its failure to face
its self-imposed task. If the relational logic is to be the
key to the sciences, it should be able to reproduce the cate-
gorical nature of being. Perry himself is loud in his insist-
ence that all schools have a common Interest in doing this.
But because it remains from beginning to end tied to a descrip-
tion of experience, and abandons all normative considerations,
the relational logic remains unproductive and barren. It can-
not contribute to its self-appointed task. It can analyze laws
(relations) already knov/n; it cannot discover laws not apparent
in experience. It insists on the universality of reality, but
cannot supply it, must always presuppose it. Here lies the
fundamental ambiguity of Perry’s position— the split between
^
his logical objectivism and his empiricism. This ambiguity,
which he never clears up because he remains silent upon it, may
be indicated in two problems: (a) the general problem of the
^P.P.T
.
,
p. 137; note the uncritical abandonment of the
traditional meaning of quality .
^Ibid
. ,
p. 316
,
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relation of universality and particularity— the relation be-
tween universals and sense data; (b) the related problem (since
it effects the categories of particularity and individuality)
of the status of being and existence, as well as such subordi-
nate categories as space and time. Is existence itself a uni-
versal? If so then one must return to the predicative logic
to establish its central position and the subordinate role of
space, time, and sense qualia. Or is existence a mere type of
relat ion
,
or a certain relation? If so the general talk of
relations should give way to an analysis, classification, and
definition of relations (attempted by Spaulding in his ”A De-
.fense of Analysis.") Are space and time ultimate universals,
relation to which constitutes existence, or are they themselves
relational? The relational logic insists on a sharp division
between universals and relations. If space end time are uni-
versals, simple sensations cannot themselves be spatial but
are merely universals. Empirical particularity vanishes in
the abstract.
2. The Relational Logic and Reality . It is this problem,
as we have already seen, which caused Hoore to abandon the
logical atomism of his first realistic works. Coming to real-
ism by Platonizing Kant, he at first concludes that "existence
is itself a concept; it is something which we mean," and that
"it seems necessary to regard the world as formed
of concepts. ...The material diversity of things,
which is generally taken as starting point, is
only derived. ...An existent is seen to be noth-
ing but a concept or complex of concepts standing
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in a unique relation to the concept of existence.
This is essentially the position, though more sharply defined,
which is Perry’s, "It is no longer necessary to hold that
logical connexions must, in some obscure sense, exist, since
to exist is merely to stand in a certain logical connexion.”^
But the period following the "Refutation," being more empirical
and interested in "common sense," must also revise its con-
ception of reality. No longer is conceptual subsistence ulti-
mate, but particular physical things. Difficult as the mean-
ing of reality now is to define, it is not logical. In the
Principi a Ethica the distinction between logical be ing and
physical existence appears.^ Reality, the existence of physi-
cal things, matter, now become synonymous for practical uses,
though definition of any of them is impossible. Reality and
existence are interchangeable terms.
"'./hat is this common simple sense of the
word "exists?" For my own part, it seems to me
to be so simple that it cannot be expressed in
other words
,
except those v^hich are recognized
as its synonyms. I think we are all perfectly
familiar with its meaning; . . .V/e are perfectly
familiar with the property v/hich the one per-
ception (i.e. object of perception) is affirraed
to possess, and the other to be without. And
I think, as I have said, that this property ‘is
a simple one."^
This is a tacit admission that all conceivable meaning of a
perception lies in consciousness; the reality independent of
consciousness is now indefinable. For both Loore and Perry
l”The Nature of Judgment," Llind . 8(1899), p. 180, 18B, 183
see also Noore’s criticism of substance in Froc. Arist. Soc .
,
1(1901)
,
p. 121-122.
^Ibid
.
,
p . 183.
. cit .
,
p. 110-112.
^Gf
.
Phil. St
.
,
p. 77.
^Phil. St.
,
p. 78.
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being as independent of consciousness is an irrational, though
not, they claim, a meaningless entity, koore defining it as
^ an "ultimate, indefinable property," Perry as "an irrational
term. "1 The dependence of both on the simple indefinable prop-
erties of common sense again obscures the issue, which ulti-
mately rests on the question of whether the meaning of an entity
is intrinsic or consists in its relations.
But with Moore’s shift in the concept of reality there
is naturally to be expected a shift back from the relational
to the predicative logic. So, in the refutation of Bradley,
reality has another meaning-— 'P/hat ’Lions are real’ means is
that some particular property or other... does in fact belong to
something," but reality is not a property, as is "mammalian";
it is neither a concept or a relation. Bradley’s distinction
between being
.
and reality is recognized in the sense in v;hich
unicorns (and time, according to him) are, but are not real
but reality is to be a thing or belong to a thing . Material
(or physical) things and their properties are real or existent;
unreality is imaginary."^ But a definition of matter is itself
impossible, and Moore’s thought ends in a vicious circle when,
in "Some Judgments of Perception,"^ Berkeley’s spritualism is
made to rest upon a conception of matter which justifies his
^
rejection of it. (Does Moore here think of the "substratum
T
^Phil. St
.
,
p. 78; Monist , 12(1904), p. 448.
^Phil. St.
, p. 212, 212.
^
Ibid
. ,
p. 215.
^Ibid
. , p. 211; cf. p. 221 for "material things or physical
objects
.
^Ibid
. , p. 222-223.
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conception?) . Llaterial things are ultimately definable only
in terms of being non-mental— in the "one very important respect”
in which they differ from mental entities, though that "certain
very important respect often repeated, is never defined. All
attempts to define it end in failure. Is it the "permanent
possibility" of sensa (the ”rJill-Russell theory")? Or is it
nothing but the sensa themselves (as the American realists are
understood by Moore)? Is it of the same type as the sense-data,
but differing as whole does to part; or do sense data merely
represent or "resemble "things
,
as Locke holds? Moore at last
inclines, as we have seen, to this Lockian view, yet without
surrendering the reality of sensa, but recognizes that skepti-
cism is a near consequence
"How can I know that these sensibles have
a ’source* at all? ...It would seem that, if I
do know these things at all, I must know imme -
diately
,
in the case of some sensibles
,
both
that they have a source and what the shape of
this source is. "2
Thus Moore, already involved in a vicious circle (for if
material — non-mental, then concepts, propositions, etc., un-
less further differentiated, are material ) . saves his realism
only by another retreat behind common sense intuitionalism.
The view is in no sense an improvement on Reid’s, which was
already rejected by him as phenomenalistic. This is shown
by Moore’s frequent later temptation to fall back on the Mill-
Russell theory of "permanent possibility,"^ from which he saves
}see above, p. 8O78I
,
86-88.
^Phil. St
.
,
p. 196; for his discussion of all possibilities
see p. 188-196; 248-252.
^Ibid.
,
p. 250-251.
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himself only because of a confused sense of its inadequacy.
Surrender the naive intuitionalism of Moore, and, like Perry,
he has no escape from positivism and skepticism.
Reality is thus used by the realists in a notoriously
Pickwickian sense. The American school uses the concept of
subsistence to express the absence of an ultimate metaphysical
"home” for the elements of analysis, only to make it such a
home. Moore, on the other hand, desiring a subs tantialistic
metaphysics, is able no more than Locke, to give meaning to
the concept of material substance or to synthesize, by its
means, the antinomies which arise in the logical analysis of
experience. That this is true may be shown by two further
problems already mentioned, detailed analysis of which would
carry this study beyond its proper limits. They are (a) the
problem of the nature and status of sense data, (b) the silence
of both Moore and Perry on the aspects of experience considered
under the categories of individuality, activity, causality,
change, We may merely indicate the trend of their thought- on
these problems.
3. The Nature and Status of Sense Data . Perry does not
define sense data but conceives them as the ultimate residua
of analysis. If this is true, sense data are strictly logical
entities, - undifferentiated from concepts, and neither
spatialnor temporal in nature.
"Just what sensation is, no man can in the
present state of human knowledge confidently say.
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But it does appear to be clear that specific
sensations are peculiarly dependent on correlated
stimuli
,
A sensum is smaller than the minimum co^nosclbVle
,
yet it can
be known. On the other hand, it is to be distinguished sharply
from universals and the two are sometimes conceived as irre-
ducible, sometimes as indistinguishable. It may be added that
sense data, in this sense, are never experienced immediately
as such, but are arrived at only by analysis.^
Moore recognizes this difficulty, and the ambiguity with
which this term, so significant for all neo-realists, is used.^
Sense data are phys ical and spatial
,
though perhaps in private
rather than physical space; they are particular.^
"They include the colors, of all sorts of
actual shades, which I actually see when I
look about me; the sounds which I actual. ly hear;
the entity of which I am conscious when I feel
the pain of a tooth-ache, and which I call the
pain.
Such entities are not the ultimate results of analysis. From
the point of view of ana-lysis they are complex.® Empirical
sense data are not simple entities but configurations; they are
capable of further analysis; but sense data in any other sense
are incapable of definition. Thus we have the empiricist.
Perry, basing his system on undefined and unexperienced entities,
^Jour. 'Phil
. , 18(1921), p. 368.
^The New Realism, p. 127.
5p.p.T.
, p. 311.
^Gf . MacDougall on the error of neo-realism. Modern Ma -
terialism and Emergent -^volution, p. 140.
bGont. Brit. Phil ., ii , p. 218, where he criticizes his
use of the term in the "Refutation" and earlier writings.
6phil. St
. , p. 92, 187. 185.
'^Proc. Arist. Soc .. 10(1910), p. 55,
8Phil. St.
,
p. 188, 231, 234.
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and the intuit ionist
,
Moore, becoming nominalistic and empiri-
cal. In either case, through absolute insistence on the inde-
pendent reality of sensa, the problem of the relation of sensa
to physical things becomes acute, particularly the problem of
the experience of individuality.
4. The Inadequacy of the Realistic Analysis of the Cate-
gorical Structure of Reality . The account of reality of Moore
and Perry is inadequate since, like the materialism which
Goethe criticized, it leaves the universe "grau, totenhaft,
ciramerisch wie ein Gespenst." This is the equivalent of main-
taining the sterility of relational logic in a dynamic world.
Panlogism is plausible only when the logic upon which it is
based is a material logic, a logic of energy and change, like
the logic which Hegel developed, and the occult common sense
logic for which Moore vaguely longs, in which empirical neces-
sity would in some sense be unconditional.^ In spite of Moore’s
defense of common sense and Merry’s of science, the thought of
both is singularly devoid of references to the dynamic, chang-
ing aspect of the world. It is "transiency which the philoso-
phical mind seeks to escape,"^' but Moore escapes it by avoid-
ing consideration of it. Perry by substituting "relaticn’^ for
more particular considerations, both by analysis. As long as
the paradoxes of iieno remain, thought cannot tolerate the so-
lution of antinomies by reducing continue to fragments and
causality to function... Nor can a philosophy do justice to
^Phil. ‘-^t
.
,
p. 275.
^Ap. to Phil ., p. 308.
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contemporary science which neglects to find a definite place
for causali ty
,
energy, change. An example from Perry »s thought
is his failure to resolve his biological pragmatism and his
logical atomism. Experience consists of mental entities and
relations selected by the physical organism, itself a system of
neutral entities and relations. The activity of selection is
another complex relationship. Consciousness may be a relation
between neutral entities and at the same time the activity of
another complex. All of this is obviously possible only as it
becomes void of meaning. Such a system may aid a type of theo-
retical analysis and classification for which a use may some-
time by found, but that it aids present day science and common
sense is far from clear.
^
It would be extremely difficult to define the status of
certain categories in Perry’s and I^oore’s thought— chiefly be-
cause they are silent about them. For Loore
,
in his earlier
realistic period, causal necessity is reducible to logical
necessity.^ This is essentially the view permanently retained
by Perry; for him both natural and "moral" causality, or ac -
tivity in general, are "composite experiences" and only "pseudo-
simple."^ Moore, on the other hand, abandons this logistic
conception of cause, as he abandons the logical conception of
space and time, for a nominalistic one, though he remains a
consistent determinist. In answer to Hume’s criticispi of caus-
ality, he maintains external causality to be possible if we
^Gf. MacDougall
,
vim., kodern Letaphysica and Emergent
Evolution
,
p. 135-139; Taylor, A.E. in Hasting's Encyclopedia
of Religion and Ethics
,
xii, p. 284.
%-ind, 9(1900), p. 303.
^FTPTT
.
,
p. 100, 341, 71-72.
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regard sense-data as real and objects as "like" then,^ All
necessity is no longer logical; there is also some type of
||) non-logical but intrinsic necessity.^ Reality is mutable,^
But causality remains undefined, and, if koore’s epistemolog-
ical considerations be taken seriously, unexperienced.* To this
ultimate faith in logical analysis, the empirical objection is
v/ell made by A. Taylor.
"sVe cannot avoid raising the question why,
out of the infinity of relations open to the
study of the logician, some and only some are
actualized— have existents as their terms. Logi-
cal pluralism has no answer to this inevitable
question except that ’it happens to be so,’ and
this is really no ansv/er at all."^
But the most serious problem for the neo-realists of the
logical school is the problem of individuality, arising from
the view that relations are external. Realism’s "central
technical difficulty, as Aristotle's metaphysics already
laboriously shows you," said rtoyce in 1899, "is that vondrous
problem of the nature of individuality and as to the meaning
of universals . For a brief outline of realistic ambiguity
on this problem we must again distinguish koore’s early posi-
tion, Ferry’s highly unclear position, and koore’s later, ma-
terialistic position.
i. For the logical atomists individuality is found in the
ultimate residua of analysis (as for the absolute idealists it
^Phi l. 8t
.
,
p. 161-163; cf. Hasan, Op . cit . , p. 27Q-271.
^Tbid
.
,
p. 272, 274.
^Ibid'
.
,
p. 131.
^"Theism," Hasting’s Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics
,
xii, p. 283.
^The World and the Individual
,
i
,
p . 76.
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is found in the concrete universal, the ultimate result of
synthesis). This view emerges for Moore in his criticism of
P Kant’s doctrine of freedom in 1898.
"Things, then, in so far as they must be
terms in relations, may be said to have a self.
But this degree of selfhbccl.. would not suffice
to define the notion of freedom. "1
The principle of individuality in thin^,s is their "qualitative”
nature. But, as "The Nature of Judgment" shows, since "terras
in relations" are logical entities, individuality and identity
are ultimately conceptual. This is the only consistent posi-
tion for logical realism to hold, thoroughly in accord v/ith
the external theory of relations.
But, unfortunately, it is a theory which is inconsistent
v/ith the facts of experience, which present in its place, two
distinct meanings of individuality, to neither of which it
does justice: Cl) the individuality of experienced objects,
logically complex, but individual as centers acting or acted
upon— chairs and trees, ideals, thought systems, and prograras
of reform, and (2) the immediately experienced individual itjr
of consciousness. Both of these meanings of individuality must
be rejected by the logical realist— and are rejected, most
consistently by B. Hussell
,
and, following .him
,
by R. B. Perry.
But, as we have already pointed out. Perry does retain another
meaning of individuality, inconsistent with this basic one— the
0 '
individuality implicit in biological function. Again it be-
comes evident that pragmatism and logical realism are mutually
iMind
,
7(1898), p. 193.
n«
t
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oontradictory
,
pragmatism and pluralistic idealism here find-
ing common ground against realist and absolute idealist.
^
|| ii. But a further problem at once arises for the logical
realist; within his atomistic, logical individuals, differen-
tiation at once occurs. Some of them are particular and some
universal, and the question arises as to the relation of par-
ticularity and universality. Moore founds the distinction
between conceptual and numerical identity upon this problem,
and begins a chain of considerations which lead him to abandon
his panlogism for a more nominalistic, common sense view,^
''Universal" becomes synonymous v/ith "characteristic", "property,
"predicate," and "attribute," A particular A has the universal
P.*^ The principle of the externality of relations is no longer
universally true.
Other realists have permitted universality and particular-
ity to stand side by side unresolved,"^ But Perry avoids this
extreme. Both aspects of the world are true.^
"There is no contradiction whatsoever be-
tween their (things*) generality and particular-
ity, ...Thus a mile is a mile whatever the
particular positions of its terminal points,
and an hour an hour whatever the particular
times of its terminal points,
He finds Taylor’s distinction between ’’perceptual" and "concep-
tual" "inaccurate and confusing," and maintains that "there is
^Gf. Dewey, J.
,
"The '^hort Gut to Realism Examined',”
Jour. Phil
. , 7(1910), p. 555,
^Proc. Arist, >^oc.
. 1(1901). p, 116.
^Proc, Arist. Soc
.
,
20(192oJ, p. 133.
^Laird
,
J.
,
A Study in Realism
, p. 119.
5jour, Phil ., l(l9Q4), p. 174.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 350.
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no difficulty in attributing both absoluteness and particularity
to space and time." In his first published paper he held the
^ distinction between noumenal and phenomenal as "not an ontologi-
cal distinction."
"The noumenon can have no possible mode of
existence apart from the phenomenon. ...It
exists merely by virtue of the ability of
the human reason to distinguish between the
^that’ and the ^what’ in the subject."!
This is similar to Moore’s -early reduction of percept to con-
cept. Knowledge of the past is not conceptual as opposed to
perceptual, though he is "not at all concerned here to disting-
uish these much abused terms. The biological organism can
respond to "non-existent or generalized objects," but Perry
nowhere describes the process of generalizing He is most
consistent when he identifies particularity with a "particular"
universal relation,"* but he ususally leaves the question open.
iii. For the materialist, Moore in his later period, indi -
viduality is ultimate and universality always its property. He
has moved from the Platonic to the Aristotelian solution of the
problem,® implying at the same time a return to the metaphysi-
cal category of subs tance— essence
,
or substance— attribute, and
therefore subjecting him.self again to the criticisms of material
substance familiar to philosophy since Berkeley. This surrender
^
^Phil. Rev
.
.
9(1900), p. 632, cf
.
,
634.
^Jour . Phil . , 3(1906), p. 625.
^Psych. Rev., 25(1918)
, p . 7
.
^Jour. Phil ., 18(1921), p. 374.
^Cf
. ,
G.T.V
.
,
p. 324, where he distinguishes objective
meaning ("problematic") and various senses of subjective meaning.
6proc. Arist. Soc ., 20(l920)
,
p. 133.
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to material substance involves also, as we have seen in the
preceding chapter, (a) a surrender of the theory of direct
apprehension for a phenomenalistic skepticism or a dogmatic
entrenchment in naive intuitionalism with a resulting loss of
status for the sensibles; (b) with the second alternative, an
increasing role to be assigned to the mind in knowledge; per-
ception itself becomes a predicative judgment; (c) a surrender
of the principle of analysis and external relations.
The Platonic-Aris totelian dilemma between particular 8n.d
V
universal is thus in no sense resolved by the neo-realists.
They are most consistent as Platonists
,
but their desire to do
justice to the particularity in the common sense view of the
world remains ungratified on this basis. The -^Aristotelian
basis, on the other hand, is incompatible with their logical
method. Meanwhile they come gradually to admit the basis of
all individuality in conscious activity (as when Moore makes
judgment a mental act, and perception a judgment, when Perry
rests individuality or biological selectivity but gives to the
biological organism conscious function)
,
while steadfastly de-
nying to consciousness (Perry) or at least refusing to ascribe
to it, individuality in its own right. vVe turn now to the
obscurities and contradictions iraplicit in their theory of
consciousness
.
5. The Theory of Gonsciousness . Pluralistic idealism
grounds the principle of individuality neither in the atomistic
logic of the realists nor in the synoptic logic of the absolu-
tist, but, recognizing logic itself as an abstraction from
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l
conscious activity, in the principle of self-consciousness itself.
And here, at length, we come abruptly to the parting of the ways,
as between Perry and idealism, though Moore, cautiously, pauses
uncertainly at the cross-roads, extremely critical of the meta-
physical synthesis which McTaggart, for example, finds in con-
sciousness, and yet not at all certain that consciousness does
not involve a unitary principle of activity which may have
metaphysical significance.
Moore and Perry agree that the data of consciousness are
far more uncertain and equivocal, than the data of the physical
world. ^ Both are thus diametrically opposed to the Cartesian
tradition in philosophy, which holds consciousness itself as
the immediate datura from the content of which reality must be
constructed. So far as is evident, this evaluation of consci-
ousness is due to two considerations.
(a) In the case of Moore, it is due to v/hat we have al-
ready understood as excess analytic zeal. If object and mental
act are to be distinguished and mental act becomes diaphanous,
consciousness becomes problematic, not, however, to the coi.mion
sense Y/hich Moore champions, but to the logical, analyst
.
(b) In the case of Perry, the obscurity is due to the dif-
ficulty of introspection,^ which, in agreement with Hume and
James, he holds to reveal only elements, not self-consciousness.
Moore’s uncertanity is reflected in his much cri^ifeed
•A
failure to render any complete account of mind. He begins
^Gont. Brit. Phil., ii, p. 209; Perry, P.P.T., p. 158.
2p.P.T.
, p. 277-282.
33ee Perry’s review of the "Refutation"; Jour. Phil . ,
1(1904), p. 77; Laird, in Mind
,
32(1923), p. 87-89 for two
realistic criticisms.
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hopefully by insisting that the basic mental datum is a mental
act,^ But immediately obscurity follows clarity when one
remembers the following restrictions inhering in this supposedly
empirical datum of psychology,
(i) It is an act that must be sharply differentiated from
its object. This follows directly from Moore^s initial epis-
temological distinction,
(ii) It is "transparent," "diaphanous^" "The moment we
try to fix an attention upon consciousness ,,. it seems to van-
ish."^
(iii) Nevertheless it not only can be distinguished "if
we look attentively enough," but (in Moore’s empirical period)
is experienced as a spatial relationship, "I observe my per-
ception of a book to be near the book and further from the
table,
When Moore teaches that "awareness of awareness" is^f)6s si
-
ble as awareness of blue, what consideration can prevent him
from being involved in an infinite regress? If consciousness
is this abstract and only uncertainly experienced entity, Perry’s
criticism of the idealistic theory of consciousness is certainly
valid for it— it explains obscurum per obscurius .
^
Is there any more ultimate entity beyond the mental act,
v/hich, as we already have seen, is conceived, sometimes indi-
vidually and atomistically
,
sometimes conceptually, in the
^Proc, Arist, Soc., 10(1910), p, 39,
^Phll, St , / p, 25,
^Ibid
,
,
p, 25, 71.
^Psych, Rev
. , 25(1918)
,
p. 16.
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sense that a sound and a taste are objects of the identical
mental act? On this subject Moore’s perplexity begins. His
early essays show him to be very close to the self psychology,
yet there is in his later thought no indication that he is
aware of the need of facing the empirical fact of the unity
of consciousness or the more disputed fact of self-conscious-
ness though his "awareness of awareness," being, of course, the
equivalent of introspection rather than of self-consciousness,
is a universal element in all consciousness. He advances a
positive theory of the self in opposition to the idealists,
Bradley, who denies the reality of the self, and McTaggart,
who reduces personal identity to a causal relation between
mental states.
"This .. .which distinguishes us from any
other thing or person ajb the present moment
is certainly what constitutes the chief ele-
ment in the meaning of self. ...Since ’self’
means to us mainly our present self, it is
almost unavoidable that, when we think of our
self at another position in time, we should
mean our present self at that position; and
this seems to me to be actually the case."^
Here he recognizes both self-consciousness and the role of
conscious activity in determining the unity of consciousness,
end thus approximates a satisfactory theory of consciousness.
Later, however, he is far less certain of the existence
of a unitary conscious principle, though he still insists on
the role of the self in supplying unity in knowledge. He is
doubtful of the existence of the "mind itself."
^Proc. Arist. Soc.
, 2(l902)
,
p. 206.
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”I am in fact much more sure that there
are such things as my mental acts, than that
there is any entity distinct from these, which
could be called my mind."
I
Consciousness is a relation between objective entities, but
Hume fails to account for the relation which makes a mental
act mine.
"I think, therefore, there is something to
be said for the view that 1 am an entity, dis-
tinct from every one of my mental acts and from
all of them put together; an entity .which is
that which is conscious when I am conscious."
This entity may be "some part of my body."!
In spite of his professed analytic rigor he toys with hylozoism
"matter may be capable of being conscious."^ Taken literally
this is an obviously vicious circle. !_ am a part of my body.
But it reveals lloore^s lack of conviction on psychological prob
lems. Either a soul psychology or extreme behaviorism are pos-
sible according to his view. My consciousness may or may not
be private to me.^
Still later, Moore^s conception of consciousness undergoes
a further modification, anticipated in the essay on "The Status
of Sense Data
,
and stated more explicitly in "The Character
of Cognitive Acts." The role of a unique core cious principle,
I, in knowledge is denied. "I directly apprehend A" is a syno-
nym for "A direct apprehension of A occurs in my mind," where
Tay mind" is "something more complex in which, besides direct
y apprehension, so'me other quite different relation is involved."
^"The Subject Matter of Psychologv," Proc. Ai-ist. Soc.,
10(1910)
,
p. 51-54.
f^Ibid . , p. 54.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 43, 44; Phil . 3t .
,
p. 53.
^Phil. St
.
,
p. 175.
^Loc. cit..
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“I am willing to admit that the relation
in question may possibly be one which consist'^
in their both (sense-datum and physical thing)
being related in a certain way to a third en-
tity, v/hich is what I am now calling *1* when
I say that I am seeing this; though it seems
to me possi’B’le that what I call is nothing
other than the event which consists in the re-
lation holding between them, on the lines of
James’s view that the present thought is the
only thinker.
Moore’s thought may thus be seen to shift from the soul con-
cept to the relational view of consciousness vtfith a behavior-
istic foundation, with the added recognition, hard to recon-
cile with this latter view, that mental activity comes to
occupy a role of increasing importance in his later system.^
Perry’s thought, on the other hand, is more consistently
behavioristic and critical of the interpretation of conscious-
ness as in any sense substantial or self-sufficient. In his
epoch making essay on "Poes Consciousness Exist?” Jam.es already
recognizes him as "frankly over the border"- of denying consci-
ousness.^ In the same year Perry had attacked the idealistic
conception of mind on a double front in his paper on "Con-
ceptions and Misconceptions of Consciousness" and his attack
of >'/ard. Psychological talk about a self and of conscious
activity is due "to the present m.ethodological cross-purpos-
iveness of that science," since "presentation is adequate to
account for (say) 9/10 of the facts, or better, perhaps, for
9/10 of each fact."^
^Proc. Arist-, ^oc
. , 21(1921), p. 139; Cont. Brit . Phil . ,
ii
,
p, 210-212.
^"Some Judgments of Perception," (1919), Phil
«
iP . 220-253,
Sjour. Phil ., 1(1904), p. 477.
^Ibid.
,
p. 351.
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I
”The term consciousness has reference to rel-
ativity end exclusion within a world of reals,
and therefore cannot signify a principle con-
stitutive of that world itself."!
Perry’s rejection of self-consciousness is on two grounds
— empirical and rational. Empirically he defies the self-psy-
chologist to discover in introspection any basis for belief in
a unitary self. There is evidence, he maintains, only for bod-
ily action.^ Rationally, the concept of self-consciousness
itself cannot be a terminus for analysis but leads dialectically
to "a thing not constituted by that thought," but "prior both
temporally and logically to the conception of subjectivity."^
Since both experience and reason lead beyond conscious-
ness to something behind it, Perry’s way to behaviorism is
clear. His concept of consciousness appears in clearest form
in the Present Philosophical Tendencies , where (1) consciousness
is a relation selected and relative between objective content,
(2) conscious activity is a property or function of the physi-
ological organism, (3) mind consists principally of interested
behavior (interest being thought of as impersonal and biologi-
cal), (4) mind thus becomes "behavior, or conduct, together with
the objects which these employ and isolate.""^
The attack on Perry’s analysis must be on an empirical
basis. T'here is, not in introspection, but in the e25)erience
of objective reality (physical or logical) an element disre-
^Psych. Rev
.
,
11(1904)
,
p, 295.
^P.P.T.
,
p7 282-285.
^Psych. Rev
. , 11(1904), loc. cit.
^P.P.T
. , p. 303., 298, 300, 303.
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garded by Ferry as by Hume, for v/hich neither the relational
theory nor behaviorism can account. It is the experienced
fact of unity and continuity, the ”1” and "my" which Ferry
constantly uses but never defines
,
having succeeded in analyz-
ing it away. This unity exists experience, and can be ex-
plained neither by a soul nor by a nervous system which pos-
sesses only a plurality of functions. Unfortunately idegl ists
themselves have sometimes neglected this aspect of experience
and given realists an occasion of rejoicing, as the examples
of Bradley and McTaggart
,
already cited, and that of Natorp,
quoted by both Jarnes^ end Ferry^ show. Analysis, making the
initial distinction between mind and content, here leads real-
ists and idealists astray; consciousness apart from its con-
tent is not experienced, but consciousness as constituting its
object is experienced as unity— a whole which is greater than
its parts. As E. H. Hollands puts it, "the question is not,
of course, Oan we distinguish between consciousness and its
objects? but. Is consciousness real apart from any objects?"^
If this is answered in the negative, the relational theory of
’.Toodbridge and Ferry is only one solution; the more complete
solution is that the structural, personal meaning of objects
constituting this "unique" but undefined meaning, is conscious
ness and is ultimate.
Ferry, like Moore, is led to surrender the privacy of
consciousness— a surrender made necessary by the theory of
yVF.T
.
, p
^Phil. Rev
^^70
• > 1(1904), p. 478.
17(1908)
,
p. 512.
1’ tSi^
J
r If iliiiiiv
,
nc!i|{’’ \cf .
'.
.
'.
i
'
[
'
<'
.'
•'V'i?
'
,
; V; .’
ft«« ®X*. ‘ic
^
1 ft
V'
IC
itJ; n£f*ifei5
,
TwVva #i/tl
,
iaaa TlJ^rraVa^f
.
/> *
I (
•
‘
,
r*-
’»
-•
gtf :ii^o pf aix9 \;,^t -v'yigT .v»t<>«
-«0II a v4 *iQa Ajr'OiV i)&j3is rc “V
'"i^\ '.'a'": • '»•''« ' •
'
''‘- '
'
,'
'
'' ""
*D4j« i,u-<'!ii5.*, 'fid' rb»ije« £! ili ttefpiiJhSn ?^e«/'J«sK>i^ *Vaii' K#vIej;#9/lJ
™*
' > i“ ’ ' ' '
.
' >* ' >
'
•*
’
,
'.*! "Xf/
’ »b^*ajQic& ',«ii.! «£* ^xolairon.o j'te 9CiiIiaV'y ban
' '
.
'
!
’
'
‘ '
'
’
'
: :
*'
• t 1'*
’
- .•'
*“
,
t
-^o j^rf? brup, X9
ecs ^p.lF.\X:e.r>^ . ^t*XTt> t 2Kfbc ^4
a
; : ,
;
'
’,
*'
_
b"; >*: fms .ne&*C-f fict^or
f
js ' ' Cef? Zi^i ; .‘ti
?V •i
> .
-,
.-
. tfi-j •
• -
^
/»-
-qt.n j.Tsb'r'! Jra'.:ss fl>^ff^;‘i>ioa'i<?c ;'^a*a'3'a» aJ
V - '
•
'
’V>-
'
'
sri ^rUJjJ’j'i/etroo isj? .'fi^'vns./aioe^oo
-AA-jF'?li ' “' '" .
'
''i, Y*
>•'•
'
'
'.*.
''
i^' . t ••''' .
^
• j , . ., 1' * **
'
;;_, y it>*io. -ittin ePr uf^O ,'5a^wV 'Ic, :,"^
i*f.' .., •
,
- ,
'
•
'
'
'
*
.-
,"
t
srijg
-Veijb^i \.A
.
Ph"’ ^ » V-. ' ..- ,,'• ’. 4*^
^^^bafv^1 a^*; fe099V»ftfi ei ^ii,';fi ' 1 V^U-civ .’Idti djft.l
ft < ‘M>' «^ro' yXi!0 t f
V Iei:t/ir.rg‘*i>-«'^d;l3 d-:?4J ei v«Q'i
iil' .; -RVoiorv/zcs^.'^jC,, sXrpi'W' .
r*’r, ..BSISmS •- .'!: .•' vi- ..; >i'-. J^pro
^
*
‘J
’
'
* / : -:. v^ V-
4uXa^^
' vv<
-Tv^]
fr4* 5;%*- ’IfcV- •*l^.6i>iBj5.^tdl'' gif'! -ftlfl. '4l e
'/^.%^^l'’*i V ».*
.
, i "Ji * /• ^ *
f -2W'-!p‘«v'50' ^ v;tv. id viB^bvtr\' ptts.t. ijV — a ’i
sae A:s0a:.i,^-:,|a^
. ft#» . g, , (huHjif .
:-•> ' / s i'SVi .A'w.'*,
.% . ,-. TTf3^
^
-u I,
6am l/‘ %
408
epistemological monism if it be taken seriously. Whereas
Moore adduced at least one positive argument— the fact that
Morton Prince’s Sally knew directly the mental acts of Bj
Perry’s lengthy arguments are purely negative and prove only
the lack of evidence for "The Hiddenness of Mind," and the
possibility of the opposite view.^
Purpose
,
as well as self-consciousness, is to be explained
biologically and mechanically, though it rests on some type of
"higher propensity" of the organism to put forth effort until
successful. This necessitates the redefinition of "determina-
tion," "conation," "attitude," and "idea" in biological terms,
and therefore in what can only be a Pickwickian and apriori
sense. Perry insists that "we must construct our account of
the higher purposive processes of man," upon the same model as
ri
that by which a dog pursues a rabbit. Purpose is merely
"tentative activity" and thought is one expression of it.'^
The ease with which Perry’s psychology can be personalized,
and the simplicity and freedom from ambiguity v/hich an emphasis
upon purpose, idea, conation, as conscious processes would add
to his system, have been frequently pointed out. Moore is con-
sistent in rejecting freedom; Perry’s behaviorism is inconsist-
ent with his emphasis on freedom in his valuational teaching.
Iproc. Arist. Soc., 1(1910), p. 43.
^Jour. Phri
. , 6(1909) , p. 29-36, 113-122, 169-175.
^^'Docilitjr and Purpose',’ Psych. Rev
. , 25(1918}, p. 16, 17, 19.
"^"The Cognitive Interest and its Refinements," .Tour, phil j,
18(1921), p. 365; cf. also p. 104-105.
Sp.P.T.
,
p. 343; cf. Brightman, H. 3.,
Studies in Philosophy and Theology
, p. 57.
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Miss Galkins charges him directly with personalism.
"Perry holds explicitly or implicitly;- a
psychological conception of interest, or valuing,
as conscious experience. The conception of psy-
chology at the basis of this doctrine differs
even more radically from the merely biological
theory which ignores or denies consciousness than
from the strictly, or narrowly, personalist ic
conception which attributes consciousness to
selves as distinguished from conscious organisms."^
And there are evidences in Perry himself, that his be-
haviorism must be modified into personalism to be consistent.
As early as the "Realistic Theory of Independence" he speaks
of a "subject of consciousness," itself at least implicitly
p
conscious but nowhere distinguished from consciousness.'^ The
bare relational account of sensory cognition becomes extended
into a pragmatic account; it assumes a "tetradic structure"
dominated by "preparatory sensing" or "cogniting" or by future
3
experience. The dynamic account of consciousness has super-
seded the abstract relational one. Kis use of James’s descrip-
tion of selection as a distinguishing feature of consciousness
may be noted, ^ In the mood of relaxing rigor marking the
Present Conflict of Ideals he holds that "Realism . . . recogni-
zes the distinctness of consciousness while at the same time
admitting it into the natural world as a genuine dynamic agent.
At the same time he openly advocates a dynamic view of consci-
ousness itself, and, in the essay on "Peace without Victory in
^Jour. Phil
. . 24(1927), p. 581.
^The New Reali sm, p. 140 et al.
3:1
. T .V
. , p. “325-328
.
^'Ibid.
, p. 209-212.
3p.C.I
.
,
p. 379.
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Philosophy," ten years later, he professes behaviorism in a
’distinctly psychological” as opposed to a "biological sense,”
Mind is now a "mode" of operation "consisting of integral ac-
tivities such as perception, will, and speculative thought."!
The uncertain realm of subjectivity already proposed in 1912
has thus grown in clarity and significance as the objects of
human purpose have assumed an increasing ideational and general-
ized character.^ Finally, in the concluding discussion of his
treatise on value— "The Highest Good"
—
personality, not merely
biological, but built upon higher value expe rience
,
becomes a
concept all the more indispensable for man because it is in-
applicable to God— the highest good is a system of all-commen-
surable values under the moral control "of all persons, by all
a
persons, for all persons.
Our psychological analysis, though incomplete, has shown
that while Moore is not at all clear on the problem of con-
sciousness but is capable of being completed in three directions,
behaviorism, soul psychology, and self -psychology. Perry’s
behaviorism exists only by virtue of assigning mental functions
to physiological processes, and is supplemented by more or less
personelistic conceptions when higher values are beiUfg discussed.
The motive of both, and of behaviorism in general, is to be
found in the supposed obscurity of consciousness, and with the
abandonment of the abstract distinction between mental act and
object, both find a natural completion in a theory of active and
^Jour. Phil. St .. 3(1928), p. 306, 311.
^Psych. Rev
. , 25(1918), p. 7.
^G.T.V.
,
p. 685-586.
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unified self-consciousness. Perry’s pragmatism opens the way.
Define purpose and interest, not biologically but in terms of
consciousness, and the charge has been made. This need not
obscure the close dependence of consciousness on the physiologi-
cal system and other aspects of the physical world. Here again
it corrects Moore, the psycho-physical parallelist, by a theory
of interactlcnism
,
resting on a dynamic interpretation of reality,
and explains error and relativity by recognizing knov/ledge
,
not
as biological selectivity, but as conscious selectivity and
relationing activity conditioned by the limitations both of
physiological and physical conditions, and of the mind itself.
6. The Theory of Value . "Philosophers,” says A. E. Taylor
in a well known criticism of logical realism,
"are certainly tending, though not without ex-
ception, to range themselves into two camps.
Those to v/hom the business of philosophy seems
to consist mainly, if not exclusively, in pro-
viding a logical basis and a methodology for
exact science appear to be identifying them-
selves with the doctrine of logical pluralism
and taking up a definitely atheistic attitude
which involves the denial of the objectivity
of the judgments of value; those, on the other
hand, who are convinced that the business of
philosophy is to make life, as well as science,
intelligible
,
and consequently find themselves
obliged to maintain the validity of these cate-
gories of worth apart from which life v/ould have
no significance, are, in the main, declared
theists . "1
The formula is significant for indicating the fundarn.ental
breach between idealistic and realistic value theory. But it
does not do justice to the complexity of realistic theories of
value, not all of v<rhich are subjective. The theories of value
^Op. cit
. ,
xii, p. 284,
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advanced by the two subjects of the present chapter are repre-
sentative of a v/ide divergence among realists, one group hold-
ing to the subjectivity of the conditions v/hich determine values,
the other to the not merely objective, but intrinsic, though not
unitary, value structure of the world. It is the thesis of
this section that a personalistic theory of value defining the
good normative ly in terms of a personal ideal, but believing
in the objective validity of that ideal, is the synthesis be-
tween these conflicting theories, represented on the one hand
by Perry, on the other by Moore.
The starting point of realistic value theory, and of the
division mentioned may be taken in Plato, whose doctrine of
ideas, with its heirarchical
,
monistic element discarded, pro-
vides the rationalistic foundation of realism’s "logical plural-
ism." For Plato conceptual analysis reveals the logical struc-
ture of reality (the ideas), and at the sane time its beauty
and goodness . The goodness of the v/orld.is an objective pro-
perty of the synoptic whole, and of lesser individuations be-
cause they "participate in" the whole. To this Platonic view-
point, Moore in essence adheres. Value is a structural pro-
perty of wholes, though not of the whole. Value or good is,
moreover, not real; and a judgment of value, though it is a
judgment concerning the objective world, is not an existential
judgment. Value is a "simple and indefinable" property of
things, "a simple notion, just as ’yellow’ is a simple notion."!
Certain difficulties are at once apparent in Moore’s conception,
^Princ . kth ., p. 7-10, 122-124; cf. Phil. St . , p. 272-275.
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and lead him to make some difficult distinctions. Since all
ao not experience the beauty of the same physical object, he
is forced to conclude that
"though both ’yellow’ and ’beautiful’ are pre-
dicates which depend only on the intrinsic
nature of what possesses them, yet while yel-
lowness is itself an intrinsic predicate,
beauty is not,"l
Moreover, "any great good must be mental " and "a purely mater-
ial existence, by itself
,
can have little or no value . The
definition of the ideal or highest good is impossible save on
mental terms. That his theory of value forces him to the
recognition that some relations are internal we have already
seen.
Perry, on the other hand, dissects the Platonic doctrine
of ideas and holds to the objectivity of logical and mathe-
matical relations while assigning values to the dubious realm
of "subjectivity" which has so perilous a status in his modi-
fied behaviorism.^ Value is not the intuition of an intrinsic
property of objective reality; it is a "function of desire,"
—
"any object of any interest," where interest is an "all-per-
vasive characteristic of the motor-affective life, this state
,
act
,
attitude
,
or disposition of favor or disfavor . Value
is thus determined entirely by subjective, that is to say, bio-
^Phil. St
. ,
p. 272.
/ ^Princ .~~2th
.
,
p. 206.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 224,
^The New Realism, p. 129-130, 140-142.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 140; G.T.V .
,
p. 115-117; cf . Jour. Phil . , 6(1909),
p. 175; "I use the term interest primarily in its biological
rather than in its psychological sense. Certain natural proces-
ses act consistently in such wise as to isolate, protect, and
renew themselves."
.'zn . .1 1 .j
* * bttc '
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logical purposes, a. This definition involves Perry in a dif-
ficulty which Moore’s theory avoids— that of psychological (or
biological) relativism. He escapes it by distinguishing the
innocuous relativism of value theory which has an intrinsic
basis in that the independent object is an element in the
interest-relation, from the harmful relativism of idealism.
But a more serious problem arises, for both Moore and Perry,
in the need of a normative conception of value if the sense
of moral obligation is to be validated. Both are ultimately
involved in a purely descriptive ethics— the ethical problem
is complete when values are described.
"Our ’duty’ ... can only be defined as
that action which v/ill cause more good to
exist in the Universe than any possible al-
ternative." "'Me give the name of ’duty’ to
actions which generally produce better total
results in the near future than any possible
alternative."!
Perry’s conception of moral obligation is even more intellec-
tualistic; duty is "the conviction of moral truth, the en-
lightened recognition of the good," it is also "the control
of particular actions by a full recognition of their conse-
quences."^ In Moore because of his rationalism, for which
volition and feeling are but instances of cognition, and in
Perry because of his behaviorism, voluntarism is lost in in-
tellectualism on the one hand end, in the case of Perry, bio-
logical hedonism on the other. Yet, strangely in the face of
his behaviorism. Perry definitely asserts that moral obliga-
!princ. £th
. , p. 148, 181.
^The Moral Economy
,
p. 40, see also his criticism
of Urban in G. T. V
.
,
p. 77-80.
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tion is a function of consciousness.
"The assertion that one ought to do what -
ever one feels that one oup,ht to do is equiva-
lent to the assertion that the obligatory act
is any act provided only that it be felt about
by the agent himself in a certain specific man-
ner.
Moore does stress the need of a gradation of values, and Perry
suggests the "principles” by which the gradation is to be car-
ried out
—
correctness
,
intensity
,
preference
,
and inclusiveness .
^
But the agent is always the motor organism, with its interests
and purposes and their cognitive aspects.
b. But if the theories of value of Moore and Perry make it
impossible for then to do justice to the validity of moral ob-
ligation, their efforts to define the "Ideal" or the "highest
good" show more clearly still the direction in which their the-
ories need supplementing.^ i"^oore admits that the ideal good,
"the greatest possible balance of intrinsic value, which it is
always our duty to produce," must contain consciousness of it,
and an emotional element.^ Perry is explicit in defining it as
"a personal integration that shall be socially qualified," and
the concept of interest is broadened to include love or benev-
olence. The interest of the organism has become the "all in-
clusive and harmonious system of interests" of the personal
will.^ From this point of viev/. Perry may be regarded as having
lint. Jour, -^th .. 21(1911), p. 287.
^g.T.Y
.
,
p. 611-658. It is noteworthy that he here de-
fines evil
,
not as positive, as in the P.P.T .
,
but in terms of
value ^in polar relation" to the good. Ibi d.
,
p. 619, This
resembles the absolutistic conception.
^Princ. Bth
. ,
ch. VI; O.T.V.
,
ch. 22.
^Ibid.
,
p. 224.
5g.T.V
.
,
p. 676
,
659.
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made a valuable contribution to axiology in stressing the
genetic approach to value, but falling short in failing to
^
recognize the unique role of consciousness, and the reasonable
will in the determination of human values, and defining the
nonaative nature of ethics. His definition of the supreme
good, (a concept avoided by Moore)
,
is distinctly personalis-
tic. His axiology really falls into two parts, a naturalistic
theory of the type Moore criticizes, and a norraative personal-
istic theory of the type Moore refuses to set up, but lacking
an objective ontological basis,
c. In one respect, however, both are agreed. Yalue theory
is not to draw for its support upon an idealistic metaphysics.
Both are pluralists on the question of good and evil.^ Yalue
is subjective but may be objectified for Perry; "what is
indifferent will acquire value"; it is objective in a material
environment for Moore; in either case the greater good is ideal
only, not real. Yet, it is hard for realism to be consistent
on this point. Koore preserves his theory to the end, but
Perry, as his behaviorism shades into personalism, also passes
from meliorism to optimism. <V]aat is the nature of a world in
which "intrinsic value" or "a personal ideal" may be real^ized?
From the "reluctant cosmos" of The Moral Fconomy (p. 14), Perry
advances, in opposition to Russell, to the belief "that the
good is both objectively real end actually operative,"^
^Princ . Eth .
, p. 223; P.P. T. , p. 338-, 344,
P. T.
, p. 344,
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"If ideals work
,
if consciousness, instead
of creating the raere toys and play things of
the imagination, does actually make things goofl;
then renunciation is as fatuous and unreasonable
as it is gratuitous."!
Ilis ambiguity on the nature of God shows his uncertainty as to
the metaphysical basis of his value theory. In The Present
Conflict of Ideals he seems to confess himself a theist;^ in
his remaining works God tends J;o become an ideal or program,
similar to S. Alexander's notion of deity.
^
From these considerations the needs of the realistic theory
of value become apparent. Moore, in spite of his theory of
intrinsicality
,
feels the need of making values dependent on
consciousness, Perry, in spite of his biological relativism,
demands a ground for optimism in the world order. Both are
prevented from the idealistic synthesis by the very element in
their thought which demands idealistic completion; the ideality
of value prevents them from recognizing its reality, but moral-
life resting on the ideality of values demands an ontological
basis, an assurance from the universe, that ideal values may be
realized and are significant. Absolute idealism tends to sac-
rifice ideality to reality; theistic personalism, however, with
its many fields of experience, only one of which is normative,
V
can assert the reality of values without sacrificing the ideal
H and normative element in value experience.
The discussion of the present chapter has covered a wide
territory in its attempt to reveal the openings for idealism
!p.P.T
.
,
p. 346.
^P.cVl
.
,
p. 379.
^Ap. to Phil
.
,
p. 80; G.T.V .
,
p. 686, footnote; Gont, Am .
PMl.
,
ii, p. 208; see above, ch. VIII,
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resulting from the incompleteness and conflicts in realistic
analysis. Realism is most consistent when interpreted posi-
^ tivistically (a) in its theories of reality, (h) its theories
of consciousness, (c) in its theories of value. Personal
idealism can supply it with an empirical principle of indi-
viduality and substance, it can put living flesh on the dry
bones of its logic, whether relational or attributive', it can
supply its ethics with a vital ideal and a normative function.
The positive empirical evidence, moreover, for the validity of
religious values, which both Moore and Perry abhor, coupled with
the essentially personal nature of the objective moral ideal,
constitute a positive argument not merely for personalism but
for theism. The type of idealism which is here advocated dif-
fers, then, from the types against which Moore’s and Perry’s
criticisms are primarily directed in that it is neither sub-
jective nor absolute, avoids panlogism by an emphasis on the
empirical concept of personality, and finds in consciousness
the resolution of the antinomy between the one and the many,
the defense of empirical individuality in the face of analysis,
and the common sense conviction that the validity of value ex-
perience must rest on its objective reality. The realistic so-
lutions are not sufficiently empirical and, in every case, end
I in an abstraction; — reality as unknovm matter or logical sub-
stratum, consciousness as external relation or physiological
function, sp ace and time as universal and particuler, semse data
as real yet phenomenal, individuality as unexperienced, and
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value as unreal and unvalued, the oup;ht in a world which
is static and logical, these and other abstract concepts
of realism, though the analysis underlying them is of per-
manent value, demand empirical completion if life is real
and experience is meaningful.

fPART IV
CONCLUSIONS AND SUMARY

CONCLUSIONS AND SUmiARY
It is the main-conclusionof the present study
that personal, theistic idealism may survive the realistic
criticism of idealism in the writings of G, E, Moore and R,
B, Perry, since that criticism is directed chiefly, though
not exclusively at other idealistic types, since it rests on
methodological and ontological presuppositions that are either
incomplete or false, since it interprets the idealistic
arguments too narrowly and aprioristically, and since realis-
tic systems based upon it themselves face the dilemma
,
as
they abandon positivism, of becoming materialism or ideal-
ism. This thesis has four aspects which have been devel-
oped together,
1. The general criticism of Moore and Perry is valid
only against those idealistic systems which are monistic,
panlcgistic, and mentalistic. It is not, in general valid
against non-mentalistic systems ( though these are essential-
ly realistic) or pluralistic systems which avoid intellect-
ualism. Perry’s criticism, more comprehensive than Moore's,
includes pluralistic systems as v/ell, but loses in analytic
rigor as it gains inclusiveness,
2, Tbe criticism is inadequate since it attempts to
reduce all forms of idealism to a single cardinal principle
Y/hich is, in reality, only secondary and of limited sig-
nificance for many forms.
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3 •The difficulties and unresolved dualisms in the
neo-realistic epistemology and ontology, properlj^ understood,
are capable of being transcended in an idealistic system,
4, The realistic criticism is of value in forcing ideal-
ism to reexamine its foundations, to recognize more clearly
the limitations of speculative methods, and to develop more
fullj;- the particular contributions which it is preeminently
fitted to make to certain fields of human interest.
In the development of these propositions, the following
more detailed conclusions have served as -significant consi-
derations,
5, ITo historic form of realism, including its contempo-
rary appearances, has succeeded coherently in escaping, in one
form or other, the subjectivism or phenomenalism with which
the idealistic epistemology begins,
6.
The development of Moore *s thought from Plato through
Ka.nt to Reid reveals the dialectic which drives rationalistic
realism, through nominalistic materialism, to phenomenalism -
a dialectic which can have only two consequences, the uncri-
tical dualism of Locke or the idealistic denial of matter,
7,
Perry’s thought, on the other hand, a development
of traditional empiricism|^ is essentially positivistic, but
is involved in unresolved dualisms through the demands of value
theory and a psychology of action,
8’, Both Moore and Perry escape idealistic consequences
by dogmatic affirmations which are empirically ungrounded.
In Moore’s case this takes the form of intuitions, in Perrjz-’s
of the ambiguous use of terms in a double sense.
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9, Coumion sense is not a criterion of truth; the
term is amhiguous and relative, and a"common sense" philo-
sophy such as Moore defends ultimately surrenders all cri-
teria whatsoever,
10, The methods of Moore, the intuiticnalist, and
Perry, the empiricist, are in essential agreement, their
critical method being that of analysis, their speculative
method tending towards dogmatism. The empiricism of
both, whether the analytic and sensationalistic tendency
of Perry, or the intuitionalism of Moore is half-hearted
and external, principally because of their conception of
logic and their failure to take consciousness seriously,
11, With other adherents of the relational logic
they err in interpreting a merely preliminary and critical
method - analysis - as the ultimate speculative method,
which it can never become. Analysis itself must be subject
to some further criterion, rational rather than empirical,
12, Realism* s ultimate lack of a criterion of truth
can be remedied only, as Moore is inclined to remedy it
explicitly, and Perry in practice, by assuming the truth
of the coherence criterion and its implications as to the
nature of the v^orld,
13, The realists do not judge idealism bj^ the same
methodological standards v/hich they use in the development
of their own thought. The realistic criticism of the cardi-
nal principle demands a rigor and certainty of demonstration

424
on the part of idealism which no speculative system can
claim. The result is a tendency (a) to neglect the cu-
mulative effect of idealism’s arguments, restricting the
criticism to epistemological and logical considerations
alone, and (h) to neglect the empirical arguments for
idealism entirely for an aprioristic and rationalistic
restatement of its argument as realism seeks to refute it.
The latter tendency is stronger in Moore than in Perry,
14!, Both Moore and Perry confuse the cardinal
principle that esse is nercini in two ways, (a) as an ar-
gument for idealism and the conclusion of idealism, (h) as
making reality dependent upon the finite consciousness or
upon a universal consciousness. As an argument for idealism
the cardinal principle is of only limited scope and signifi-
cance, and does not apply to all esse .
15, As the conclusion of idealism the cardinal
principle is not to he regarded as analytic and apriori
in the sense defined h3^ Moore, To do so is to judge con-
temporary speculation hy eighteenth century logical ideal^;
The principle of idealism is to he regarded as a universal
hypothesis which gives order and meaning to experience, and
is therefore ( prohahl^O true. Thus it claims apriority
in the sense of universality, not in the sense of self-evidence.
It is admittedly synthetic,
16, Idealism may therefore escape the dilemma of
subjectivism in the sense of solipsism or skepticism, since for
most forms of idealism the cardinal principle is secondary
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to the fundamental intuition that we knov/ reality inde-
pendent of our minds* The only alternative to imiaediate
knowledge of independent reality is not the impossibility
of all knowledge. Consciousness may mediate knov/ledge of
the independent order,
17, Idealism may v/ell admit the charge of subjectivism
in its broader, universalistic sense. In this sense sub-
jectivism is not inconsistent v/ith the doctrine of indepen-
dence as it is held by all idealists who are not solipsists,
18, The knowledge of other selves, imless it is re-
garded as direct and intuitive, does imply, as Moore insists,
the objective existence of the objects of our perceptions,
but it does not imply that we must perceive them directly,
nor that their reality is exhausted by what we know of them,
19, The ego-centric predicament is not a mere methodo-
logical difficulty, and can be classed as one only by those
who overlook its universality and neglect to examine the
positive evidence in favor of its significance - the facts
of relativity and the creative activity of mind. The only-
escape from the predicament is by a dogmatic and empirically
unattested assiimption,
20,
It is therefore no refutation of the argument from
the ego-centric predicament to hold, as Moore does, that it
rests on the principle of contradiction alone, or as does
Perry, that it rests on the exclusive use of the method of
agreement and the fallacy of exclusive particularity, Mo more
certain criterion than possibility and rationality can be found
for speculative thought.
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21, The principle of the internal! ty of relations is
amhiguous. It need not mean, as Moore holds, that the
Bt, part has the properties of the whole, hut only that being
is conditioned hy its logical relations to the whole,
22, The question of the internality or externality of
relations in its general foim is an abstract problem. To
regard it as ultimate is to reduce reality to logic, a re-
duction which the empiricist and nominalist will avoid.
The answer to it depends on the level of logic on which
the thinker places himself, but all logic is an abstraction
from reality. The universe may be a unity of relations
and yet not determined.
23, Personal idealism agrees with pragmatism and Moore
that some relations are external and some internal, but finds
the principle of internality, not in material substance, but
in consciousness. The universe of meaning and value may
be organic and contingent, and yet be determined by and sub-
ject to change by the plurality of minds upon whom meaning
and value depend.
24', In criticizing Berkeley Moore and Perry are unjust
in separating his phenomenalism from his spiritualism and
then concluding them to be contradictory. Perry is also
unfair in interpreting Berkeley as a mystic. Both neglect
his positive arguments from the relativity of sense data,
and the rational activity of the mind.
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25, Any idealism which distinguishes the finite
person and his experience from the objective ground of
reality cannot be charged with the fallacy of exclusive
particularity,
26, The charges of dogmatism ( or "initial predi-
cation"), equivocation, and formalism against idealism
in general arise from certain prepossessions of Moore and
Perry, chiefly their demand that idealism conform to an
impossible ideal of rigor and their devotion to analysis.
Idealists have been guilty of unjustifiable dogmatism,
but in general idealism has succeeded better than realism
in justifying its hypotheses,
27, The charge of formalism is valid against all in-
tellectualistic idealism which, like the realistic panlo-
gists, overlooks the dynamic nature of reality, but, unlike
them, insists on monism,
28, The charge of equivocation rests upon the idealis-
tic argument from the analogy of human consciousness, an
argument which is valid in so far as the points of agree-
ment are significant.
30, The idealistic interpretation of Kant is closed
to both Hoore and Perry because both restrict their attention
to the Kant of 1781, since their interest is primarily
logical. Perry’s naturalism and Moore's determinism making
Kant's further thought impossible for them.
31, Both interpret Kant*s doctrine of freedom as
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essentially deterministic, Moore assenting and Perry dis-
senting in the interest of the behavioristic completion
of his system.
32. Moore *s and Perry’s rejection of the Kantian
principle of the creative activity of consciousness as
formalism need not be regarded as ultimate, as the logical
structure of sense experience has not been explained
satisfactorily on any other basis save dogmatic intuition-
alism, while self-ccnscicusness provides an empirical
basis for reconciling reason and will,
33. The categorial structure of reality cannot be
deduced from consciousness as empirically given. But the
antinomies which arise in the logical analysis of the
experienced order, ultimate for neo-realism, can be re-
solved by referring them to conscious activity after the
analogy of, but not subject to certain limitations cf,
infinite consciousness,
34, The rejection of the principle of self-con-
sciousness by both Moore and Perry, the former because
he neglects empirical evidence for it, the latter because
he denies there is any, is a result, in both cases, of
dependence on the ultimate results of analysis. Both
fail, in their turn, to account for the experienced unity
of consciousness,
35, The realistic argument against absolute ideal-
ism is valid, not against its idealism, but against its
panlogistic monism and its determinism, a tendency which is
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strengthened as it surrenders the concept of consciousness
as the hasis, resting on analogy with experience, of unity,
contingency, and purpose,
36, The dualism "between voluntarism and intellectual-
ism upon which, according to Perry, both monistic and
pluralistic idealism shatter, cannot be resolved either
intellectualistically, as Moore solves it, or naturalis-
tically, as Perry solves it, without a surrender of empiri-
cism. It is resolved empirically in conscious activity,
37, Historical systems of personal idealism have
ranged between the extremes of subjectivism and absolutism,
but a particular system need not be in unstable equilib-
rium if it succeeds in defending the autonomy/ of the indi-
vidual consciousness and its activity in constituting pri-
vate experience,
38, Personal idealism may solve its crucial problem,
finding the basis of the universal elements in experience
in a conscious activity v/hen the universalizing activity
is not itself experienced, in either of tv/o ways - the
solution of Malebranche and Hegel, which tends to episte-
mological monism and absolutism, or a solution closer to
that of Berkeley and Jeibniz, in which the categorial
activity is defined as ultimate in finite consciousness
itself and attributed to the simplest mental act, and which
is therefore epistemologically dualistic and pluralistic.
39,
The limited subjectivism with which some idealism
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"begins its argument and the ultimate objectivism of most
idealisms conflict only (i) if logical objectivity is
confused with ontological objectivity (the fault of pan-
logism) and (ii) if finite experience is not sharply
differentiated from the supreme conscious ground of real-
ity ( the fault of absolutism resting on epistemological
monism,
)
40. Perry’s attacks of the moral and social conse-
quences of idealism are directed at absolutism, not at
pluralistic forms, with whose ethical views he is in essen-
tial agreement but with which he disagrees in refusing to
ascribe an ontological significance to value experience,
41. The reality and unity of value, denied by both
Perry and Moore because of their identification of value
either with logical structure or biological interest, can
be justified on the grounds of the conscious experience of
value centered in an ideal of personality. In particular
the reality of value not yet humanly actualized is possible
on a theistic basis,
42,
The idealistic demand for a status of value in
reality and a metaphysical basis of value experience is
justified by the sharp breach in Perry’s thought between
descriptive and normative considerations, and in Moore’s
between the logic of reality and the logic of value,
43,
Personal idealism agrees with Perry in harmoniz-
ing the individualistic and social motives in morality, both
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deducible from Kant*s doctrine of freedora, in the moral
ideal,
44, The service which idealism renders to religion
need not make it unfair to the scientific account of the
world. Though idealism is not interested primarily in the
physical world it has sought, and must continue to do so,
not only to mark the limits of science hut also to pro-
perly evaluate its conclusions,
45. .Contemporary realism cannot make good its claim
as champion of science because of its shallow empiricism,
its exclusive devotion to a sterile logical method, its
failure to account for the differences among relations,
its neglect of the dynamic aspects of reality, and its refu-
sal to take seriously, as science has done, the bearing of
physiological considerations on knowledge,
46, The realistic epistemology as propounded by Moore
and Perry is not empirically grounded, but rests on "initial
predications" which derive their strength from a false di-
lemma - that between naive realism and skepticism. The
realists rest their case for "the independence of the imma-
nent" (or the immediately' given) on the same type of arguments
for which they criticize idealism,
47. The dispute between realism and objecti-ve idealism
centers, not on the general doctrine of independence, but on
(i) the nature of the independent, and (ii) the nature of
the immediate
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48. Perry and Moore are disagreed on the scope of
the doctrine of direct apijrehensicn and on the relation
of consciousness to its objects.
49» The realistic attempt to solve the fact of the
relativity of sense data, which leads Moore to a meaning-
less phenomenalism and Ferry to the self- contradictory
assertion that relativity is ultimate, fails adequately
to rec.ognizeo the common sense view of error, the scien-
tific demand for universality, the hearing of physiologi-
cal psychology for knowledge, and the experienced fact of
the activity of the mind in knowing.
50. The fact of error leads both Moore and Perry, the
former explicitly, the latter by combining biological
pragmatism and subjectivism, to surrender their epistemo-
logical monism in its original scope.
51. The realistic analysis of experience is best to be
interpreted as positivistic and capable of idealistic com-
pletion if its dogmatic presuppositions are rejected.
52. Both Moore and Perry admit that the notion of
reality or being must be meaningless or irrational if
separated from consciousness, though both try to retain
some neaning for it.
53. The realistic dilemma between universality and
particularity is left empirically unresolved, whether in-
dividuality is interpreted as conceptual, as in Perry’s
and Moore’s early thought, or substantialistically, as in
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Mocre’s later thought. It is capable of solution in har-
mony with the experience of individuality only on the
basis of conscious activity,
54. Moore’s conception of consciousness is unclear
and ambiguous; Perry's relational theory supplemented with
his behaviorism tends toward a personalistic emphasis in
his later writings, in so far as he recognizes (i) the sig-
nificance of essentially conscious ideas and activity, (ii)
the existence of a realm of pure subjectivity, (iii) the
reality of a "subject of consciousness
55. The abstractions in which the analyses of the
neo-realists end; an unknown or merely ' logical reality,
consciousness as external relation or physiological func-
tion, sense data as independently real but phenomenal, in-
dividuality unexperienced, value as unreal and unvalued,
and moral obligation superadded on a static world, demand
resolution in the concept of consciousness. Such a reso-
lution is possible if it is recognized that logic, though
its field may be the relational structure of reality as
experienced, is itself an abstraction from conscious relating
activity,
56. The criticism of Moore and Perry points to the
following tasks v/hich idealism must face to keep its world
view in harmony with contemporary thought,
a, A re-examination of its methods and charged in-
consistencies, v/ithout tying itself too narrowly to its
:"
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historical antecedents, and v/ithout claiming a certainty
to which it is not entitled.
h. A reconstruction of its account of knowledge
to make it clear that we do know reality independent of
us, and to draw more sharply the distinction between the
activity of the finite knower and his experience, and the
conscious ground of reality.
c. A concept of consciousness sufficient to account
for the categorial structure of experience without doing
violence to the experienced data.
d. A more complete assimilation and interpretation
of the positive conclusions of science. The outstanding
philosophies of science today are .realistic (though not
neo-realistic )
.
e. Particular attention to the fields of scientific
investigation for which it provides a sound speculative
basis and which are essential to its interest, among them
the valuational structure of experience ( a field in
which absolutistic thought has prevailed since Hegel) and
the psychology of personality, developed on constructive
lines in relation to the outstanding types of value,
SUlffl'iARY
In firing one of the opening guns for the
American attack, Fullerton announced that "idealism is the
weakness of acute minds, not of dull ones."l Thinkers have
1 A System of Hetaphysics
.
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been too much impressed hy its su'btlety rather than "by
its truth. The criticism of the neo-realists, though, as
our historical introduction has shown, it has "been largely
a reiteration of the old charge of su^bjectivism in "better
logical form, has had the 'beneficial effect of placing
idealism omce more cn the defensive, and forcing it to
state more clearly- and less dogmatically and equivocally,
its “basis in epistemology, logic, science and axiology.
The examples of laoore and Perr-3/ have shown that the attack
from rationalistic and empirical centers is largely the
same, hut that it presupposes realistic assumptions which
are themselves dogmatic and empirically unjustified. The
attack has centered, though hy no means exclusively, about
tv70 fronts - the subjectivistic approach to experience
which has served idealism in the past, and its organic logic.
He have concluded that some types of idealism are too in-
tellectualistic and deterministic to escape it - among them
all monistic forms, all forms that reduce reality and value
to logic, and all forms whose argument may impl3^ that reality
is exclusively ^ idea. In so far as Kocre and Perrj^
attack narrow subjectivism and absolutism, they are correct.
But the charge of subjectivism has been shown to be too in-
clusive, for not all systems that hold that certain aspects
of m3/ experience consist of their percipi by me, and that
all reality (except in so far as it includes my experience)
is the percipi of a supreme consciousness, involve narrov/
subjectivism or contradiction Personal, theistic idealism
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thus meets hoth objections by agreeing that some relations
are external, but insisting that logic is an abstraction .
from reality. Such idealism stands or falls v/ith its concept
of consciousness, which v/e have seen is capable of empirical
justification though its function of creative activity is
not itself directly experienced.
On the other hand, both the realists’ criticisms
and their positive theories lack a sincere empiricism. Only
a system which takes seriously the notion of self-conscious-
ness can supply that. Their criticism is excessively
aprioristic, neglecting some of idealism’s positive argu-
ments, and reconstructing others as extremists have formu-
lated them or as they wish to refute them. The criticism
of the motives of idealism is on the v/hole irrelevant to
refutation, while Perry’s optimism is in harmony v/ith the
practical implications of personal idealism, though the
intellectualistic interests of Itoore are not. Their
criticism of the practical implications of absolutism is on
the whole justified.
Positively, the development of Moore’s thought toward
phenomenalism, and the elasticity of Perry’s professed
behaviorism, show that as realism passes from criticism to
speculation it still faces a further alternative - material-
ism or idealism. History must repeat itself whenever naive
realism is reasserted, the positivist (Perry) surrendering
to unresolved dualisms and abstractions, the materialist
(Moore) surrendering to phenomenalism and skepticism, both
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finding a home for normative and obligatory experiences in
a universe defined only logicall3^ or as material substance.
Realists are thus unresolved dualists, and to this dualism
idealism offers itself, as it did to followers of Locke
and Kant, as the onl3^ world view that is at the same time
empiricall3^ grounded, coherent, and adequate to the demands
of our spiritual nature.
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